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CHRIST AND HUMANITY;

WITH

A REVIEW, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL,

OF THE

DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S PERSON.

By HENRY M. GOODWIN.



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TO
HORACE BUSHNELL,

MY REVERED FRIEND AND TEACHER, WHOSE PROFOUND AND SANCTIFIED GENIUS
HAS MADE THE WORLD HIS DEBTOR, AND WHOSE EMINENT SERVICES
TO CHRISTIANITY IN THE RECONCILIATION OF FAITH
AND REASON AWAIT THE VERDICT OF
THE FUTURE AGES,

THESE LATER STUDIES OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
ARE
FILIAALLY AND AFFECTIONATELY

Inscribed

BY

THE AUTHOR.

Now his coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout. They said, therefore, Let us not rend it.

John xix, 23.

P R E F A C E.

IF apology were necessary for the appearance of a new volume on so old a theme as the Person of Christ, it might be found in the fact that the old has become the new—as it will ever be the grand centre of regard and interest to all Christian minds. The thought of the Christian world is being turned, as never before, to this central Person of history, with the feeling that here, in this wonderful Life and Character, is contained the secret that will explain the riddle of the world, as well as the power that alone can cure its evils. The numberless Lives of Christ which are multiplying every year are a significant token of this revived interest in the greatest of all subjects. They are so many studies, or portraitures, of this one Character, each bringing out some new, or newly discovered, feature or lineament or aspect from the inexhaustible Gospel history. But these discoveries only make more urgent and emphatic the inquiry—Who and what is this wonderful Being that

so attracts and baffles the thought of the world?—who is so lowly, yet so majestic; whose words are so simple, yet so freighted with wisdom and authority; whose acts are so natural, yet so miraculous—in a word, who is so truly and intensely *human*, yet so manifestly *divine*? And this question is not answered by the history—at least the answer does not lie upon the surface—else there would not be so many and conflicting interpretations of His person.

Doubtless the secret of His person is practically disclosed to every true believer, as it was to Peter, by a divine revelation, or inward persuasion below the reach of the reasoning faculty to demonstrate or refute. But the intuitions of faith, while they never contradict, do not always satisfy the reason, or the world at large. Theology, after nearly eighteen centuries of trial, has not yet mastered the problem, as is evident from the fact that no theory or creed yet framed explains perfectly the facts and impressions of the historic life. The conception of Christ constructed by the logic of the schools is not coincident with that perfect and single image given in the Gospels, still less with that which lives in the heart, and constitutes the practical and unformulated faith of the Church.

The chief labor in the field of Christology hitherto has been expended in proving the *Divinity* of Christ, as an element by itself. And in this direction the work

has been somewhat overdone—not through an undue estimate of the importance of this doctrine, but through a false method of procedure. While the logical and Scriptural proofs have been unanswerable, the real *Humanity* of Christ has given way under them; and another and opposite school has arisen to defend this equally important truth. The result has been that Christ remains divided between the so-called Orthodox believer in His Divinity, and the Unitarian or Humanitarian dissenter—each contending for his own side or fraction of a Redeemer, which neither has yet been able to reconcile with the other.

The true method of proof for the Divinity of Christ is that which He himself gives in His self-revelation, viz., *through the medium of His Humanity*. Nowhere does Christ assert or demonstrate His own Divinity as a thing by itself—since it did not so exist—but only as *the distinction, or inmost essence, of His Humanity*; and which, as in other divine revelations, only anointed eyes can discern. “When ye have lifted up the *Son of Man*”—He says to the Jews—“then shall ye know that I am He.” When we have held up the *Humanity*, or human life of Christ, to the gaze of love and faith till its true meaning dawns upon us, we shall see and know that it is *Divine*.

The time has come for a new method and direction of theological and Christological inquiry; and the to-

kens are abundant that it has already begun. Christian thought is directed with new interest to the Humanity of Christ, with the conviction that He is *more* human, or more *truly* human, as well as more Divine, than other men; that Humanity is more truly represented in Him than in any other man, or in all men together. There is something in this Man that brings Him nearer to us, sinful though we be, than is explained by the supposition that He is only a man, or even man and God united. The commonly accepted theories of the Person of Christ remove Him further from us by making Him an anomalous being, whose humanity is supplemented by union with a Divine nature, or *hypostasis*, which we can not share or comprehend, and can only faintly and distantly follow. According to this conception, He is human only in a part of His nature, or, as the creeds declare, in only *one* of His natures, while in the other He is not human, but Divine. The peculiar power and truth of Christ's Humanity will not be reached till this anomalous division and composition of His person be abolished; till His Divinity be brought over to the side of His Humanity, or His Humanity be identified with His Divinity, and be considered, as it is, a *Divine* Humanity, not less but more human because it is divine.

It can not be denied that the image of Christ as commonly conceived, and as presented in most theological

symbols, is a confused or double image. He is conceived now as Divine, and now as human, or as both together in a kind of unity called one person, but which is really and practically a *duality*. Nothing else, indeed, is possible so long as the ancient creed or symbol is literally held of 'two natures in one person,' each retaining its own distinctive properties. None will question the importance of such a conception of Christ as shall bring these two aspects of His person into a real unity or *identity*, so as to give a single, distinct, and adequate—and, so to speak, a *stereoscopic*—image of the God-Man, without blur or confusion, and at the same time without detriment either to His Divinity or His Humanity. The author humbly but confidently believes that he has attained such a view, which he has endeavored to present and vindicate in this volume. In this view Christ is at once and eternally the Image of God and the Ideal of Humanity. The Incarnation is not a violation of His nature, but simply a descent from the 'form of God' to the form and limitations of a man, to redeem and perfect the race of which He is the Divine Prototype and Head.

A few words further as to the point of view from which the author has written, and the amount of its divergence from the 'orthodox' stand-point, may not be out of place. Dissatisfied with the ordinary interpretations of Christ's person, as inconsistent both with reason

and Scripture, he has sought to find a ground for the Incarnation deeper and more permanent, and a conception of its reality less contradictory and confusing to reason, than has hitherto prevailed. This, he thinks, he has found in the nature of God and of man as related to each other, or *the essential unity of the Divine and Human*: a truth obscured and practically denied by the alienation and antagonism brought about by sin, but demonstrated and restored to its reality in the person of Christ.

If man is made *in* the image of God, and if Christ *is* that Image in its eternal and divine reality, then the Divine and Human are not so diverse and incompatible as they have commonly been supposed, but differ only as the ideal differs from the actual, or the prototype from the copy. This fundamental error—the assumed diversity and exclusiveness of the Divine and Human—determined the orthodox conception of the Incarnation, as a *synthesis* or union of the two natures brought together from without, each retaining its own properties, ‘without conversion, intermixture, or confusion;’ which, of course, resulted in a union that is merely a conjunction and not a unity, much less an identity. The attempt to merge them into a unity, or to combine two heterogeneous natures in one person, has been tried now for nearly fifteen centuries, in every conceivable variety of form and combination; and the problem is not yet

solved, and never can be on these premises, for it is an attempt to make the impossible possible.

The view advocated in this volume proceeds from a different idea or starting-point, viz., that the Incarnation is not a *synthesis*, or union of opposite natures, but a *development* or determination of the Divine in the form of the Human. It is thus a return to the literal meaning of the Scriptural statement, 'The Word *became* flesh,' instead of the current statement, derived not from Scripture, but the creeds, that 'He assumed human nature.' The essential Humanity of Christ, aside from its unessential and fleshly robe, is traced to its true origin and eternal existence in God, and not derived from the race He created, and of which He is the original. It is thus a *Divine* Humanity, and identical with His Divinity. For, as Dorner has truly said, 'the Deity can be shown to be the principle of itself and of humanity, but the humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the Deity.' Still less can our fallen humanity be the source of that sinless and ideal Humanity which we behold in Christ.

It has not been considered that *the true idea of God, as revealed, includes humanity*, or at least a human determination and manifestation; and the true idea of Man includes God, as the ground and complement and inspiration of his being.

As the true idea of God unfolded implies a *Trinity*,

in which the eternally begotten Son stands over against or dwells in the bosom of the Father, without contradicting the unity of the Godhead—and this in order that there may be a creation—so a still further unfolding of the idea of God implies an *Incarnation*, in which God becomes Man, or the Word becomes flesh; the eternal Image and Form of God reveals itself in the human image and form, without contradicting His nature, but rather in fulfillment of its ethical demands, and in order that there may be a Redemption.

In maintaining this view, the author believes that he is putting forth no novelty of speculation, nor reviving an ancient and exploded heresy, but is only gathering up and combining into a consistent whole those fragments of truth which lay at the heart of the Monophysite controversy, and kept it alive for many centuries, but which were overborne by ecclesiastical authority, or distorted into error by the substitution of logic for insight in the interpretation of Scripture. He also believes that he has done violence to the spirit, at least, of no Christian creed, but has only attained a more consistent and Scriptural standing upon that ground of truth on which all creeds are built, and of which they are but imperfect and fallible expressions. For a comparative survey of the various opinions and teachings of the Church from the first centuries on this subject, and a fuller statement and vindication of the view here pre-

sented, the reader is referred to the Historical and Critical Review of the Doctrine of Christ's Person, which forms the second part of this volume, and to which the author invites special and thoughtful attention.

Two errors, or misconceptions, have contributed hitherto to keep asunder or hinder the coalescence of the Divine and Human in Christ. First, His Divinity has been conceived in its *absolute* and *infinite* form, as it exists in God, and not in its finite and *human* form, and subjected to human limitations—although this is the very idea and import of the Incarnation. Secondly, His Humanity has been measured by ours, and whatever in Him transcends this imperfect type has been referred to His Divinity, instead of measuring our humanity by this Divine Ideal. The study and comprehension of these two points will furnish the key to the view of Christ presented in this volume.

In close connection with this Divine-human conception of Christ is the more exalted view of *Humanity* which is here presented. This is especially needed at this time in order to redeem, or recover what is in danger of being lost, the true idea of Man, and of his place or rank in the creation, in contrast with the low and degrading notions which many are seeking to substitute for the Divine idea revealed in the Bible. The vindication of the grand doctrine that Man is created in the image of God, and has a Divine parentage and destiny,

is the best refutation of the new and blasphemous doctrine that he was made in the image of the brute, and is only a developed ape.

Of the Discourses embodied in this volume, the first, on the Divine Humanity of Christ, was originally preached before the General Association of Illinois, in 1860, and published the same year in the *New-Englander*. The view there propounded—the result mainly of independent investigation—the author, after fourteen years of maturer thought and study, has found no reason to modify in any essential respect. It is therefore republished in its original form, with only a few verbal alterations. The views of Gess, Liebner, and other German theologians, which have since appeared, and which approach very nearly the view here given—especially as regards the *kenosis*, or human limitation of the Logos involved in the Incarnation—it is perhaps needless to say, were unknown to the author at the time this Discourse was written. The great work of Dorner, of which abundant use has been made in the Historical and Critical Review, was not accessible until its appearance in an English dress in 1861–70. All the more gratifying, therefore, are the many correspondences of thought therein brought to view by recent writers on Christology, showing a convergence of Christian thought from independent sources toward the same point or

solution of the problem which is a confirmation of its truth.

The remaining Discourses have mostly grown out of the first, as side-shoots or branches of the same doctrine, and, with a single exception, were preached in the ordinary course of Sabbath instruction during the twenty years of the author's ministry in Rockford. One sermon—the seventh—bears traces of an earlier and *rhetorical* period, for which he asks due indulgence.

In conclusion, the author commends his volume to the thoughtful and candid perusal of his Christian brethren of every name, with the earnest hope that it may help them to think more divinely, and at the same time more humanly, of Christ, and more reverently of themselves and Humanity.

[The following passage from Dr. Theo. Christlieb's recently translated work on *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, alighted on since the above Preface was written, will show the attitude of the latest and most advanced Christian thought toward this great Christological problem: "Since these late disputes, certain theologians have truly pointed out that the Church has proceeded in too *one-sided and dogmatic* a manner in her delineations of the Person of Christ. It can not be denied that there is a considerable gulf between the portrait of Christ in the Gospels and that of our dogmatic writings. In the latter we often miss the living historical reality of the Saviour. What with the great stress laid on the two separate factors—His Humanity and His Divinity—we have *lost the living unity of the Person*, the human and historical element in Christ; His learning obedience in constant and free self-surrender to His Father's will has been neglected as against His divine nature.

"At this point of her doctrinal development the Church has still much to learn with regard to the great Christological problem of the present day—a problem so great and difficult that it will never be more than approx-

imately solved. Yet we shall constantly approach toward its final solution, if only we do not forget, on the one hand, that the genuinely human does not stand in absolute antithesis to the divine, but is intimately related to it; whereas, on the other hand, in a race degenerated through sin, this true humanity can not be fully brought out except by a fresh ingrafting of the divine. The true, the perfectly beautiful humanity of Christ, is so far from being annihilated by His Divinity, that it is only the latter which completes and guarantees the former."—Lect. VI., p. 446, American Edition.]

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HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S PERSON.

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DISCOURSES
ON
CHRIST AND HUMANITY.

CHRIST AND HUMANITY.

I.

THE DIVINE HUMANITY OF CHRIST.

And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.—*John* i, 14.

Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest in things pertaining to God.—*Hebrews* ii, 17.

THE doctrine of Christ's Person, or the question Who and what was Christ? is the great question, the fundamental and all-inclusive doctrine of Christianity. Yet this question, important as it is, is not definitely and finally settled, as is evident from the many and diverse theories respecting Christ which still prevail in the world; from the fact, moreover, that acknowledged Christians, and some of the most devoted and wise of Christian teachers, differ, if not radically, at least widely in their interpretations of His person; and also from the fact—a most significant one—that the Christian mind of the present age is turning itself with more and more of interest and gravitating tendency toward this great question—revolving about it with holy curiosity, desiring

with the angels to 'look into' this mystery of godliness with a profounder and more intelligent gaze.

If it be said that this question, and the doctrine of Christ's person, was settled authoritatively by the councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, when the various heresies concerning it were eliminated and proscribed, and the whole truth defined and circumscribed by logical boundaries, yet, like many other questions, it will not stay settled, but rises ever and anon, like Hamlet's ghost, after being 'quietly inurned,' inviting and demanding reinvestigation.

There are reasons why this question could not be finally settled in the earlier ages, besides the skeptical tendency which is more or less rife in all ages. The science of man, to say nothing of the science of God or Christian theology, has been advancing. The man of modern anthropology is not precisely the man of Plato and Aristotle, any more than the cosmos of modern science is the same cosmos which Hipparchus and Ptolemy understood. And this very advance is owing, in no small degree, to the new light which Christianity, or the ideal humanity revealed in Christ, has contributed. Christ is Himself the key to a true interpretation and science of man, as He is the type of a true and perfect manhood. And just as the key which unlocked the mysteries and motions of the starry universe was seized by Newton, in connection with new discoveries which it alone could explain, so a deeper and truer knowledge of the person of Christ is to be understood, if at all, only in connection with a deeper and truer knowledge of man, of which He is the divine head and type.

In attempting one more reply to this greatest of all

questions, we do it in no spirit of vain speculation, or conceit of superior wisdom. Rather do we feel that it were more befitting the writer, and more honoring to the Redeemer, to be silent and adore with the humblest disciple, than to contend and argue with the ablest. But we also feel that we may not shrink from uttering the truth through modesty or fear of reproach; and that a profound conviction of truth on a subject so vital to the faith and comfort of the Church, a fit occasion being given, is a distinct call to utter it.

Let us first glance at some of the existing beliefs and theories respecting Christ, as preparatory to the true doctrine.

Rejecting the manifestly unscriptural theories which deny the real Divinity of Christ, the faith of the Christian Church seems to be practically settled in the great twofold truth or doctrine, that Christ is in some real and true sense *Divine* and *human*. He is both the Son of God and the Son of Man. No faith can be Christian or Scriptural which leaves out really and practically these two elements of His being. But how they co-exist or are united; what is the relation of the one to the other; in what sense Christ is divine, and in what sense He is human, and how He is or can be both—here is a large and undivided field of truth, where different claims and theories are put forth, which in their conflict confuse and mar the faith of the Church, and greatly obscure the light of Christ, for want of a single eye to discern it.

The most prominent and prevailing theory is the common orthodox belief of “two natures and one person”—

meaning by two natures two distinct subsistences, one the Logos, or Divine nature, the other a human nature, consisting of a physical body and a reasonable soul; and all included in a metaphysical unity called a person.

The theoretical objections to the duality of Christ's spiritual nature, or the doctrine that He had two distinct souls, a Divine and a human, are too obvious to need any thing more than a statement of them. How, on the one hand, these two souls or wills, and their several activities, could exist together, and yet form but *one person*; or how, on the other, they could exist in one personal consciousness, and yet preserve their individual integrity; how, moreover, to conceive of such a spiritual conjunction of two rational souls in one person without a confusion too great and insurmountable for a rational faith in Him; and, finally, where is the need of supposing a distinctively active human soul in Christ when a Divine soul—the Word made flesh—will answer all the conditions and terms of the problem; and especially, and last of all, since there is no clear warrant in the Scripture for such a supposition;—these are questions which reason can not help asking, however she may be silenced by the reply that they are questions she has no right to ask, since the subject of them lies without the pale of reason and speculation, and belongs to faith alone.

We are aware that a need for a human soul in Christ is found, or thought to be found, and also a seeming warrant for it in Scripture, in those passages which set forth most distinctly His humanity, His perfect likeness to His human brethren, His growth in wisdom, His dependence, weakness, suffering, and temptation, and other distinctively human traits and attributes. But these,

as we propose to show, may be better explained on the supposition of one spiritual nature than of two.

But the *practical* objections to the theory in question are more weighty than those of reason. By this theory of a distinct human soul the Divine and human in Christ are practically separated; a *man* is, as it were, thrust between our faith and the being we worship. In approaching this Divine person—whom we profess and believe to be divine—it is not the Divinity, but the humanity of Christ that we really approach. The Divine is still separated from us by the intervention of a human soul. The love and sympathy of Christ toward men is not the very love of God, or of the Divine heart, but of a *human* heart in union or conjunction with the Divine. The love of God can only be *inferred from*, not felt and seen *in*, the love of Jesus. And so the suffering of Christ and His atoning death is not *Divine* suffering, and expresses not the real feeling of God, but only of a man, or a human nature bearing certain relations to God; and so the very meaning and vitality of the atonement, as a Divine *self-sacrifice*, is lost out of it.

As a reaction from this unsatisfactory, and at best clumsy theory of the person of Christ, there is the simpler, and to some more satisfying theory recently revived by a distinguished preacher of our own country—of *one* nature in Christ, or the Divine Soul manifested in a human body. This avoids the difficulty of an intermediate substance between the Divine in Christ and its outward manifestation; it avoids also the confusion consequent on holding practically a bi-personal Saviour, and so gives a closer and more vivid reality to the doctrine of Christ's Divinity, or "God manifest in the flesh."

But the chief objection to this view is that it denies, or seems to deny, the real and essential *humanity* of Christ, since it makes His humanity to consist only in the outward and bodily *form* of man, and thus makes Him human only in appearance, and not in reality. Christ, it is affirmed, and truly, must be *both God and man*, in the truest and most real sense, in order to realize the true idea of His person, or the true meaning of the incarnation.

A belief in Christ's real and proper humanity is fundamental to any true conception of His person or work.

From these opposite and unsatisfying theories let us now turn for relief and guidance to the words of inspiration, where the true doctrine, if any where, is contained, could we but penetrate their deep and comprehensive import.

If we inquire, Who was Christ? what was His real and essential nature? the answer is explicit: "*In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.*" Whatever is here meant by 'the Word,' it is manifestly a *Divine person*. Christ was truly and properly Divine, and that in the highest sense, without qualification or subtraction. What is the Scripture doctrine of the incarnation? The same authority answers: "*And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.*" Understanding the word '*flesh*' here in its larger and most obvious import, as equivalent to *man* or *humanity*, the teaching is that He who was God was made or *became Man* (σὰρξ ἐγένετο). The doctrine is, not that the Divine Word was *united* to a man, however

close and intimate the conjunction, but that He *became* man; not that He became *a* man, but *Man*, in the generic sense, mysteriously passing over into, and identifying His Divine nature with the human; yet not thereby losing or essentially changing His Divinity—for we read afterward, after He became flesh, “and we beheld His glory.” Whose? Not of any man interposed between this Divine person and ourselves, but “the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” If we inquire still further concerning the humanity of Christ, how far humanity can be predicated of Him who is essential Deity; was His humanity real and complete, or only outward and partial? The answer given by inspiration seems equally explicit: “*In all things it behooved Him to be made like unto his brethren*, that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest.” (Heb. ii, 17.) “For we have not a high-priest that can not be touched with a feeling of our infirmities, but was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin.” (Heb. iv, 15.) This language declares Him to be human in a real and inward as well as an outward sense. It also seems to exclude the idea of bi-personality, or a twofold spiritual nature, since this is not a human characteristic, and would separate Him from His brethren, instead of assimilating Him to them. The same thing is implied in the word ‘*brethren*,’ as is shown by the apostle in the context. “For both He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are *all of one* [i. e., of one nature], for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren.” (Heb. ii, 11.) Let it be noted here that the word ‘brethren’ is applied to men by the Spirit of Christ before the incarnation, as denoting an original and essential brother-

hood between Himself and them, which was afterward perfected in the flesh: "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same. . . . For verily he took not on him the nature of angels [or, more correctly rendered, *he took not hold of*, or came not to the succor, of angels], but he took hold of the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren. . . . For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted." (Heb. ii, 14-18.)

In addition to this, He is frequently spoken of in the Scripture as a man, most generally as *the* man, or man in the generic sense, as in the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians: "For since by man came death, by *man* came also the resurrection of the dead." "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam [was made] a quickening spirit." "The first man is of the earth, earthy; *the second man is the Lord from heaven.*"

Christ, then, according to the Scriptures, is truly God and truly man; and this is not by the union of two beings or personalities in one, but the same person is both Divine and human, at once Son of God and Son of Man;—or, in the expressive term which seems to condense the whole truth into a single word, He is the *God-Man*.

This we understand to be the Scripture doctrine respecting Christ. But how adequately to conceive this doctrine, so as to preserve at once the true Deity and the true humanity of Christ, and, at the same time, the strict and real *unity* of His person—this is the problem before us. Let us here say that we do not undertake to solve the mystery of the incarnation. We admit, with Atha-

nasius, that 'the true Christ is incapable of being construed by human reason.' The person of Christ is and must be a mystery in which all other mysteries meet and blend. All we shall endeavor after is to present such a *conception* of this person as may preserve inviolate the truth of Scripture, and afford a resting-place for the heart and reason in their approaches to Him, and so a basis for a clear and rational faith in the Redeemer.

This conception, as near as it can be presented in a logical statement, is the *identity* of the Divine and human in the person of Christ, so that it is proper to speak of His nature as the *Divine-human*, and His humanity as a Divine humanity. Christ is not God and man *united*, each nature retaining its own separate individuality and functions, nor yet a fusion of the two, forming an intermediate or compound nature; but their *identity* in a person who is *both Divine and human in all His attributes*. The idea of the Scripture is not that the Logos *assumed* or put on humanity (except, indeed, the outward form or body of man), nor that He united it to Himself as a foreign nature, but that He *became* man, without losing His real Divinity. The Divine in Christ *is* the human, and the human in *Him* is *Divine*.

In order to verify, or even make intelligible, this conception, it will be necessary to consider one or two prior and fundamental truths respecting the nature of man and of God.

It is one of the first truths of revelation—the second in order after the first grand announcement that God created the heavens and the earth—that *God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him*. This is repeated in a manner and with an em-

phasis which shows its superlative importance in the Divine mind. While God formed the physical and animal creatures each after its *kind*, i. e., after an idea or type then first originated, He created *man* after a type already existing in Himself or His own nature. The import of this truth, that man is made after the image and similitude of God, that he is therefore *kindred* to God in his nature, *of the same kind* with Him in his spiritual attributes, and not, as some theorists maintain, sprung from some lower and animal type; that he is, in his mental and moral structure, not something essentially different from God, but essentially like his Creator, and even a partaker of the Divine Nature—the reality and import of this great truth has not been sufficiently recognized and vindicated. Its bearing, not only on the question of man's origin and place in the creation, but on intellectual and moral science, on morality and theology, on the whole science both of man and of God, can not be sufficiently estimated. If, as certain philosophers of our day teach, the attributes and faculties of the human mind have no correspondence with the Divine; if the attributes of God are in our faith and reason different from the reality; if right and justice are one thing in our minds and another thing in God; if conscience is not the voice of God, and its revelations are not *true* revelations; if human reason, in its purity and integrity, is not a ray of the Divine reason, and its light “the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world;” if love, in its purest human manifestation, is not identical with, and *the inspiration of*, that love which flows from the Divine heart—all of which denials rest upon a denial of the fundamental

truth that the human soul is made in the image of God—then there is an end of all true knowledge of God, or real communion with Him.

But this truth has a special and emphatic bearing upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. One of the greatest hinderances to the full reception of this doctrine has been the low and degrading conception of human nature prevalent in the world, and enforced by Christian teachers: a conception far below that exalted idea expressed in the sublime sentence, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.’ The prevalent conception of humanity has been inconsistent with the idea that it is or can be divine; and so the truth is disbelieved that God can become *human*.

As a Christian poet of our own country has said :

“Poorly of his own nature must he deem—
His very immortality a dream—
Whose God’s so poor he may not condescend
With his own last and greatest work to blend.
Though veiled in flesh, did God his glory hide?
God counts not glory thus, but human pride.”

It is not an incredible or unscriptural thought that God created man originally with special reference to the incarnation, that He might have a mould or type of being in the creation which he might afterward fill with Himself, and so become visibly and perfectly one with man. This at least is true, that the Scriptural idea of man, as God made him to be, and as he will be when perfectly redeemed, is one of transcendent dignity and glory, the realization of which is only seen in *the Man*, Jesus Christ. It is wonderful to see how the Scripture identifies man, especially redeemed humanity, with Christ

in nature and dignity, as if the *Divine* Man was the only true and ideal man. It is not without significance that Luke traces up the genealogy of the chosen race from Christ to Adam, and from Adam to God—"which was the son of Seth, which was the son of Adam, which was the son of God"—as if Jesus were not more truly the Son of God in His divine than in His human generation. Mark, too, the words of the apostle: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as he is."

In the second chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the inspired writer quotes the eighth Psalm, which sets forth the greatness and dignity of man as originally created; made to rule as a king over the creation: "Thou madest him a little lower than the angels [or, more literally, a little less than God]; Thou crownedst him with glory and honor, and didst set him over the works of Thy hand. Thou hast put all things under his feet." This language, which refers unquestionably to man, is not yet true in its highest and complete sense. "For," argues the apostle, "in that he put *all* things in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him. But now we see not yet all things put under him [i. e., man]. But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor." In Jesus Christ alone, as the ideal and Divine man, we see this language fully realized, and in Him, as the second Adam, redeemed humanity shall yet be crowned king of the creation, and shall reign with Him on His throne of Divine and universal empire.

Notice once more this identification between Christ and humanity, in the expression '*image of God*,' as applied to both in the Scriptures. Christ is called "the image of the invisible God," "*the express image of his person*"—that form or manifestation of God in which the Deity is most perfectly expressed; and this language is applied to the Logos before his appearance in the flesh. When man, then, is said to be created in the image of God, is there not a reference to this prior Divine image of the *Word*, as being created *in* and *through* that original Divine Form, who is par excellence the Image, as He is *the Son*, of God, "the First Born of every creature."

But there is a reverse side to this great truth, which is greater and more blessed still. Not only is it true that there is in man, as the image of God, something which is truly and properly divine: it is also true that there is in God something which is truly and properly *human*. There is a Humanity in the Deity, which is the original from which our own humanity is derived, and in the image of which it is made; by virtue of which alone a real union and communion between God and man is possible. The reality of this is testified on almost every page of the Bible. What is the *anthropomorphism* every where met with in the Old Testament, or the expression of the Divine mind in human language, human thoughts, and human feelings? Shall we call it, as many do, an accommodation merely to human capacities? But is there not also a truth and reality in it behind the language, and pertaining to the Divine consciousness itself? Does God express Himself in this human way simply because *we* are human, or also because He really thinks and feels thus, and the outward form

corresponds to the inward reality as it exists in Himself—because, if we may so express it, God himself is human, at least in a part of his nature? The same truth is involved, as might easily be shown, in the very *personality* of Deity; for this conception of God as a person, in contradistinction from the Absolute, is a finite and human conception. We can not conceive of God as a person, except through the mould of our own personality—i. e., as human. And either this conception, which the whole Scriptures warrant, is a falsity, or there is a Humanity contained in the Divine Being through which all His revelations and communications with men are made—the true *Mediator* between God and man. We know it is maintained by philosophers of the present day that the conception of God as a person, having personal thoughts, feelings, and sympathies, and sustaining social relations with men, since it is a finite and human conception, involves a contradiction to the true idea of God as absolute and infinite, and therefore, however true and even necessary to *faith*, is false to the reality.* But here Christianity makes issue with rationalism and infidelity, however disguised under the name of reason. Let it be granted that the rationalistic idea of God as the infinite and absolute One, is in contradiction to the Christian revelation of Him as a person, and especially to the Trinitarian doctrine of three persons; yet it does not follow that that is true and this is false, but only that the idea of God which the reason is able to form is not the whole truth respecting God, and of necessity can not be. The reality or being of God must include more than the

* Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*.

bare reason can hold as an *idea*—must include what shall even be a contradiction to the understanding, as every supernatural truth or mystery does. And one truth or reality respecting Him is that which is the basis of Christianity and the Incarnation, viz., the essential humanity of Deity, or rather of the Word, the second person of the Trinity. The Divine mind is in one sense human in its thoughts, else we could not understand these thoughts. The Divine heart is human in its sympathies, else we could not repose upon it or trust in it; else, too, there would be no truth in the language, “Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him;” and “like as a bridegroom rejoiceth over his bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee.”

Another evidence of this truth is found in the *Theophanies* or human apparitions of God made in the Old Testament. What were they, and what do they signify? Being made before the Incarnation, they indicate an essential Humanity in the very being and nature of God. Whenever God *appears* as a person, He necessarily appears as a *man*—not by the assumption of a foreign nature, but by the revelation of His own. The person who here appears is now called a man and now an angel—the angel of Jehovah—and was the same, as most orthodox critics admit, with him who afterward appeared in the flesh. These Theophanies differ from the Incarnation in the fact that the form or body assumed was not a human body of flesh and blood, but probably a spiritual or heavenly body. The Son of God was not yet organically and historically incorporated with the race by being *born* into it, but only approached it, and communicated with it, from without.

One more argument for the essential Humanity of the Word is derived from the fact, or at least the belief, which so generally prevails, that the humanity of Christ as it now is, including His glorified or celestial body, is to be eternal. If so—and the teaching of Scripture seems certainly to warrant if not to require such a belief—it would seem to indicate that this humanity is not a forced union of a foreign nature to His own, nor an essential change of state, which we can hardly believe would be permanent forever, but that such an essential relation exists between His Deity and humanity, that the human form, freed from its present limitations, is, and is forever to be, His *true* form of manifestation.

The Divine Humanity, then, as revealed in the person of Christ, rests upon and supposes a prior truth, viz., the Divine Humanity as it exists in God. The Incarnation, or God becoming man, visibly and historically, is not a violence done to the nature of God, except as any manifestation of the infinite in the finite is a violence and contradiction to our idea of the infinite; but the manifestation of a hidden reality in the Divine Being, viz., the Humanity of Deity. Is it not a disbelief, or want of recognition of this great truth, that has stood in the way of a full reception of this doctrine of the Incarnation? The Word, in coming unto man, whether before or in the Incarnation, '*came unto his own*' in a higher and truer sense than we ordinarily attribute to this language.

Having thus found a basis for the Incarnation in the nature of God and the nature of man, the transition to the *fact*, as revealed in the Gospel, is comparatively easy.

Respecting the *mode* in which this fact was accomplished, or just what is involved in that change of state

by which the Word became flesh, speculation is blind and helpless. It becomes us to know that we are here treading among deep and awful mysteries, and can not go a step beyond the written Word. But there is one passage of Inspiration which seems to lift the veil from a portion of the mystery, which deserves to be specially considered. In the second chapter of Philippians, it is declared of Christ, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but *emptied* Himself," for so the original reads (ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσε), "taking the form of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men." What is here affirmed is that Christ in becoming incarnate emptied or divested Himself of something which He had before. This was not His essential divine nature, or any portion of it, but the divine *form* or condition in which He formerly was, as the co-equal of God, including the exercise of His divine attributes as distinct from the human, and that He took upon him the form of a servant, being made in the likeness or similitude of men. It is not declared here that He assumed human nature as something foreign to Himself; especially is it not said or implied that He took a human soul, but only that He who was in the form of God divested Himself of this, and took the form of a man, and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death. As Olshausen judiciously remarks: "It is not the laying aside of the divine nature, nor even the assumption of the human, that is here spoken of, but that Christ's *forma* and *conditio* was first of a divine kind, and then of a human. Both the one and the other are forms of appearance and condition in Him, who does not give up the identity of His

divine nature, while He becomes a man, and is on that very account such a man as no other is." (*Com.*, in loc.)

The teaching of this passage is only an expansion of that contained in the first verses of John's Gospel. Being God, Christ became man. He assumed the form, and became subject to all the laws and limitations of humanity, which He could only really do by having His divine and infinite nature reduced, as it were, and psychologically adjusted to its human form. Many persons can not conceive the possibility of an infinite or divine soul manifesting itself in finite and human conditions, without supposing a human soul as its medium. But they do not consider that there is the same difficulty in kind, if not in degree, in respect to this or any spiritual nature manifested through physical organs. There is a contradiction in any case, while the supposition of *two* spiritual natures, instead of relieving, makes the contradiction twofold.

A human soul is not *measured* by the body in which it dwells, nor by any physical manifestation; so the divine soul of Christ is much less measured by His human form and human actions, and yet is, or may be, as really *expressed* through them.

Moreover, the connection of a soul or spiritual nature with a bodily organism, implies *limitation* and dependence, which we recognize in the phrase 'emancipated spirit,' as applied to a disembodied soul. If Deity, then, is to become incarnate, it can only be by a limitation of His infinite and divine attributes, and a subjection to the laws and conditions of humanity—all of which is implied in the language of sacred Scripture—"Who, being

in the form of God, emptied Himself and took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." (Phil. ii, 6, 7.)

But Christ, it will be said, grew up as a child from infancy, increasing in wisdom as in stature; hence the soul or intelligence within Him must be under a law of development, therefore a strictly human soul like others. But infancy and mental development are *human conditions*, and we find no greater difficulty in supposing a Divine soul to be brought under these conditions, and experiencing them, than any other laws and limitations of the human state. If the divine Word can become man at all, or reduce his Divinity to the form and experience of a man, he may reduce it still further to the form and experience of a child, and this without any greater contradiction to his infinite and divine nature.

Still the question recurs, how God, *being God*, can become man, without either losing His Divinity or assuming into union with it a human soul? We might reply, as has already been said, that on the latter supposition God does not *become* man at all, but is only united to a man, who can not be called God, except in some remote and secondary sense.

And yet a human soul, in some sense, there must be in the person of Christ, else he is not really human; only it is not distinct from the divine, but one and the same spiritual essence, which is both divine and human, or the *identity* of the divine and human in one and the same personality. The possibility of this we have endeavored to show in the fact that the spiritual divine nature *includes* the human, or that there is an essential Humanity in the bosom of Deity, which is the basis of

the Incarnation; that it is this Divine Humanity which appeared in the flesh and dwelt among us. Still, if any insist on finding a distinctively human soul in the person of Jesus, generated of His human parent, they are welcome to the discovery when it is made; only let them call it a discovery or inference of their own, not a revelation of Scripture. If it be a human soul distinct from the divine in its consciousness and activity, the unity of Christ's person is destroyed, and the very meaning and power of the incarnation is lost. As Dr. Bushnell has significantly said: "As to the man, the human soul, we see men enough, and meet with human souls enough elsewhere. The tenderness we rejoice in, as testified in the person of Christ, and under the type of a human feeling, is the tenderness of God, not the tenderness of the human soul, or of the distinct human substance of Jesus. What we feel so deeply is that God is with us on our human level, and is drawn so close to our sympathy—not that a man is. And the moment we find a human soul in Him, distinctly conscious and distinctly active, we shall immediately draw ourselves to that, in the manner of the mere humanitarians; and having our sympathy with that, we shall be turned quite away from that which is the sole, or at least principal, object of the incarnation, viz., the manifestation of the Life or the expression of God."

If, on the other hand, it be discovered that there is a human soul in Christ which has no distinct activity, "what, then," in the words of the same writer, "is this soul to us? Is it any thing? Can we sympathize with a soul that has no distinct consciousness? Indeed, have we not much to do, after all, to keep it from nonentity?

And then, if we succeed in finding a place where non-entity will not overtake it, we shall want to know very much what becomes of it—whether it has any moral character of its own; whether it rose with Jesus in His resurrection; what place it will hold in a future world; whether it is ever to be more distinctly human than it was here, or ever to have a distinctly human character. And suppose, after we have gone this round of problems, confusing thus all thought and feeling, so that for a great part of our life the manifestation of God in Christ and His passion is virtually lost, we come at last to the clear and fixed opinion that a human soul was in the person of Jesus, but was never distinctly active, and never will be. What, then, have we done? Why, we have discovered with infinite labor that a certain drop is in the sea—nothing more! The sea is not any larger or purer or stronger; for if the reality of Christ be God, and God is infinite, what more or better is He for this drop of humanity that is merged thus eternally in the boundless ocean of His nature?—so merged that, as regards its human existence, it shall never be distinctly active, or distinctly known?”*

Both these dilemmas may be avoided—of either destroying or confusing the true idea of the Incarnation, and, at the same time, a real and solid place be found for the humanity of Christ—by the explanation already given, of the *identity* of the divine and human in His person.

But, dismissing argument, let us draw analogy to our aid, not to prove, but to illustrate the truth here propound-

* *Christ in Theology*, pp. 94, 95.

ed, and render its conception more clear and intelligible.

It is one of the wonderful properties of genius in its loftier workings to *become*, in a sense, the characters or beings it creates. Thus Shakespeare, in his dramas, not merely delineates the characters of Hamlet, Othello, Desdemona, and the rest, but he becomes for the time being Hamlet, Othello, and Desdemona—merging, as it were, his own personality in theirs—who, indeed, have no personality but in him. He, for the time, renounces or lays by his other attributes, his sovereign and independent consciousness, and descends into the person he creates—feels, thinks, and acts in and through him alone. And he is able to do this because, and only because, he possesses in his own mind or nature the elements of these characters, the constitutional elements and passions of human nature in all its myriad forms. He becomes, and is able to become, only that which he essentially *is*. What the poet does in imagination, and through the genial power of sympathy, God, or the divine Word, may do in reality. He may really *become* man, identifying His divinity with humanity, His divine feeling and activity with the human, because He possesses in Himself all that essentially constitutes humanity or a human soul.

Again, in order that the person of Christ may have its full power over us, it is needful that we conceive Him not only as *one* person—the identity of the divine and human—but as the unity of two opposite natures. Just as it is a practical aid to our faith in God to conceive of Him now as One in the unity of His being, and now as Three in the Trinity of divine persons—Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost—so it is an aid to our faith in Christ to conceive Him not only as a personal unity—the Christ—but a unity that comprehends a duality, viz., Divinity and humanity. And there is no more of contradiction in holding the identity of these two natures in the one person of Christ, than in holding the unity of the three persons of the Trinity in the one Being of God. And this, beyond question, is the real meaning of the formula, ‘two natures and one person,’ as essential to the doctrine of the God-Man; only it was not seen how Christ could combine in Himself two natures without a distinct human soul.

The analogy or symbol which most perfectly represents this truth, to our thought, is that of polarity. Christ is one person with two poles, or polar-natures—the divine and the human. As the magnet is not the union of two kinds of metal, but one metallic substance manifesting two opposite powers, so Christ is one being, God, manifesting himself, and represented to our thought, in two opposite natures, the infinite and the finite, the divine and the human. And the transition from one nature to the other is not over any chasm or even line of division, but clear and continuous, as the transition from one pole of the magnet to the other; or as the transition from the foot of the mountain, where it blends with the common plain, to the summit, where it blends with heaven.*

* A more philosophical statement of the doctrine may be given in the technical language of the Polar Logic, or Logic of Ideas; viz.: Deity and Humanity being regarded as Thesis and Antithesis, Christ, in His original divine form, as the Logos, is the *Prothesis* or Identity of the two, including both natures in His higher unity. Christ, in His human form, or the

Christ is thus, as He tells us, the way to the Father, as a mountain path is the way to the mountain summit, by a visible *extension* of the mount of Deity into the plain of Humanity. And as the eye of a traveler at the foot may slowly travel up the majestic slope till it is lost in the clouds or dazzling glories of the summit, so the mind may contemplate Christ from His lowliest and most human traits, where He is one with the humblest human being, up beyond the highest reach and limit of humanity—‘far above all principalities and powers, and every name that is named,’ to that dazzling summit of glory where He is one with God.

Christ thus fills up the whole interval between God and man, Deity and humanity, by *including* both in His own wonderful person, not by a union or conjunction, however close, but by an absolute unity or identification of the two.

Having thus stated what seems to us the true doctrine and conception of Christ’s person, it remains to give a more practical verification of it, by showing how this view meets all the real conditions of the problem.

The first condition of the Incarnation, which any theory concerning it must answer, in order to be true, is that God shall be really and personally *manifested*. “God was *manifest* in the flesh.” But God was not

Word made flesh, is the *Mesothesis*, or Indifference of the two, being either in relation to the other, or both at once in different relations; e. g., Christ in relation to the Father, or the Absolute Deity, is a man; while in relation to men, or to human thought and worship, He is God. The common view may be represented as the *Synthesis*, or combination of the two, *a posteriori*; from which the doctrine here presented differs only in its contemplation of Christ *a priori*, from an interior and profounder point of view.

manifest in the flesh, if a distinct human soul was interposed between the Deity within and what was visible without. What was seen or manifest in that case would be the feelings and actings of a man, like other men, not of the God-Man; and the Divinity behind would be a matter of inference or secondary faith, not of actual beholding. If the human soul of Christ acted by itself, apart from the divine, in what was most distinctively human in his experience, then a great part of the life of Christ loses its divine significance, and God was not manifest in that. If the Divine Spirit acted *through* the human in all its demonstrations, then Christ was only an inspired man, like other good men and prophets—though in a superior degree—as the Unitarians contend. In either case it was not God personally and manifestly present in a human form, and living a human life, but God obscurely and partially revealed through the veil of the human.

But if, on the other hand, we can hold such a conception of Christ that all which we see in Him, not His miracles and words only, but His human love and friendship, His tenderness and compassion and overflowing sympathy, is believed to be the very feeling of the divine heart, the feeling of God, revealed as directly and personally, separated from us no further than the heart and feeling of our dearest human friend—and that this divine feeling and tenderness is not less divine because it is human, nor less really human because it is divine—we shall be able to say, with a reality of meaning, “Great is the mystery of godliness; *God was manifest in the flesh.*”

Another condition clearly taught in the Scriptures,

and which requires to be met by any true theory of Christ, is His *inferiority* to, and *dependence* on, the Father. This is declared in such passages as these: "My Father is greater than I." "The Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father do." "I can of mine own self do nothing." "The Father who dwelleth in me, He doeth the works." "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, nor the Son, but the Father." Even His divine prerogatives are declared to be *given* to Him from God. "For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself." "All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth," etc.

In connection with these explicit declarations is the corresponding practice of prayer and worship which He habitually rendered to the Father. It can not be denied that this is one of the greatest difficulties to solve consistently with the doctrine of Christ's real and essential Deity, and one which no theory yet propounded has seemed satisfactorily to answer. The Unitarians, it is well known, seize upon these declarations and facts as effectually disproving the true Deity of Christ; to which the common Trinitarian replies that these limitations belong and are to be referred to His human nature, and are not applicable to His divine. Just as it is proper to speak of man as mortal when the reference is to the body alone, and not to the soul which is immortal; so Christ was inferior and dependent in His human nature or as man, but not as God. But it is nowise clear that Christ means to distinguish in these declarations between the divine and human in Himself. It is not the man Jesus merely, but *the Son* who can do nothing of

Himself, and who is ignorant of that day; and the 'works' of which He speaks are not mere human, but *divine* works or miracles. And, furthermore, the *words* He spoke—which certainly are not mere human words—He refers to the same source: "The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself." "As the Father hath given me commandment, even so I speak." If it be said that He speaks here not absolutely, but relatively and in accommodation to the understanding of His hearers, before whom He appeared as a man, and that He means simply to assert the divinity of His words and miracles by referring them to the Father—what shall be said of His acts of prayer and worship, which were often practiced alone in the solitude of the mountain, and therefore could have no reference to others, but only to His own real and personal needs? This, if it be real, indicates a *real* and not a seeming dependence. Shall we admit, as the Unitarian declares we must, that prayer by Christ is no real prayer; for He is omnipotent and can need nothing? or shall we say that it is the human soul of Christ only which prays while the Divinity within Him slumbers or stands aloof, unable or unwilling to grant that support which He supplicates the Father to bestow? This fact of prayer and spiritual dependence is utterly inexplicable on any orthodox theory which supposes God to be *united* to a man, or a human soul, in the person of Jesus. But not so on the Scriptural doctrine that God, or the divine Word, *became* man; for here Divinity *is* Humanity; He who was in the form of God and who was God, self-emptied of His omnipotence and sovereignty, and reduced to the human and subject state, therefore subject to all the conditions and limitations of humanity.

And here appears one of the glories of the Incarnation, lost sight of in the common view, viz.: that it is a revelation, not only of the true God, but of the true Man. Humanity, in its true idea, as well as Deity, was lost out of the consciousness of the race, and needed to be restored; and both are restored and revealed in Jesus Christ. The dependence of Christ on the Father is based on, and is a revelation of, the great truth that man is incomplete without God. The true idea of man is not a self-existent, or self-dependent, or self-righteous, or self-knowing being, but a receptivity and organ for the Divine; made to be inspired, led by, and filled with the Spirit of God. Man lives only (spiritually) as the Spirit and life of God lives within him. He loves only as the love of God is shed abroad in his soul. He knows in the highest sense only as the light of God shines within him, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding. The Word made flesh verifies this truth in his own experience. The Son, *being* human, and not merely united to or clothed with humanity, is dependent on the Father, lives by the Father, prays to and receives from the Father, according to this true idea and law of humanity.

The same view explains the *temptation* and suffering of Christ as no other theory can. God as *God*, the Absolute and Infinite one, can not be tempted of evil, neither can He suffer from it. But God as *Man*—the Word made flesh, and subjected to the fleshly conditions and limitations of humanity—can do both.

When it is declared that Christ was tempted in all things like as we are, yet without sin, it is very easy for logic to argue that, since God can not be tempted with

evil, therefore this is an experience of the human soul of Christ, and proves a human soul distinct from the divine. But this explains neither the fact nor the import of the Saviour's temptation. The fact revealed is not that a certain man, Jesus, was tempted, but that a Divine Being, the Word made flesh, came under these human conditions. And the divine significance of this fact is that God claims no exemption from the law of duty on the score of His omnipotence and divine immunity from evil. The temptation of Christ shows the identity of divine and human virtue, or that God requires no more of man in the way of obedience and resistance to evil than He is willing to do and encounter Himself. This at least is part of its divine import. Another part is that given by the apostle: "For in that He himself—this Divine Being—hath suffered, being tempted, He is able also to succor them that are tempted;" able to succor them out of His own experience, as well as divine power.

The temptation of Christ has also a *human* significance, which is that *sin* is no part of human nature, or necessarily involved in a true humanity. Christ in His human aspect, or the Divine Humanity of Jesus, differs from our common humanity in this, that He presents in His person the true and ideal man, which is sinless and perfect, while we present the *actual* man, which is fallen and depraved. Hence He is styled the second Adam, in contradistinction from the first; or humanity in its actual and fallen state. As the first Adam was subjected to temptation, that he might develop a virtue which should be his own, and which could not be created or imparted, so the second Adam was subject to a similar but severer trial, that He might develop a divine virtue under

human conditions, and by His victory over evil break the power of evil over humanity, and prepare the way for its complete and final redemption.

Again, as regards the *sufferings* of Christ, it is easy enough for logic to argue that, because the divine nature is impassible, therefore Christ suffered only in His human nature, and so to quite vacate this great tragedy of the Cross of all its divine and real import, as the expression of God's real feeling in regard to sin—the revelation in time of what the heart of God suffers in eternity from the sins of men, bearing them in His pierced bosom as Jesus in His pierced and tortured body; the revelation also of the patient and self-sacrificing love of God toward the sinner, and what He will do and suffer in order to uphold His law and reconcile its transgressors to Himself. But if we can once attain to a true conception of the unity of Christ's person, and of the Divine Humanity therein embodied, all logical reasonings and inconsistencies will melt away under the light and power of the Cross, as all speculations about matter and spirit vanish beneath the tearful gaze of one we love.

We anticipate two objections which may be urged against the view of Christ's person here presented, and these of a diametrically opposite character: one, that it denies His real Divinity; the other, that it denies His true humanity. In asserting a single spiritual nature in the person of Christ, if that nature be divine, it will be said, it can not be human; if it be human, it can not be divine. But this is a logical inference drawn from words, and based on a denial of the *identity* of the divine and human in His person. On the contrary, we maintain that the nature of Christ is both more divine and more

human in this view than in the common theory of two natures severally distinct and only locally united. For here is only a conjunction of Deity with humanity, and all below the line of junction, or rather division, is a mere man. Jesus is divine, not in His whole person, but only in a part; while in this view He is wholly divine in all His attributes, and not the less so that He is truly human.

Christ differs from all other men in two respects: first, in the *origin* and *nature* of His humanity, which is eternal and divine—a humanity existing from eternity in the bosom of Deity, and only manifested, not originated, in time; secondly, in the spiritual presence and oneness of God with Him in a more perfect degree than was possible for a mere man, or for the constitution of a creature, to sustain. He is ‘the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father;’ one with the Father. ‘God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto Him;’ for ‘in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.’ This can be true of no other than a being essentially divine, exalted by an infinite distance above all mere created beings.

If any say that Christ was less really human because His humanity was not derived, like His body, from His human mother, but generated directly from the eternal fountain of being, this is the very distinction we claim for Him above all other sons of *men*. They exhibit humanity in its actual, depraved, and partial aspect. Christ, as the Son of Man, exhibits its ideal and perfect divine type as the true image of God on earth. And this could not be if He had derived it from human parentage, but only as He brought it forth in unstained purity from the

bosom of the Father.* That declaration of Christ to the Jews, "Ye are from beneath, I am from above; ye are of this world, I am not of this world," was spoken and is true not more of His divinity than of His humanity. Herein the humanity of Christ excels that of all other men, in that it is *from above*, a *divine* humanity, as it needs must be to possess any elevating and transforming power. For it is not that Jesus even in His human character is the perfectest product of the race, the consummate flower of a fallen humanity (for who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? or a perfect thing out of an imperfect?), but that a Divine Man has descended, and inserted Himself into the race, that He might lift it to a height of glory and perfection beyond that from which it has fallen, and far exceeding what it is in itself to attain or to be. As it is written: "The first man, Adam, was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening Spirit. The first man is of the earth, earthy: THE SECOND MAN IS THE LORD FROM HEAVEN."

We have now finished the argument for the Divine Humanity of our Lord. Whatever weight or impression its reasonings may have, we earnestly desire that the comfort which this view of Christ's person has imparted

* Hence it is that Christ entered the world, not as other men by natural generation from two human parents, as He must have done if His humanity were *merely* human, consisting of a human soul and body, united to Deity, but by a divine generation, and from only one human parent, deriving His body from the mother, and His soul from God His true Father, according to the laws of physiology. Hence, too, the soul of Christ was free from the taint of natural depravity, which it could not have been if it descended, like other human souls, from Adam.

to us, and the light it has thrown over the entire Gospel, may be shared by our readers. If it be a truth, it is a great and blessed truth, whose practical influence can not but be inspiring and comforting in the highest degree. Let us, in closing, indicate in the briefest manner a few of its practical bearings.

1. And first, the *unity* of Christ's person is here restored to faith from the duality and division in which it has been held by the reason. The doctrine of a human soul distinct from the divine has been a source of endless confusion and distraction to faith, and not less to any intelligent understanding of his life and actions. Practically, we have had not one Lord but two, between whom our love and reverence has been divided, and the several acts and attributes of His person have been parceled off and labeled—this as human, and that as divine; so that the question has been pertinent, "*Is Christ divided?*" The true answer to this, which we have endeavored to verify, is that which every Christian really believes in his heart, whatever his creed may be—No. "*There is one body and one Spirit, one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.*" Whatever mysteries may be hid in that wonderful person—and mysteries unfathomable there must be in Him in whom dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily—yet it is something to believe, as we may, that there was but one will, as there was but one character pervading and actuating all his manifestations, whether of doing or suffering.

2. With the restoration of the unity of Christ's person, his *Divinity* is extended downward to include those

acts and demonstrations which are most intensely human; while at the same time His humanity is extended upward to include those which are most divine.

Not the least disastrous effect of the division of Christ's person has been the practical separation of the Divinity and the humanity of His life; calling His miracles divine, and His ordinary actions human. But the weeping of Jesus with the sisters of Bethany was not less divine than His raising of Lazarus from the dead; and this miraculous display of divine power was no less human in Him than the former; for this, like all His other miracles, was an act of *humanity*, and was invested with the most humane and tender sympathies. If such demonstrations are above the reach of *our* humanity, they were not above His, any more than washing the feet of His disciples was below His divinity. Nay, they are not above our possible humanity: for Christ himself has declared—"Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do, because I go to my Father."

And here we almost feel as if we had wasted words to prove what every Christian reader of the Gospel must have felt in his contemplations of the Saviour's life. We might appeal from the reasonings of logic, as embodied in creeds, to the truer intuitions of the heart. We *feel*, when we approach nearest to Jesus Christ, that He is *one* person—one mind and one heart—and that every act and word and expression of that wonderful being is *both human and divine*: human, because it *finds* us in the deepest and inmost places of our human soul, and awakens a sympathy there; divine, because

never man spake or did like this man ; because no merely human demonstration could so penetrate and subdue and awe the soul ; because the nearer we approach the humanity of Jesus, the more does it recede from all mere or human humanity, and declare itself to be superhuman and *divine*.

3. *Our doctrine reveals the identity of the divine and human in Christian character.* Christ is an example to us, not only in His human, but in His divine character ; and since these are identical in Him, they should be so in us, so far as we can be followers of Christ, or partakers of Him. The divine and human are too much separated in our life and character, and hence our human character is not patterned after that of Christ, but after the world and its maxims, after the flesh and its lusts. It should be understood and never forgotten that true *manliness* is *godliness*, and that true godliness is perfect and genuine manliness. A true manhood implies divinity, and it is impossible without it ; if not essential as in Christ, yet derived from Him, and penetrating with its light, and transforming with its power and purity, all that is human into its own likeness. "That ye might be partakers of the divine nature."

4. A new light is shed by this doctrine upon the *example* of Christ, or Christ as our exemplar. The whole of practical Christianity is summed up in the duty of *following Christ*. "Follow me," is the command of the Saviour to all men. "He that saith he abideth in Him, ought himself also to walk even as He walked." But a practical difficulty is felt by the mind in seeing *how* this precept is to be obeyed, or how Christ can be a perfect example for man, when He is so different from

man in His nature, or the composition of His person, as the common theory of His person represents Him to be. Is it the *divinity* or the *humanity* of Christ that is set before us for imitation? If the former, this is so far distinct and separate from the humanity with which it is conjoined that even the human nature of Christ himself can not partake of it, or rise into its sphere. How much less then can *our* poor, fallen humanity hope to be like it, or to do any thing which shall be *divine*? If it be the human character of Christ which we are to imitate, this is still practically impossible, because His human nature was mysteriously united with the divine, so as effectually to remove it beyond our reach and sympathy. Christ was not in our very condition tempted in all points like as we are; or, if so, He had divine resources within Him which we have not; and so His sinless virtue and example fails us in the very point where we most need it. But the doctrine here presented avoids all these difficulties and confusions, by making His divinity and humanity one and identical. Christ is our example as divine, and also as human. His virtue is divine virtue, the very virtue of God, and yet it is human, and therefore level to and one with our own virtue, so far as it is true virtue or holiness. Because His divine virtue is also human, therefore *our* human virtue may be also divine. In this view there is reason and encouragement in the precept otherwise so impossible. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father who is in heaven is perfect."

5. *Finally, our doctrine reveals and restores the true relationship between Christ and humanity.* Man is related fraternally to the *whole* nature of Christ, and not

merely to a part. Christ is our brother in His *divine* as well as His human nature; since these in Him are one and identical. This, indeed, is involved in the fact, so little believed or understood, that God is *our* Father, as well as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. But this truth comes home to us as a new revelation when He that is the only-begotten Son, who dwelt in the bosom of the Father before the world was, becomes man, and lives a human life, is crucified, killed, and buried; when He rises from the dead, and the first word after His resurrection—that miracle of miracles which would seem to separate Him totally from the human—the first word is, “Go and tell my *brethren* that I ascend unto my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.” What does this word import, but what the Church rejoices to believe, that Christ is not less human now in His kingdom of glory than when here on earth; and certainly He is not less divine.

What, too, does His glorified humanity import, but that He is now reinstated with the *same* glory which He had with the Father before the world was—the glory of a Divine Humanity—the only difference being that now He is not only one with God, but one also with the actual human race He has redeemed; and therefore they are now, and are hereafter to be, more perfectly one with Him, and to reign with Him in His glory forever? “*That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us.*”

II.

THE SON OF MAN.

Who is this Son of Man?—*John* xii, 34.

THIS is the caviling reply of the Jews to one of the declarations of Jesus, signifying what death he should die. It follows immediately after the saying, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me;" though it seems more logically connected with a previous one of like import, "When ye have lifted up the Son of Man, then shall ye know that I am He."

The people, understanding little of the tragic and mighty import of this word, but surmising that it implied some kind of withdrawal from the earth either by death or translation, answered him, "We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth forever: and how sayest thou, The Son of Man must be lifted up? *Who is this Son of Man?*"

What I propose in this discourse is to answer this question; or, rather, to unfold the meaning of this name or designation, *Son of Man*, and what it denotes concerning the nature and character of Christ.

This name, I need not say, is peculiar to Christ, and is appropriated by Him for some special reason growing out of His mysterious nature and His relation to the race. It is remarkable that we do not find others addressing Him by this title. Even the Evangelists, in their men-

tion of Him, never use it, although He is sometimes popularly addressed as the Son of David; and some of His most intimate and advanced disciples confess their faith in Him as the Son of God. It occurs about eighty times in the Gospels, yet with the exception of a single instance, that of Stephen in his dying vision, and perhaps also that of John in his vision at Patmos (Rev. i, 13), this name is never applied to Christ by any one but Himself. He reserves to Himself the use of this remarkable name, using it more frequently than any other, as if discerning a fitness in it which others did not recognize. May we not say that this fondness of Christ for this peculiar designation seems to betray a peculiar consciousness in Him of His relation to mankind, which no other could share. How strange and inappropriate would such a title be on the lips of any other man! Or how great the assumption in any other to deem it necessary to call himself a man! On the lips of Christ it is a word of condescension, and yet of dignity, such as no other word expresses. In regard to its meaning, I observe:

It denotes, in general, the *Humanity of Christ*, or His identity with man, just as the opposite and contrasted name, *Son of God*, designates His *Divinity*, or His identity with God. These opposite terms appear to be used by Himself indiscriminately and interchangeably, not to distinguish the human in Him from the divine, still less to separate them, but to denote the twofold nature and character of His person. If the one declares and makes prominent His human nature, and the other His divine, it is not in order to discriminate or draw a line between them, but to show that the same person is *both divine*

and human. He who is the Son of God is also the Son of Man.

It denotes also identity *with a difference*; which difference is indicated by the word *Son*. Christ is not God in the absolute sense, but the Son of God. He is also not a man, like other men, but the Son of Man. This difference we shall consider more fully hereafter.

1. *Christ is a real and true MAN.* This, of course, is not questioned by those who hold that He was *merely* a man. Nor is it questioned theoretically by those who hold the orthodox doctrine that He was *both* God and man. But the manner in which some conceive of this doctrine is a virtual denial of His humanity. It is important, therefore, that the real and true *Humanity* of Christ should be emphasized, and held up anew, not as excluding, but as humanizing; and so bringing near and making intelligible His true and proper Divinity.

Again, the manner in which the humanity of Christ is conceived, as differing in no respect from our ordinary humanity, sin only excepted, is not only at variance with its unique and lofty character, with its miraculous origin, and with His own repeated declarations—as where he says to the Jews, “Ye are from beneath, I am from above;” “What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before?”—but it necessitates a division between the divine and the human in His person which we nowhere find in His life and consciousness, and makes the incarnation to be merely a union or *conjunction* between God and a man, instead of what the Scripture declares it to be—the Word *become* man; *God manifest in the flesh*. We need, therefore, to show both His identity with man, or the human race, and

also the superiority of His humanity to that of all other men.

That Christ was a man is proved from His human attributes and characteristics, as well as by His birth from a human mother, and His true human development through all the stages of infancy, childhood, youth, and manhood. He possessed not only the form and physical nature, but the thoughts, feelings, desires, and passions of a man, in all their normal and undepraved character. He ate and drank and slept; was weary, was moved with compassion, was grieved, and even angry, at times, with a righteous indignation. He was dependent on His friends for help and sympathy, and on God for grace and spiritual help, as is evident not only from His own words, but from the fact that He often prayed to His Father alone and in secret, as He taught His disciples to do. He was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin; which He could not be, if He had not the nature and infirmities, without the moral disabilities, of a man. "In all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren." This appears, not only from this inspired record, but from the impressions He produced upon those who were most conversant with Him. His neighbors and early acquaintances were slow to believe that He was any thing more than human, any thing radically different from the rest of His family and other men around Him. "Is not this the carpenter's son?" they said. It is a significant fact, moreover, that even His own brethren did not believe on Him; which implies that the *human* was primary and paramount in His character, and that the *divine*, however inherent, was yet latent from the eyes of men (is it not always?), and did

not manifest itself by any infallible tokens till His public ministry began. And then it was the unfolding and efflorescence of a hidden glory, blossoming on a human stock, whose full significance was not realized until after the resurrection, when the Son of Man was glorified, and ‘declared to be the Son of God, with power.’

All that is truly and properly *human* Christ possessed in its integrity. Whatever is abnormally human, as sin, selfishness, or unholy passion, He was without. Sin is an excrescence, a disease, cleaving to, but not properly belonging to, humanity. He is, therefore, the touchstone by which to test the real and true man, in distinction from a false or depraved or partial humanity.

2. While this name designates in general the humanity of Christ, it denotes a *peculiar* humanity, as the word itself is peculiar. It implies that Christ is not simply *a* man among other men, but it is a title of distinction, implying a difference between Him and them, as well as a likeness, or an identity of nature.

This name could not be applied to other men with propriety, even if Christ had not appropriated it. They are called men, or sons of men, or children of men, but not sons of Man. In Ezekiel, the prophet is indeed many times addressed by the word of the Lord, “O son of man!” But here it is always without the definite article, and is equivalent to, “O man!” Christ only is called in Scripture *the* Man, or the Son of Man, as in one of the visions of Daniel, which unquestionably refers to the Messiah: “I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought Him near before Him. And there was given Him dominion and glory,

and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and His kingdom that which shall not be destroyed."

Christ, then, of all men, is alone styled the Son of Man. Being man, He is yet fairer than the children of men, the chiefest among ten thousand, and the one altogether lovely. While He is not ashamed to call them brethren, He is the *first-born* among many brethren; among them, yet not of them; bearing our nature and walking our earth, yet infinitely above us in origin and nature. We are from beneath; He is from above. No man hath ascended up into heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man who is in heaven. Coming after men, and born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, He is yet preferred before them, for He was before them.

3. Again, this title is not only one of distinction, separating Christ from all other men, but it is *generic*, denoting not an individual of the race, but *Humanity* itself, individualized in one person.

In other men we see only partial and imperfect specimens of humanity; we can not see in them, or gather from them, the true and complete idea of Humanity, as God meant it to be. Even if we combine all that is highest and best in human biography and human history, in all its manifold developments, sifting out of it all that is impure and abnormal, retaining only what is genuinely human, we should only approximate, not reach, the divine ideal; for this ideal is ever higher and better than mankind has yet attained. But Christ is the realized Ideal of humanity. He combined in Himself all

that belongs to the true Idea of Man. This will appear more clearly under the following heads:

(1.) Christ is the *typical*, or *representative* Man, one who represents the whole of Humanity in His own person.

There have been many representative men, so called, who are types of particular classes of character or genius. Thus Homer and Shakespeare represent man as the poet; Plato, as the philosopher; Fénelon, as the saint; Cæsar and Napoleon, as the hero and the conqueror. But all these are only partial types, representing only one side or feature of that universal Humanity from which they sprung, and of which they partake. No one mere man ever yet embodied in himself the *whole* of Humanity, with all its original attributes, powers, and capacities in equal balance, unperverted and undwarfed by sin, in full and perfect development, according to the Divine idea.

It may be supposed that Adam, being created in the image of God, created upright and complete, was such a representative man. In this first man the whole human race was contained potentially, since they all sprang from him. Therefore Adam represented humanity as no other of his descendants could do. In him, as the first human cause, the first mover of a train of consequences that would continue to flow to the end of time, was vested the future character and condition of all mankind. In him, as the original man, were deposited the germs of all the manifold powers and characteristics that have been developed in the history of the race. But they were only germs, potentialities—latent, perhaps, in all men—that could not be fully realized in him or any

one man. It is not supposable that Adam at his creation was a *perfect* man, in the truest sense of the word. Innocent and upright, indeed, he was, but morally perfect he could not be, for moral perfection supposes a character and powers *developed*, and confirmed by experience and trial, and not simply inherent. If he were, as Milton says, 'the goodliest man of men since born,' he was not the wisest nor the holiest. But he had the *germs* and capabilities of all knowledge and wisdom and character, which he was placed on earth to develop and perfect. And so his moral character, notwithstanding his primal innocence, being left to his own freedom, developed *wrong*, and became a sinful character. So, we may believe, that his natural and mental powers, though capable of indefinite increase and perfection, received but a partial, if not an evil and erroneous development.

And here appears the essential difference between the first and the second Adam. Christ represents Humanity, but a perfect and ideal Humanity, corresponding to God's Idea of man; not the actual, imperfect, depraved humanity that has come from Adam, and is represented by him. The difference between Adam and Christ is the difference between the original of a thing as it exists in nature, and its original as it exists in God. This may be illustrated by the difference between the first *oak*, from which all other oaks have sprung by a natural law of reproduction and development, and the *idea* of the oak in the mind of God, after which all oaks are fashioned, and of which they are but imperfect copies or embodiments.

What in Adam existed only as germs, or unrealized capabilities or partial developments, in Christ appear as

perfect and fully developed realities. The virtues of the whole race, that are found distributed in different forms, through many varieties, classes, and individuals of the human family, are all gathered up and concentrated in Jesus Christ. Yet they exist here, not in their partial and imperfect manifestations, as seen in men, but purer and more perfect than were ever before or since beheld on earth; so that they are, manifestly, not *derived* from the race, but exist in Him originally, as in their fountain-head, who is thus the second Adam, from whom all that is perfect and divine in humanity is derived, as all that is imperfect and depraved is derived from the first.

Furthermore, Christ is the representative Man, not only because all human capabilities and all human virtues are represented and embodied in His person, but also because He *acted for* the race. The vicariousness of Christ's life and sacrifice is not only a plain doctrine of Scripture, but has its analogy in daily life, where the action of one standing in a representative relation is virtually the action of all who are thus represented. Passing over other and minor examples, let us look at that which stands at the beginning of human history. To the mind of God, who sees all things in their causes, and not merely in their historical development, the whole human race was included in Adam, its first father. His sin and fall was the sin and fall of the race, not because of any special 'covenant' made with him, but because 'like produces like.' Hence it needed not that the experiment of a legal probation, once fairly made, should be repeated in the case of all his descendants, to issue in a similar result; but our first father

acted *for* his descendants. Humanity, as represented in him, sinned and fell with him; and the curse pronounced upon the first pair was pronounced and entailed upon the entire race. As the apostle declares, "God hath concluded all under sin, that He might have mercy upon all."

So in Christ, the second Adam, only in a much higher and truer sense, the whole of humanity is included and represented, not in its imperfect and actual, but in its perfect and ideal character, as God meant it to be. He acted and suffered *vicariously*, not for Himself, but for humanity, as represented in Himself. His obedience is the obedience of humanity; His sacrificial death is the sacrifice of humanity, and so its atonement; according to the word of the apostle, "Because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then all died" (not *were* all dead, as this passage is erroneously rendered). "And He died for all, that they which live [risen again with Christ to newness of life] should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto Him that died for them and rose again." (2 Cor. v, 14, 15.)

As in Adam, and through his sin, we are a fallen and condemned race, so in Christ, and through His obedience and death, we are a *redeemed* race, and heirs, not of the curse of death, but of the grace of life. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." And "as by the offense of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." (Rom. v, 18, 19.)

(2.) Christ is the *universal* man. I have said that

the whole of humanity is represented or embodied in Christ, as the Son of Man; i. e., all that belongs to the true and full idea of humanity is found in Him. He combines in Himself, and reconciles by uniting, all differences of nationality, of rank or condition, of class, of sex, and of kindred; so that all that is really *human*, and not sinful, meets and is represented in Him in its integral and perfect form. To illustrate this:

a. In respect of *nationality*.

Christ was born a Jew, of the tribe of Judah, of the lineage of David. Hence He is called the Son of David. As such He inherited, or would be supposed to inherit, all the peculiarities of the Jewish character. And yet we find in Him none of the distinguishing characteristics of a Jew. Not a trace of Jewish prejudice, bigotry, or narrowness can be discovered in all His words and actions. Though trained in all the peculiar and exclusive ideas of the Jewish faith, His mind is not fettered or even tinged by them. Unlike any of His countrymen, it outreached the narrow boundaries of the ancestral religion, and embraced all men and all classes in His love and sympathy. Brought up in the observance of forms and rituals, and taught to regard all other nations as heathen, beyond the pale of God's fatherly mercy, He is found sitting and teaching a Samaritan woman the sublime doctrine of the spirituality of God and of all true worship, and the equality of all men as the children of God. His birth and education were in the East; but there is nothing peculiarly Oriental in His ideas or instructions. Like the sunlight, which takes a coloring from the atmosphere through which it shines, but is itself pure and without earthly stain, so His doc-

trine is clothed in the rich figurative style of parable and sententious paradox, but the truth within it is purely divine and heavenly. He spoke the language of Judea, but He spoke to the hearts of *men* in all nations and ages.

b. Again: Christ had none of the prejudices and peculiarities of the *class* to which He outwardly belonged, or of the *station* in which He was born and brought up. Born in poverty, of obscure and humble parentage, He never betrays by word or character His ignoble origin. He was a poor man only in condition. In His words and bearing, He makes us oblivious of rank or station, and makes us feel only the wealth and royalty of His spirit. 'He was a Nazarene and a Galilean only in origin. He had none of the rusticity of an obscure village, none of the narrowness of a despised province. Country and city were alike to Him. He taught with equal freedom and authority in a fisherman's boat on the Sea of Galilee and in the temple at Jerusalem.'

He can not be located or measured by His surroundings, but gives to all places and conditions a dignity derived from Himself. Even when an infant, lying in the manger, He is worshiped by the wise men, led thither by His Star in the East. In boyhood He is listened to and marveled at by the doctors in the temple as the wonderful child; and in manhood is followed by all classes and ranks with reverential wonder, attracting around Him the rich and the poor, the high and the low, nobles and rulers and publicans, and even little children, by His condescending grace. Rank and station are lost sight of in His presence, while He blesses the poor and sends the rich empty away; and is Himself as far above

these outward distinctions as He is aloof from their petty rivalries and oppositions.

c. The prejudices and distinctions of *sect* are no less ignored by Him. Brought up under the teachings of the most severely religious and scrupulous of the Jewish sects, He is yet no sectarian, and is utterly free from sanctimony and artificial scruples; violating the traditions of the elders, when these violate the higher dictates and sanctions of reason; breaking the Sabbath according to the letter, and the over-rigid notions of the Pharisees, that He may keep it according to its intent and spirit; declaring that the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath; and offending the purists of His day by forgiving harlots, and eating and drinking with publicans and sinners.

d. Once more: notice how the universal Humanity of Christ swallows up and obliterates even the distinctions of *family* and *kindred*.

These distinctions, though closer and deeper than those already mentioned, are yet partial and relative distinctions. His human mother, near and dear as she was to her Divine son, was not, and could not be, the mother of that Divine Humanity which was broader and higher than any mere human parentage could give birth to. Therefore we find Him, even in childhood, giving intimation of His higher relationship by His staying behind in the temple, to attend, as He said, to his 'Father's business;' yet returning, when sought, with His parents to Nazareth, to be subject to them, as was meet, during His youth and adolescence.

Again, on the occasion of His first miracle in Cana, we find him rebuking His mother's seemingly officious claim

on His divine power for mere domestic service, saying to her, "Woman, what have I to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come;" yet conceding to it afterward by turning the water into wine; compromising, as it were, between the earthly and the heavenly claim by a miracle, which at once 'manifested forth His glory,' and His sympathy with all innocent social enjoyments.

On another occasion we see Him waiving the private claims and relationship of His family in favor of one larger and more spiritual. When told, in the midst of a discourse to the people, that His mother and His brethren stood without, desiring to speak with Him, He exclaimed, "Who is my mother? and who are my brethren?" Then stretching forth His hand toward His disciples, He said, "Behold my mother and my brethren. For whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, the same is my mother and sister and brother."

e. But a deeper distinction than any of these—one that is constitutional and organic, and belongs to every other human being—is wanting in Jesus Christ, or is merged in His higher and all-inclusive Humanity. The distinction of *sex* is not confined to the body, but runs through mind and soul and character, dividing humanity—not its outward form merely—into two parts, male and female. God created *man*, male and female. That is, the one substance or being of humanity was divided at its root into these two opposite branches or types, both of which together constitute Humanity, neither of which alone fully represents the true Idea of Man. No one man, who was merely man, ever yet rose above this organic difference, so as to combine in himself, in full measure, both the masculine and the feminine type of

humanity. There have been men with certain feminine attributes, and there are women with certain masculine qualities predominant; but never a human being with all the attributes of man and woman blended in perfection. In Jesus Christ alone, the Son of Man, this union, or unity, is seen. In Him neither was found exclusively, but both in perfect balance. There was in Him all that was most manly and all that was most womanly. In His mind we see blended the strength and wisdom and authority of manhood, with the tact and delicacy and intuitive discernment of womanhood. In His character are united all the sterner and more active virtues that ennoble and dignify man: the iron will that temptation or suffering could not bend; 'the calmness that never quailed in all the uproars of the people; the truth that never paltered; the strict, severe integrity that characterized the Witness of the Truth; the justice that never gave way to weak feeling.' And with these manly traits, all the tender graces and passive virtues that enter into our truest idea of woman: the sensibility that wept over human grief or human guilt; 'the sympathy craved and yearned for, as well as given; the shrinking from solitude in suffering; the trembling of a sorrow unto death; the considerate care which provided bread for the multitude, and said to the tired disciples, as with a sister's rather than a brother's thoughtful care, "Come ye apart into a desert place, and rest awhile."'

We know not which side, or pole, of human character predominates, the masculine or the feminine. Each sex, as well as all nationalities, ranks, and classes, every man and every woman, find in Him their truest repre-

sentative, that which meets and satisfies them, and complements their nature and want.

f. As Christ had no national or class or family peculiarities, so He had no *individual idiosyncrasies*.

Those peculiarities of character which spring from temperament, or blood, or special organization, or special endowment, and which are owing often as much to defect on one side as to overplus on the other—these idiosyncrasies had no place in Christ. All that is good and great and genuinely human in John or Peter or Paul, or in all other men that ever lived, whether intellectual, moral, or spiritual, is found in Him in harmonious perfection; although, for obvious reasons, the manifestations of His all-sided capacity were wholly in the sphere of religious truth, and for the practical end of blessing and saving men, rather than in those more brilliant but really lower achievements of what the world calls *genius*. He has therefore an affinity with all men, below all their differences of mind and character, beyond that of any other being. All men may find in Him their brother as well as pattern, the complement of their being as well as the Saviour of their souls.

Thus we see what is implied in this expression, Son of Man, as declaring the *generic* Humanity of Christ, or as comprehending the whole of humanity in His own Person. He belonged to no particular age, but to all ages. He had not the qualities of one clime or race, but that which is common to all climes and all races. He belonged to no one class or rank or sect, but transcended them all, and comprehended all in His higher Humanity. Not even the distinctions of family and sex could confine His nature or His character, which knew

no limitations but those which belong to man as man, or rather to the Divine Idea of humanity. This is what Paul means when he says that "in Him there is neither Jew nor Gentile, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free." And again, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; but Christ is all and in all"—a Humanity in which there is nothing distinctive, limited, or peculiar, but universal and generic.

4. One more thought remains as implied in the full meaning of this name, Son of Man, which, though already indicated, deserves a somewhat fuller development.

This title denotes that Christ is the *ideal* or *Divine* Man, and as such is wholly above, both in nature and character, the *actual* man, which is imperfect and depraved.

While Christ is Man, truly such, He is not *a* man in the ordinary sense of the term. That is, He is not *of* the race into which He is born, springing from it, or deriving His real being and Humanity from the corrupt human stock which He came to redeem. For, if so, He could not be *above* it in character, or impart to it any divine or redemptive virtue. The distinctions already spoken of prove this. He could not *be* Humanity in its ideal perfection if His humanity were itself derived from the race; for "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean," or a perfect thing out of an imperfect? The peculiar and miraculous character of His birth also shows the same thing. He was not born, like ordinary men, of two human parents, but of one only, deriving His body, or 'flesh,' from His mother, but His Spirit, or true

personality, from God, His real Father (Luke i, 35). He *was* before He became incarnate, and before the race of men was created. He was the Son of Man before He was born of the Virgin Mary, and appeared as such to Daniel and other holy men and patriarchs. Therefore He is such a man as no other of the race is, or can be. Christ is not so much born of the race as born *into* it from a higher sphere, or plane of being. He comes as the Divine Man into our world, emptying Himself of His original Divine form, and His equality with God, and, taking on Himself the form or condition of a servant, was made in the likeness of men. The form and likeness is human, but the reality and personality is divine. This is the Scripture doctrine, and this is what we mean by saying that Christ is the *ideal* and Divine Man, in distinction from actual and common men.

When we speak of the *ideal* of a thing, what do we mean? Not any thing existing in nature, or the world of things, but something *out* of nature, and *above* it; something better and more perfect than the actual thing we behold—viz., the *idea* in which it originated, out of which it sprung, after which it was formed, and toward which it continually aspires.

It may sound strange to some, in these days, to speak of the *idea* of a thing as its original, and not merely its derivative—viz., the notion we form of it, therefore having no existence or reality out of our own minds. But I hesitate not, in the face of this empirical and shallow philosophy, to hold up the older and truer philosophy of which Plato is the grandest expounder; according to which Mind is before matter, and Thought is older than things; that every created thing has its origin in a di-

vine Thought or Idea, which is at once its creative pattern or prototype, and the conception we have of it when we reach its true *idea*. The idea of a thing is the divine *thought* after which it was created, which constitutes the *genus* or generic law of its being, that by which it is what it is; and since Nature is fallen, as well as man, is always *above* the actual fulfillment, which the thing itself suggests, but never wholly realizes.

The ideal of Man is not a Divine thought, but a Divine *Being*. For while God created plants and animals, each after its *kind*—i. e., its generic idea—not so man; of him God said, “Let us make man in *Our* image, after *Our* likeness.” The true ideal, and the true original of humanity, is God, or rather that Divine Personality, who is the primal Image of the invisible God, and the express image of His Person, and who sustains an aboriginal relation to man as the divine Ideal or Prototype of Humanity. This ideal is not realized in any one individual of the race, but only in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, who became an actual man for this very purpose, to realize historically, and under human and finite conditions, what He was essentially; and so be our pattern and Redeemer.

Christ did not derive His Humanity any more than His Divinity from the race into which He was born. All He derived from us was the flesh and blood with which His Humanity was clothed, and that psychical nature connected with it, which belongs to the body and the earth. Therefore Christ is truly man, yet a *Divine* Man; Son of God, and Son of Man; the perfect and ideal Man; that Divine Humanity, which our

fallen humanity suggests but does not realize, toward which, when quickened by His Spirit, it aspires, and in which alone it finds its perfection.

In conclusion, one or two thoughts of practical import are suggested by our subject.

1. We can not but be impressed with the *sacredness* of that common humanity of which all men partake, which was realized in its perfection by the Son of Man, and is still possessed by Him though He now sits at the right hand of God, on the throne of the universe. How empty and worthless are all the distinctions of rank and wealth, in comparison with the *nature* which every man shares in common with Christ, and which He has redeemed and glorified! If it be esteemed an honor to be related to a prince or some great man who has reflected honor upon the race by his worth or genius, how much greater honor and sacredness attaches to every man by reason of his relationship to Jesus Christ. The greatest and most sacred and most glorious Being in the universe claims him as His brother; and though he be poor and degraded and sinful, yet for His sake, who has both shared and redeemed and glorified this humanity of which he partakes, let him be treated tenderly and sacredly, as one for whom Christ died and rose again.

2. We are able to see also, in the light of our subject, what is true *manliness*. It is *Christliness*, or likeness to Christ, the true and model Man, the ideal and Divine Man, the only perfect type and pattern of humanity. How irrational and absurd is the thought which some seem to entertain that by becoming Christians they will

lose somewhat of their manhood and dignity! As if Christianity required any thing of man that is derogatory to true dignity of character, or inconsistent with the finest sense of honor, or the noblest and completest manhood; or bestowed any thing but that which tends to ennoble and refine and perfect our nature. Is there any thing in the character of Christ which if added to, or substituted for, your own imperfect character, would not be an unspeakable gain? Is it not wisdom to take for your standard this matchless and perfect Ideal, the Son of Man, and not any false and pretentious imitations?

3. We see, also, the necessity of union to Christ, as the Son of Man, and of His being formed within us, in order to a true life and a true humanity.

Man can attain to a true life only as he receives the life of God, that eternal life which is in His Son. He can attain to his full and proper manhood only in and through the Divine Humanity of Christ. For this end the Son of God was manifested, and lived a human life as the Son of Man, and was lifted up on the Cross that He might draw all men unto Him. For this end His body was broken, and His blood shed, that the life and virtue of Christ might be imparted to the world in a way to be received. It is as if a new blood should be transfused into the veins of humanity, dying under the disease of sin, from the pierced side of the Son of Man, which not only cleanses from all sin, but restores man to a new and divine life, and builds up within him a true and divine Humanity. All of which is signified by those most significant words of our Lord: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son

of Man and drink His blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood, dwelleth in Me and I in him."

III.

CHRIST THE ROOT OF HUMANITY.

I am the Vine, ye are the branches.—*John xv, 5.*

THIS word declares, under a beautiful and profound symbol, the true relation between Christ and Humanity. The full meaning of this symbol is seldom appreciated, for want of faith and insight to receive it in its entirety—as not only true in a partial and restricted sense, but wholly and absolutely true—the most adequate expression of this relation which can be made in language. When Christ declares, “I am the light of the world,” and the Evangelist writes concerning the Word, “That was the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,” this language is understood and accepted. Just as the sun is the light of the natural world, and gives light to every man that cometh into it, so Christ is the light of the moral and spiritual world, the Sun of Righteousness and Truth, that lighteth every human soul, whether from without, through the Gospel, where He shines in visible brightness, or from within, through the moral instincts and intuitions of the conscience and reason. The natural light of the sun is but an image of that truer and more real light which comes from Christ into the minds and souls of men. So when He declares again, “I am the true Vine, and my Father is the husbandman; as the branch can not bear fruit of

itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me and I in him the same bringeth forth much fruit, for without me ye can do nothing"—He announces a truth equally great, equally true, and equally universal. As that is a truth expressing the relation of Christ to humanity in respect of knowledge, under the symbol of natural *light*, so this is a truth expressing the relation of Christ to humanity in respect of *life*, under a symbol of natural life. This vital relation as exhibited in nature, in the vine and its branches, is but a semblance of that truer and more vital relation which subsists between Christ and redeemed humanity. This, in comparison with that, is but an image compared with the reality, a shadow compared with the substance. "I am *the* vine, ye are the branches."

Notice, first of all, the *comprehensiveness* of the truth here announced. It is not to be restricted to the Church, or true believers simply, since mention is made, at the outset, of unfruitful branches in the vine, which are to be removed. Yet neither is it true, in the fullest sense, of all mankind, since there are many who can not be said to be branches in the true vine, who are not in the true sense partakers of Christ.

The explanation of this seeming inconsistency is easy, and will be more manifest as we proceed. This, like many other truths respecting Christ and His relation to man, admits of a twofold meaning—one a general truth, applicable to all mankind; the other, one that is specifically true in the highest sense only of believers, or true Christians. As in the inspired declaration concerning Christ, that "He is the Saviour of *all* men, especially of

them that believe," so all men are in one sense branches in this true vine, since Christ is a head to all men, being the root and stock of a true humanity; and thus, in this sense, all men hang upon Him, all races and individuals upon earth have a portion in this vine, and are called to the knowledge of it. But especially is this true of those who really believe in and are vitally united to Him.

This may be illustrated by the analogous truth where Christ is represented as the second Adam, or new head of the race, bearing a similar relation to humanity as redeemed to that which the first Adam bears to humanity as fallen and depraved. This relation is both universal and special. For it is written, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." This, which is true in a general sense of all mankind, is true in the highest and spiritual sense only of those who are Christ's. So when Christ declares, "I am the vine, ye are the branches," He announces a truth which is true for all men in their generic relation to Him, as the second Adam, but is specially true in its highest and truest sense only for those who believe in Him, and are vitally united to Him by faith and love.

Let us now consider this truth in its completeness, and what is implied in it.

1. It implies that *the true source and root of humanity is Christ.*

Man is not an independent or self-existent being, but derives his existence and life from a source out of himself. This is a truth universally admitted by all but atheists, but which in its admission is only half believed. The greater truth implied in it, that man lives and has his being in God, is too commonly left out or severed

from it. The true source and origin of man's being, we say, is out of himself or the existing human race. Where, then, is it? Whence do we derive this life and being which constitutes us what we are—living and rational souls? The body we derive from nature, or the physical world, of which it is a part. This we discover by its affinity to the physical elements around it, being composed of the same materials, and resolved into them when deserted by the soul. This too is confirmed by the word of inspiration, that God formed man of the dust of the ground. "Dust thou art," said God to Adam, "and unto dust shalt thou return." But the soul, the real man—whence is this derived? Not from nature; not from any of the material or immaterial elements which are found in the physical world; for there is nothing *kindred* to it here. Not, as some modern scientists attempt to derive it, by development from the brute creation. A thing can *develop* only what is *in* it, potentially, from the first; it can *become* only what it essentially *is*. And there is no spiritual, immortal, thinking principle in the brute. An animal nature can not become or develop into a spiritual, for it is not spirit, but flesh. Man in his higher nature is a supernatural product, and derives his true life and being, not from below, but from above. The true account of his origin is that given by inspiration, which is the best antidote against materialism and false philosophy of every sort. "*God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him.*" After He had formed man from the dust of the ground, He breathed into him the breath of life—that life which is in Himself—and man became a living soul. The soul, which man *is*, is

distinct both in nature and origin from the body which he wears, and is derived from a distinct and diviner source—viz., the nature and life of God.

Again, man is not only a derived being, as opposed to self-existence, but he is a *dependent* being, still deriving his existence and life from the source whence it originally sprung. The very idea of dependence, as the word itself implies, is that of a being *hanging upon* or from another, as fruit hangs from the bough, or a branch from the tree or vine on which it grows. The common idea of creation, as of something made out of nothing, and then thrown off from the hand of the Creator, to be henceforth an isolated and independent thing, existing and moving or living by itself, is a most crude conception, applicable only to the mechanisms of human art, but most inapplicable, and even irrational, in respect to the works or creations of God. Here there is no such thing as independence, but all life and all existence hangs perpetually on the being and exerted power of God, in whom are the ever-flowing springs of all existence. Even the stars and inanimate forces of nature move only as they are moved by the will and constantly exerted might of God. *He* sendeth forth lightnings; *He* bringeth the wind out of His treasures; the strength of the hills is His also. Man's body and bodily life is not an independent and detached existence, but has its roots in nature and the physical world, as truly as a tree has its roots in the soil in which it grows. It lives and draws its sustenance from the world around it, which is evident from the fact that if once completely, or only partially, isolated and severed from all vital connection with it, and left to live in and by itself, the body dies.

So the soul has its roots—the springs of its life and being—not in itself, and not in nature, but in God, from whom it came, and in whom alone it lives and moves and has its being. God is not only the original source whence man derives his being—which is true of all other creatures and things—but He himself is the image or *prototype* in which or after which man is created; which is true of no other creature of which we have record. Man is not only the creature, but the *child* of God—made in His image. God is the creator or former of our bodies, but He is the *Father* of our spirits; which implies that our souls are *descended* from Him, and partake of the divine nature and life. The true original of man is God, or rather that divine personality called the Word, which was with God and was God, the only-begotten Son, who was from eternity the image of the invisible God, after which and by which man was created. The true original of man is not Adam, but Christ. Hence Christ sustains a primal and aboriginal relation to man—before that which was revealed in the incarnation, before and more radical than that which the first Adam sustains. ‘Before Abraham was,’ He declares, ‘*I am*,’ the true Father, not of a select family only, but of the whole human race. All have their source and root in me. *I am the vine, ye are the branches.*

I hold up this grand Scriptural doctrine in opposition to the degrading and blasphemous doctrine lately put forth in the name of science, that man is descended from the brute. The same grand truth is declared by the apostle: “But I would have you know that *the head of every man is Christ*; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God.” As Christ

came forth from God, in whose bosom He lives eternally as the only-begotten Son; as the woman was taken out of the man, in whom she originally was, and with whom she again becomes one by a voluntary and sacred reunion; so man came forth, so to speak, from Christ, in whom, as the image of God, he was created, from whom he still derives his essential humanity, and in whom alone he realizes his true life and manhood. The head of *every* man is Christ, as the source and root whence his humanity is derived, and the crown or summit in which it finds its perfection.

There is a sense in which Christ is *in* every man, as the root and ground of his spiritual being, the inmost law of his humanity. As the generic law of the plant, that *divine idea* after which it is formed, is present in every living tree and shrub, shaping and presiding over its growth, however abnormal and imperfect may be its actual development, or however imperfectly this idea may be realized in the individual, so the divine idea of humanity, which is not a thought, but a *person*—viz., Christ—is present in every man and to every human soul, by virtue of the image of God in which it is created, however marred that image may be, presiding over it and imparting to it all that is highest and truest and best in its spiritual nature. This is the source of all the goodness, of all the greatness and nobleness, as well as of all the holiness, there is in man; of all that is morally excellent, or which commands the reverence and homage of the soul. Let it not be deemed a heresy if I say that there is something *good*, something *divine*, in every man; which yet is not his own, which no man can appropriate to himself as *his* goodness or his divinity.

This we recognize in that 'better nature' which we speak of and appeal to in distinction from the depraved human nature; as if another and diviner self lay behind and above our ordinary self. We recognize it in the *conscience*, which we call, and truly, the voice of God in man; as if there were two voices within, a divine and a human, sometimes blending, but oftener conflicting with each other. We recognize it in the *reason*, which is not any self-kindled light, or any reflection from nature through the senses, but a ray of the divine Reason, or Logos, which was in the beginning with God—the inward shining of that true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. We may recognize it in those *ideals* of goodness and excellence which rise in the soul, as if in mockery and condemnation of all actual human virtue which we or others have attained, and which can come only from a source within, yet above, ourselves.

We recognize it also in that sense of a *righteousness* within, deeper, more real, and more inextinguishable even than our consciousness of guilt; a righteousness that is ours and yet not ours; which found utterance in Job, when he justified himself before God, and to the divine approval, notwithstanding his felt unworthiness, and though he abhorred himself, and repented in dust and ashes: a paradox which finds its solution in that Christian confession of faith made thousands of years before Christ appeared—"I know that my Redeemer liveth."

We recognize it again in that conflict and antagonism between the *flesh* and the *spirit*, or between the law of the mind, the moral reason, and the law in the members,

described by St. Paul in the seventh chapter of Romans; which all men, even 'the heathen,' have experienced. While he confesses, "For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not;"—yet he says, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man [in the inmost core of his being]. But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." And the conclusion he reaches is, "Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." That is, sin is no part of the real and true self; it is no part of the nature of man as it comes from the hand of God; but is an enemy and a usurper that has got possession of the lower nature, and brought the man into bondage; from which bondage Christ only, the Divine Man, can deliver us.

We recognize it, finally, in the superior goodness and wisdom which many of the heathen attained before Christianity appeared, and which evinces something more in them than a depraved human nature, something *divine*, else they could never have risen above the darkness and corruption which reigned about them. The virtue of Socrates was not, any more than that of Abraham, a self-originated virtue or goodness, but sprung from the same divine root which produced that of a Paul, an Augustine, and a Luther.

Now, what are all these gleams and manifestations of the Divine in man, whether they be voices of conscience, or intuitions and ideals of the reason, or aspirations and strivings of the spirit in conflict with the flesh, or natu-

ral faith and goodness so called, but which is really supernatural—what are they all but so many revelations of a *Christ in Humanity*, as its divine root and ground, a permanent presence and indwelling of the Divinity in man, prior to His incarnation or revelation in the flesh?

Some Christian scholars delight to trace the presence of Christ in History, by showing how He is the central law which governs and shapes the course of all human events. No better service could be done to Christianity than by tracing also the presence of Christ in Humanity, by showing how He is likewise the central law within and beneath the workings of every human soul; in most unrecognized, or put by as an unwelcome presence; in others, before He appeared in the flesh, acknowledged under other names—as the Dæmon in Socrates, or the ‘Word of the Lord’ that came to the prophets and holy men of old, and sometimes burned within them as a fire shut up in their bones—in all as an inward voice or light, even that true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

But these revelations of the divine in man, let it be also considered, are but broken and partial revelations; glimpses only of a better nature obstructed and overpowered by the lower; gleams of a celestial light breaking through the dense clouds of animalism and sense and passion. Conscience, though it be the sovereign, is not the reigning power in man. Goodness, though it be the normal, is not the natural and spontaneous product of the soul. While we see and approve the right, we do the wrong. While we delight in the law of God after the inward man, we find another law of sin in the members thwarting our better nature, and bringing us

into captivity to its base and evil dominion. And this fact, which is universal, indicates, what experience and Scripture both testify, that some terrible catastrophe has befallen the race, paralyzing its divine energies, and preventing or perverting its true and normal development. It is as if a deadly wound had been inflicted upon the very trunk of the tree of humanity, near to its root, interrupting the vital connection between the root and the branches, and causing the whole tree to suffer, to become distorted and stunted and fruitless, or to bear only diseased and withered fruit.

Need I say that such a wound has been inflicted in the *fall* of man, which is nothing else than a severance or disruption of the soul, in its inmost life, from God in whom it lives. And with the soul the body, which shares inseparably its fortunes, fell out of the harmony of life and health, in which it was created, into disease and death.

Humanity, in the person of its head, sinned, and so ruptured the vital spiritual bond by which the life of God flowed into and nourished the true life of man; which may as well be done by the first man for all his descendants, as the tree may suffer in all its branches, and in all its future growth, from a wound upon its trunk when a sapling. The vital connection between the divine root and the human branches in respect to spiritual life was sundered or fatally interrupted, while the organic connection, in respect to natural life, remains. Hence the natural state of man is that of spiritual death; being alienated from the life of God, and practically averse from the law of God, which is yet the true law of humanity. Hence the discord, conflict, and contra-

dictions which appear in man ; being made in the image of God, and capable of a divine and immortal life, but developing only an undivine, depraved, deformed, and diseased humanity—through which gleams and currents of the divine stream occasionally, like sunlight bursting through clouds, or flashes of reason through the bewildered fancies and ravings of a maniac.

The soul is not wholly and completely severed from God by the fall. This is a blessed truth, which it becomes us to know. There are still visitations and influxes of the Divinity in man, even of every unregenerate man that is not wholly lost. There is a light of God in every soul that has not quenched it and turned it into darkness. There is, O believe it ! a living and divine Redeemer, not only in the Gospel, but below and at the root of every human life, which sustains a closer relation to us than father or mother or wife or sister or brother, or the world in which we live ; which is the true ground and sustainer, as well as Redeemer, of the soul.

What we mean to say is this : that Christ sustains an *original* and *essential* relation to humanity, such that His word is evermore true for all men—“*I am the vine, ye are the branches.*” This relation was not first established, this word was not first true, when Christ appeared in the flesh, and His disciples began to believe on Him, and to draw their spiritual life from Him ; but it always existed, and was true from the beginning. He is the root as well as the offspring of David. He is the true Vine of Humanity, and all men are but branches in Him, broken indeed by the fall, yet never entirely severed, at least in this world, from Him who is both the Life and the Light of men. The Incarnation is only a means for

reuniting the broken branches to the vine, of re-establishing the vital and normal relation between Christ and humanity. Hence I remark:

2. This word implies that *our truest humanity is derived from Christ, and is realized only in Him, and by union to Him.*

Christ is God's idea of Man realized and perfected, actualized before us in a divine-human life; even as He was originally the Ideal, or prototype, after which man was created. This idea is not realized in *men*, as we have already seen, because of sin and separation from God. Even our own ideal of human excellence is not attained, much less that of the Divine mind. Hence there needed to be a manifestation in time and in the world of a true and divine Humanity, one that should exhibit in perfection that image of God in which man was created; one that should exhibit also that perfect union of man with God which was sundered by the fall. This was needed both that men might see what a true humanity is, and that by it they might be restored to God and goodness, and so realize that perfection for which they were created. Therefore He who is the true and primeval Image of God, the divine Word, the eternal and only-begotten Son, became man, and dwelt among us, entering into and passing through all the experiences and temptations and sufferings of humanity, and showing forth in all these ways both what God is and what man was made to be. He realized the full and perfect idea of man in vital or perfect union with God, and so became a new stock or vine of humanity, into which the broken and fallen branches might be re-inserted and live.

Whatever perfection humanity, according to its divine idea, is capable of possessing, whatever grace or virtue is conceivable, whether divine or human, is exhibited in Him in actual and living form; and may not only be seen but possessed by every man *in Him*, by a participation of His life and spirit. "Of His fullness," says an apostle, "have all we received, and grace for grace."

He is the fountain where every man may draw just what he needs to fill out and complement his imperfect character. Are you deficient in wisdom, or meekness, or patience, or self-sacrificing love? Here is wisdom and meekness and patience, and love that is perfect and divine—sufficient to complete all that is lacking in you.

And all this store and fullness is yours, if Christ is yours: "And ye are complete in Him, who is the head of all principality and power"—and only *in Him*.

But in order to this completeness, and the full participation of Christ, *faith*—a voluntary act or state of reception on our part—is requisite.

The ingrafting or vital union of the soul to Christ is not a matter of necessity or compulsion, but of freedom. Hence Christ addresses men in words of persuasion. To the weak and bruised souls, torn by the tempests of the world, He says, "Come unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest." To those already dead, branches broken off and withered, He declares: "He that believeth in me, *though he were dead*, yet shall he live." There is power in Christ to quicken even those dead in trespasses and sins. He gathers, or seeks to gather, and unite to Himself, as the true Vine, the sundered and scattered branches of humanity, and impart to them His own divine life. And when once inserted

or grafted into Him, faith is still necessary to preserve the union and realize all its saving efficacy. "*Abide* in me and I in you: if a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered."

3. This word of the Saviour implies a *community of nature between Christ and humanity*. The vine is not a different nature from the branches which grow from it, though before them in time and dignity. So Christ is not a different nature from the race He came to save, but essentially one with it. "For both He that sanctifieth and they which are sanctified are all *of one*; for which cause He is not ashamed to call them *brethren*." This original affinity or fraternity between Christ and His human brethren was *manifested*, not constituted, by the Incarnation. This miracle of time, wonderful as it is, was not a violation of the nature of God, or of the Son of God, but only completed, visibly and perfectly, that oneness with man which existed essentially before. "Forasmuch, then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also himself likewise took part of the same. . . . Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren." Being like them in nature and kind, He now becomes like them in form and condition, partaking of flesh and blood; partaking, too, of suffering and temptation. "For in that he Himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them that are tempted"—succor them out of His own *human experience* as well as by His divine power.

This also may help us to understand how Christians were loved and chosen in Christ 'before the foundation of the world.' Humanity, or the human race, was *in* Christ, as its spiritual head, from eternity, as it was in

Adam, its natural head and father, from his creation; or as the branches of the vine are in the root and stalk before they are produced from it. God loved them in Christ, the Father loved us in the Son, before the foundation of the world, not for our sakes, but for *His* sake—the only-begotten and well-beloved Son. As the children of a friend are beloved for the father's sake, irrespective of their own character or desert, so mankind are loved in their sin and rebellion for His sake from whom they sprung, whose image and nature they bear.

4. Finally, this word implies a *community of life between Christ and His disciples*. While this word is ideally true for all men, that Christ is the vine and they are the branches, since He is the true root and stock of humanity, it is actually and completely true only in respect to those who are united to Christ by a living faith and love, who are grafted anew into this vine, and partake vitally of its living virtue. Christians are one with Christ, not only in nature, but in spirit. They live only as He lives in them; their righteousness and strength and *life* is in Him, and derived from Him. Hence His word is, "*Abide* in me, and I in you; as the branch can not bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me; for without me ye can do nothing."

Without Christ and the life of Christ within, no man can really *live*, any more than a branch can live apart and dissevered from the parent stock. "He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life. . . . If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered"—i. e., if there be no abiding indwelling community of life between Christ

and the disciple, his condition and fate is that of a withered branch. His having been once a part of the vine, or his present outward attachment to it, is nothing, if there be no vital and inward union, if no life flow from the vine into the branches. The destiny of all such dead and fruitless branches is indicated in the calm but terrible words—"He is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."

In conclusion, our subject furnishes two or three practical applications.

1. We learn wherein consists *the true unity of the Church*. It is in its vital union to Christ, from whom and in whom it subsists. The unity of a vine consists not in the singleness or uniformity of its outward growth. It may be dispartite in form, and divergent in its several trunks and branches. Some of these may be trained to an elaborate trellis which furnishes support for every shoot and tendril, while others may grow in wild freedom, their luxuriant branches running over the walls of the vineyard; but so long as it springs from one root and partakes of one life its unity is preserved.

So the Church may be manifold in its several branches, and diverse in its outward organization, its creed, and polity—which are but the supports or frame-work to which and by which it is trained; but so long as it is vitally joined to the Root, and receives its life and nourishment from Christ, it is the one holy catholic Church, though distinguished by different names.

A *sect* is a branch cut off (*sectus*) from the main stock, and seeking to live an independent life as if it were the whole. Hence all sectarianism is in spirit, if

not in fact, heretical and schismatic—a dividing of the body of Christ, not by the natural division of growth, but by a vivisection and dismemberment. The fate of all such sects and divisions is and must be the same for them as for individuals—“If a man abide not in me he is cast off as a branch, and is *withered*.”

2. We may see the duty and privilege of Christians as members of Christ or branches in the true Vine. It is all indicated in one word of Christ, viz., to *bear fruit*. “Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples.” It is not enough simply to have been *with* Christ, or to be called His disciples, or to be nominal members of His Church—outward branches attached to the vine by a mere local adhesion. The one vital, essential question is—Are we *in* Christ? do we abide in Him, and does Christ abide and live in us? Is there a real *oneness* between His spirit and life and ours? Does the word or doctrine of Christ so abide in us that we practically exemplify it in our lives, so that men may know what Christ was from what we are, may learn what Christ taught by what we *do*? Do the *charities* of Christ live in us, and is the fruit we bear seen and acknowledged to be *divine* fruit and not human, the product, not of a bare human will, putting forth its own natural, sour, and stunted virtues, but the gentle graces, the generous, mellow, and perfected fruits of the Spirit of God? Are they recognized, not as our virtues and graces, but those of Christ reproduced in us, making our life an extension and continuation, as it were, of the life of Christ: as the fruitful branches of a vine are but the extension and overflow of the life of the stock from which and in which they grow? No other-

wise can we realize in all its fullness that declaration of the Saviour—"I am the vine, ye are the branches."

3. Our subject has a practical application also to those who are not Christians, or not vitally united to Christ.

You may have thought that because you are not members of the Church, or members of Christ in the truest sense, that therefore Christ is nothing to you or you to Him; and that the great redemption He has wrought does not include you, at least that you have only a possible, not an actual and present interest in it and in Him. Some interpretations of the Gospel, it is but too true, exclude from its benefits all but a limited portion of the human family, for whom alone, it is said, Christ really died, and who alone have any real interest and portion in Him. Just as some interpretations of humanity exclude from this title and from the common rights of man a large portion of the race who have fallen below the true dignity of manhood, and exist as a degraded and servile and outcast race. But a better and truer interpretation says, 'Nay, these degraded and ignorant and brutalized beings are *men*; the image of God is in them, however defaced and indistinguishable it may be; they inherit the sacred nature and the sacred rights of humanity, and are to be regarded and treated as brethren, and not as brutes or chattels.' So a truer interpretation of the Gospel recognizes in all men an inherent and indestructible relation to Jesus Christ, the Divine Man, the true type and head and Redeemer of humanity; however far they may have fallen below or away from the divine type, or however they may ignore and deny this relation. He is the Vine in which all men are originally and normally the branches. The head of

every man is Christ. In coming into the world, "*He came unto His own*, and His own received Him not;" they were not His because they received Him, but before, and even while they rejected Him. Christ died for all, and is the Saviour of all men, notwithstanding that some will reject Him and perish forever. The branch that is severed from the vine none the less belongs to it, in one sense, than if it were visibly growing in it; and the death it suffers, in its dry and withered separation, is death only because it *does* belong to the stock from which it is broken off. The prodigal son was as really a *son*, as truly belonged to the family and home from which he had wandered, when he was a swineherd in the wilderness, as when he came to himself and returned in penitence to his father's house. So every man, however low he may have sunk, or however far he may have wandered in sin, *belongs to Christ*, more truly than to himself; he has an *interest* in Christ and his redemption beyond every other interest, whether he realize or lay claim to it or not. Think not, then, O sinful and wandering soul, that Christ is nothing to you because you are not a Christian. If you are a *man*, you *belong* to Christ by the twofold bond of creation and redemption—creation in His image and redemption by His blood. Christ is more to you, He sustains a closer and more vital relation, than father or mother, or wife or husband, or any other dearest being in the universe. The air and light and food in which and by which you live are not so necessary to your physical existence as Christ is to your soul's life. And yet you are attempting to live without Christ, to be a living branch in the tree of humanity apart from the Root that alone sustains and

nourishes it. Try no longer so vain and fatal an experiment. Believe the word which declares, "Without me ye can do nothing." Seek not to prove further by your own dismal experience that other fearful word so tenderly uttered, "If a man abide not in me he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."

IV.

THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OF JESUS.

And the child Jesus grew and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was upon him.—*Luke ii, 40.*

THERE is great significance in the fact, seldom appreciated by common believers or teachers of Christianity, that Jesus was once a *child*, with a child's thoughts, feelings, joys, griefs, and trials. Not only was He a man, and therefore nothing human was alien to Him but sin, He was also a child, and nothing childish is unknown to His experience or removed from His sympathy. He became a child, as Irenæus beautifully observes, that He might be the Saviour of children. He has sanctified childhood, as He has every other age and experience of humanity, by passing through it. And the light and sanctity of this divine childhood still lingers around every human child, as the ideal of the artist hovers over the statue he has wrought, making it beautiful by the reflection of its pure and perfect beauty.

It is a question full of unutterable meaning, why the Lord of glory came into the world as an infant, not distinguished outwardly from other infants, and grew up to maturity as other children; and not, as we should expect a Divine being to come, descending visibly from heaven in the form of God, and radiant with the glories of Divinity. Or, if it behooved him to become a man,

and to be made in all things like unto His brethren, why those thirty years of obscurity passed in the humble vale of Nazareth—an obscurity guarded by the silence of the Evangelists, which is unbroken except by the single sentence of the text and a single anecdote of His boyhood.

The wisdom of God in the Incarnation, and in the inspired record of it, is manifestly not the wisdom of man. 'It is the glory of God to conceal a thing.' And this glory and wisdom is apparent to those who can perceive it, in this very concealment of His Divinity under the veil of humanity, even of infancy, with its weakness and dependence, and its subjection to all the conditions of human growth and development, of obscurity in His life and ignominy in His death.

There is more, infinitely more, in this mystery of the Incarnation than the wisest theologians have yet discovered. The method usually employed, of stripping off the humanity of Jesus, or prying curiously into it with the cold eyes of logical speculation, to see the Divinity within—as if this *could* be seen apart from the human—is a murderous process, killing not only all true faith, but all true life, which can be developed or manifested only under the conditions of life, viz., an inseparable union and harmonious blending of all the forces, material and spiritual, which constitute a living being. The separation of the divine and human in the life and experience of Christ—calling His growth, His temptation, and His sufferings human, and His miracles divine—is simply a denial of the Incarnation, and the substitution of a bare conjunction of persons, at once untrue to history and confusing to faith.

Can you separate the vital principle from its material

organism, and argue from the essential nature of life how it ought to manifest itself? Or can you, reasoning from the spiritual nature of the soul, affirm what ought to be its experience or consciousness: how much or how little intelligence it ought to have, when inclosed within the brain of an infant? No more can we reason from the nature of God, or the eternal Word, as an omniscient and creative power, what this Divinity ought to be when veiled in flesh, or, rather, when it has *become* flesh, and entered not only the form, but into all the conditions, physical and psychological, of infancy and childhood. Suffice it to know that the child Jesus—meaning not one part of Him, but the whole of that Divine-human being who was born in Bethlehem—*grew*, physically, intellectually, and morally, like other children; that He passed through all the stages of human growth and development, from infancy to manhood; and this not in appearance only, but in reality. If He were a real and true *man*, as He unquestionably was, He was also a real and true *child*, growing, as other children do, in stature, in knowledge and wisdom, in moral and spiritual strength or character, even as the Scriptures declare.

Let us look at this fact of the childhood or early development of Jesus, divesting it, if we can, of those misapprehensions which obscure its reality and rob it of its beautiful interest and instruction for us.

1. The fact that Jesus grew, as other children, implies that He passed through a stage of *immaturity* and *imperfection*, when His mind and character were forming, and only gradually reached the maturity of a perfect manhood. This is not inconsistent with the idea of a

sinless and even faultless childhood, since immaturity is not to be confounded with depravity or moral obliquity. We find it difficult to conceive of such a childhood, because all children that we know have some *faults* to be corrected as well as crudities to be ripened; and imperfection thus becomes naturally associated, with evil in our thoughts. But if sin had not entered the world, we should see childhood developing into youth and manhood as naturally and as beautifully as a flower grows from the bud into the perfect blossom, free from fault or blemish—perfect as a bud, and yet capable at every stage of a fuller and more perfect grace. Such we conceive to have been the early development of Jesus—a celestial flower growing under the selectest influences of heaven and earth, unfolding more and more the graces of the Spirit, and gradually ripening into a mature and perfect character. Neither is this inconsistent with the idea of His Divinity, as some suppose, but only with certain crude and almost mechanical conceptions of it. His Divine consciousness, being not distinct or separable from the human, was subject to the same law of growth and limitation. We may illustrate this from the growth or development of *reason* in children. This faculty is not so much an individual as a *universal* attribute or endowment, of which all men partake, and so many represent to us the *Divine* in Christ, that eternal Word which was with God, and was God, and which was made flesh, or became incarnate, in the person of Jesus. This, too, is a divine light in man, not so much an unfolding from within, as an inshining from without and above, being a ray from that true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the

world. Now as this light of reason (*logos*) is in every man, and is his truest humanity—being the image of God in which we were created—yet is not in full and perfect possession all at once, but is subject to increase and development, insomuch that only in a few of the race it has attained its full-orbed radiance—so the original Divine Logos came under the same law of limitation and increase in the person of Jesus, being graduated in its conscious unfolding by the finite and expanding vehicle in which it was revealed. And so it is written that Jesus '*increased in wisdom*,' although in His essential being He was Himself the Wisdom of God, that was with Him in the beginning when He laid the foundation of the world.

2. Let us now look a little more closely at the *conditions* of this growth, or early development, of Jesus. These were the same, doubtless, in kind as those of other children, only more perfect in quality and degree, and less hindered in their operation by innate depravity. His *physical* growth was necessarily dependent on food and air and exercise, and other physical conditions, which, in the simple rural and Oriental life in which He grew up, were more favorable to health and vigor than under our more artificial and stimulating modes of living. Jesus when a child did not sin, nor did His parents cause Him to sin, against His body, by violating those physical laws whose transgression induces so much of pain and sickness and hereditary disease in our day. Growing up in the bosom of Nature, and in obedience to its divine laws, in that mild and salubrious climate, His physical person we may believe to have been a model of strength and beauty, like that of the youthful David,

His royal ancestor; or like Moses, of whom Jewish legends relate that such was the wonderful beauty of the child that passers-by stopped to look at him, and laborers left their work to steal a glance. The Divine Man and second Adam, who came to be the Saviour of the body as well as of the soul, could not be other than physically perfect. A lamb without blemish was this Lamb of God. And this implies a perfect and sinless obedience to the physical as well as to the moral laws of God.

His *intellectual* development was not less dependent upon outward conditions; and these too were simpler, and therefore better, more wholesome, because less stimulating, than our forced, artificial, and often oppressive modes of culture. We know not if there were schools for children in those days—certainly there were no infant or primary schools—but the parent, and especially the mother, was the natural instructor of the child in all necessary knowledge, as she is the nurse and provider for its physical wants. What this Divine child learned from His human mother in those years of sweet and loving dependence, what wise questions He asked, or what wonderful sayings He uttered in that humble home, which Mary, His mother, laid up and pondered in her heart, we may never know, at least in this world; for the lips of inspiration are sealed except in a single instance. But there were two oracles of instruction ever open, in which God spake to His Son, and taught Him, preparatory to His speaking through Him to the world He came to save. The first of these were the *Scriptures of the Old Testament*, that sincere milk of the word by which all devout and holy minds have been nourished, and have grown thereby. Jesus's intimate familiarity with the letter of

Scripture, shown by His frequent quotations from it, evince how carefully He had studied the written Word—like the Psalmist, hiding it in His heart. . And His profound and sometimes startling penetration into its spirit shows a deeper and more spiritual knowledge of it, such as no Rabbi or mere human expositor could have imparted.

Besides this, there was that other not less sacred book, or revelation, of *Nature*, where God's thoughts are written and embodied in the things that are made. And of this book the child Jesus was a constant and diligent student. The vale of Nazareth is described by travelers as one of the most beautiful spots to be found in Palestine, or even in the world. 'St. Jerome rightly calls it the flower of Galilee, and compares it to a rose opening its corolla. It does not command a landscape like Bethlehem; the girdle of hills which incloses it makes it a calm retreat, the silence of which is, still in our day, broken by the hammer and chisel of the artisan. The child Jesus grew up in the midst of a thoroughly simple life, in which a soul like His might best develop its harmonies. He had only to climb the surrounding heights to contemplate one of the finest landscapes of the Holy Land. At His feet lay the plain of Jezreel, tapestried with myriad flowers, each one more beautiful than Solomon in all his glory. Its boundaries were Tabor and Carmel, whence echoed the voice of Elijah; Lebanon confronted Carmel, and the chain of Hermon joined its snowy summits to the mountains of Moab; while afar off glimmered the Great Sea, which, outlying all national barriers, seemed to open to Jesus that world which He came to save.'*

* Pressensé.

Here, surrounded by this stately beauty, in daily communion with objects of grandeur and delight, the mind of Jesus expanded to a sympathy with all God's creatures. Here He learned to read the symbolic and spiritual meanings of nature—in the flowers of the field and the birds of the air, and in the still, deep mysteries of the germinating seed and the growing grain; meanings which He afterward expanded into parables in His public discourses. Here He fed His soul with lofty thoughts and heavenly contemplations, drinking in from those deep, divine fountains that calmness and patience, that repose and strength of spirit, which communion with nature, or with God in nature, is fitted to inspire, and which so eminently characterized the mind of Jesus.

In thus attributing to the influence of natural objects an instrumentality in the intellectual and moral development of Jesus, I do not exclude other supernatural influences; for we read that 'the grace of God was upon Him.' But neither does the supernatural grace exclude or supersede these natural agencies which have acted so powerfully on other men, and to which He, as the Son of Man, must have been peculiarly susceptible.

In regard to His *moral* development, distinctively such—His growth in character, or in moral and spiritual strength—the *fact* of such a growth must be first of all admitted, which it will not be difficult to do after what has been said. For one of the conditions of the incarnation was that Jesus should grow up under the laws of humanity, and should form or establish a character, as well as other men. And it is expressly declared that He grew, and 'waxed strong in spirit,' as well as increased in wisdom and stature.

If it be asked how this was done, I answer, By the exercise of His moral powers in resisting the temptations arising from mere natural desire, and which needed to be controlled in Him as well as in all men. While the grace of God was upon Him and in Him, to inspire and aid His good endeavors, it did not supersede His own free moral agency. The discipline of life came to Him, as it does to all, and challenged Him to conflict; and He acquired moral strength and wisdom only through experience and trial, by overcoming whatever foe or hindrance lay in His path of holy obedience. And this was not an easy victory, but involved conflict, self-denial, and suffering. For we read that, "Though He were a Son, yet *learned* He obedience by the things which He suffered;" and that "He was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin;" which He could not be, without a real conflict between desire and will, between the flesh and spirit. The difference between Him and other men was not in His exemption from trial and moral discipline, nor in His impeccability or inability to do wrong, but in the fact that in Him the spirit, or will, never succumbed to temptation, but remained steadfast and sinless though continually solicited; while in others the will is often overcome, and so weakened in its power of resistance. The conflict in Him was to *retain* His integrity, in others to recover it. And the indispensable help in this conflict, without which no wisdom and no virtue can be established, was *reflection* and *prayer*; a thoughtful vigilance to detect the first approaches and manifold disguises of moral evil, and a reinforcement of spiritual strength from the infinite Source of all strength and wisdom. That charge so often made to His disciples

afterward, "Watch and pray, lest ye enter into temptation," was drawn from His own deep and life-long experience.

3. Another point to be noticed in the early development of Jesus is *the growing consciousness of His Divine character and mission*, which must have been a gradual birth or disclosure, a dawning within of that supernatural light which declared Him to be the Light of the world, and which increased more and more unto the perfect day. To suppose otherwise, or that He possessed from the first the full consciousness of His Divinity, and of the mission for which He was sent into the world, is too violent an assumption, and utterly inconsistent with His growth in wisdom and other divine knowledge. It is more in harmony with all we know of His early history to suppose that this divine consciousness followed the same law of development as His other faculties, and was analogous in its unfolding to what we term *genius*, or the consciousness of a special endowment fitting its possessor for a special work or mission in the world. Without dogmatizing on so mysterious a subject, we may yet believe that His divine Sonship, and the exalted nature of His mission, was at first a matter of *faith* rather than of knowledge, or immediate revelation; a faith that strengthened more and more as His character and powers expanded, as He saw and felt the difference between Himself and others, and as His knowledge of the Scriptures increased, until its miraculous confirmation and attestation at His baptism. The thoughts which Milton in his 'Paradise Regained' puts into the mind of Jesus, as He revolves His past life and experience, during those forty days in the wilderness, preparatory to

His entry on His public ministry—these thoughts are not all poetry, but doubtless have a basis of truth and reality in that wonderful childhood, which must have been distinguished from other childhoods by its serious and *reflective* spirit:

“When I was yet a child, no childish play
To me was pleasing; all my mind was set
Serious to learn and know, and thence to do
What might be public good.”

We do not know, of course, when this consciousness of His divine character and mission took definite form in His mind—when the discovery of what He was, whence He came, and what He was born to do, first awoke within Him. There were doubtless periods in His childhood, as there are in other childhoods, when these questions filled Him with awe, and received partial answers that opened new depths in His consciousness, and made an epoch in His life and experience. One of these periods is mentioned in the Gospel, the only anecdote of His childhood that has come down to us, and on this account is worthy of careful study.

Jesus was twelve years old when He accompanied His parents to Jerusalem, according to the custom of the Jews, to celebrate the feast of the Passover, and to be initiated into the public religious life of the nation. This solemn visit to the temple filled the soul of Jesus with unutterable emotions. He beheld for the first time since infancy the city of His father David, and the house of God His greater and true Father, with all its venerable and hallowed associations. He felt the awe and thrill not only which is inspired by looking at majestic and imposing scenes, but that deeper awe which comes

to a soul dimly conscious of a mysterious relationship between itself and the object beheld.

Unwilling to leave a place the most interesting to Him on earth, He stayed behind after the company had set out on their return ; but was not missed until they encamped for the night ; when, finding He was not there, His parents returned to Jerusalem seeking Him. On the third day they found Him in the temple, ‘sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them and asking them questions.’ The questions of a child, it has been truly said, are often wiser and ‘more embarrassing by their artless depth than the arguments of the most consummate dialectician. They go straight to the truth by the royal road of simplicity.’ And what questions were asked by this wonderful child, sitting there in the temple, in the midst of the doctors (like the child He afterward set down in the midst of the wrangling disciples), we may imagine, but we can not know. We may well believe, however, that they were wiser and deeper than these doctors could answer. There was not a white-headed Rabbi in the schools of the law who could meet the questions of this child of Nazareth. When His mother, grieved at the trouble He had caused them, addressed Him in words of tender reproach, He gave that deep and mysterious reply : “How was it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father’s business?”—or perhaps more correctly rendered, *in my Father’s house*—a reply whose artless simplicity reaches how far, and discloses how much ! It is a touch of truthfulness in the narrative, when it is said that ‘they understood not the saying which He spake unto them ;’ and a still more delicate stroke when it is added, ‘But

His mother kept all these sayings in her heart,' pondering the holy secret of their meaning, as she had that of His mysterious birth, till time should disclose it.

This scene in the temple, as Pressensé has observed, 'was of great moment in the development of Jesus, by revealing Him to Himself.' It was a crisis in His life, when He passed from the spontaneous and receptive period of childhood to the self-conscious and self-reflective period of youth and adolescence; when the great meaning of life—great and mysterious to all, but how much greater and more wonderful to Him!—begins to present itself to the young soul, and questions of infinite depth and moment press on it for solution and for action. This crisis in the history of Jesus is marked by this single incident, which reveals a momentary glimpse into this most interesting transition period—and then the curtain falls, with this brief sentence: "And He went down with them [His parents], and came to Nazareth, and was subject unto them."

The next eighteen years He passed in the most complete obscurity, unbroken by a single word of authentic Scripture. Legends enough abound, and are preserved in certain apocryphal gospels, especially one called 'The Gospel of the Infancy;' but their puerility and grotesque absurdity only serve as a foil of falsehood to set forth in stronger contrast the beautiful simplicity of the true Gospel.

This period of seclusion was at length ended by His baptism, and His withdrawal into the wilderness for a season of solitary thought and preparation for His work—called in the Gospel His *temptation*.

The significance of this forty days' retirement in the

life of Christ is seldom fully appreciated ; when the divine powers which had hitherto slumbered in Him, as it were, awoke with an energy that made Him oblivious of food and all other physical wants, and the consciousness of His divine character and mission burst into full and tumultuous recognition ; when His will, reinforced by prayer and meditation, rose to meet His dawning destiny, and accept the work given Him to do, victoriously overcoming and thrusting aside the temptations here presented to Him to use His divine power for Himself, and not for God and humanity ; and, finally, when He calmly and with earnest forethought lays out His great plan of life and labor that was to terminate in the cross. The significance of this interval, not only in its relation to His after-life, but as a type of what all great and earnest souls, who have wrought a mission in the world, have experienced—is a matter for reflection, but which I can not here pursue.

4. Did time permit, I would here consider, as a last point, the significance of this *obscurity* of the life of Jesus during His residence at Nazareth, and before entering upon His public ministry ; the bearing of this period upon His subsequent history, as a preparation for His work, and the moral lessons it contains for us. I will here only call your attention to the fact, as food for much and deep reflection, that He whose life-work was to be the greatest and most momentous that was ever wrought on earth, passed the greater portion of His life in the privacy of a humble home, in an obscure country village, engaged in the lowly occupation of a carpenter. He who had slumbering within Him divine and miraculous powers, who was destined to revolutionize human

society, and found a religion and a kingdom which should supersede and outlive all others, was content to pass among his countrymen for a carpenter's son, and was for thirty years unknown beyond his native hills. He whose name in heaven was the Word, and whose spoken words were to shake the world, and to endure when heaven and earth shall have passed away, was *silent* during all that period when in our day young men, and young women too, are impatient to be heard. And this not because He had no occasion, and did not burn to speak out against the corruptions and hypocrisies of the age, but because *His hour was not yet come*. He repressed the rising indignation, and nursed in patient silence the struggling thought, which uttered prematurely would have ruined the cause He came to lead; and so was able to speak at length with the meekness and moderation, and also with the authority, of true wisdom.

He who is the model Man set this example in a world of noisy and impetuous action, of living for thirty years in obscurity, in quiet and noiseless preparation for His work, and only three years as a public teacher and benefactor. There is a world of meaning in this fact; and one of its meanings is that great characters and great things are not made in a hurry, or by any extempore or fortuitous method; that *quality* weighs more with God than *quantity*; and that this outward material life, which is all in all with us—the occupations we pursue, the positions we occupy, the fortune, the success, or the reputation we acquire—is of far less consequence than that inward life of thought and character which we live before God. *That* is circumstantial, the mere husk or envelope of the man, which appears for a time, and then

drops off and passes away ; *this* is the real life and being that endures forever.

In that still, retired, meditative life which the youth Jesus lived at Nazareth, so undistinguished outwardly, so unlike what the youth of our day aspire after, there was slowly maturing a divine wisdom and power that was to work the world's redemption.

So of Moses, the man of God. It was not in the court of Pharaoh, but in the deserts of Sinai, while leading the flock of Jethro through those lonely defiles, among those grand and awful peaks, that he learned most of God and himself, and was prepared to lead the children of Israel, like a flock, to the Mount of God and the Promised Land. So of Elijah and John the Baptist, of Luther and all great and holy men, sons of God and prophets. It is not in great cities, but in some secluded vale among the hills, shut away from the great human world, and shut in to the greater divine world within and around them, that the great teachers, philosophers, and poets of all time have mostly arisen and received their education. Their inspiration and power were drawn, not chiefly from books or society, but from the deep wells of thought and wisdom opened in the soul by communion with God and nature. Men of the world are made by the world, after the world's law and method ; but men of God, or God's men, like all divine things, grow slowly and silently, fed with all divine and heavenly influences, and waxing strong through that which weakens ordinary men—solitude, adverse circumstances, poverty, and obscurity—till, having attained their stature, they emerge from their concealment to instruct, to reform, and to bless the world.

V.

THE IMAGE OF GOD.

So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him.—*Genesis i, 27.*

IN these high and emphatic words is announced the grand fact of the origin of Man, the crowning act of the drama of creation, the masterpiece of the Creator's hand. The repetition, or twofold announcement of the fact, indicates something great and wonderful, which deserves especial notice. There is some eminent distinction implied in the fact thus emphatically announced, which distinguishes it from all the facts or events which had preceded, and sets it above them as the crowning wonder. This is also seen in the foregoing verses, in the peculiar manner in which this fact is introduced. The manner in which God sets about the creation of man is different from that of any other work which He had made. It is preceded, you will observe, by a *consultation*. A counsel or deliberation is held in the Divine mind, which is represented, in the dramatic form observed throughout the history, in these words: "*And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.*" This indicates, what the whole description implies, a more immediate and personal act of creation, or an act in which more of the Divine presence and working was to be engaged than in any preceding. God

does not say simply, Let there be man; as He said in the beginning of the creation, "Let there be light"—standing aloof and observant, as it were, while the mandate is obeyed. He does not say, Let the earth bring forth man upon it; as in the creation of plants and animals He had said, on the third day, "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind." Or as, yet again, on the sixth day, He had said, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature . . . cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth." But by an eminent act of deliberative counsel, God takes upon Himself immediately the creation of this masterpiece, saying, "Let US make Man in our image, after our likeness."

Notice, again, the difference not only in the act of creation, but especially in the *type* after which man is created, as distinguished from all others. It is said of the creation of animals, "And God made the beast of the earth *after his kind*, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and God saw that it was good." The same is said of the creation of plants: "And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good." That is, the plants and animals, and all creatures which the earth brought forth, or *nature* produced, were created after a genus or type then first originated, or existing only in the Divine mind. But not so of man, who was to be *above* nature, and all which had hitherto been created. Of him this sublime language is used: "Let Us make *man* in *Our* image, after *Our* likeness; and let

them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. *So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.*"

While the vegetable and the animal world were created after a type which had no previous existence save as an *idea* in the mind of the Creator, man was formed after another and infinitely higher type: not simply after a *thought* of God, but in the image and likeness of God himself—that is, *after a type already existing* in the infinite Creator. This, and nothing less, is meant by these high and awful words.

What is said of the creation of man shows conclusively that he was not 'developed' out of some inferior order or type of existence below him, but was created, or formed after a *divine* and *supernatural* type above him. The genus *Man* is not only above and better than the creatures below him, being an improvement on all that had preceded him, but he is *infinitely* above the animal and natural world, separated from it by an immeasurable, impassable, and uncommunicable gulf. Man is a *supernatural* being, as truly so as God himself, since he is made not after a natural, but a Divine pattern.

Let us consider, thoughtfully and reverently, the import of these words of the text. What is meant by the *Image of God* in which man was created?

There are various interpretations of this, as of every other high and vital doctrine of revelation. And, as might be expected, they are all, or most of them, *below* the truth, partial conceptions of that which is too high

for the dimly seeing and sense-judging understanding of man to grasp in all its grandeur. For the words of God almost always mean more than we can at first comprehend or believe.

Let us look briefly at some of these partial interpretations, as preparatory to the true.

The first is that which understands the image of God to consist in the *dominion* granted to man over the lower creation. This view claims to be derived from the words immediately preceding the text—"And God said, Let us make man in our image . . . and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth." That this dominion is closely related to the divine image is clear, since it is spoken of in immediate connection with it. Hence those who look no deeper than the mere words may understand it to apply only to this. But a deeper insight into the spirit of the words shows that the relation is one, not of identity, but of cause and effect. *Because* man is made in the image of God, he enjoys a kind of divine supremacy. *Because* by this image of God man is essentially *different* from all that is merely nature, and *toto genere* exalted above it, he has also the destination and the power to rule over it.

A second and more generally adopted interpretation or theory is that of Luther and the Reformers generally, which has through them prevailed more extensively than any other. This makes the image of God to consist in what is called *original righteousness*—a condition of holiness, or moral integrity, which was lost by the fall, and is restored by Christ or redemption.

The only or chief argument for such a view is de-

rived from one or two passages in the New Testament, especially Col. iii, 10: "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him." Also Eph. iv, 24: "And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." But the objections to this argument, and the theory it claims to support, are so many and conclusive that I need only to mention them to show its futility.

In the first place, it rests on an assumption that must first be proved, viz., that the new creation by redemption is essentially nothing else than a restoration of the condition in which Adam was before the fall; which is far from being true.

The aim and work of redemption is not simply to repair the ruins of the fall, and bring man back to where he stood at first. God does not thus work through ages without progress; and redemption is something more than conservatism. The aim of redemption is to raise man *higher* than he was before, as much higher as Christ, or the second Adam, is higher and better than the first. Undoubtedly the divine image which is the result of redemption stands in close and essential connection with the image which man bears from his creation. The former is the true realization of the latter. The one is first given to man in order that he may attain unto the other, if not in the straight way of sinless obedience, then in the circuitous way of fall and redemption. But from the nature of this connection it follows that the purport of the two is not the same.

Again, there is no evidence whatever from the Bible that the image of God was lost by the fall; on the con-

trary, we find decisive evidence of its presence after the sin of our first parents. In the ninth chapter of Genesis, and after the flood, the violent destruction of human life is sentenced with the severest vengeance; and it is given as a reason therefor that God made man in His own image. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man"—which manifestly presupposes that man still bears this image, as the seal of his inviolableness. In a very similar connection (James iii, 9), the apostle gives as a reason why we should not curse our fellow-men that men (not man, but *men*) are "made after the similitude of God."

Again, not to insist on the fact that holiness, or moral character, can not be created, but must be a personal attainment, the whole account which is given of the image of God evidently refers to the *nature* or *constitution* of man, something essential and constitutive, and which, therefore, can not be lost. If man is *made* in the image of God, he can not be *unmade*, so as to be without this image, so long as he retains his humanity—though it may be marred or obscured by sin.

Again, and finally, the moral image of God, viz., holiness, is the *result* of the natural divine image, and implies it, but does not constitute it—just as the dominion of man over the lower creation results from, and implies, the image of God, but is not the same with it. *Because* man is made in the divine image, he is capable of the character and holiness of God, as the brute is not. Holiness can not be superinduced upon, or brought out of, an animal nature, or any other but a being made in the image of God. The fact, then, that man *can* be

holy, and so possess a moral likeness to God, implies, and is based upon, the fact that he still possesses a natural or *essential* likeness to Him, that he is *made* in the image of God, and so forever and divinely differenced from the beast of the field and the fowl of the air.

I conclude, then, that man still possesses the image of God, in which he was created; that it is not and can not be lost. Though obscured and disfigured so that it can hardly be recognized, though darkened by ignorance, or crushed by oppression, or defiled by sin, it is yet forever and imperishably within every human being, part and essence of his very humanity, belonging to it, as the bones belong to the body, or thought and reason to the soul.

We are now prepared to consider more positively, What *is* the image of God in which man was created?

I answer, it is something *generic*, peculiar to, and distinctive of, humanity; and also *something which we possess in common with God*. This can be no secondary or contingent property, but pertains to the essential being of man as man.

It is, in the first place, something possessed by every human being; it is something within ourselves, and is to be sought and discovered by looking, not without, but within.

Again, the image of God is that which constitutes our proper and essential *humanity*; that by which man is distinguished from all products of Nature, and exalted above them. This does not consist in the material *body* of man, the elements and properties of which he shares with the lower animals. The body is not man, though vitally connected with him, and necessary to his life

here on earth. In its present constitution it is no essential part of humanity, since it is left behind at death, while man himself continues to live on forever. It belongs rather to the earth, out of which it was formed; is a part of Nature, in which man is placed, or into which, as a foreign being, he is introduced as into a nursery, to be trained and disciplined for another life. At the same time there is something in the body, or outward form of man, more exalted than the fact of its earthly origin and relationship, taken by itself, would indicate. It is the highest and most perfect of all the forms or types of Nature, and so is the crowning glory of the natural world. But, more than this, its connection with man, who is essentially above Nature, gives to it a more than natural dignity and worth. Being vitally connected with a soul or spirit, which is made in the image of God, it shares in its dignity and glory; shares also, alas! in its fall and degradation. The body, moreover, is included in the *redemption* of man, and thus rises to a sacred dignity above itself, and far above all other natural creations; becomes, in the words of an apostle, "the temple of God," who dwells by His Spirit in the person of every saint. It is, therefore, not to be despised, or lightly esteemed, but held in the highest reverence. Again, the doctrine of the *resurrection*, in connection with that of the incarnation of Christ, exalts the body of man to a still higher, even a *divine* dignity. What is now of the earth, earthly, dishonored, mortal, corruptible, is hereafter to be raised again in honor and glory and immortality, fashioned anew like unto Christ's glorious body. While the *materials* of the body are continually changing, even in this life, and will be

wholly changed at the resurrection — since “flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God” — the human *form* remains in all its essential features: that form whose ideal the Son of Man now wears, and shall wear forever. And this fact suggests the probable truth — which the whole teaching of Scripture seems to warrant — that the ‘image of God’ includes the *form* as well as the *spirit*; that man was created outwardly, as well as inwardly, in the image and likeness of God — even of Him who is “*the* Image of the invisible God, the first-born of the whole creation.”

It is certainly a significant fact that the expression ‘Image of God,’ as applied to the creation of man, is one that is already appropriated by the Son of God as denoting His nature as the Form and Revealer of God. He is elsewhere called the *Word*, whose significance lies in its relation to thought as its outward form or expression. As a word is the image of thought, and the mediator between the inward world of consciousness and the outer world of sense, so the Divine Logos is the Form and Image of the invisible God, the express image, not of His thought merely, but of His *person*, and the Mediator between the invisible and absolute Deity and the outward universe, especially in the work of creation. For we read that “all things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made that was made.” Being Himself essential Form, He is the originator of all the forms of the natural world, in whom they and all things consist. When, therefore, it is said that man was created in the image and likeness of God, primary reference is undoubtedly had to this original Image of God, who is not only the immediate creator,

but the *prototype* of humanity. Man was created not only *by* Him, as an instrument or power, and *after* Him, as a type or model, but *in* Him, as being in some sense the truth or essence of humanity. He is the Ideal, who contains in Himself the Divine original of all that belongs to the true idea of man, whether it be the outward form or the inward spirit and character. Hence, or from this aboriginal and essential relation to man, we may see a divine reason for the Incarnation, or the revelation of Christ in the flesh for the redemption of man.

Again, this image of God which we are seeking, or our proper humanity, is not the whole of the immaterial principle within us. For there is a life bound up with that of the body, which belongs to Nature, and which man possesses in common with Nature, or mere natural creatures. Such are the animal instincts and passions, whose objects and affinities are *below*, within the sphere of Nature, or the physical world, and which do not transcend this sphere. Such is the *understanding*, considered as an earthly or sensual intelligence, knowing and judging only of things revealed by the senses. This lower mind, conversant wholly with material things, and not able to know spiritual things, is possessed in a measure by the brutes, and is a part of that *Nature* to which they belong, and to which man is allied by his body, while he is above it in his spirit. This is not that by which man is *distinguished* above the lower creation, or any part of that image of God in which he is made. The image of God in man is not any thing which he possesses in common, or in kind, with animals, or creatures of nature, whether the body

or its instincts, or animal passions, or animal *mind* or understanding. It is something distinct from all these, something which he possesses in common with God—viz., the *Soul* or *spiritual* nature, comprising Reason, Conscience, and Will, with the moral affections that spring from them. It is that which we include and designate when we speak of man as a moral or *personal* being. Whatever endowments enter into the *personality* of man, and constitute him a moral and responsible being, these are included in that image of God in which man is created.

You may not have thought how much is comprehended in this difference between a *person* and a *thing*, or between a spiritual and an animal nature; but it is an *infinite* difference, filling up that immeasurable gulf which separates God from the brute, Deity from dust.

Let us look at these spiritual and divine endowments of man which constitute the image of God.

And, first, the attribute of *Reason*. This is a *divine* attribute, which brutes do not possess, either in kind or degree: a light above Nature, which shines only in a soul made in the image of God, and which lighteth every *man* that is born into the world.

I am aware that it is with many a disputed question whether brutes possess reason; and some, confounding the radical distinction between reason and understanding, attribute all manifestations of mind, or *instinctive intelligence* in animals, to a rational faculty. But without going into a philosophical discussion of this question, there are one or two conclusive and common-sense tests which we may apply to its solution. Reason, where

it exists, is known by its fruits; and two of the most universal products of reason are, *abstract ideas*, and the expression of them in *language*. When a brute or a species of animals can be found that can be made to comprehend the axioms of geometry, or the moral distinctions of right and wrong, or can express their thoughts in spoken or written language, or make any progress in science or art or religion, we may concede to them the possession of reason. If it be said that the absence of such rational products is owing to the absence or defect of the physical organs of expression, and not of the rational faculty, I reply, if the faculty were given, there would be given with it the corresponding organs; and the absence of these, as a law, is proof that no such faculty exists.

The things which this light of Reason reveals are supernatural; they are not contained in Nature, nor transmitted through the senses, viz., Ideas of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True; of the Infinite and Eternal, of Cause and Freedom; or, comprehending all in one, the idea of *God*, which in some form or other lives in every soul made in His image; ideas which, however they may be *awakened* by outward objects, are not derived from nor measured by them, but underlie, support, and comprehend them, as the heavens comprehend the earth.

“Truths that wake
To perish never.”

In this transcendent light of Reason, shining upon and through all things, man is able to *think*, and to utter his thought in speech or discourse. The brute has a sort of half-conscious intelligence, which may be called the

shadow of reason, but the brute can not think. Its dark mind can see no further than the material world by which it is surrounded, and in which it lives and moves and has its existence. It can not look beyond sense; it has no invisible, immaterial realm of thought and reason, where it may range at liberty. Man alone possesses such a realm. He alone can reflect; i. e., retire back into himself and hold converse with things that exist only for this interior world. This fact of itself sets man at once far above all this material creation, and allies him immediately to God. By this sovereign gift of thought and reason man is made a partaker of the Divine nature. Hereby we come even nearer to the Creator in His grandest prerogative than we are wont to be aware. The act of *creation* is the passing of a *thought* into a *thing*, or outward existence. And the next power to creation is to comprehend what is created. The universe sprang from and embodies the thoughts of God; and man, by comprehending and tracing the laws of the universe, travels back through the Divine works to the Divine thoughts, and thus builds the universe over again, as it were, in his own reason. Yea, he himself puts forth a creative power in that highest form of thought, *imagination*, and constructs new ideal worlds more stately and beautiful than his eyes behold, and rejoices, like the Creator, in his own works.

Again, the *Conscience*, or moral reason, is another part or feature of the image of God in man. This, too, is a supernatural light revealing things above nature, and which beings of nature know not of, viz., the moral ideas of *right* and *wrong*. This light is also a *law* for the practical guidance of man—the law of God written

on the heart. As the natural world contains and reveals the laws of the Divine *Mind*, those thoughts of God after which all *things* were created, so the spirit of man contains and reveals the laws of the Divine *Spirit*, those eternal and immutable principles which God himself obeys, and which the human spirit, as being the image of God, must obey also. Conscience allies man to God by a consciousness like that of God, and open to a divine fellowship. It points to realities unseen; refers to a sphere or world out of time—a spiritual and eternal world for which the soul is made, and with which it has momentarily and essentially to do.

Again, the *Will*, or free moral power of the soul, the power of *choosing* the right or the wrong, of doing the good or the evil, including the moral affections which spring from and blend with it—this eminently spiritual power is what is specially denoted by the image of God, and constitutes man a spiritual being. This is the centre and seat of responsibility, and the culminating point of personality, without which man would be a light and a law unto himself, but not a *power*. The will is eminently a supernatural power, wholly divine in its essence. It has no counterpart in the world of matter, or in the animal creation, but only in the Divine bosom. Here, within the abysmal depths of this mysterious power, is born *love*, the deepest and most sacred of human affections, which, more than any other, assimilates and unites man to God. “For God is love; and whoso loveth is born of God, and knoweth God.”

The human will differs essentially from the animal will, as is shown by the fact that the former is *free*, or

self-determined, able to put forth or to change its volitions from motives furnished within—able even to determine the motives that shall determine it, and so to be a true *cause*, as no other power but will can be; while the latter—the mere animal will—can act only as it is acted on, or moved from without by a law of necessity. This, too, is the point of distinction between the ‘carnal’ will (which, so far as it is fleshly, has lost its freedom, and is in bondage to nature and appetite—has become, in fact, a mere animal will) and the ‘spiritual,’ or true will, which is free, and sovereign over nature. As such it is superior to all natural laws and forces, for these are physical and necessitated; but this is a spiritual and free energy, acting from itself, and not compelled from without. It is a power above nature, which natural laws can not reach, whose only law is that which God and the conscience prescribe, and whose true sphere and vital element is the Divine will.

The supernatural character of this attribute of will is shown in its perversion, in the fact of *sin*, which is a supernatural or contra-natural fact, out of the order and course of nature, which is incapable of sin or wrong. It is a fearful power with which man is endowed, that of resisting and violating the laws of God; and fearfully has he used or abused it. The evil that is in the world, and which was not in it at first, and is not of God’s making; the woes and ills and diseases which sin has introduced; the deformity and desolation and ruin which man has wrought by his crimes upon the fairest works of God, show the presence of a power fearfully and wonderfully great, which could only be exercised by a being made in the image of God, and wielding a

divine potency—not as God, beneficently for good, but perversely for evil.

And as sin, so is virtue, or moral greatness and goodness, a supernatural product. Look at the heroic deeds of the great names in Christian history, the sufferings and sacrifices of martyrs, of whom the world was not worthy; and attempt to measure them by any natural standard. How poor and inferior is all physical force or grandeur beside them! How invincible and omnipotent the moral power which fire and flood, the ferocity of savage beasts, and the fiercer rage of wicked men, and all the tortures they can devise, can not overcome! How it transcends in excellence all the powers of Nature, and compels the mind to refer it to a divine energy, the image and inspiration of the Divine Spirit!

So of the moral affections. *Love*, which is the essence of virtue, and the distinctive attribute of Deity—love, in its true sense, is something transcending nature, infinitely above the capacity of the brute, but which man can exercise, and in exercising resemble and hold fellowship with God.

Thus all the higher powers and attributes of our being, all that is essentially *human* within us, has its prototype and correspondence in the Divine nature. We are made in the image and after the similitude of God. Hence our true glory and perfection consists in being *God-like*, in having every power and activity of our being to correspond to its divine original; to have our life in all its functions one with the life of God.

Our subject is fruitful of many important inferences,

and carries with it many doctrinal and practical applications.

1. We see from what has been said *the essential and inalienable distinction between man and the animal creation*. To some who have never reflected on the subject this difference may appear slight and unimportant, and they may say, with the ancient and the modern skeptic, "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" But this difference is not slight or unimportant, since it concerns the image of God, and with it the honor of God, and the origin and nature and destiny of man.

There is a class of scientists in our day who are endeavoring with specious arguments to do away and annul this essential distinction between man and the inferior races; who claim that the human species is but a higher grade of animal, *developed* by natural law from the natural orders of being below him. I will not say that all who advocate this 'development theory' are infidels or unbelievers in the truth of revelation, since many good men have held and taught most pernicious doctrines. But the theory itself, I hesitate not to say, is a bold stroke of infidelity, springing from, and leading directly to, materialism and atheism. It not only robs God of His glory, but man also. It is not enough that it makes man a mere birth of nature, and not a direct creation of God; it makes bold to derive the human soul, and all the sublime and godlike attributes of his spiritual being, from the low instincts of the brute, and therefore like them in kind—as his body is supposed to be derived from that of the beast, working

up through successive gradations till it finally attains the human form. In short, it claims that man was originally made in the image of the brute, and not in the image of God.

We may safely leave to science the refutation of this theory, which contradicts its first and best-established principles, even that loudly vaunted one, the immutability of natural law; and which is based on mere resemblances connected by the largest and most incredible assumptions, without a single conclusive fact to support it. The facts which are adduced for its support, such as the variations of species under human management, only prove, what every naturalist knows, that within certain fixed limits all species, animal and vegetable, are capable of improvement through cultivation, or the stimulus of a superior power. But they do not prove that Nature, *left to itself*, or the operation of mere natural law, ever varies or improves its types, still less transmutes one species into another. The contrary is proved by the fact that on the withdrawal of human culture it almost always relapses to its original condition. This theory offends not only faith in the teachings of Scripture concerning the origin of man, and every high moral instinct of the soul, but it offends or contradicts no less the facts and principles of science itself, and those axioms based on universal observation, such as—‘Like produces like;’ ‘The stream can not rise higher than its fountain;’ which are parables in the natural world of the truth uttered by our Saviour—“That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.”

It is strange, indeed, that a theory so contrary to the teachings both of science and Scripture should be so

widely accepted. Perhaps the explanation is that the discoveries of modern science, especially the revelations of the telescope, are so startling and wonderful that the ordinary limits of credulity are broken down in the direction of nature and natural law, as they were formerly in the direction of the supernatural; and the public mind is stimulated and eager for new scientific sensations. It is just now the fashion to believe every thing that is put forth in the name of science, however contrary to former and established beliefs; and all the more readily, with a certain class, if it contradict, or seem to contradict, the Bible.

While there is little danger that a true science, or a true faith (which must always be accordant, and not at variance), will ever adopt this theory, there is yet danger, so long as the claims of both are unadjusted, of being unawares entangled in it, unless one hold firmly and intelligently the real and essential difference between man and the animal creation. It is common to speak of man as a 'reasoning and thinking animal;' which is as absurd and contradictory as to speak of a material spirit, or a divine beast. Man, in his distinctive being, is not an animal, and never was, and never can be, without losing his proper humanity—that which makes him a man, viz., the image of God. The presence of this image, as we have seen, is the constituent element of humanity, and makes the interval between man and the brute an infinite and impassable and incommunicable gulf—a difference, not of degree, but of *kind*. Indeed, this very word 'kind,' in the use we make of it, shows how fixed is the constitution of genera and species by divine law and human understanding, since it has be-

come the synonym of essential and unchangeable distinctions. There is less essential difference between man and God than between man and the brute creation. For he is made a little lower than God, but infinitely higher than the brute. He is made in the image of God, and not in the image of the brute. Man is the offspring of God, and not the offspring of Nature, or of natural laws. He is of the same kind with God, but not of the same kind with animals. Between him and them, between the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth, there is an infinite chasm, which can not be filled up nor bridged over; which is represented by the fact—more significant than we deem—that we can not converse or commune with the brute, while we can converse, and are made to commune, with God. A brute can not be taught to reason or discourse or love, in the spiritual sense. It can not become *man-like* with all the training we can bestow; much less, if left to itself, will it develop into manhood, though millions of ages be allowed for the experiment. But man can become God-like and divine. Man can approach and assimilate to God, because he bears on the face of his soul the image and likeness of his Father. Man is a supernatural being: having his origin, not from Nature, but from God. His truest affinity and his manifest destiny is not below, but above; even as his countenance is not prone and earthward, like that of the beasts, but heavenward, like that of the angels.

2. The doctrine that man is made in the image of God illustrates the import of the truth that *God is our Father*.

No truth is so high and precious to him who can receive it, yet none so little received or appreciated, as the fact so clearly and tenderly set forth in the Bible, that God is our Father, the Father of every human creature. God is the Father of the human family, not in some remote or figurative sense; not as He is the Father of the numberless creatures He has formed, each after its kind. He is the Creator of the worlds, the Former of the animal creation, but He is the *Father* of man. Hence the genealogy of the human race is, by a significant turn of language, traced by the Evangelist Luke directly to God, as terminating the ancestral line in a Divine parentage: "Which was the son of Enos, which was the son of Seth, which was the son of Adam, which was the son of God." Had Luke been as wise as some of our modern savans, he would have terminated this august lineage differently, and have traced the 'descent of man' downward instead of upward, to an origin low enough to justify the most abject and humiliating view of human nature ever conceived.

God is the former or fashioner of our bodies, but the *Father* of our spirits, because these bear the image of God, as the child bears the image of his parent. A man is not the father of the work he executes. A machinist is not the father of the machine he makes, or an author the father of the book he writes, though it bear the impress of his mind and soul as well as of his hand. He is the father only of the *child* he begets in his own image, and who, though small and weak and dependent, is as much above the mere work of his hands as he himself is. So God is, in a true and literal sense, the Father of man, whom He has made in His own image, and

who, though small and weak and finite, is as truly above the whole material and animal creation as the Creator himself, since he is made to have a divine dominion over it. (Psalm viii, 3-6.)

And not only so, but God cherishes toward man the feelings and affection of a father. He is 'mindful of him,' and visits him with parental and providential care. Our Saviour, who came to reveal and perfect the filial relation between man and God, presents this relation first of all as realized in His own person, who is the Son of God, and yet a true man. The first word of the prayer He taught His disciples reveals the Fatherhood of God, not as an exclusive, but a universal truth: "*Our Father which art in heaven.*" And His first reported discourse unfolds the meaning of this truth with a beauty and pathos never surpassed in language: "Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings? and not one of them shall fall to the ground without your Father. But I say unto you that the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not, therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows."

3. The doctrine we have considered illustrates and enforces the fact of *human depravity*.

It is common to depreciate the essential dignity and greatness of man's nature, in order to magnify or make more manifest his depravity and moral baseness. But this latter truth can be seen in all its extent and import only as measured by or from the former. We can truly estimate the *fall* of man only as we look at the height from which he has fallen. We can see what man is morally only by appreciating what he is *essentially*, as made in the Divine image. Those who say that the

image of God was wholly lost by the fall, and that nothing divine is now left to humanity, take away that which especially aggravates human sinfulness. By making depravity a part of human nature, and not a violation of that nature, they destroy its sinfulness and its humiliating import. For it is not wrong or humiliating for a brute to be brutish; but for a *man*, made in the image of God, and having divine capacities, to become a brute, to obey the instincts and live the life of a mere animal—this is both degradation and guilt.

I have said that man still retains the image of God in which he was created; but it is not meant that this image exists in all its original beauty and perfection; that it has suffered no damage by the fall; that it is not greatly obscured by sin; marred and disfigured, though not destroyed. This may be illustrated by what we see outwardly in the body or form of man. It is a significant fact that we nowhere find among men a perfect human form. All the specimens of humanity as compared with the original and ideal type of man are more or less deformed; more as the race degenerates into barbarism, less as man rises in Christian civilization. But yet all are *below* the true and perfect type, such as we may suppose the first pair to have been. These pinched or gross and uncomely forms, these wrinkled and diseased and ignoble bodies, which we commonly see, do not represent the true and sacred form of man, the temple of the Divine Spirit on earth. In proof of this is the fact that artists are able to conceive and represent *ideal* human forms more perfect than any which actually exist on earth. The human type remains in all its essential features, but it is shorn of its primeval

beauty and glory. So the image of God remains in the soul, but it is a defaced image, spoiled of its spiritual beauty, the beauty of holiness. Reason does not image infallibly the true, nor conscience reveal infallibly the right, nor the will embrace and pursue infallibly the good, as they were made to do; but these divine faculties are more or less injured and perverted by sin. Yet the image of God is seen through the deformity, in the very perversions of the spiritual powers of man, in the supernatural might which he puts forth in the pursuit of ends unworthy of himself; in the infinitude of his wants and desires, which nothing earthly can satisfy; in the grandeur of his ambitions, in the intensity and persistence and fearful energy of his passions; as well as in the worthier traits, the high and sublime thoughts, the beautiful affections and divine aspirations that spring up like celestial flowers amid the ruins of his nature. Of man as fallen and depraved it is true, as Milton says of the fallen fiend—

“His form had not yet lost
All her original brightness, nor appeared
Less than archangel ruined, and the excess
Of glory obscured.”

“It is dangerous,” says Pascal, “to make man see how like he is to the beasts without showing him his true greatness. It is dangerous, also, to let him see his greatness without exhibiting his baseness. It is still more dangerous to let him remain ignorant of both.” Hence he combines both these contrasts in that famous representation which may be called the human paradox. “What a chimera is man! what a novelty! what a chaos! what a subject of contradiction! A judge

of every thing, and yet a feeble worm of the earth; the depository of truth, and yet a heap of uncertainty; the glory and the outcast of the universe. If he boasts, I humble him; if he humbles himself, I boast of him—and always contradict him, till he is brought to comprehend that he is an incomprehensible monster.”

4. The truth that man is made in the image of God illustrates the doctrine of the *Incarnation* as a means for the redemption of man.

This it does in a twofold way: It explains and justifies the interest of God toward man, as exhibited by this divine fact; and it also makes more credible and conceivable the fact itself. It is incredible, it is sometimes said, that God should take such amazing interest in the welfare of an insignificant creature inhabiting one of the smaller worlds of His creation, as to become incarnate, and suffer and die for his redemption. This objection, which is of weight if some views respecting man are correct, is of no force at all under the view or doctrine we have been considering. If man is a mere animal, born of the dust, or of other animals indigenous to this planet, and sharing their ignoble destiny, then any such act of God in his behalf is wholly incredible and absurd. But if man be a supernatural being, a child of God, made in His image, and endowed with divine powers for a divine destination—then, to recover such a being from apostasy and ruin, and raise him to that glory and blessedness for which he was destined, is an end worthy of the most strenuous efforts and even the utmost condescension on the part of God. If the facts of the Gospel, and especially the great fact of the incarnation, appear incredible, it must be because either the

nature of man or the character of God is not truly and rightly estimated.

Again, if man is made in the image of God, or is by lineage and birth a child of God, then it is surely not impossible for the eternal Son of God so to identify Himself with man as to become human, without detriment or contradiction to His Being. God could not become a brute, nor manifest His Divine personality through an animal nature, because a brute is not made in the Divine image, and is not receptive of the Divine spirit. But man is of the same *kind* as Deity, viz., Spirit. Man is receptive of Deity, and made to be the abode and temple of God. Hence there is nothing incredible in the fact of God's *becoming* man, i. e., of manifesting His Divine personality in a human form and under human conditions.

Christ, in this view, is not a being unrelated or incomprehensible to us, but our Divine Brother, Himself the express and perfect image of the invisible God, as man is a lesser and finite image of Him. God being already related to man as Father, becomes in Christ our Brother also, that by this twofold relation, and the double endearment it reveals, we might know more of God, and be drawn into a closer love and affinity to Him. Man, being an *alienated* child of God, Christ, the well-beloved Son, comes to us, bringing the love and offering the forgiveness of God, that through Him we might become reconciled and reinstated in the favor and friendship of our heavenly Father. Behold, O sinful man, the love of thine offended Father tendered to thee in the sympathy and compassion and forgiveness of Christ thy Divine Brother!

Finally, our doctrine illustrates the nature of true religion. Religion is a fellowship of man with God, which is possible only as he is made in the image and after the likeness of God. Man can hold no communion with the brute, but he can hold spiritual communion and fellowship with God; and this communion and fellowship is religion. Religion is a supernatural and divine life, possible only to one gifted with supernatural and divine powers. The senses and animal functions all find their objects and ends here in this physical world. But the spiritual being of man can not limit its capacities to earthly and material things; it must breathe 'an ampler ether, a diviner air,' and look on more real and enduring objects, and act in a grander capacity, for more glorious ends, than it finds here. It is made to live the life of God, in communion with the Spirit of God, and in fellowship with the thoughts, feelings, and workings of God. This is what *religion* imports; it is the *binding back* (re-lego) or reunion of man to God, by a free choice and obedience, in a mutual sympathy and community of aims, principles, thoughts, feelings, and activities. There is but one law common to the human and Divine spirit, that law of which the Divine character is the living and perfect realization. God, if we may so speak, or rather Christ—God as man—is the Divine and only law of humanity. Hence all activity that does not correspond to God's action or Providence, i. e., which is not religious, is a perverse and lawless activity, and therefore powerless. All thinking which is not conformed to the thoughts of God is wrong thinking, and therefore imperfect and false. All willing aside from and independently of the will of God, i. e., all self-will, is a per-

version of the power of will, is *sin*. The end and import of religion is to perfect man by making him God-like, to elevate him to his true sphere and dignity as a child of God, made in His image, and make him to partake the sublime freedom and power and supremacy of God.

Look up, O man, to thy divine origin, and thy celestial home! Commune with Him in whose image thou art created. Leave these earthly and brutish pleasures, which are unworthy of a soul so divinely descended and endowed. Lay off thy sin and shame, and return to thy Father.

VI.

THE HUMAN TRINITY.

And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.—1 *Thess.* v, 23.

THERE is something remarkable in this prayer of the apostle, as denoting the *thoroughness*, not only of the sanctification prayed for, but of his knowledge of man, or the subject of this sanctification. “The God of peace sanctify you wholly” — or, as Luther translates it — “through and through.” Then, to show what is included in this, he adds, “And I pray God your whole *spirit* and *soul* and *body* be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

This threefold designation of the one being of man is not a casual or isolated use of language. Like all other utterances of the inspired apostle, it is employed with the strictest correspondence to truth and reality; and is one of many similar expressions scattered throughout the Bible, showing that the distinctions here indicated are grounded in the nature of man, and are as real and significant as those belonging to the one Being of God.

To cite a few examples: In Hebrews (iv, 12) it is said of the word of God that it is “sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the *dividing asunder*

of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." The physical image, or comparison, here introduced is very significant. 'That which the marrow is to the joints or bones, that the spirit is to the soul. As marrow is flesh within flesh, so the spirit is a soul within the soul.' The sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, divides and discerns between these interior parts, laying open what is most secret and inscrutable in the nature, as well as in the thoughts and purposes, of man.

Again, in 1 Corinthians (xv, 44), the apostle, in speaking of the resurrection, distinguishes between the natural body (*σῶμα ψυχικόν*) and the spiritual body (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*); the former being that in which the *psyche*, or natural soul, is the animating principle; and the latter that in which the *pneuma*, or spirit, is the principle of life. The distinction here indicated between the Psyche and the Pneuma, or the soul and spirit, is just as real and important as that between the bodies which they animate—i. e., the present body of flesh and blood, and the future resurrection body. Again, in Phil. i, 27, the same distinction is implied in the exhortation, "Stand fast in one spirit, with one mind [*μῆ ψυχῇ*]."

Other examples in the New Testament abound, where the same distinction is indicated, though other terms are employed; e. g., "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength" (Mark xii, 30). The word *heart*, here and elsewhere in the Bible, is used in nearly the same sense as 'spirit' in the more discriminating language of Paul, as denoting the inmost fountain of action and character, the moral and respon-

sible power in man. The words *flesh* and *spirit*, so common in the New Testament Scriptures, indicate the same distinction. The flesh denotes, not the mere material body, but includes an immaterial principle, or soul, animating it, and bound up with it as a part of nature, yet distinct from it, as the soul of the brute is distinct from its material part; a power below the spirit, and capable of resisting it;—for we read that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary one to the other, so that ye can not do the things that ye would” (Gal. v, 17). This is spoken of the flesh as depraved, and the seat of sin; but this is not its true and normal condition. Man was made to be a harmony, and not a discord, and the body and its soul to be the obedient organ, and not the antagonist or clog of the spirit. Compare also Rom. vii, 22–25, where the conflict between the ‘inward man’—the *νοῦς*, or spiritual mind—and the *σαρξ*, or flesh, is graphically described, and the personality, the true *Ego*, is identified with the spirit, and not with the flesh, or lower nature, though brought into bondage to it. No possible language could declare more convincingly the reality of the distinction between the two immaterial principles in man.

If we turn to the Old Testament Scriptures, we can not, for obvious reasons, expect to find there as full and clear a revelation of the nature of man, any more than of the nature of God, as in the New Testament. The first revelations were outward rather than inward; since “that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual.” Yet, as there are hints and indications in the Old Testament of a Trinity in the Godhead, which the clearer light of the

Gospel enables us to read and understand, so there are indications also of the tripartite nature of man, though not sufficient of themselves to establish the doctrine. The history of the creation of man shows a radical and essential difference between him and the animal creation. Man is not a birth of Nature, like the living creatures which the earth and waters 'brought forth abundantly,' but an immediate creation of God, made in the image and likeness of God. While his body is formed of the dust of the ground, i. e., of material and earthly elements, his soul is an inbreathing of the divine Spirit and life. "And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" — or the breath of *lives*, as it is in the Hebrew, indicating a plurality in his inward being, as a plurality is also indicated in the Being of God in the expression "Let us make man in our image." "*And man became a living soul.*" The word 'soul' is not that which denotes distinctively the *spirit*, as is declared by the apostle when he says, "The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." Hence some have inferred that Adam was not endowed at his creation with a spiritual principle, which, they assert, is conferred only by regeneration, or the new creation in Christ Jesus. But such a supposition is entirely without warrant; for the new birth is a *quickenings*, or renewing of our spiritual nature by the Spirit of God, and not the creation of a new substance. The meaning of the words may be, that what before was inanimate dust, now, by the inbreathing of God, the source of all life, became a living, breathing, intelligent being; that Adam began his

existence from the lower plane of a merely natural or psychical life, as all his posterity have since done—not as being destitute of a higher and spiritual principle, but this was as yet undeveloped and without character; and his probation was appointed to develop and perfect a true spiritual life and character.

The reality of this distinction is also shown by the existence of different *words* to denote these different principles or constituents of man's being. These different terms are found to exist in all the principal languages of the world. Thus in the Greek tongue we have *πνευμα* and *ψυχη*; in the Hebrew *רוח* and *נפש*; in the Latin *spiritus* and *anima*; in the German *geist* and *seele*; and in English *spirit* and *soul*. A distinction which has created distinct words to express it in almost all languages can not be an unreal or superficial one. Not that these words are always used in the Bible or in common discourse with philosophical precision; but the distinction is there, below the words, and embodied in them, and invariably appears whenever, as in the text, discrimination of thought and language is required.

But the full import of the distinction in question can not be learned from individual words or single texts, but only from the whole teaching of Scripture concerning man and his relationship to God—or man as a religious, a spiritual, and an immortal being. And this shows how much truer is the teaching of the Bible in regard to man than much of what is called science; and that we must go to the Scriptures to learn the true science of man, as well as to learn the science of God.

This doctrine of the nature of man as threefold is not a new doctrine, nor newly discovered in Scripture. It

was held by Plato, and by the wisest of the Greek philosophers. It was recognized by the early Christian fathers, especially by Origen and Apollinaris, but afterward fell into disrepute in consequence of the alleged heresy concerning the person of Christ which this doctrine was supposed to countenance. In later times the Semi-Pelagians taught that the soul and body, but not the spirit in man, were the subjects of original sin. Therefore the distinction was slighted by Augustine and the Latin Church generally—another instance of the rejection of a truth because of its inconsistency with certain theological dogmas. It has been ignored by modern Protestants, both Lutheran and Reformed, partly for the same reasons, and partly because of a looser and more superficial philosophy.

The distinction thus lost sight of, or repudiated by dogmatists and shallow thinkers, is an essential one, and needs to be revived and vindicated at the present day, in order to vindicate the Scripture doctrine of man as made in the image of God, against the false and debasing doctrines of materialistic science, which not only deprives man from the brute, but denies that there is any distinction of kind between the spirit and reason of man and the soul and instinct of the brute—therefore no difference of destiny, but both perish together, or are resolved into the All of Nature out of which they are evolved.

I have called this threefold distinction of body, soul, and spirit *the human trinity*, from its correspondence or analogy to the threefold distinction existing in the Being of God, and revealed in the New Testament.

We might suppose some such analogy to exist from

the fact that man is made in the image of God, and bears this image stamped indelibly on his nature. This analogy has been recognized by many deep-thinking Christian minds. Thus Augustine says, "Man has three parts—spirit, soul, and body. Man therefore is an image of the sacred Trinity."

Let us trace out a little this analogy between the Divine and the human trinity—not with a view of explaining that high and sacred mystery, still less of measuring God by what we find in ourselves—for our being is but a faint shadow and finite image of His infinite and incomprehensible being—but as a divine light to us in the knowledge of ourselves; and as a basis and warrant for a more thoughtful and discriminating insight into our own nature.

I. In the Divine Trinity, the Father represents the absolute and self-subsisting Deity, or God in His inmost and inconceivable Being; the *I Am*, whom no man or angel hath seen, or can see; the infinite source and fountain not only of all created being, but of the other two Persons of the Trinity.

The Son, or Word, is God *expressed* in an outward form or image. As a word is the image and expression of thought, as a son is the image and representative of his father, so the eternal Son is the image and representative of God—"the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person"—on whom He can look and behold Himself, with whom He can commune in ineffable self-consciousness, on whom He can lavish the fullness of His love, and through whom He can act, and declare His power and wisdom and love. Hence he is called in the Scripture "the image of the invisible

God, the first-born of the whole creation." He is called also the Logos, or Word, or Wisdom of God, by whom He made the worlds, through whom, as essential Form, all things receive form and beauty, and in whom, as essential Reason, all things consist, or stand together as a universe; who, finally, as the expression of the *love* of God, is the eternal Mediator and Reconciler between God and man—the Reconciler, also, as the Scripture teaches, of all things both in heaven and earth, the Divine Head and harmonizing Centre of the whole creation.

The Holy Spirit is God as an *indwelling power*, or inspiration; conceived not as the absolute Deity, and not as God expressed in outward form, or as giving form to things, but as the Spirit of life, dwelling in souls, enlightening, inspiring, and quickening them to the life of God. Hence the Holy Spirit is never an object of direct perception or consciousness, but is known only by its effects, as life is known only by its fruits and workings.

To come now to the image of this Divine Trinity, as found in our own being.

The *spirit* in man is that part of our nature which corresponds to the infinite Father of spirits. It is the Ego, the personality, the man within the man, from which, as the inmost fountain or 'heart' of our being, thought, affection, volition, and character proceed. (See Matt. xii, 35; xv, 19.) It is the seat of moral responsibility, the organ of faith and love, and so of religion or communion with God. It is the highest and divinest part of our nature, the very image of God in which we are created.

The *body* is the man expressed, or made visible in outward form, and so corresponds to the Word, as the

image of the invisible God. It is the medium of our intercourse with one another and with nature; the mediator between the world within and the world without. Through the body and its senses we are rooted and grounded in nature, and made partakers of its physical life, as through the spirit we are elevated above nature and made partakers of a higher life, even the life of God. Finally, the body of man, by its twofold relation to matter and spirit, is the bond of union and reconciliation between these two opposite worlds, the physical and the spiritual. In man, as the head of the physical creation—in whose body all its laws and elements meet, or are gathered together in one, and in whose spirit the higher laws and powers of the spiritual world are combined—the whole universe is, as it were, represented. Hence man has been called a *microcosm*, or little universe, and so is (potentially) the mediator and reconciler of all things visible and invisible; though this high function is perfectly realized only in Jesus Christ, the perfect and Divine Man.

The *soul*, or *psyche*, is that which gives life to the body, as its indwelling and animating principle. It is not a free and self-acting power, like the *pneuma*, not visible and material like the body, not a self-conscious intelligence, enlightened from within or above, but derives all its knowledge from the senses, and its humanity, by which it is differenced from other animal souls, from the spirit. It is thus a connecting and mediating link between body and spirit, bringing down the spiritual into the sphere and life of the body, and elevating the physical to be the instrument and organ of the spirit. It thus corresponds to the Spirit of God, which in the be-

ginning brooded over chaos, and quickened dead matter into life and order; which afterward dwelt in Christ, as the inspiration of all His words and works, and now dwells in all Christians as the Spirit of life and holiness; who reveals not Himself, but takes of the things of God and of Christ, and shows them unto us.

This analogy between the threefold nature of man and of God is, of course, imperfect, and must not be pressed too far, or carried out into detail. As here unfolded, it applies not to the *nature* of the distinctions, but only to the *relations* they sustain to each other in the one complex being. As such the correspondence is wonderfully true.

In the common usage of Scripture, the Father alone is termed God in the absolute sense. The Son is not God absolutely, but the *Son of God*. The Holy Spirit is the *Spirit of God*—denoting that these other two Persons, though the same in substance (ὁμοούσιος), have their being and deity *in* God the Father. So the spirit in man is alone the true *man*, the essence and substance of humanity. The body is not man, but the body of man; the soul, or psyche, is the soul of man—neither having an independent or self-subsistent being, but deriving their humanity or human qualities from the spirit with which they are connected.

II. Thus much concerning the general truth of the analogy between the Divine and human Trinity. Let me now draw out more specifically the implied distinction between *Soul* and *Spirit*, and show that the one differs essentially, or in *kind*, from the other.

The *spirit* (*pneuma*) is the diviner part of our nature, the image of God in which we are created, which

we possess in common with God himself. The *soul* (*psyche*) is that which we share in kind with the brute, though its connection with the higher principle lifts it to a far higher plane, and makes it a *human*, and not a mere animal soul. Through the possession of spirit we are constituted *rational* beings, able to discern truth and beauty and goodness, able to read and understand the thoughts of God as embodied in the creation, to have a knowledge of things unseen and eternal, in distinction from the knowledge which comes through the senses. By the spirit, too—and this is its highest distinction—we are constituted *religious* beings, able to know and commune with God, to enjoy His love and fellowship, and share His divine and eternal blessedness.

A closer study of our spiritual nature reveals a three-fold distinction in this department of our being, showing that here also, where our nature most resembles God's, being its spiritual image, there is a trinity, not of persons, but of powers. This is recognized in the common division or distribution of powers into Intellect, Feeling, and Will; or man as a *knowing*, a *feeling*, and an *acting* being. The analogy between this triplicity of the spirit and the Divine Trinity may be indicated as follows: The *Will*, as the inscrutable centre of personality, the self-determining, regnant, or executive power in man, corresponds to the Father.* The *Reason*, or intel-

* "The true conception of God requires that, even in relation to being and self-consciousness, the will should be apprehended as the primitively causal first in God. Later theology will be compelled to acknowledge this more and more; for the great problem of Christology—the Kenôsis—is absolutely insoluble without this prior assumption."—Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, p. 203 (Clark's Edinb. Ed.).

lect in its highest form, corresponds to the Son, or *Logos*, which in the Greek language signifies reason as well as word. *Feeling*, in the spiritual sense, which springs from and partakes the properties of both will and reason, corresponds to the Spirit, which proceeds from the Father and the Son.

This analogy, it will be observed, is more inward than the former, or that between the three persons of the Godhead, and body, soul, and spirit. That is an image of the Trinity in respect of the mutual *relations* of the three persons; this, in respect of their *nature* and operations.

But the Soul, or *psyche*, has also a threefold life, viz., of *understanding*, of *desire*, and of *sense*, which are often confounded with the spiritual faculties, especially as the spirit in most men is not in its true and normal condition, but is, as it were, sunk or buried in the flesh, its divine faculties remaining dormant, or turned to lower and fleshly ends. We need, therefore, to carefully distinguish between the higher and the lower nature in respect to these three capacities.

1. *Reason* belongs to the *Spirit*, *Understanding* to the *Soul*.* Both are forms of intelligence, and the lat-

* Heard, whose very able treatise on the 'Tripartite Nature of Man' is deserving of careful study, rejects this distinction between reason and understanding, and even denies to the spirit any rational intelligence, properly such. This belongs, in his view, only to the soul, or *psyche*, which he defines as "the sum total of man's natural powers, embracing not only the animal, but also the *intellectual* and *moral* faculties, in so far as their exercise has not been depraved by the fall." The spirit, or *pneuma*, he defines as the "God-consciousness, which is dead or dormant, in a great degree, since the fall, and which it is the office and work of the Holy Spirit to quicken, and then to direct, sanctify, and govern."

ter in its higher range resembles the former in its lower exercise, and is even blended with it in many processes of thought or reasoning; but a careful scrutiny will discover that they really differ in kind, and not merely in degree. This will appear—

(1.) From the *sources* whence they respectively derive the knowledge which they give. Reason knows and judges *a priori*, i. e., before experience, by a light within itself and above the range of the senses. Its knowledge is not derived from sense (though the occasion and materials of its knowledge may be so derived), but is often contrary to sense and independent of experience. It is characteristic of *rational* knowledge, that with the subject-matter of thought, which is furnished from without, there is an element which is not thus given, but comes only from within, viz., the *idea*, which can not be resolved into conception, or any mere generalization of particulars—which, like the light of outward day, illumines and explains the things of sense, but is not explained by them.

The *understanding*, on the contrary, judges always

This separation of the spiritual, or religious, nature from *all* the other powers of man, even conscience and will, we regard as a very serious defect in this otherwise admirable book.

More discriminating is the view of Delitzsch in his 'Biblical Psychology.' He holds to a triplicity of the spirit, corresponding to the Divine Trinity. "That in man which wills, thinks, and experiences, is called in general *πνεῦμα*, as God is the Tripersonal *πνεῦμα*. But in this self-conscious *πνεῦμα* are distinguished *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, and *πνεῦμα*—a representation of the Father, Son, and Spirit. That which or by means of which the self-conscious spirit thinks and wills is called *νοῦς* (*mens, animus*, as distinct from *anima*), or also *διάνοια* (*ratio*). As the will of the *νοῦς* is to be distinguished from longing (desire), so is its thought to be distinguished from conception, and its knowledge from perception."—*Bib. Psychol.*, pp. 211, 212.

according to sense. Its knowledge is limited to things of sense, and is at most a generalization of the facts or phenomena perceived by the senses. It is the prudential and calculating faculty, which discerns the relation of means and ends—an intelligence which animals also possess, sometimes in a high degree; but its ends are material and earthly. Its wisdom is worldly wisdom, not that which cometh from above. In its higher range it is the organ of physical science, but not of morality or religion. It deals with facts, not principles. Its sphere is this present outward world, things seen and temporal; it can not rise above sense, or discern things unseen and eternal. Spiritual realities, or things out of the sphere of time and sense, are as alien to it as colors to the blind, or as sounds to the deaf. Hence the apostle declares that “the natural [psychical] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them, because they are *spiritually* discerned.” Not that the reason, as a mere intellectual power, can discern them, for they are above not only the sensible but the intellectual world, and are objects of *faith* rather than intellection; but the understanding can not know them in any sense, whereas the spirit, being the organ of the Divine, when quickened and enlightened by the Divine Spirit, can both receive and know them.

(2.) The difference between reason and understanding will be still more manifest if we consider the *character* of the knowledge given by these faculties. The understanding, having to do only with sensible things and relations, its knowledge is always partial, contingent, and relative. It can not transcend experience, or know absolute, universal, and necessary truth. Reason, seeing

by its own divine light, is able to do this, and to affirm truths which are universal and necessary ; which are true, not here and now, but every where and always. The conclusions of the understanding are valid only so far as observation and experience goes, and may be reversed by a larger or higher experience, as the history of the inductive sciences abundantly proves. The affirmations of the reason, on the other hand, are as valid, and as confidently given, before as after experience, or even after a thousand experiments. They transcend not only all actual, but all possible experience. The axioms of geometry, e. g., as the truth that a whole is greater than a part, or that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles—these are seen by the reason to be true of all wholes, and all possible triangles, and not alone of the particular one which may be used for illustration.

So of higher truths which the moral reason affirms respecting right and wrong, good and evil. What is clearly seen to be *right* by an enlightened and unperverted conscience, *is* right, every where and always. Justice and injustice are the same in all worlds and eternities, the same to God as to us.

Reason, then, is a power of knowing truth *absolutely*, as it is in itself, and not merely in its relation to us, or as measured by our experience. It is thus distinguished from the understanding, which can know only *empirically*, whose knowledge therefore is relative, partial, and subjective knowledge—one thing to one mind, another to another.

This distinction between rational and empirical knowledge is one of the highest importance for us to recog-

nize. If, as some in our day assert, there is no higher or surer knowledge than that which comes from the impressions of sense, and the conceptions or generalizations of the understanding; if we can not pierce through appearances or phenomena to *realities*, and know some things at least absolutely, as they are in themselves or in God, then all our boasted science, whether of things, of ourselves, or of God, is mere *opinion*, a house built upon the sand. Morality and religion have no stable foundations, and are not grounded in immutable principles, but on the shifting sands of expediency and conventionalism, and men verily 'walk in a vain show,' like the dwellers in Plato's cave, who were conversant only with shadows, and mistook shadows for substances.

The distinction, also, between contingent and necessary truth is ignored or denied by the modern materialistic school, who either make all contingent truths to be necessary, affirming, with Mr. Baden Powell, that the laws of physical nature are as necessary and immutable as those of geometry, thus making miracles to be impossible, because contrary to the 'primary laws of belief;'* or maintaining, with Mr. Stuart Mill, that what we term necessary truths are true only to us; that in Saturn, e. g., or some other part of the universe, twice two may be five, or the whole may be less than a part, or right may be wrong, and wrong right, according to some other constitution of things there prevailing.

To such absurdities does the ignoring or confounding of these fundamental distinctions inevitably lead. This is the legitimate result of the principles and practice of

* See *Essays and Reviews*.

this modern school of thinkers. As certain persons are affected with color-blindness, so that they can not distinguish between red and blue, so the exclusive use of the understanding exercised constantly on material things and relations, and the disuse of the higher intuitive faculty, induces an intellectual and moral blindness, which would be ludicrous if it were not so sad.

(3.) The disparity between the reason and the understanding is still further shown by the inability of the latter to apprehend the *ideas* of the former. These ideas, such as *cause*, *right*, *freedom*, the *infinite*, etc.—which are *in* the mind or reason when fully awakened, and which are not given by the senses or the material world—are entirely beyond the reach of the understanding. This is shown by the fact that whenever this faculty attempts to define or to deal with them, it always substitutes some *conceptions* of its own, drawn from material things and relations—such as ‘invariable antecedent’ for cause; utility for right; unrestraint for freedom; and the unconditioned or unlimited for the infinite. These conceptions are either mere negations in place of positive ideas, or are simply attendant conditions and circumstances connected with their manifestation in time, but which do not touch their real essence. They are attempts of the understanding to *conceive*, or frame in terms derived from material things and relations, those primary truths or ideas which are in their very nature inconceivable and unrepresentable, because out of the sphere of time and space. It is taking facts of experience to represent that which transcends, precedes, and interprets experience.

Ideas, properly such, can not be reduced to concep-

tions, or defined in terms of the understanding, without a contradiction. And this shows, not that these ideas are false, but that the understanding can not grasp them, being above its range and capacity.

I have dwelt thus long on the distinction between reason and understanding, and the truths they are respectively conversant with, because this represents the difference between man and the brute—between the *spirit* of man, that goeth upward, and the *soul* of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth; because, also, those who deny the supernatural and the spiritual, and seek to derive man from the brute, and his higher intelligence from animal instinct, begin by identifying these two faculties, and confounding contingent with necessary truth. Just as the body of man bears certain structural resemblances to that of the ape, being formed after the same general type of organism, but differs immeasurably in the divine *form* which is superadded to the bones and sinews, and which lifts man out of the animal sphere into an infinitely higher and nobler one—so the human understanding is similar in kind to the intelligence of the brute. But this is not the whole of the mind of man: a *spirit* is superadded to the soul, or psyche, which is a breath of the Divine Spirit, a ray of the Divine Reason, the image of God within us, which lifts man out of the low sphere of sense, in which the understanding alone would leave him, and makes him a rational, a spiritual, a supernatural, and an immortal being.

The distinction between reason and understanding, I have said, *represents* the difference between man and the brute; but this is not all which constitutes this difference, as I now proceed to show.

Reason, as a mere *intellectual* power, is, so to speak, its lowest exercise. It is this divine light turned toward earthly or material things, which does not reveal its highest and divinest function. A higher exercise or manifestation of this power is seen in the moral reason, or *Conscience*.

Many psychologists regard conscience as a wholly distinct faculty, because of its distinct and peculiar functions. But, if we hold to the distinction already shown between reason and understanding, this is unnecessary. It is sufficient to regard it as the spirit in its higher relations, turned toward higher truths and objects than those which the intellectual reason perceives, and revealing ideas of a higher order, viz., of Right and Wrong, of Duty and Sin, of absolute Good and Evil. Its intuitions differ in the same way, both in character and origin, from all knowledge which the senses or the understanding can give.

How do we know what is right or wrong? or, rather, how do we know that there is a Right and a Wrong? Not by any dogmatic instruction; for this can give only a formal and outward, not an inward and real knowledge—may *awaken*, but can not *impart* the idea. Not by inference from the observed effects of certain actions. This might teach us their *utility* or injuriousness, but not their rightness or wrongness—for the moral quality of actions lies in the act itself, and not in its consequences. The *idea* of *Right*, which is the ground of all moral judgments, does not come from without, but from within; is not an inference of the understanding, looking at the outward relations of things or actions, but an intuition of the spirit, or moral reason, discerning their

inner and moral quality. It is a divine light and voice in man—as the wisest and deepest thinkers have ever acknowledged—revealing, as by inspiration, the mind and will of God for the practical guidance of man. It is the ‘law written on the heart,’ of which all outward law is only the articulate utterance and expansion.

This relation of conscience to God is an essential part of its true idea, and may be recognized in the very etymology of the word. *Con-science* signifies a *with*-knowing, implying, may we not say, another mind or spirit—that of God—bearing witness with our spirit, and giving a divine sanction to its moral intuitions. We are conscious, moreover, in our deeper and calmer moments, of a higher voice and testimony speaking within us, which often testifies against us, and against our will to gainsay or resist.

While conscience may be called the moral reason, there is an element in conscience which is not in reason as a purely intellectual power—viz., *feeling*.

Conscience is not a dry light, nor an impersonal and abstract knowledge; it is a more inward and personal power, carrying with it a sense of *obligation*, personal duty, and approbation or condemnation. Conscience is thus a voice and feeling issuing out of the very depths of our spiritual nature, and bearing living witness to the reality of Right and Wrong, the supreme excellence of moral good, and the divine and personally binding law of Duty.

Again, conscience is not only personal in its ground and nature—it is personal also in its revelations. It reveals not only moral good and evil, but in its normal state it testifies of *God* as lawgiver and sovereign, with

whom we have inwardly and momentarily to do, and to whom we are responsible for our thoughts and actions. Much speculation has been employed about the *Dæmon* of Socrates, of which he often speaks as a certain inscrutable power or influence that always deterred him from unwise or wrong courses of action, but was silent concerning what was best. May we not say that it was the very voice of God speaking more distinctly, because more reverently listened to, in the conscience of this wise and good man, thus realizing its true function as an inward oracle, the medium and interpreter of the Divine will in every man. That it was a deterrent rather than a guiding or commanding voice, is according to the normal working of conscience, which, like the moral law, more commonly says 'Thou shalt *not*,' than 'Thou *shalt*.'

Conscience may be termed the *God-consciousness* in man, or, rather, the remains of this divine power—a sense of God remaining in the reason after it has been lost out of the heart. As we have a *world-consciousness*, of which the senses and the understanding are the organ, and a *self-consciousness* within this, the distinctive property of reason and reflection, so there is a *God-consciousness* within or behind the other two, which distinguishes man as a spiritual being, made in the image of God, and standing in as real and close relation to Him as he does to the world or to himself. This, and not the reasoning faculty, is the true source of the idea of God. This idea is not a conclusion of the understanding, logically deduced from the evidences of design in nature—as the natural theologies and Bridgewater Treatises would have us believe—but is an intu-

ition of the moral or spiritual reason, which, once apprehended, or 'understood by faith' (Heb. xi, 3), explains the existence of the world, but is not itself explained by it.*

Conscience, in most men, manifests itself as a *moral* rather than a *spiritual* faculty, i. e., it reveals a moral law—the idea of right and duty, and of God as its source and authority. But it does not reveal this law as *love*, or God as a *spirit*, in personal union and communion with our spirits. It presents a God afar off, with veiled or averted or angry countenance. And the reason of this is that man has sinned, and does not like to retain God in his knowledge and fellowship. Hence this divine light does not shine full and clear into the heart, but is clouded by a sense of guilt, or colored and distorted by fear and superstition, so that conscience becomes an accusing voice, a troubled and aching sense of wrong and wrath, instead of a clear fountain of conscious peace and joy, as it was made to be.

* The discernment of the *supernatural*, or divine, is the proper function of the spirit—the *pneuma*, in distinction from the *psyche*—and especially of the reason and will (*νοῦς*), which, when quickened and enlightened by the Divine Spirit, is the organ of *faith*. The understanding can not see or believe in the supernatural, because it is out of its sphere—because it is spiritually discerned, i. e., discerned by the spirit, or *νοῦς*.

“The invisible things of God (*ἀόρατα*) are called (Rom. i, 20) *νοούμενα*. . . . In a similar sense the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi, 3) pronounces the fact of the origination of the world by the word of God to be a *νοούμενον* of faith, *scil.* of the believing *νοῦς*. . . . Thus *νοεῖν* is the radical, ideal, penetrating thought and knowledge, directed to the essences of things, and which, in a word, are spiritual or rational, and the will determining itself in conformity thereto, distinct from the kindred psychical facts of presentation, perception, and desire.”—Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychol.*, p. 212.

2. Another power or constituent of our spiritual nature is the *Will*. This is to be distinguished from *desire*, with which it is often confounded, as reason is distinguished from the understanding. The will belongs to the spirit, and is its most essential attribute. Desire belongs to the soul, and is shared in kind by the brute creation. Will is eminently a spiritual power, the centre of personality, the fountain of action and character, the seat of responsibility, the supreme and regnant power in man, of which reason and conscience are counselors, not arbiters. "If there is any thing spiritual in man," says Coleridge, "the will is such." Desire is natural or psychical, being subject to the laws of nature, of which the psyche is a part. Will is supernatural, being above these laws, and subject only to the moral and spiritual law of God.

Freedom belongs to the will, as its peculiar and inalienable possession: by which we mean the power of determining itself—as the real cause of its own acts—in the light of truth and reason, or in the darkness of sense and passion. The will does not act without motives, but itself determines, in the last analysis, what motives shall govern its action. In this respect the will is unlike any other power in nature, all whose forces are under the law of necessity, or within the chain of cause and effect, and can act only as they are acted on, or made to act, so that the antecedents and circumstances being given, the result can be predicted. But the will is a power above nature, and out of the chain of cause and effect, such that it can act, and does act continually, as it was *not* made to act; and the antecedents and circumstances of its action being given, the result can *not*

be predicted, except by the omniscient One, who seeth not as man seeth.

The difference between will and desire may be seen in the first temptation, which is the type of all temptations. The tempter appealed to and excited a natural desire, which could not but be excited by the presentation of its proper object. This desire, too, was innocent, because natural and involuntary. The sin lay in the spirit or will *yielding* to this desire instead of controlling it, as, being spiritual and free, it was able and bound to do. So long as desire only solicited, the pair were innocent, for evil was still without them. But so soon as the will yielded, or the spirit succumbed to the flesh, by tasting the forbidden fruit, *sin* was born. Evil entered into them through this gate of the will by an act of choice, and with its seed of death became incorporate in their whole being.

This is the natural history, not only of the first, but of every sin, according to the description given by St. James (i, 14, 15): "Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived—[by the spirit surrendering itself to the lower nature, or psyche]—it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." Sin is here represented as the product of the flesh, through the consent and co-operation of the spirit; and death is the natural product of sin working out its own legitimate issue, and not the creation or direct infliction of God. Both sin and death are works of the devil, which Christ came to destroy.

The will is sometimes referred, by writers on this subject, to the soul, as belonging to the psychical instead

of the spiritual nature of man ; and by some is located as a middle power between the flesh and spirit. But this argues an inadequate conception of both soul and spirit, and of their relation to each other. The Bible, it is true, speaks of ' the will of the flesh,' as well as of the ' desires of the flesh and of the mind.' But the meaning of this expression is, not that this faculty of the will belongs to the flesh, or lower nature, in distinction from the higher, but that it is in bondage to the flesh through sin ; has become identified, as it were, with natural desire, instead of asserting its supremacy over it, and so has lost its true spirituality and freedom.

This is the very evil and curse of sin, or moral depravity, that it makes of the will a *nature*, instead of spirit, or brings a nature into the spirit by making it subject to the flesh, or natural desire, so that it can not act as spirit, with divine power and freedom, but only as carnal desire impels it. This is that bondage under which St. Paul groans in the seventh chapter of Romans, and which leads him to cry out, " O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?"

By the will, as a spiritual and free power, man is distinguished from the brute. Animals have instinctive *desire*, which necessarily arises in presence of its object, and which impels them by a law of necessity to follow its impulses. But the animal is not endowed with *will* ; it can not resist or control its desires, except under the stress of some other and stronger impulse, as fear. It has no free and rational, or truth-enlightened power to act in opposition to mere desire, and in accordance with the higher and spiritual law of *duty*. This prerogative

sets man at an infinite remove from the animal, and marks him, not as a mere birth of Nature, or a development of the ape or gorilla, but as the offspring of God.

As the Bible speaks of the 'will of the flesh,' so it speaks also of spiritual desires. These are desires generated not by the flesh but by the spirit, partaking therefore of its spirituality and freedom. They are contrasted with carnal desires or lusts, differing from them both in nature and origin. The latter are of the earth, earthy; the former are spiritual and divine, being the product of the Spirit of God, and so far partakers of the Divine nature.

3. Still another department of our spiritual being, the inmost and deepest in this threefold unity, is what is variously denominated *susceptibility*, *feeling*, the emotional nature, the seat of the affections, etc. It is called, in the language of the Bible and of common life, the *heart*, as distinguished from the intellect, on the one hand, and the will on the other. This is perhaps the best, as it is the most intelligible name for it. What the heart is in the body, or physical man, that this spiritual faculty is to the inner or spiritual man—the centre and fountain of the life. The spiritual nature of this faculty may be seen from the place which the heart holds in the religion of the Bible, and in the highest and most sacred relations of life. It is an intensely *personal* faculty, the inmost constituent of personality, and having to do with persons rather than things—with God as its supreme object, who alone can fill and satisfy all its capacities—and with man, or fellow-beings, in the manifold social relations and intercourse of life. It is the bond of union between persons, as reason is the bond

of union between man and nature. Hence its eminently sacred and religious character, when it is the organ of a true and divine life, and its eminently evil and abhorrent character when it becomes the organ and seat of sin.

The heart partakes of both reason and will: i. e., it is both a rational and a moral faculty. It partakes of *reason*, as is shown by the clear intuitive discernment which the heart often displays, and is thus distinguished from the blind, unintelligent feeling or passion which belongs to the lower nature, and is often mistaken for a true or spiritual affection. It partakes also of *will*, or the voluntary and responsible element. The heart is the *ground* of will, in which this free and active power has its support and rest, below all conscious volition, *out* of which volition thought and action proceed (Mark vii, 21, 22). It is the true seat and constituent of *character* as determined by principles, which have their root in the heart, and are thus vital and permanent, while actions or volitions are transitory, and do not always represent or measure the true character. A change of will may imply, but does not constitute, a change of heart, or character.

There are two exercises of the heart—if they should not rather be called principles—which are made supreme in the Scriptures, as they are the supreme principles of the spiritual life, viz., *love* and *faith*. A glance at the nature of these principles will reveal the nature of the fountain from which they proceed.

Love is not a mere feeling or affection. It is, in part at least, voluntary, and includes a rational *choice*. This is evident from its being made the subject of command

and the sum of duty ; also from the sense of responsibility, of moral worthiness or unworthiness which attaches to a noble and pure, or to an ignoble and base affection. It also includes the highest exercise of reason in discerning the excellence of the being who calls forth and engages our love. Spiritual or true love is thus distinguished from mere natural affection, which is involuntary and without moral character, and from that blind, instinctive passion which counterfeits the name and some of the characteristics of love, but is mere animal impulse. The spiritual character of true love is shown by its permanence and unchanging constancy, like the love of God, below all affection in the subject or change in the object—

“Love is not love
That alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove.”

It is shown also by its conscious dignity and nobleness, and the *totality* of the devotion and the service which it renders ; according to the first and great commandment—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.”

Again, *faith* is not mere belief as an intellectual act ; it includes a voluntary, as well as an intellectual assent, and is therefore properly required as a religious duty, and the condition of salvation. Faith is the highest exercise of the reason, supplemented by the deeper and more penetrating perception of the *heart*. It is a *total* act of the whole spiritual being, and hence its supernatural and almost omnipotent might. It is the union of reason, will, and feeling, with reason or intuition pre-

dominant; while love is the union of the same powers, with feeling predominant.

As reason is distinguished from the understanding, and will from desire, so this spiritual faculty, the heart, is distinguished from that which corresponds to it, and is often mistaken for it—viz., natural sensibility, or instinctive affection. The former belongs to the spirit, the latter to the soul, or psyche. The one is a divine faculty, which we share with God himself, who is love, and therefore Heart as well as Spirit—or rather because He is Spirit; the other we share in kind, if not in quality or degree, with the brute creation. All men, even the worst, have a natural sympathy or compassion, which suffers in the sufferings of others, and an attachment which binds them together in a mutual fellowship. And certain animals, like the dog and the horse, manifest a like fondness and attachment to their masters, which may be called the shadow of friendship. But only one whose spiritual nature has been awakened and quickened by the Spirit of God is capable of spiritual affection, and so of that highest and purest of all friendships—fellowship with God and with man through Christian faith and love.

4. And this leads us to the last and highest distinction of the spirit in man, that which more than any other distinguishes it from the lower nature, and from all other natures not made like man in the image of God, viz., the fact that it is *of the same nature or kind with God*—who also is Spirit—and is made to be the organ and vehicle of the Divine Spirit.

Man, in his spiritual being, is *a capacity for God*, as truly so as the eye is a capacity for light, or the lungs

for air, or the heart for love. It does not realize its true idea and function, except as it is filled or inspired with the Spirit of God. There is not a department or faculty of the human spirit which does not need for its true development and normal activity the indwelling light and power and inspiration of God. Hence in unregenerate humanity, or man without God, the spirit is not recognized for what it is; its highest faculty, the religious, is unexercised and dormant; its divine and infinite capacities are under eclipse and stagnation, like a blind or unopened eye, or a dormant life; and only those powers are developed which have to do with material things.

He is dimly conscious of a higher nature, has

“Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized;
High instincts, before which our mortal nature
Doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised.”

But these ‘intimations of immortality’ are in strange and bewildering contrast with the low current of his daily and earthly life. This alone explains the contradictions of man’s being—his greatness and littleness; his high ideals and infinite aspirations, and his humiliating, actual experience; his grand and sublime capacities in union with his base and earthly passions—as if an angel and a brute were linked together in indissoluble unity.

The fall of man consisted in losing out of his spiritual nature, through sin and alienation from God, the presence and Spirit of God, which was its true life, and a descent into and subjection to the lower nature, the mere psychical life of the flesh. This is rightly called spiritual *death*; for death is the loss of the higher prin-

ciple which controls and subordinates the lower powers, leaving them to their own natural laws and working. As when the body dies the departure of the soul leaves the material part to the dominion of the elemental laws of matter, so the withdrawal of the Spirit of God as the life-principle of the human spirit left it to the dominion of the lower nature, the natural understanding and desires of the flesh. Hence the natural (psychical) man is said to be in the flesh, and to mind the things of the flesh, obeying the desires of the flesh and of the mind (or understanding), in distinction from the regenerate man, who is *in the Spirit*, i. e., whose spiritual nature is quickened and animated by the indwelling Spirit of God. As the life-principle, when present, permeates and quickens the whole body, making every nerve and fibre alive, bringing every organ and function into its true and normal activity, and the entire system into subjection to its sovereign power and dominion, so when a man is born of the Spirit, the Spirit of God, as the life-principle of man, makes him throughout alive unto God, renews and quickens not only the spirit, but the soul and body, bringing every thought and desire and member into captivity to the obedience of Christ; according to the prayer of the apostle—"The very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."

The doctrine here unfolded of the threefold nature of man, and especially the distinction between soul and spirit, throws an illustrative light on many other doctrines of Scripture.

1. *The origin of the human soul.* The question of whence the rational and spiritual principle in man is derived—whether it is propagated with the body, according to physical laws, or is an immediate creation of God; or whether, as many heathen and some Christian writers have maintained, it is a birth in time out of a pre-existent state—this question is one that has exercised the speculations of philosophers and theologians from the earliest times. Discarding the latter theory of pre-existence, as inconsistent with the Scripture doctrine of man, and creating more difficulties than it solves, we may briefly consider the two former in the light of the foregoing doctrine. The chief argument for the traducian theory that the soul is propagated with the body is the fact that children seem to inherit the mental and moral as well as physical characteristics of the parent, and especially the fact of inherited depravity, or ‘original sin,’ which, it is argued, must belong to the nature that is transmitted, which can not belong to a new created soul without making God the author of sin. On the other hand, it is clear that what is highest and most spiritual in man is not inherited or transmitted, e. g., a regenerate character; that children often manifest wholly original powers, especially in what is termed *genius*, which is recognized as a divine *gift*, and not a natural inheritance. Moreover, the propagation of a spiritual substance by natural laws savors so strongly of materialism, that even Augustine hesitated to accept the traducian theory, though more in keeping with his doctrine of original sin, and favored creationism, notwithstanding it was advocated by Pelagius as a strong argument against the Augustinian dogma.

The distinction maintained in this discourse between the soul and spirit furnishes a solution of this long-contested question. The *soul*, being allied to the body and its life, is propagated with it, like the soul of animals, as a part of nature, and according to natural laws. The *spirit*, the distinctive principle of humanity, being a supernatural and divine endowment—the image of God in man—is a direct creation of God, in connection or coincident with natural laws, but not their product. This is no more incredible than the equally supernatural fact of regeneration, or the *new* creation through the Spirit, which also is an immediate act or operation of God, though wrought in connection with human means and agencies, and according to spiritual laws. The words of Christ have thus a twofold meaning, referring to the first as well as to the second birth—“That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.” A careful study of Scripture confirms this view. In addition to the passages already cited, which indicate the supernatural origin and divine affinity of the human spirit, compare Genesis iv, 1; xviii, 10, 14: implying a Divine intervention, or supervention, as necessary to a human birth, corresponding to the Divine act in the original creation of man. Compare, also, Job xxxii, 8, and Eccles. xii, 7.

If it be objected, as it sometimes is, that it is derogatory to the Divine dignity to suppose the creative energy of God to wait on the mere will of the flesh, and be subservient to the blind and sensual passions of men—this objection is of no force whatever when we consider the fact of the Incarnation, and how far God has actually humbled Himself by subjecting His Divine dignity and

immaculate holiness to the selfish wills and malignant passions of wicked men; how patiently, too, in the work of the Spirit, He waits on the perverseness and impurity of the human heart, striving to convert and to sanctify. It may even be an exaltation of the Divine character, when rightly viewed, that He condescends so low in the work of creating as well as of redeeming humanity.

2. *The doctrine of human depravity, or original sin.* This doctrine has suffered much distortion from extreme and one-sided exposition, and for want of the harmonizing light supplied by the distinction between soul and spirit. On the one hand, a universal spiritual fact—viz., *sin*—is accounted for by the operation of natural laws, as if moral action or character could be transmitted by inheritance. And, furthermore, the natural taint and moral disability induced by sin has been exaggerated into the phrase and dogma of ‘total depravity,’ which, as applied to the race, is true neither in respect of degree—since all men are not wholly or equally depraved—nor of the entire man, since all parts of our nature are not alike corrupted by the fall. The sweet innocence and heavenly purity of childhood—indorsed by that divine word of the Saviour, ‘Of such is the kingdom of heaven’—is a perpetual rebuke and refutation of the dogma which classes little children in the same category with reprobates and under the wrath and curse of God. Such a dogma is not less a libel on the Creator than it is a denial of the word and testimony of Christ, and an injury to those little ones who are dear to Him as the apple of His eye.

Again, the existence of such a faculty as *conscience*, whose natural working is ever on the side of God and

truth and duty, is no less a refutation of the dogma that the whole nature of man is corrupted, and the image of God utterly lost by the fall. The teaching of Scripture gives no real countenance to this view. On the contrary, a good and divine, as well as an evil or natural principle, is recognized in all men, except in those who have utterly quenched this divine light. The relation of these two principles is seen in the experience of the apostle as described in the seventh chapter of Romans, which is a *typical* experience, not of the wholly renewed, or the reprobate, but of the average 'moral' man, whose better nature is ever in conflict with the lower—in a desultory and vain struggle when left to its own unaided powers, in victorious conflict only when reinforced by the faith and strength of Christ. While he confesses, "I know that in me, that is, *in my flesh*, dwelleth no good thing," he admits that all is not evil: "For," he says, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man [in the personal centre and substance of his being]: but I find another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into subjection to the law of sin *which is in my members*." Again, in another epistle, he speaks of those whose 'very heart and conscience is defiled,' as if it were an exception to the ordinary depravity of human nature. On the other hand, the Pelagian view of human nature, as if it were in no sense depraved, and needed not to be regenerated, as if it were as pure and stainless and free to good as that of the first man, is no less manifestly false to the real facts and true condition of humanity.

The truth can only be reached by the discriminating and reconciling view already presented. Man has a

psychical nature, or 'flesh,' which is inherited from Adam, and carries in it the taint or depravation, the disharmony and weakness, which the first transgression induced, and which all subsequent transgressions have aggravated and confirmed. He has also a *spirit*, not inherited, but created or inbreathed, the image and likeness of God, and carrying within it divine powers, but coming into the world in union with a fleshly nature and unruly desires, and unable of itself to control this nature—hence uniformly yielding to it or falling into sin, in the same way and with the same fatal facility that our first parents fell. This accounts for the universality of sin, without the contradiction of inherited or transmitted guilt; also without the dreadful anomaly of the child commencing his moral existence with a depraved will or a corrupt spiritual nature. The inborn depravity is only in the *nature*, or 'flesh.' The spirit is pure until it contracts sin or guilt by weakly yielding to the temptations of the flesh; and then the inward shame and reproach that is felt attest that evil is something foreign to itself, and below its high and divine destiny.

It is only when moral evil is deliberately chosen by the will, and pursued as an end, that the man becomes thoroughly evil and corrupt. This is that 'spiritual wickedness' which is attributed to devils, and to men who like them are confirmed in evil, but which is not the character of the mass of mankind. Accordingly, our Saviour, who 'knew what was in man,' discriminates with divine wisdom between these two classes. He judges more leniently, as well as more truly, than we are wont to do, those whose sins are sins of weakness, of

struggling will overcome by sense and passion. He looked on the moral infirmities of men, as He did on their physical, with compassion, and more in sorrow than in anger; saying to the sleeping disciples, "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak," and to the trembling harlot, "Neither do I condemn thee; go, and sin no more;" while He reserved His severest condemnation for the spiritually and willfully depraved, who had quenched the light that was in them by resistance to the truth and Spirit of God, and who in their blindness thought that they were righteous and despised others.

VII.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE CREATION.

When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained; what is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the Son of man, that Thou visitest him? For Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet.—*Psa.* viii, 3-6.

In this sublime passage Man and Nature are brought into comparison or contrast with each other. Man, the child of God, made in His image, is set over against the work of His fingers—this physical universe—and an estimate is formed of his rank and worth in the scale of being; first as the two appear to the eye of sense, and then as they really are in the Divine constitution and according to the Divine judgment.

The inspired poet has his eye upon that grandest spectacle in nature, the nocturnal heavens, blazing with an infinitude of worlds, where the physical power and glory of the Creator is visibly declared. While rapt in this sublime contemplation, with his mind overpowered with the display of physical grandeur, he reverts to *Man* as he appears in the midst of such a universe, a being physically so insignificant, an atom floating in immensity; and he gives utterance to his thought in the exclamation: "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that Thou visitest him?" Then,

when his mind has a little recovered from its amazement, and reason has leisure to review and correct the judgment of sense, the real greatness and dignity of man returns upon him, and he continues: "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor; Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet."

There are, then, you perceive, two distinct aspects in which man may be viewed, leading to two opposite conclusions respecting his nature and rank in the creation. Following this thought of the Psalmist, I propose to consider him under both these aspects, or on both sides of his being. My design in this comparative view is not simply to get a just conception of ourselves and our own nature, but to remove certain objections to Christianity and hinderances to faith, which are constantly pressing upon it from nature and the physical world. The tendency of modern science, conversant as it is with purely physical things, is to exalt *Nature* as lord of all, to the disparagement of the soul, or spiritual being; to regard man as a merely natural product or development—a part of the physical world—as much so as the animals or trees; to merge the soul and all that is spiritual and supernatural within us in the great *All* of Nature, governed only by natural law, and thus to ignore and deny his moral freedom and immortal destiny. The speculations of Darwin, and especially his recent work on the 'Descent of Man,' tend directly to this conclusion, by denying all radical and essential distinction between man and the brute, since the one is, according to his doctrine, derived from or developed out of

the other. The same tendency shows itself still further in discrediting Christianity and the great facts of the Gospel, as making too much of man and this little world, which are so insignificant as measured by the universe.

Let us, then, endeavor to find out, if we can, *man's real place in the creation*, by viewing him first in the light of nature and natural law, and afterward in the light of spirit, and according to spiritual laws.

I. First, let us consider man in his *physical aspect*, leaving out of view his rational and moral nature, and regarding him simply as a physical being, and a part of the physical creation.

The first thought consequent on such a view is *the utter insignificance of this fraction when compared with the whole*.

The largest conceptions we can form of the universe we live in must needs be imperfect; but God has manifestly designed to convey to us some idea of its vastness by nightly withdrawing the veil from the surrounding worlds, and permitting us to look forth from our little island in space upon the immense ocean of being in the midst of which we are placed. Nowhere does the physical littleness of man appear so small as when, standing alone under the starry heavens, he considers with David this outspread revelation of God. The eye is bewildered in the effort to take in the multitude of heavenly bodies that people the sky and throng upon the unassisted vision. "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold, who hath created these, that bringeth out their host by number: He calleth them all by names, by the greatness of His might, for that He is strong in power; not one faileth."

Bring, now, science to the aid of sense; enlarge the sphere of vision and of thought, till this 'brave o'erhanging firmament' shall appear what it is — but the porch to the great temple of the universe; its galaxy of worlds but a single cluster in the lighted dome of immensity! Let reason go forth and explore this field of the Creator, measuring as she goes the distances and proportions of world to world, of system to system, and of firmament to firmament; while with every league she traverses the earth and its tiny occupants recede and dwindle in the scale of creation. And when reason fails, let imagination continue the circuit, till her eye grows dim at the ever-circling prospect, and her wing droops in utter weariness.*

As the beholder contemplates this immeasurable sea of world, stretching upward and onward, beyond thought or imagination to find a shore — 'deep calling unto deep' in silent but majestic chorus—how does he shrink and shrink, and almost vanish from existence, swallowed

* In illustration of the vastness of the universe, take the following facts: "In the Milky Way alone there are more than twenty million suns; and the Milky Way itself is but an island in the great ocean of the universe. The most remote distances are filled with worlds. And then these distances! Though light travels at the rate of 200,000 miles per second, that of the nearest fixed star (viz., Centaur, more than twenty billion miles off) takes nearly four years in reaching us; that of the most distant part of the Milky Way eight thousand years; and that of the most distant visible nebulae at least twenty million years. A railway train, traveling day and night at the rate of thirty-two miles per hour, would take three hundred and forty-two years and three months to reach the sun; and since the nearest fixed star is 269,420 times more distant, we could not reach it in less than ninety-two million years. How, then, can the earth—this grain of sand in the sea of the universe—be regarded as its centre?" —Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, Lect. IV.

up and lost in the vastness of the universe! Well might he exclaim, What is man—an atom, a mote—that Thou art mindful of him? What though I and the ball on which I stand were swept from existence, what greater loss would it be in the universe of God than if a leaf were swept from an autumnal forest, or a particle of spray from the ocean?

But we need not resort to so grand a scale and so remote a position in order to estimate the physical littleness of man. Let us contemplate him from a nearer point, according to a closer and more determinate standard.

Compare this creature man, for example, with other creatures and forces in respect of *physical power*. Look at the infant as he comes into the world to try its element and win an existence from its hard and inclement bosom. He is the absolute type of weakness. His very breath is labor and sorrow, and his timorous wailings are the pleadings of utter helplessness. It is long before he can sustain his own weight, or avail himself of the scanty strength with which nature has endowed him. As he grows up and puts forth his powers, he finds himself hemmed in on every side by the strict walls of necessity. Wherever he turns he comes in contact with hard, unbending laws, which limit his capacity, and drive him back upon himself and his own weakness. Thus he comes to learn that his whole power as well as safety lies in yielding to these laws instead of resisting them; and his whole experience is of what he can not do rather than what he can. His maturest physical strength is bounded by such narrow limits that whoso transcends these limits is looked upon rather as a prodigy than a man.

As the physical littleness of man is most manifest when contrasted with the vastness of the universe, so we shall best understand his physical weakness by viewing it in contrast with the great powers of nature amidst which he is placed. What are the utmost exertions of human strength when compared with the ordinary forces and operations of nature? If a man would be impressed with a sense of his own impotence, let him go and stand by the ocean, or encounter a storm upon its convulsed and heaving bosom. As the chaos of elements mixes and welters in tumultuous rage, tossing him and his frail bark like a bauble from one depth to another of the wild abyss, how does he cower within himself, and his very strength become a mockery!

Or let him climb the heaven-piercing Alps, and stand beneath the avalanche as it comes thundering through the air like a falling world. In presence of such energies, what becomes of the boasted might of man? What is the conflict of the battle-field and the shock of armies compared with the war of the elements when God mustereth His own hosts to battle? What are temples and pyramids, and the proudest structures of human art, to those monuments which the hand of Nature, instructed by God, hath reared to tell and perpetuate her ancient strength? What is man himself and his mightiest works measured against the destructive forces which are constantly at work around him? The lightning blasts, the floods drown, the earthquake engulfs, the frost freezes, the fire consumes him. Yet these are but the outward demonstrations, and therefore the least part of the *real* power that resides in nature. We make no account of, because we do not see, the hidden might

which is present as an animating soul in every form and species of created being. The very element we live in carries concealed within it slumbering and hostile energies which a slight disturbance may awaken into a terrible and destructive activity. The dull iron, which seems as if made to be hammered and wrought out as the passive instrument of man, has yet its soul of fire, which leaps forth when struck in vindictive sparkles. The earth itself is a vast magazine of pent-up forces—a furnace of liquid fire, as geologists inform us—surging and seething in its rocky caverns, whose only outward witness is the earthquake or the volcano. Every thing around and beneath is a *force*, open or concealed; the repose they seem to possess is a repose of opposite and counterbalancing forces. Man himself is a weak force, suspended between mighty and ever-active powers, whose existence he perceives not because they are acting so constantly. Who is aware, for example, of the motions of that invisible and subtile fluid which permeates the world like a sort of mundane sensation? But let its currents be interrupted, and the lurid flash and the crashing thunderbolt give token of the interruption. Nay, what is this to that silent yet amazing force which forever whirls onward our planet in its path around the sun with a celerity and power which, if it were as palpable as it is real, would hold us breathless and senseless with terror?

Here, then, is man, a physical creature, set down in the midst of such agencies and forces against which he is powerless; holding his existence at the mercy of elements whose nature is destruction. He walks through spaces and over deeps within which are embosomed hos-

tile energies that threaten every moment to burst forth and annihilate him. He meets every where demonstrations of a power that makes him tremble. He beholds above him meteors and worlds rushing through the sky; himself and the earth he treads on hurried along with them in a perpetual and perilous career.

Thus circumstanced and endowed, What is man? and what is his puny strength? Well might Jehovah demand of Job, when He would set before him his own littleness, "Hast thou an arm like God? or canst thou thunder with a voice like Him? Canst thou send lightnings, that they may go, and say unto thee, Here we are? . . . God thundereth marvelously with His voice. Great things doeth He which we can not comprehend. *He saileth up the hand of every man, that all men may know His work.*"

Again, let us estimate man as he appears in respect of *duration*.

Our conception of time, like that of magnitude, is wholly a relative conception. Nothing temporal is absolutely long, but becomes longer or shorter according to the standard or point of view we assume. There are two aspects we may take of human life, both of which will impress us with a sense of its brevity. We may estimate the life of man on earth as measured by his own nature and wants, or by the duration of other natures and existences around him. If we look no further than the individual nature and experience of man, he will appear not only the weakest, but the most transient of beings. All other creatures may be said to endure to the full extent of their capacity. Their life may not be long as measured by months and years, yet

at least they live out their day, and cease to be only when their course and destiny is run. The ephemera that begins its life in the morning and expires in the evening has its successive periods of growth, perfection, and decay. To itself its little life may be as long and as complete as that of the tortoise is to it. If it could speak and make known its sensations, it would utter no complaints over the brevity of its existence, because that existence is the ample measure of its wants. Man alone always dies *prematurely*. Even when the apparent and outer circle of human life in respect of years is complete, the *real* circle of his wants, purposes, experiences, which make up his true life here, is but just begun. Who, after the longest and most prosperous life, feels a satisfaction, as if his work and course on earth were accomplished? To whom does not old age come prematurely, as a calamity and a disease, rather than the natural going down of the sun? Who, on looking back over his three-score years and ten, does not with the Patriarch pronounce them 'few and evil'—a mere point in comparison with what they appeared in prospect from the other extremity of life?

Thus we see that the largest view which can be taken of human life is little and narrow beyond all other created things. But how is this view contracted still more when we consider how few of mankind actually complete this circle. A vast majority of our race die in infancy, and more than half before the age of twenty. At every period and step of man's progress through the world death stands by under a thousand shapes, to arrest his career and cut short the little remnant of his existence. The youth who has just entered upon life, and

whose kindling eye and eager step seem already to possess the future, is suddenly stopped in his ascent, and all the bright prospect sinks with him into the ground. The man of large culture and mature mind, in whom the early blossoms of hope seem now ripening into fruit, is cut down by an unseen hand, and all his thoughts and purposes perish. Nothing is so frail and transitory as the life of man considered simply in itself; but its brevity will be still more impressive when viewed in contrast with the duration of other inferior objects. We can not look around on the creation without seeing and being impressed with this contrast. The *tree* under which we played in childhood, and which still shelters the roof where we were born, was the same tree to our fathers as to us, and will still wave above our descendants when we shall be no more. There it stands, the type of permanence, a visible link connecting the past and the future, while successive generations of men pass away beneath it like its shadow.

Or contrast man's fleeting existence with the more enduring and grander features of nature. The mountains still rise as of old on the morning of the creation, the rivers and seas still flow, the heavens still stretch above us in their ancient grandeur. These objects undergo no change or decay, but remain the same through all the fluctuations and successions of mankind. There is something inconceivably affecting in the thought of the *stars* as the abiding witnesses of man's mortality. The self-same orbs shone upon our earth at its creation, and upon the first man, as now shine upon us. We perish, but they remain. There they hang, keeping their everlasting station, or measuring out with calm, unwearied motions the circles of eternity,

while man passeth away like a shadow, and continueth not! Oh, if this be the only life of man, if this earth be his only and final home, what a language of compassion, and almost of reproach, does he read in the stars! Why, he may well ask, do they shine from their ancient seats upon me and my transitory life? Why is it permitted me to look upon their calm and eternal smile?

Thus far we have considered man only in his outward and physical aspect, as a creature of time; and we have seen how small and insignificant is his rank or place in the creation as thus measured. But we are here brought to a point where is suggested to us the necessity of assuming a higher and different point of view. We are forced here to abandon the contrast we have begun, and to look at man, not simply as a physical, but a spiritual being, a creature of immortality, as the only fact which can explain or even justify his existence in the universe. This is the thought to which the Psalmist returns in the text, where, after contrasting man with the heavens as both appear to the eye of sense, he breaks forth in the reflection: "*Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet.*"

In looking, then, at man, not as body, but as spirit, it is evident that our former estimate of him will no longer hold; for we have removed him out of the sphere of the visible and tangible world, and therefore away from its standard. Considerations of great and small in the physical scale have here no place. The inquiry is not

what place does he hold in the physical creation in respect of size or physical power, but what is his worth in the moral scale, as a moral and spiritual being.

And yet our natural philosophers and scientists almost wholly ignore this side of man's nature, but class him wholly with the animals, as if he were a mere animal creation, comparing his bony structure, his limbs and features, with those of inferior animals, to show how they might have been 'developed' from those; while they say little or nothing of the higher and distinctively *human* attributes, in which man is infinitely differenced from the brute creation.

But even confining our view to the physical structure of man, and looking not at his mere bulk, but at the exquisite delicacy and complication of his bodily organism, the wondrous wisdom and skill displayed in its various parts and organs, and above all at the perfect *beauty* of the human form and countenance, with which no other form in nature can compare, we shall come to the conclusion that man, as a physical being, is at the head of this lower creation. He is the masterpiece of the Creator's works, and manifestly made to have dominion over all other creatures and things. We shall be led to exclaim with the Psalmist, "I will praise Thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made;" and with the poet, "What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and motion how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet what is this quintessence of dust?"—if man is *only* an animal, with no higher nature or nobler and diviner destiny?

And here we come upon a principle of the utmost importance and the widest application, which we need to have constantly before us in our estimate of things, viz., that outward size and consequence is no just index of inward or real worth. The greatest values most often lie concealed under the smallest bulk. What *appears* grand and powerful is in reality the least so. The pyramids seem stupendous prodigies of art, towering so grandly to the eye; but they become mere toys in comparison with the power and skill displayed in the steam-engine. Nay, what are both to the hand and brain that executed and devised them? So God delights to hide the greatest efficiency under the least imposing forms. He has made the mountains and seas large, whose barren breasts only glitter to the sun, or ebb and flow beneath the moon; but He has concealed the miraculous power of *growth*, containing all the waving luxuriance and living beauty of the world within a little seed, which an insect may devour. Who thinks of estimating a statue by its dimensions? or a poem by the number and size of its letters? or any work where truth and beauty are embodied by the amount of space which it occupies? The truth is that real greatness has nothing to do with size and space: it can not be measured nor apprehended by the senses. A child, because of its small stature and physical weakness, we are apt to look down upon with a feeling allied to pity or contempt. We think it little, because it appears so. But could we look into that child's spirit, could we see that little one as God sees it, nothing in the universe would appear so great. It is easy to hurt its limbs; its frail body a slight force may crush; but to hurt the *soul* enshrined within—for one to offend

that—it were better for him, said our Saviour, that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones.

Discarding, therefore, the judgment of sense, by the aid of this principle, let us look behind and within the physical littleness of men, and estimate,

II. *Man's real and essential greatness.*

1. And, first, contemplate man in his rational capacity, as a being who can *think*. Here mere physical might, whether of man or nature, disappears as nothing in comparison with this divine and transcendent power. What are stars and systems and suns, yea, the whole universe of worlds, compared with *thought*? What is the strength of mountains and seas, the outbursting force of storms and earthquakes and volcanoes, with all the hidden energies of nature, the revolutions of the world itself, to the invisible grandeur, the silent power and celerity of thought? Thought is greater than all these things, because it can comprehend them. It is more powerful, because it can control them. At least, the Divine thought is the controlling power which gives laws to nature; and human thought is endowed with a similar though subordinate control.

Look at the *effects* which thought has actually produced through its own inherent power. All the works of man in this world, all the productions of art with which he has renewed, as it were, the face of the earth—temples, cities, empires, with all their included magnificence—are the results of thought. They are a new creation, superinduced upon the old, by a supervening human power superior to it.

Look, again, at the agency by which thought *controls* the laws and forces of nature. The human body, that part of the physical world with which we are more immediately in contact, and which is subject throughout to physical laws, is yet pervaded by the higher power of *mind* and *will*, which itself subjects these laws and their operations to its own free thought. No mere force of nature can lift my hand to my head against the law of gravitation, which draws it downward; but my will can do it, and thus overcomes a mere natural law by its own superior and supernatural power. Nor does its dominion stop here: it goes forth into the outer world of nature, and exerts a controlling agency over the grand and terrific powers at work there. Thought has tamed the winds and waves, and made them its ministers. It has discovered the secret place of thunder, and made the lightnings to come and go at its bidding. It has made the clouds, if not its chariot, its steeds, to draw man's chariots with the speed of wind. It has compelled the subtlest and most active of fluids to act as nerves to transmit its motions around the world; and has thus converted the earth into a living body for itself, by making it the organ and vehicle of its operations.

Thus we see that man, in his rational capacity, as a creature of thought, rises above the universe, and becomes its superior. While in his material part he is its slave, held in bondage under its laws, in his mind he is emancipated, and rises aloof from their dominion. As a physical creature, man is subservient to the universe; he exists for it, as a part exists for the whole. His individual life is swallowed up in its immensity, as a drop is swallowed in the ocean. As a spiritual being, the

universe becomes subservient to man. It exists for him, as his instrument, to obey his thought, to nourish and feed his intelligence. He is no longer a drop merged in the ocean of being, and rolled along blindly and irresistibly in its tremendous surges; but a *free man*, rather, who stands on the shore and looks out on its immensity, and receives into his soul its whole vast magnificence, and is lifted through it, and above it, unto God.

2. Consider man as an *immortal* creature, made to endure and live forever.

This doctrine of immortality effectually redeems man from the insignificance which his brief duration here on earth seems to impress upon him, and raises him infinitely in the scale of being, even to an equality, in one direction, with God himself. This fact of immortality is the great demand of our spiritual nature, and is even necessary in order to justify the gift of thought and reason. For what else but a mockery were this noble endowment of reason, with its capacity of infinite expansion, its vision looking before and after, its 'thoughts that wander through eternity'—if there were no eternity of its own to range in, if it is given only to illumine for a brief moment the infinite abysses of truth, and then go out in darkness? Our whole being cries out for immortality, as that alone which can satisfy the infinite wants and capacities of the soul. And this instinctive craving for another and endless life, as the complement of this, is the primal ground of that belief in immortality which has prevailed in all thoughtful minds in all ages of the world.

We are accustomed to speak of the soul's immortality as a common and admitted truth. The word is easily

pronounced, and the idea connected with it is readily, alas! too readily, apprehended. But have we ever sounded the import of that word? Not the meaning which can be found in the dictionary, but that which deep reflection alone can discover. The truth is, I suspect, that with most of us, this, like many other great facts and mysteries of our being, is not realized because of its grandeur. Immortality, while it is the one deep craving of our nature, and can alone reconcile our reason to itself, is yet too great, too good, to be believed. The mind shrinks abashed before so august a thought, and is overpowered in the very effort to appropriate it. Yet I would endeavor, if possible, to bring this high truth within the reach of faith, and present it in a more tangible and conceivable form, by comparisons drawn from material things.

Certain astronomers claim to have demonstrated scientifically the finite duration of the present material universe, proving, by means of strict mathematical calculations, that this material system carries within itself its own laws of dissolution, which will, sooner or later—it may be after millions of ages—prevail to destroy it. However this may be, whether such speculations be valid or not, it is at least true that this material universe is not in itself and essentially eternal. If it shall continue forever, i. e., if there never shall be a period when there is no universe, yet this continued existence can be no attribute or property of the worlds themselves, but must be caused by the direct supervening power of God, perpetually conserving or newly creating the universe.

But the soul is of such a nature that it must endure forever, in order to develop its capacities and fulfill the

laws of its being. There can never come a period when it can be said to have reached its perfection or accomplished its destiny. The history of the soul can never be complete. Death, which is the end of all other creatures and things, is but the beginning of man. Appalling, yet glorious thought! We who are here to-day, breathing this air, encompassed and engrossed by these earthly scenes and interests, to each one of us there shall come a period when that dread crisis which terminates man's life and history on earth—that confronting terror which throws its awful shadow over all on this side of eternity—when death shall be but a dwindling point, scarcely discernible in the infinite perspective of the past; nay, when this life, with all its included events, shall bear the same proportion to the ages that have since rolled over it that this little scene of its history does to the universe of worlds in which it is engulfed.

If now, having gained this dizzy and bewildering height, we dare to look within and behind this exterior view, and contemplate man as not only an enduring, but a conscious and thinking being, as having therefore an internal as well as external history and progression—a history and progress measured, not by years, but by thoughts and feelings, by the conscious enlargement of the soul in knowledge and character, in capacity for enjoyment and suffering—if, as is well-nigh demonstrable, the high and sublime thoughts that here sometimes visit us, the great emotions that enrich and sanctify this life, the entrancing joys and the unutterable griefs that are here experienced—if these shall keep pace with our immortality, and continue to accumulate and deepen forever, till this universe of worlds shall be but a mir-

ror, as it were, an outward and visible type, of that inner universe of *thought* that shall people the depths and measure the eternity of each individual mind—what shall we say of man? what need of words to set forth the greatness and dignity of his nature? Who does not lift unto God his most earnest prayer that He who fashioned the soul after His own image, and made it immortal as Himself, will vouchsafe His help, and enable him to support this perilous weight of immortality, that it may prove indeed a weight of glory, and not of shame and everlasting dishonour.

Here, then, in this high attribute of immortality, man more than recovers his standing in presence of the universe, and rises to a dignity as far above this material frame of things as he falls below it in material grandeur. Here, emphatically, he puts the universe and all material things under his feet. Secure of an existence that can not die, of powers within him that can not be extinguished, he can look up exultingly to the shining worlds above him and say—Roll on, ye mighty orbs, in your majestic circuits, miscalled everlasting; your utmost periods can not outnumber the years of my duration. Ye have witnessed the beginning, but shall never see the end, of my existence. When your glory and beauty shall wax old, like a worn-out garment, and the celestial bloom of your countenances shall fade; when your strength shall fail, and ye flag wearily in your orbits, like a bird whose flight is spent, *my* race shall be but just begun! Though ye and all your stately order should rush into dissolution; though all the forces of nature break loose from their harmony, and mingle in one wild chaos of destruction about me, yet I shall

emerge safe and serene above the ruins of the universe!

3. A third and highest point of contrast, where the superiority of man over nature, or the physical universe, is most clearly witnessed, is in *his capacity for moral greatness or character*.

Man is a being capable of *holy virtue*, and thus of a greatness and strength and beauty of character which no physical grandeur can measure, or do any thing more than faintly to symbolize. The impression which comes from moral greatness is infinitely superior to that of mere physical grandeur, though it be the grandest display which the world of nature or art can furnish. To show this we need only think of a character like Washington, or an act of moral heroism like that of Leonidas and his brave Spartans, sacrificing themselves for their country in the pass of Thermopylæ; and then seek to find some scene of nature or monument of art that shall equal in sublimity these grand realities. How does all physical grandeur sink and become insignificant beside such moral greatness! If stones could be brought from all the planets, instead of the states, and piled into a monument as high as the moon, it could not reach the summit of Washington's glory, or express the towering majesty of his name and character. And the sun and moon that looked upon Leonidas and his band, and the mountains that shut in the pass of Thermopylæ, are but the picture-frame to that sublime deed which saved the liberties of Greece by the self-sacrifice of its noblest sons. So—and yet not so, for what comparison can resemble or set forth such glory?—there is more of divine grandeur embodied in the character and life and death

of Jesus of Nazareth than in all the glories and splendors of the firmament. Over this earth on which His feet have trod, and on which the cross has been erected, the heavens may well bend as an arch of glory, and the Milky-way, with its pavement of suns, remain as a starry path on which the Redeemer came and returned to his throne in heaven. The glory which streams from the cross more than eclipses the glory of the sun, which might well hide its face before that greater moral effulgence.

God's estimate of moral greatness, as compared with physical, may be seen in what He has done and is doing to form and establish it, or to recover it when lost. The great end for which the world of nature exists is not a mere physical display, or to express the wisdom and power of God, but to serve the moral uses of His rational offspring, and especially to be the theatre and instrument for the formation of character. For this the heavens were created and stretched abroad, and the stars maintain their perfect motions and eternal order—that the mind of man might be as expanded and free, and his life as harmonious and orderly and punctual as they. For this the sun rises and sets, the seasons come and go, and the earth, with its seas and mountains, its continents and rivers, and all its manifold freight of life and beauty, keeps its place in its orbit. For this the law and providence of God retain their hold upon every creature, guiding, governing, and restraining all according to their individual need as well as according to the counsel of His own will. For this, too, when man had fallen, God sent His own Son into the world, as a Redeemer, to restore and perfect that greatness of charac-

ter, that crown of glory and honor, which was lost by sin.

And this brings into view the most impressive argument for the real greatness of man ; for what must be the inherent worth of that nature which the Son of God disdained not to assume, and even died to redeem ? I am aware that the redemptive work of Christ is most often viewed in another aspect, as magnifying the stupendous love and condescension of God, who could stoop so low to raise a being so abject as man. But while it derogates nothing from the love here manifested, it glorifies the whole scheme, and renders it more worthy of God, to take into view also the inherent worth of the object of redemption. It was because God saw into what a depth of ruin man was plunged—‘from what height fallen’—that He stooped for his deliverance. The original glory of man measures both the greatness of the fall and the magnitude and glory of redemption. Nothing can exceed the ignominy and baseness of man as he is, because nothing can exceed his dignity as God made him to be. Man is fallen—deeply, immensely fallen ; but over this ruined temple of humanity is thrown a grandeur, if possible, more imposing than pertained to his perfection. For into this ruin God has descended ; through its desolate and broken walls He has poured the splendor of His glory, and made the very desolations of sin to set off and magnify the beauty of holiness and the majesty of grace !

From this imperfect survey of a great subject we derive two instructive thoughts :

1. We see the futility of an objection often urged

against the facts and teachings of the Gospel, drawn from the vastness of the universe.

It is inconceivable, it is said, that this little point in the creation should be the scene of such stupendous developments; that this insignificant abode of a more insignificant creature should absorb and concentrate so much of the Divine regard as revelation ascribes to it and the facts of redemption involve. This objection seems at first view so plausible that not only the opponents but the friends of Christianity too often deceive themselves by it.

Its force lies wholly in the assumption that what is small in the physical scale is proportionally small in the real and essential scale: that what appears insignificant to the eye of sense, and as measured by a standard wholly external, is therefore insignificant in the eye of God, and according to a true and spiritual standard. But we have shown that this method of judgment is false and inapplicable in the case of man, as of all other creatures and things; that number and size are of no account in God's estimate of things—they have nothing to do with real and essential greatness. We have seen that the true measure of man is not the physical universe, of which he is a fraction, but his worth as a moral and spiritual being. Here it may be found that man as far transcends this universe of worlds as he falls below it in the material scale; that the universe is in fact but a middle point or term standing in contrast each way with his twofold, marvelous nature.

But we are willing to allow to the objection all the force which may belong to it. We therefore look upon this stupendous array of worlds which science reveals to

us, not as a mere physical display, but as a vast spiritual realm, peopled with intelligences equal, or, it may be, superior to those which inhabit this planet; and we ask with still more significance—What is man, that God should be mindful of him, or the son of man, that He should *thus* visit him? Still we are asking the question with minds a little beclouded by sense; for if we consider it, the multiplicity of objects of regard diminishes in no degree the preciousness of one. Still less does it diminish or divide the individual and specific care which God exercises over each. If the whole are infinitely dear and precious in His sight, so is each individual, and the whole only because of the individual. Besides, the irruption of evil, of sin, into a single one of these innumerable holy spheres may give to that one a prominence in the Divine regard above all the rest—a principle which our Saviour himself recognizes in the parable of the lost sheep, which excited a greater interest in the shepherd than the whole ninety and nine which went not astray. For aught that we can tell, this remote planet, isolated by sin from the universal empire of holiness, may occupy a prominence above the rest on this very account, and stand out before the universe in solitary grandeur as the sole and lasting monument of grace.

This magnifying of what is outwardly small by making it the theatre of great moral and historical events is in perfect analogy with what we see to be the plan of Providence in the history of this world. The countries that have weighed most in history, and have developed the richest and grandest results, are not the great continental empires—China, Russia, and Brazil—but the little insular states of Greece, Italy, and England. The ‘eye

of Greece,' like the eye in the human body, was a small point, but its lustre has enlightened the world and the ages. A narrow strip of mountain land on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean has proved of more value in the religious education of the race than the whole of Asia. And within this narrow province, the obscure town of Bethlehem, and not Jerusalem or Rome, was chosen as the birthplace of the King of kings. So this earth, and not Sirius, or the central sun, was selected as the theatre of redemption, according to the wisdom of God, who has chosen the weak things of the world, and things which are despised, to confound the things that are mighty.

But if the physical theatre of redemption be small, its objects and results are not small. Man, as we have seen, is no insignificant creature, especially when the entire race and its completed history—now only begun—are taken into the account. If made a little lower than the angels at his creation, he is to be exalted above them through redemption, even to a participation of the throne of God and the Lamb (Rev. iii, 21). Besides, we are by no means required to limit redemption to this world and the human race. Other worlds, without number, may have fallen, and the economy of grace instituted here, and centering in the Cross, may be the centre of a system as comprehensive and far-reaching as the universe of God. That the work of Christ has relations which reach beyond our sphere, and embrace other orders and intelligences, is distinctly intimated in many passages of Scripture (Col. i, 20; Eph. i, 10; iii, 15); and glimpses are afforded here and there of a proceeding economy too vast and magnificent for our

finite vision to comprehend entire. Whatever God's wisdom undertakes, we may be sure will be accomplished in a manner and on a scale worthy of God. If it appear to us otherwise, it is because sin or ignorance has blinded our eyes, so that we can not see true enough or far enough to take in all its wisdom and proportions.

2. Our subject may assist us to conceive something of *the future destiny of Man*. There are two theories in regard to man's future destiny held by disbelievers in Christianity, each of which is without foundation. The one is the *materialistic* view, which ignores or denies immortality, and links man with the brutes in origin and destiny. But this is so contrary to the highest and truest instincts of the human soul that it may be left to refute itself, and die of its own dismal fatuity. The other, which may be termed the *idealistic*, conceives humanity as eternally progressive, but, by virtue of an inherent necessity, independent of Christ and redemption. But history, as well as revelation, refutes this idea, and shows that human nature, left to itself, without the quickening and regenerating Spirit of God, tends continually downward, and not upward. Man without God, and apart from Christ, is powerless, and dead to all true progress, whether physical, intellectual, or spiritual. But man quickened and enlightened from above, man restored to God, and therefore to himself, with the Spirit and life of God working in him and through him—what may he not hope for? "Without me ye can do nothing," and "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me," are two complementary truths which we need not fear to accept in

their largest and fullest significance. As no limit is set to the duration of man's existence, so no limit is assigned to the unfolding of his capacities. Here he is scarcely aware of the capability of his nature. He is like a child beginning to make acquaintance with the body he lives in. By a certain miraculous power lodged in his will he exerts a control over his muscles and limbs, and makes his hand obey the motions of his thought. Soon he extends this control beyond his body to the world without, and produces effects in nature not less miraculous. What shall set limits to this control, this ever-extending dominion of mind over matter? Here thought is in its infancy; and we wonder at what it has already accomplished, as the child wonders at its first puny efforts. But the present dominion of man over the world of nature, we have reason to believe, is nothing to his future and possible dominion. The miracles of Christ may be taken as a type and prophecy of that supremacy and sovereignty over nature which man was made to possess, and which he will yet realize. Many causes exist, here and now, to limit this dominion, all of which may be included in one cause, viz., *sin*. Nature now is in a state of hostility to man, as is indicated by the thorns and thistles, the storms, earthquakes, and pestilences, and other plagues with which she scourges him. Her laws stand arrayed against him as an offender, no less than the laws of God; or rather, since both are Divine laws, God stands opposed to man because man is a sinner, because he is alienated from the life and laws and workings of God. But with man's return to God this opposition will cease, and the prophecy of Job will be fulfilled: "He shall be in league with the stones of

the field, and the beasts of the field shall be at peace with him."

When once man shall become wholly reconciled to God, he will at the same time be reconciled to Nature, and all her powers, instead of hostile forces, shall become his willing and obedient servitors. When the will of man, through a vital union to God, moves only in harmony with the Divine will, and all his powers are quickened and sanctified by the inspiration of the Divine Spirit; when by a knowledge of all laws he has attained to universal power, and by allegiance to all laws to universal freedom, then we may understand and realize the full meaning of those words of our text: "Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet."

But it is a *spiritual*, and not merely a physical dominion which is to constitute the chief glory of man's future destiny. And here Christ, the head and type of glorified humanity, comes into view as the representative and ideal Man, in whom all prophecies and possibilities respecting the race find their fulfillment. As the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in his interpretation of the eighth Psalm, says, "We see not yet all things put under him [i. e., man], but we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor." And in this glory and honor that of redeemed humanity is included. We read that Christ is 'exalted far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come;' that He is 'head over all things to the Church, *which is His body*, the fullness of Him that

fillet all in all.' In many other passages the glory and dignity of Christ and His Church are represented as one and inseparable. "That ye may know what is the hope of His calling, and what *the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints.*" Again, saints are said to *reign* with Christ, to sit on thrones, to inherit a kingdom prepared for them before the foundation of the world.

We know not all which these symbols import, but they at least indicate supremacy, and open glimpses of a future power and greatness which the imagination fails to grasp. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him."

Let this blessed ignorance, this intimation of a reality too great to be revealed, be your consolation, oh, Christian believer! as you journey on through time to eternity. There is a *Future* before you outreaching in grandeur and glory all this universe of worlds. Christ, who made the worlds, and is heir of all things, has gone before, to prepare you a place and a kingdom. Follow Him up thither, through all the steps of His immortal progress, through a life of holiness in a world of sin, through trial and tribulation, through patient suffering and triumphant toil, through Gethsemane and the cross, assured that when He who is your life shall appear, then shall you also appear with Him in glory.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL REVIEW
OF THE
DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S PERSON.

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S PERSON.

PART I.

HISTORICAL SURVEY.

A KNOWLEDGE of the various theories, or classes of opinion, respecting the Person of Christ that have obtained in the Church from the earliest ages to the present time seems necessary for any intelligent judgment on this subject, or for one who would keep pace with the progress of theological and Christological science; or, indeed, for all who would be conversant with some of the deepest and most vital questions and profoundest speculations which the human mind can entertain.

A thorough survey of these opinions in their historical order has been given in Dr. Dorner's great work—*History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*—which is a thesaurus of theological learning, and a monument of patient and impartial investigation, of rare philosophical insight and critical acumen. The author confesses his deep obligation to this work, not for his own views of the Person of Christ—which were formed, for the most part, independently and before reading it—but for the flood of light which

is here reflected from some of the master-minds of the Church and of the ages on those deep and intricate problems through which they pushed their clear and adventurous thought, and which they were raised up to investigate, if not to solve—showing what has heretofore been thought on these great subjects, what has been established on immutable foundations, what refuted because of its falsity, and what, though logically refuted in its imperfect form, still lives on and refuses to die, waiting for a truer and more perfect development.

It is unnecessary, if it were possible, to give even a summary of this comprehensive and elaborate work, which is nothing less than a history of theological thought for eighteen centuries. It may be useful, however, to indicate a few of the main headlands and lines of progress in the development of this doctrine, dwelling chiefly and discriminatingly on those views which have most affinity with that presented in this volume, as preparatory to a fuller exposition.*

During the first century of the Christian era, the Person of Christ was apprehended rather as an object of faith than as a problem for the intellect. The Church, accepting the Scripture testimony concerning Him, and His own testimony concerning Himself, as Son of God and Son of Man, contemplated the *total* image of Christ

* As regards the relation of the present review to Dorner's history, it may be proper to say that we have carefully condensed the various opinions and teachings of the Church Fathers as given by him, adding comments and criticisms of our own. Where the words of Dorner are used, credit is given by quotation marks or other indications of their original source. The references and citations are from Clark's Edinburgh edition, 1861-70.

presented in the Gospels in its twofold divine-human aspect, without seeking to understand *how* the divine and the human were conjoined in one person. That He was *divine*, the Son of God, who existed in eternity before He appeared in time, who created the world by His power, and afterward redeemed it by His blood—they believed as a fundamental truth, because the Scripture so declared, and His whole miraculous character and life, His resurrection and ascension confirmed. That He was also *human*, as shown by His appearance in the flesh, His birth in Bethlehem, and His early life and development in Nazareth, His eating and drinking and sleeping, His human sympathy and fellowship, and finally His death as a man—they also could not help believing, different as He was from all other men. And that this wonderful being was *one* person, notwithstanding these seemingly contradictory elements, the whole impression made by His life and character and words caused them also to believe. Thus the grand total image of the living person of the God-Man rose before their minds as an intuition of faith—*one, real, and historical*, whose inner being was a mystery, but whose past and present and eternal existence was at once a fact and an inspiration, which made them and all things new, and for which they esteemed it glory to die.

This mystical intuition of the person of Christ formed by the early Church—the result of an impartial and truthful reception of the Gospel revelation, which holds in clear solution, as it were, all the momenta of truth that a scientific analysis has since developed into a Christology—this intuitive knowledge of Christ's person is happily the inalienable property of the Church and

of the Christian consciousness. And it has remained in its integrity through all the controversies that have risen around it, guiding the Church as by a compass, or pole-star of truth, amidst the rocks and shoals of heretical doctrine—often disturbed by logical reasonings, or dimmed, and sometimes eclipsed, by mists of error, but always again recovering itself, or emerging from the cloud, to disclose the false and reveal the true path, and will yet lead to the haven of a perfected Christology.

But this primitive Christian intuition of the Person of Christ, which is sufficient for faith, is not sufficient for the reason, which ever strives after a scientific conception of the truth. Hence very soon arose speculative attempts to construct a *theory* of Christ's person in conformity with this intuitional image. This was commonly done by means of *a priori* reasoning on the natures of God and of man, which were assumed to be two exclusive and incompatible substances, between which a true unity could only be secured by the denial or curtailment or absorption of one or the other constituent. According as the divine nature was curtailed, and the personality was conceived as *human*, with only a divine indwelling, the result was EBIONISM. According as the individuality and reality of the human nature was detracted from or denied, the result was DOCETISM. Between these two extremes, held in one form or another, the doctrine of Christ's person struggled and vacillated for many centuries.

The radical forms of these errors are represented by CERINTHUS and MARCION, the former of whom held that Christ was first a man like other men, and that the union with the Deity was a subsequent endowment and the

reward of his virtue; the latter denied the human birth and flesh of Christ, making His body merely an appearance. These errors were easily refuted, but not so the tendencies represented and set in motion by them. "They fell into Ebionism when they represented the Divine nature as transformed into the human; and into Docetism when they represented the human nature as transformed into the Divine; and they bore a certain resemblance to both when they represented the one as tempered and modified by the other—so that, as in chemistry, the result was a compound product, or mixture of both. They all belong to the Monophysite family, which, as well as the school of Antioch, conceived of the Divine and human as antagonistic to and exclusive of each other. Hence the only union possible was one which involved either the entire or the partial absorption of one of the factors; and usually the Divine factor, which was chiefly described and defined by physical categories, absorbed the human."

This inability to construct a true theory of Christ's person—one that should preserve the personal *unity*, and at the same time the *reality*, of the Divine and human aspects—was due chiefly to radically defective views of God and of man, and their essential relation to each other. Hence no real progress could be made until a true conception was formed of these natures, and especially of the Divine Being.

Accordingly a whole age (A.D. 150–325) was occupied in the investigation of this problem, and the settlement of the doctrine of the Trinity. The relation of this doctrine to that of the Person of Christ, and that there can be no true incarnation without a personal dis-

tion in the Godhead, either immanent and eternal, or incidental to revelation — (the Logos hypostatizing itself first in the creation, and afterward more personally in Christ)—is evident to every intelligent reader of the Scriptures. But the essential relation of the Logos to the absolute God on the one hand, and to man on the other, was a question which lay at the root of the whole problem, and employed the subtlest powers of intellect of some of the profoundest Christian thinkers which that or any other age has produced.

CHRISTOLOGY OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN FATHERS.

JUSTIN MARTYR.

JUSTIN MARTYR held to a generation of the Logos by the will of God, which was therefore subordinate to God as hypostasis, while equal or identical in essence. In the Dialogue with Trypho he says: "Not to angels, nor to the world, did God speak, when He said, Let Us make man, but to His Son. He, begotten by the Father, was before all creatures with the Father; and with Him the Father converses, as the Word by Solomon declares, that as principle (*ἀρχὴ*) before all creatures this birth was begotten which Solomon calls Wisdom." This Wisdom, or divine Reason (*λόγος*), he teaches, pervades the natural world, which was created through Him, and was partially revealed in the heathen philosophy—that of Plato and Socrates, etc., as well as in their virtue. He even calls them Christians, arguing that since in the Son who was manifested in Christ there is the whole truth, where there is truth elsewhere it must be a portion of the Christian truth, revealed by the same Son who revealed Himself in His fullness in Christ.

As respects the soul, it has not merely an inborn idea of God, but also a *natural* and *essential* relation to the Logos. (*Apol.*, ii, 10, 6.)

Besides the creation of nature and of men, the Logos has manifested Himself also in history. The Old Testament revelations are revelations of the Logos. The Person who spoke to Moses out of the burning bush was the Logos, or Son, and not the Father. This Being who then and there styled Himself the I Am, or the Eternal, he maintains, became incarnate in Jesus Christ.

On the question whether Justin recognized a human soul in Jesus, different opinions have prevailed. In the only passage bearing on this point he names only three potencies in the person of Christ—*σῶμα*, *λόγος*, and *ψυχή*. The soul (*ψυχή*), according to his trichotomy, is only the animal principle; the inference therefore is that he viewed the divine Logos as supplying the place of the human soul (or *πνεῦμα*). And this is confirmed by his frequent use of the phrase that the Logos *became* a man, and from his assertion that what men, apart from Christ, have of reason, is to be conceived as a spermatie indwelling of the Logos in them; so that Christ is not placed beyond the sphere of the rest of mankind, if in Him, in place of the germ and seed, the *whole* Logos dwelt. (Dorner, vol. i, pp. 268–279.)

IRENÆUS.

Irenæus affirms the eternal pre-existence of the Logos, and regards Him as the Jehovah of the Old Testament, agreeing in this with Justin Martyr and Tertullian; attributes Deity to Him as to His essence, and represents Him as an object of worship.

His relation to man is thus defined: "The Son, or Logos, is the original type after which and to which man was at first made. Thus from the beginning there

belonged to the essence of man a participation in Him, so that, so far from the appearing of the original type among us, His copies, being pronounced something contrary to the human nature, or the idea of humanity, the entrance of the original type is rather to be viewed as bringing with it for the first time true and perfect humanity." Again: "He comprehends humanity in Himself: In Him has appeared the original type with which humanity stands from the beginning in essential and vital connection from which it sprung, and to participate in which, when it shall have become real, completes each individual according to his idea." After His infinite love, says he, hath the Word of God become what we are, in order that He might make us what He is.

"Christ is thus, according to Irenæus, a being not foreign to mankind, but rather the representation of perfect humanity, the idea on which Adam was at first created, but which was not wrought out in Adam. As little, however, is He of the Adamic race. He is truly conceived only as a descent of the Logos, the primal type, into the world of those formed on His model, in order to be in the world the real Head and Type." (Dorner, pp. 317-323.)

While the doctrine of the Trinity remained unsettled, two opposite tendencies began to manifest themselves, one of which regarded the Son, or Logos, as a subordinate being, created or generated in time; the other identified Him with God to the exclusion of all hypostatical distinction. Irenæus, Athenagoras, and Clement of Alexandria set themselves against the subordination of the Logos, and maintained His essential equality with the Father, but failed to show wherein the distinction

consists. This ignoring of any eternal distinction between the Father and the Son led the way to *Monarchianism* and *Patripassianism*, which attained subsequently its most perfect form in Sabellianism.

The first teacher of this form of doctrine was

PRAXEAS.

Praxeas held to God's capability of sympathy and suffering in Himself, and also in the finite or fleshly nature of Christ. His view of the incarnation was that the Most High God appeared in Christ. The higher element in the person of Jesus is God himself, or the Father; in Christ, however, He entered into finitude, and became man. In the one person of Christ he distinguished the part that was born, viz., the flesh, and God, who is in Himself unalterable. The Father proceeded forth from Himself, and returned back into Himself. In this way the incarnation is reduced to a mere theophany of longer continuance.

Among other teachers of the Patripassian school is one whose views are specially worthy of notice, viz.,

BERON.*

According to his opponent, Hippolytus, he taught the conversion of Deity into humanity, and of humanity into Deity, in the person of Christ; and he (Hippolytus) asks refutingly: "What conception can they form of the one Christ, who is at one and the same time God and man by nature? What sort of existence

* Beryll of Bostra is classed with Beron as holding the same or similar views.

can they attribute to Him, if, as they say, He became man by the conversion of Deity into humanity; and if, on the other hand, He became God through the conversion of the flesh. For the mutation of the one into the other is the entire destruction of both."

This view, cleared of its obscurity, is thus stated by Dörner: "God has subjected Himself to the determination of finitude or humanity. He entered into the limitation and circumscription of humanity; His self-emptying (*κενωσις*) was real and objective; and the result was that God posited Himself as an actual man. The limitation did not affect the humanity alone, but God subjected Himself to limitation. The man thus originated is related to God in Himself as the lesser to the greater. The humanity which arose in such a manner is not foreign to the Highest—to the Divine—but, conformably to its origin, carries the Divine within itself as its inner essence; consequently the development of this humanity is its deification."

A positive advance is here made upon the old Patripassian doctrine, in that the Divine nature does not absorb the human, as it must if conceived to be present in Christ in its fullness; but a *limitation* is admitted, or reduction to the form and circumscription of humanity—a most important truth, as we shall see hereafter. Thus the reality and the eternal duration of the humanity of Christ is thereby secured; a thing which always remained doubtful with others of this tendency.

"This theory," remarks Dörner, "is very far removed from Ebionism; but it is equally remarkable as indicating that Patripassianism, which had originally put the humanity of Christ into the background as compared

with His Divine nature, had arrived at a stadium when it found it needful to lay special stress thereon. No allusion, it is true, is made to a human soul, but this view of a limitation of Divinity by the *kenôsis*, and indeed the entire course taken by this Christology, secures for the humanity of Christ a dignity and an importance such as the doctrine of the Church was as yet far from attributing to it."

The great defect of Beron is that he did not attribute to the Logos an hypostasis of his own apart from the incarnation; and so the mediating link, or connecting medium, between Deity and humanity, which is necessary for a true incarnation, is wanting.

HIPPOLYTUS.

Hippolytus taught, in opposition to Beron, that God is unchangeable. So impossible is it that a conversion of Deity into humanity, or of humanity into Deity, should take place, that God and man can not even be compared with each other. Between the Creator of the universe and the creature, between the infinite and the finite, no sort of comparison can be instituted; for they are not merely relatively, but essentially different. What the Divine was before, that it remained after the incarnation — essentially infinite, unlimited, impassible, incomparable, unchangeable, and immovable, possessed of all power in itself," etc. Thus Hippolytus, through his too hasty opposition to Patripassianism, approximated the opposite extreme of Pantheism. His own view of the incarnation was far less rational and Scriptural than that of Beron. According to this, the flesh or humanity which Christ assumed was something wholly exterior

and foreign to the Divine. He could not say the Word *became* flesh, or *was* man; but merely that He wore man as a garment, or dwelt in him as a temple. The only difference between Christ and the prophets was a quantitative one. In Christ the union between the Logos and a man was not merely momentary, but permanent.

In reference to this view, Dorner justly remarks: "It can not be denied that so long as the humanity of Christ is merely regarded as a garment or a temple; so long as the Logos merely has or is the vehicle of humanity, without *being* man; and *vice versa*, so long as the humanity of Christ can not be termed *divine*—so long is there no incarnation, but merely theophanies; so long is that immanent union of the divine and human not logically demonstrated, which faith feels to be the essentially new element in Christianity."

TERTULLIAN.

Tertullian rendered an important service to Christology by defining more clearly the hypostatic distinction between God and Christ before the incarnation. Previously the higher nature of Christ was termed only the *Logos*, a designation which, although Scriptural, threatened to substitute an ethnic for the Christian conception of God, and also to identify the Word with the Divine Essence as a mere power or attribute, or else with the world as its *ratio* or organic principle. "The new point which Tertullian brought to light, and which constitutes an epoch in the history of Christology, was *his designation of the personal element in the higher nature of Christ by the name Son*; and his endeavor to

lay bare more fully the genesis of the Sonship and its relation to the Divine Essence, with which, so long as He was merely termed *Logos*, He was too completely identified."

The very important bearing of this point on the doctrine of the Incarnation may be seen when we consider the *human* significance of the term 'Son;' and that not only the personality, but the *filial* relation, which was so perfectly exemplified by Christ as a man, is thus carried back to its ground in His eternal nature and His essential relationship to the Father. Whereas the term *Logos* indicates His archetypal relation to the world, as the creative Wisdom of God, the name *Son* declares His archetypal relation to *man*, and contains the idea and prophecy of the incarnation. Accordingly, Tertullian gives special prominence to the truth of the *humanity* of Christ, and conceives man to have been created with special reference to the incarnation. "Human souls he deemed to be of Divine substance; humanity he held to have been from the beginning an object of the love of God, and destined to be exalted and transformed into the Divine nature through Christ. Again, he believed that it was involved in the eternal idea of humanity from the very beginning that its history and the history of the Son of God should be interwoven with each other; and that consequently the Son of God was eternally related to and incorporated with humanity. When God created Adam out of the earth, He looked on the image of the future Incarnate One; and, creating Adam in His likeness, God created him in His own likeness." The theophanies of the Old Testament he regarded as a preparation or training for the incarnation. For this

reason He appeared so frequently to the patriarchs, to Moses and others, as it were testing Himself, in sympathy with the sufferings and tears of men, and in loving intercourse with them. The Son of God, says he, revealed Himself from the beginning. "The Father is not only not seen, but He can not make Himself visible. No man can see God and live. The nature of the Son was from the beginning otherwise constituted: it was capable of appearing. He would not have become visible at the end of the days, had He not been visible from the beginning."

ORIGEN.

Origen carried on the work of Tertullian, and developed still further the doctrine of the Trinity by teaching the *eternal generation of the Son*; thus securing for the higher nature of Christ not only personality, but an eternal existence or hypostasis, as opposed to His generation in time, and distinct from the Father as Son, while one with Him in Essence. This great and essential point was compassed by his subtle and comprehensive intellect seizing the elements of truth contained in former and seemingly antagonistic views, and combining them into a higher truth. Thus, discarding the category of *before and after* in time, as inapplicable to the idea of cause, least of all to divine causality, he shows that the Father is the generating cause or ground of the Son's existence, who is eternally begotten, and eternally coexistent with the Father.

Discarding also the notion of *exclusiveness*, as pertaining only to physical and finite things, he maintained that in the domain of spirit, and especially in the Godhead, distinctions, so far from excluding each other, rather

confirm and establish unity, since a unity evolved out of distinctions is more perfect and self-sufficient; that the category of *part* and *whole* is not applicable to God, who is an indivisible unity; that we can not allow of a greater and a less in Him, because wherever He is at all, He is entirely and indivisibly. Hence that the entire fullness of the Deity, and not a part merely, is attributable to the Son.

Lastly, combining the two opposed principles of *equality* and *subordination*, as not contradictory, but both necessary to the true conception of the Son of God, he attributes on the one hand an equal Divine essence to the Son, and on the other a subordinate, i. e., a derived and dependent existence or life; so that in the Son is the eternal fullness of God. He proceeded forth from the Divine Essence, but He is God in a derived sense; the Father alone being the eternal and self-subsisting ground of His being.

Thus the great outlines of the doctrine of the Trinity were struck out, and their rationality demonstrated, by this master intellect, which were afterward completed and embodied in the Nicene Symbol, against the views of Sabellius, on the one hand, who denied any personal distinction in the Godhead, and of Arius on the other, who denied the deity and eternity of the Son.

The views of Origen respecting the Son, or Logos, are so fundamental to our whole subject, that we subjoin the following:

“The Son was not generated once for all, but is continually [being] generated by God in the eternal *to-day*.” This idea of eternal generation, so difficult for some

minds to conceive, was afterward thus stated by Athanasius in his rejoinder to the objections brought against the doctrine of the Church by the Arians and Sabellians: "Among men we see only imperfect copies of fatherhood and sonship; for the same person stands successively in both relations. Instead of the mutability and mobility which characterize men, in the Deity the Father represents Fatherhood absolutely and eternally, and the Son Sonship. Indeed this absolute Fatherhood and Sonship in heaven are the archetype of all fatherhood and sonship on earth. The Father, because He is perfect, does not first begin to be a Father, as though He had not been a Father previously; it belongs to His essence to be a Father, even as brightness belongs to light; and this His essence He does not acquire gradually, but it is His eternally. Therefore, because the Father exists not at all, or is eternally Father, the Son also is eternally Son."*

Origen further teaches: "The Father possesses in the Son an absolute image of Himself. For no one, I believe, embraces the entire glory of the Father in Himself, in copy, save the Son. He not only participates in wisdom, truth, reason, but *is* Wisdom, Truth, Reason itself; and all the wise are wise through their participation in Him."

The relation of the Son, or Logos, to the world is thus set forth:

* Gregory Nazianzen developed this idea further, as follows: "Not even in earth is the causal relation limited to cases in which the cause precedes and the effect follows: in other words, succession in time is not an essential attribute of the causal relation; the causal relation may have a place, he urges, in connection with things whose existence is contemporaneous, and adduces as an illustration light and the effects it produces."

“The indivisible unity and unchangeableness of God do not admit of the multiplicity and mutability of the world being directly grounded in Him, i. e., the Father. Equally impossible is it to conceive the world as existing independently, as an atomistic multiplicity without unity. For this reason the Son is the middle or medium between the world and God. He is the substance which runs through the whole world, its heart or reason, present alike in every man and in the entire world. The Son is the truth, the life, the resurrection of the creatures. He is the One who lies at the basis of their manifoldness, however numerous the names or various the modes in which He is regarded. And however far freedom may go astray, however wide a field of action may be allowed it, as rational, it is indissolubly connected with the Logos, who constantly manifests and maintains Himself, as the overarching omnipresent and all-dominating power, in the development of the world.”

From hence it appears that the Son stands to the world in a more direct relation than the Father. He is the truth and the soul of the world; in Him is all true reality, for only the rational can be said to have true reality. Through Him, therefore, the true spiritual substance of the universe is an organism. He is the reason in every soul.

This substantial relation of the Son to the world embraces not only man, but also angels—nay, the whole universe, which can only have true reality so far as it participates in the Logos. This natural participation in the Logos, which he ascribes to all rational beings, is not however the whole of his doctrine. He attributes to the Logos a new form of existence besides the immanent

one *in* subjects, viz., an objective appearance alongside of His creatures, particularly men.

His view of the incarnation corresponds with the universality of his idea of redemption as including all worlds. What Paul says regarding himself, that he had become all things to all men, he held true in a much diviner way of the Logos in all ages; for He became all things to all, passing through all stages, from the angels down to the beings in the nether world, that He might win all. To the angels He became an angel, to men a man.

According to Origen, the incarnation was not accomplished in one act, but had a history, progressed from one stage to another, and fell into three main acts. The first two acts were played out ere time commenced; the third commenced with the earthly life of Christ. This view is connected with his belief in the pre-existence of souls, according to which Christ's human soul, like all others, pre-existed from the beginning of the world. By its virtues it earned the distinction of an abiding union with the Logos. At the commencement of the creation, it is true, He was united with all souls; but this one alone clung to Him so closely, faithfully, and unchangeably that it became one spirit with Him. Hence the Son of God did not dwell in this soul merely as He dwelt in the souls of Peter and Paul; for neither of them was free from sin. But the soul which was in Jesus had chosen the good ere it knew the evil, and it alone was incapable of sin.

This view of Christ, notwithstanding His pretemporal existence, is essentially Ebionitical. It is also Docetical, inasmuch as he denies to the humanity of Christ an es-

sential and permanent significance in itself, even as he denied it to the other forms which he assumed.

Thus gradually emerged the true doctrine of Christ in His higher nature and relations, as the Image and Revealer of God; first as *Son*, dwelling in the bosom of the Father, the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of His person; then as *Logos*, or the revealer of God in the creation, the Divine archetype and organic principle of the world, by or through whom all things were made, and in whom all things consist; and, finally, as *God-man* entering into the world and humanity, and revealing the personal love and condescending grace of God in the face of Jesus Christ.

The significance of this doctrine of the Son, or Logos, and his hypostatical distinction from the Father, in its relation to the whole problem of revelation, as well as to that of the incarnation, must be obvious to all deep-thinking minds. "If the Father himself is immediately the revealer—if there is no distinction in Him, no Son through whom, as through His image, He reveals Himself, first in Himself and for Himself, and then also in the world—then the object of revelation is lost, and its idea destroyed. For if the Father, as the final ground, Himself comes forth in revelation; and if, in order that the revelation may be complete, nothing can be left behind in the ground; then did the Father, that is, God, pass over into and really become the world; and there is consequently nothing left but the world. This is the ethnical, pantheistic feature of Patripassianism and Sabellianism. The final result is to do away altogether with revelation; for, on the supposition referred to, that

which was to be made manifest by revelation no longer exists."* (Dorner.)

The truth respecting the higher nature of Christ, which Sabellianism disallows, on the one side, by denying His hypostatical distinction from the Father, was assailed on the other by *Arianism*, which denies His deity and eternal existence.

ARIUS.

Arius maintained that the Son is not eternal, and that He was created out of nothing. He represented Him as a middle being between God and the world, the first and highest of created beings, but yet not God nor equal with God. This error, opposed as it is to that of Sabellius, yet springs from the same root. For the basis on which Arianism and Sabellianism both rest is "the anti-Christian idea of God as the unknown, infinite Being, which remaining shut up in the rigid simplicity of its own nature, can not enter into true fellowship with man—an idea whose natural and logical end is either Deism or Pantheism."

* Athanasius uses the following language respecting Christ as the image of God: "The Son is the image and brightness of the Father, the configuration of His essence and the truth. If the light exist, the brightness is its image; if the essence exist, He is the complete expression of the essence. Given the essence, the image and expression must also be given; for the image of God is not a thing painted from without, but *God himself is the begetter thereof, and beholding Himself therein, He rejoices.*"

Hilary of Pictavium propounds the same view: "The idea that the Father and Son know and behold themselves in each other was familiar to him, which involves the truth that *the self-consciousness of the Deity consists in this reciprocal knowledge of the Father and the Son*; which is not merely a knowledge which the one has of the other, but which each has *in the other.*"

“The entire position taken up by Arianism, as Athanasius shows, is a false one; for instead of asking, How could Christ, although God, become man? it asks, How can Christ be God, although man? In other words, its Christological starting-point is untheologically the humanity, and therefore it failed to arrive at the Deity. *The Deity can be shown to be the principal of itself and of humanity; but the humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the Deity.*”

This heresy helped and hastened the settlement of the true doctrine. Arius was condemned and deposed by the Synod of Alexandria, and an Œcumenical Council was convened at Nicæa, A.D. 325, where was framed the famous NICENE CREED, which acknowledges the eternal generation of the Son, and His essential equality with the Father, and gives the following more precise definition of it: “That the Son is of the essence of the Father, that He is very God of very God, and that He was begotten, not created.” The term *ὁμοούσιον*, implying identity of essence and equal coexistence, was added through the efforts of Athanasius the Great, who made it his life-long task successfully to defend and scientifically establish this confession of the substance of the Christian faith.

The doctrine of the higher nature of Christ being thus established, the next problem to be settled was that respecting His *humanity*, and the union of the two in one person; and this, as we shall see, was a problem much deeper and more difficult of solution.

As no view of Christ's higher nature can be satisfactory which does not recognize His true and essential dei-

ty, so no view of His humanity can be true which fails to recognize in Him all that really belongs to humanity, all its true and essential conditions; not what is accidental or peculiar to our fallen and depraved nature, but what belongs to the true and *Divine idea* of man.

Now, as this has never been perfectly realized, save in the Divine man, Christ Jesus, it is necessary that we form our conception of what a true humanity is from the perfect standard presented to us in Christ, and not judge of His humanity empirically by the imperfect standard furnished by actual men. In other words, we must go to the God-man to learn what humanity is, just as we must go thither to learn what God is, and not judge of either by our abstract and empirical notions apart from this concrete and living reality.

The overlooking or ignoring of this principle has brought confusion into our conceptions and interpretations of His person. Judged by ordinary human standards, Christ has been conceived as a wholly anomalous being, an exception to the race because of the divinity and perfection of His nature, instead of the true *ideal Man*, in relation to whom all other men are exceptions and anomalies. What is supernatural in Him has been attributed to His divinity, when it belongs quite as truly to His humanity. A distinction and separation has been made between His divine and His human nature, instead of conceiving Him as one *Divine-human* person, in whom the Divine is human, and the human is Divine.

This result was inevitable so long as the Divine and human were conceived as opposed to and exclusive of each other. The true relation and essential unity of the

two is the discovery of a much later day, and is even yet but partially and timidly apprehended.

One essential condition of a true humanity is a real *growth* and *development*, implying, of course — unless the whole manifestation is mere seeming — previous ignorance and a limitation of capacity, gradually ripening into knowledge and perfection. This condition is one of the most difficult and insoluble elements in the whole problem, which most theologians have either ignored or but very partially resolved, either leaving no place whatever in their Christology for such development, or else attributing it only to one side or factor of the person of Christ — the human; while the other — the Divine — by its omniscience and freedom from all limitation, practically denies and makes unreal the human development.

Another condition is *moral freedom*, involving temptability and a possibility of sinning, though without the moral certainty of sin consequent on a depraved nature: a freedom, moreover, able to resist, as Adam did not, the strongest solicitations to evil, and so to acquire a strength and perfection of virtue at once human and divine. This condition, which the history of Christ's temptation supposes, unless it is a mere show without inward reality, is for the most part ignored or denied by most interpretations of His person.

A third condition of a true humanity is what is found only in regenerate humanity — a *Divine indwelling and inspiration*, realizing the true idea of sonship, viz., obedience, vital dependence on and spiritual oneness with God as our Father. The mode in which most theologians attempt to meet this condition makes the

humanity of Christ an exception to rather than an example of a true and perfect manhood.

Let us now see how these conditions were met, and the problem of the incarnation was attempted to be solved, by the early Christian fathers.

ATHANASIUS.

Athanasius, the valiant defender and able expounder of the Nicene Creed, allowed full reality to the Deity of Christ, but he failed to show, though strenuously asserting, His true and complete humanity, and especially the unity of the two in one person.

He taught that the Logos, who is the creator and archetype of humanity, assumed human nature, and thereby made it His own, appropriating its sufferings along with the nature itself, which thus acquire a significance in and for the Logos himself. "Though He dwelt in a human body, His all-embracing infinitude was not shut up in it, nor was He shut out from other places; but as the Logos, He was in the body, moving it, even as He moves the universe which He created. At one and the same time He was in the body and in the universe; nay, more, as He was in, so also was He outside of, the All, resting in the Father."

According to this view, the man Jesus was simply and solely the Logos, walking among men in the human nature which He wore. Athanasius thus verges toward the old representation of the body of Christ as a garment or temple, which excludes the full idea of the incarnation. At the same time he is aware that this is not sufficient, for he frequently declares that, "What we needed was not a new theophany, but that He should

really become one of us. In order to be our representative, He must not merely have or bear or dwell in a man, but must Himself *be* this man." He fails, however, to show how He could be such—that is, he fails to meet the conditions of a true humanity. He hesitates to attribute freedom of choice to Christ, while insisting on it for men, lest the unity of His person should be thereby destroyed. He leaves no place for a true human development, or for the limitations proper to humanity. Christ's ignorance of the day of judgment he refers solely to His human nature. He says: "As man, He was able to say, I know it not; for as man He did not know it, although the Word knew it." But how this comports with the real unity of Christ's person, and how it is possible to combine a non-knowing humanity and an all-knowing Deity into a personal unity is a question not easily answered.

In short, notwithstanding the consummate ability of Athanasius, and his immense service to theology in respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, and the higher nature of Christ, his Christology is defective on the radical point of so combining the Divine and human in Christ as to meet all the conditions of a true humanity, while preserving the unity and singleness of His person.

More successful in many respects was another distinguished father, who occupies a large space in the history of this doctrine; and whose views, notwithstanding some serious defects, and their condemnation by the early Church, deserve a more thoughtful study than they have yet received.

APOLLINARIS.

This father, like many other teachers and founders of schools, has suffered from the misrepresentations of his enemies, and the imputations of opinions held not by himself, but by others of the same school.

The following outline of his views is chiefly derived and carefully condensed from Dorner's history.

It was not the doctrine of the Church which he opposed; on the contrary, he believed himself to be in harmony with its spirit and meaning. His aim was to construct a Christology on the basis of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. He took his start from the principle that the higher element in Christ must be conceived not as a mere animating power, as in the prophets, but as an *hypóstasis*.

Again, Christ must be *one* person. He can not have merely assumed, He must have *become* man. If the Divine—the Logos—dwelt personally in Him, there can not have been a second human person in Him; for in that case Christ must have been a monstrosity, rather than a unity. If the humanity of Christ also possessed its own living and spiritual centre, we should have to attribute to Him two wills; and as freedom of choice pertains essentially to the human centre, we should be driven to assume the existence of an immutable will (that of the Logos), and a mutable will (that of Jesus), in one and the same subject. Such a result can only be avoided by denying to Christ the human *νοῦς*, the rational soul or *πνεῦμα*, in which freedom of choice has its seat; not, however, as though this person had no *νοῦς* whatever, but the Logos constituted Himself the human *νοῦς* in Him.

His view is based on a *trichotomical* view of man, according to which man consists of three elements—body (σῶμα), soul (ψυχή), and spirit (πνεῦμα, or νοῦς)—in proof of which he appeals to 1 Thess. v, 23. But Christ also consisted of three elements—πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα. The two latter he represented as appropriated from Mary. He did not, of course, derive His πνεῦμα from men; nor was it fitting that He should do so; for then He would not have been the second Adam from heaven, but like the earthly Adam. If the man from heaven had been in all things like us who are earthly, even to the possession of the same πνεῦμα as we, He would not have been the heavenly Man, but rather the mere lodging-place, the receptacle of the heavenly God.

According to Nemesius, he held that “souls are generated by souls, as bodies by bodies. But that which arises in the way of propagation is not in the full sense πνεῦμα, but merely soul. Adam became a living soul, but he lacked πνεῦμα, which was first brought to him by Christ, the man from heaven. What Adam did not possess he was naturally unable to propagate.” “In Christ the Logos assumed the place of the inner man, by which the outer man (the σῶμα and ψυχή) was determined. Hence sin found no place in Him, however strongly the flesh with its ψυχή may have been opposed to the νοῦς. For only that can be called evil in which the νοῦς takes part.”

From this we may see that Apollinaris might without hesitation have designated Christ a composite person, after the example of the Church, save that he most decidedly protested against representing the factors as any

thing else but elements of the one indivisible person ; a composition of the person out of two persons — to which the opinion of many teachers of the Church seemed to lead—he felt compelled entirely to repudiate. To his mind, also, the duality of the *natures*—if the *φύσεις* are to be conceived as complete—was equivalent to a duality of persons.

Christ therefore is *μία φύσις, one essence* ; by which he understood both the unity of the person and the essential unity of the two aspects, the Divine and the human. To the unity of the person corresponds unity of volition and of thought.

This indivisible unity of Christ's person is the regulative idea of his whole doctrine, according to which he assigns to the Logos, not an external and foreign position, but one which constitutes Him *the truth of the humanity itself*, and gives His incarnation its reality.

“The humanity of Christ,” says he, “is that which is moved ; the Deity is the mover. In the Holy Scriptures we find no separation whatever made between the Logos and His humanity, but it is one being, one hypostasis, and one activity.” A disciple of Apollinaris—Julian—writes to another as follows: “Alone, and for the first time, did our father Apollinaris give utterance to and clear up the mystery hidden from all: to wit, that Christ became one being, and a composite nature, constituted out of the movable and the immovable ; which nature alone, moved by the one will, by one activity, accomplished the miracles and the sufferings.”

Apollinaris himself also was well aware that the Church teachers of his time made too light of Christology, and he set for himself a higher and truer goal, in

that he aimed at attaining a living intuition of the unity of this person, and at an understanding of how the same subject can be designated both God and man; whereas (as he objects) the teachers of the Church contented themselves with merely saying what belonged to a complete humanity, and what to a complete Deity, but troubled themselves little with the question of how the two can become one person.

And yet this question was just the principal thing; for unless it be answered, the incarnation can not be shown to have really happened, and all previous labor has been in vain.

He endeavored to gain a more complete conception of this personal unity by saying that the Logos made the human His own, constituted it a *determination* of Himself. His aim was to show that each of the two, humanity and Deity, stood in the position of a determination of the being of the other, both belonging together. In these speculative efforts he was guided by the most important practical and religious interests. "If there were in Christ one being and another being, unity and sameness of worship must be condemned; for the Creator and the creature, God and man, may not be worshiped after the like fashion. But the worship paid to Christ is one, and therefore God and man are included under one and the same name. Consequently we must not say that in Christ there were two natures, God and man, but one indivisible being, constituted by God's conjunction of Himself with a human body."

Apollinaris maintained that the unity of the Person of Christ was not secured, unless we can say, Our God was crucified, and man is exalted to the right hand of

God : the Son of Man was from heaven, and the Son of God was born of a woman. And the work of uniting God and man is first accomplished when God puts Himself completely in the place of humanity, and man is exalted to God.

But how did He bring the two together, so as to constitute a real unity, or one person? The answer to this question lays bare the true ground of the incarnation, and the radical difference between Apollinaris's conception of it and that of other teachers. This ground lies in *the essential unity of the Divine and human*, which in the higher nature of Christ becomes *identity*. The Logos, so far from being foreign to, constitutes rather the proper perfection of humanity, or rather the humanity itself, its essential truth and reality. This idea Apollinaris expresses as follows :

"The *πνεῦμα* in Christ was human *πνεῦμα*, although divine. Nay more, it was eternal, and existed before the incarnation. The Logos must therefore have existed as man prior to the incarnation, and *His deity was in itself man from the very beginning*." Gregory took the words to mean that Apollinaris held the flesh of Christ to be eternal. But Apollinaris never taught this ; nowhere did he assume a heavenly humanity in this sense. But he viewed the *πνεῦμα*, or the Logos, in Christ as the eternal humanity. To him *the Logos was both God and archetypal Man*. The primal grounds of the incarnation lay, not in the Virgin, but in the eternal Logos himself, who by His essential nature is the eternal archetype of humanity, and bears within Himself the potency of a real incarnation. "The Divine nature is humanity." Of the man in Christ, he says, "He was the brightness of the

Father's glory, and in Him the essence of God acquired a form. His humanity was of one substance with God prior to the birth on earth, yea, prior to the universe, and was the companion of God."

The incarnation, however, is not a mere revelation of the archetypal man, but the birth from Mary, the assumption of our form, of the form of a servant, must be regarded as an act of condescension, as a humiliation of His humanity, having for its object the making of the new humanity, which eternally existed in the Logos, a reality on earth, and a common possession of the race.

But in becoming like, He did not become *identical* with us; for as He remained the Logos, so also did He remain the archetype of humanity, in order to exalt it and to transform us. As Apollinaris repeatedly declares, "Christ can not have so entirely become that which we are, as to have lost the ability to make out of us that which He is."

This shows that Apollinaris did not teach, what has been sometimes charged against him, the *conversion* of Deity into humanity in the person of Christ. For this would imply that the Logos who converted Himself into man ceased thereby to be Logos, ceased to be what He was; and then, in fact, nothing remains but the holy man Jesus; and instead of a union of the Divine and human in the incarnation, we have the absorption of the former in the latter. The man who was brought into existence by the conversion of the Logos into a man may be converted back again into God; in such a manner, however, that the humanity then ceases to exist. But according to the view of Apollinaris, both the Logos, or Deity of Christ, continues in the incarnation, and the eternal duration of His humanity is also secured more

consistently and surely than by the ordinary doctrine. The humanity of Christ did not exclude His deity, nor did His exaltation exclude or supersede His humanity; nor did they coexist as two distinct and conflicting natures; but *the human and divine were contained in each other*; each was a determination of the other, and essential to its true idea.

It belongs also to the view of Apollinaris to say that the Logos, in assuming what was in a measure foreign to Him, viz., the form of a servant with our fleshly infirmities—which His divine love prompted and enabled Him to do—really *suffered* whatever the human nature suffered. “It must be possible to refer sufferings to the Divine nature of the Logos; otherwise Christ did not really put Himself in our place, and could not have conquered sin, for then it would have been a mere man that suffered. The Redeemer suffered hunger, thirst, weariness, conflict, and sadness. But how could He be at the same time God? He is not two persons, as though God were one, man another. Accordingly God suffered; and that suffered which, properly speaking, admits no suffering into itself—not by a necessity of its nature, but because it willed to sympathize with or participate in the sufferings of men.” From the words of Christ concerning the corn of wheat that dies, he concluded, “Christ’s dying could not have brought so much fruit if it had been the death of a mere man, instead of the suffering of the Deity. But the Church in its doctrine does not leave to Him who was crucified any thing divine in His own nature; not even in His noblest part, in the πνεῦμα, was the human at the same time also divine.”

Apollinaris seems not to have conceived the doctrine

of the *Kenôsis*, or human limitation of the Logos, in any thorough and consistent form; and this is the great defect of his system. But he made an approach to it in the two aspects presented by the *πνεῦμα* in Christ, one as to which it is Logos, or God, and absolutely immutable; the other as to which it is finite, and able really to humble itself, and sympathize with our sufferings and conflicts. This duality of aspects appears in the words, "Not my will, but Thine be done;" where the will of Christ (which is the will of the Logos) is rendered by His humanity different from, but not antagonistic to, the Father: the truth of the humanity of Christ manifested itself in this difference. He represented the Son as unchangeable as to His deity, but believed that by His incarnation the Logos made Himself unequal to Himself, though He restores Himself again to His original equality with Himself—an equality which always continued to be potentially His.

This inequality, however, did not reach the full demands, nor satisfy all the conditions of a true humanity, so that he laid himself open to the charge of Docetism which was brought against him. This shows itself in the circumstance that he was unable to attribute growth in wisdom and grace, learning, exercise, temptation, to the humanity of Christ. "Christ," he says, "was raised above all necessity of practice (*ἀσκησις*); and only on the condition that He was raised above practice, both as to knowledge and virtue, could He be the Redeemer. Without learning, He must needs be wise and holy from His very birth. He worked His miracles, not like a prophet by the power of God, but by His own power. [This is contradicted, however, by His own declaration—

John xiv, 10.] He spake not by revelation, but was Himself the Lawgiver." Consequently, the inmost core of His personality remained untouched by that inequality or diremption (διαίρεσις); this core was not merely a principle, but the complete inner man, the perfect πνεῦμα, or the Logos. His growth was subjective, or apparent merely; in other words, that which was already present in Him was more and more clearly revealed to us. But if He was not the subject of actual growth, and merely revealed to others in ever-increasing measure the inner treasures of His being, which remained in themselves ever the same, He did not pass through a truly human course of life. On this view the childhood of Christ was merely an appearance.

The same defect as regards the conditions of a true humanity appears in his denial of moral freedom to Christ. Freedom he believed to involve sin, at all events for a soul of Adam's race. Hence he denied not only freedom of choice to Christ, but a human soul, or *ψυχή*, in which such freedom inheres. This latter denial especially brought upon him the charge of teaching a mutilated humanity, and was the cause of his condemnation.

But the real defect, if we look deeper, was not in denying a human soul—of which there was no need, if it did not act, and if it did would destroy or impair the unity of His person; but the radical defect of his system was in allowing to the Logos only a partial, and not a perfect *humanification*, i. e., a real subjection to all the conditions and limitations of our finite humanity, including not only suffering, which he allows, and a loving sympathy with our conflicts, but actual experience of

them—a real growth in wisdom and virtue, a learning of obedience by the things which He suffered, implying ignorance, temptability, freedom of choice, and all human experiences, yet without sin.

Notwithstanding these defects, we can not but be struck with admiration at the grandeur and importance of his aim, and the elements of truth which he brought out—the immense advance which he made upon all that preceded and most that have followed him, especially on the great question of how the divine and human are combined in the unity of Christ's person.

Apollinaris's doctrine of *faith*, and of the believer's relation to Christ, is marked by the same penetrative insight which characterizes his Christology. Through faith we are made partakers of the deity of Christ, which is at the same time humanity; in other words, we are made partakers of the principle of the Divine-human life. Faith corresponds to the fact of the incarnation. By the incarnation Christ became like us; by faith we become like Christ. As the Divine *νοῦς* was the ruling principle in Christ, so is the spirit of Christ in us. And as the Divine *νοῦς* was not something foreign to humanity, but rather the true, the eternal man, even so are we perfected by our reception of the *νοῦς* of Christ, although we are thereby at the same time exalted above ourselves.

Dorner, in his able chapter on Apollinaris, points out what he deems a discrepancy in his system. "Men," he says, "even apart from Christ, have *νοῦς* in themselves; but it is not the true *νοῦς*, since it lacks a Divine content, but is, as it were, merely the form or the possibility thereof; it is *δεκτικός* (susceptible) for good or evil, *τρέπῶς* (mutable), etc.; in reality, however, the servant

of sin. Christ, on the contrary, has no *νοῦς* at all which is derived from the Adamic nature; and therefore His equality of essence with men suffers. Had Apollinaris been minded to carry out the parallel between Christ and men strictly, he must have maintained either that believers have no *νοῦς*, no *πνεῦμα*, before they believe, and that it is first created in them by Christ—or, as it was impossible to carry this out, he must have attributed a *νοῦς*, a human soul, to Christ as to His human nature; at all events, in the sense that this *νοῦς*, so far as it owed its existence to the first creation, was a *νοῦς δεκτικός*, neither filled with the sensuous nor with the divine, but still endowed with the possibility of both. In the incarnation itself, however, he must have conceived it filled and appropriated by the Divine *νοῦς*, or Logos, as was required by the idea of a true incarnation.”

But it might be replied to this that Apollinaris did not require a strict parallel, at least identity, between Christ and men; otherwise He could not be the Divine man and Redeemer. The mutable and imperfect human *νοῦς* found no place in Him because He had no need of it, either for Himself or us, its place being supplied by the Divine *νοῦς*, or Logos, the perfect and archetypal Man; and when the perfect is come, that which is in part must needs be done away.

But the parallel is really closer on Apollinaris's premises than the common view of the incarnation allows, although, by the defect already mentioned, he failed to carry out these premises to Scriptural conclusions, and so to meet all the conditions of a true humanity and a true incarnation. For, to carry out the parallel between Christ and humanity, on the supposition of a human

soul in Christ, it is requisite either that this human soul be itself the personality, the true *Ego*—which would be to make Christ simply a man, like other men in whom God dwells—or, if the Logos and not the human *νοῦς* be the personal *Ego*, as orthodoxy requires, then the parallel can only be completed by man's losing his own personality and consciousness in the Divine; in other words, by making every man an incarnation of the Deity.

To make the parallel perfect, the inmost personality of Christ, the *Ego*, or Divine *νοῦς*, must itself become *δεκτικός*, or receptive of Deity, dependent on and obedient to the indwelling Spirit of God. And just this is what is implied in the *Kenôsis* properly understood—the Son of God, who is eternally and potentially man, emptying Himself, or putting off the Divine form or condition, and humbling Himself to the form of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men. “In *all* things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren;” which could not be if He retained His equality with God, or could draw on His own Divine resources, and was not dependent, like us, on the Spirit and help of God His Father. Christ nowhere speaks of the Logos as the ruling or actuating Spirit within Him, but always of the Father as dwelling in Him, and the doer of His Divine works; and He himself draws out the parallel in question as follows: “As the living Father hath sent me, and *I live by the Father*, so he that eateth [or receiveth] me, the same shall *live by me*.”

This Scriptural theory, the only true solvent of the incarnation, as it seems to us, was not apprehended by Apollinaris, although he made an approach toward it; much less by his opponents, who could find no way for

an incarnation, except as a complete man and complete Deity met together in Christ. Apollinaris charged the Church with teaching a double person, that is, a monstrosity, rather than an incarnation; and they in return charged him with teaching a mutilated humanity; that a God in a human body with simply an animal soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$), without a human $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, is a mask and not a God-man. It is true, he affirms a Divine $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ in Christ as taking the place of the human, which through the appropriation of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}$ might be supposed to form a complete man; but this Divine $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, they affirmed, differed too widely from these to be able to constitute with them one living unity without the middle link of a human or finite $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. "A complete and perfect $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ can only stand in a purely external relation to a body that must grow ere attaining completion." A true human development is thus excluded by the theory of Apollinaris. But it is equally true that, according to the common theory, a purely human development alone is admitted, since it is the human soul alone that grows in wisdom; while the divine, the true Ego, the seat and centre of personality, according to orthodoxy, stands aloof, or 'holds only an external relation' to the holy child Jesus.

We have dwelt more fully on the views of Apollinaris, both because of their bearing on the whole subsequent history of the doctrine, and especially because of the very important elements of truth contributed by him, which must be recovered and separated from what was false or defective, before a true and Scriptural Christology can be attained.

Apollinaris was condemned, and his doctrine repudiated, at the Synod of Constantinople, A.D. 381. This condemnation was directed against what was deemed a curtailment in Christ himself of the human nature which He came to heal and perfect. With equal firmness they rejected the opposite error of a double personality. The two complete aspects of the person of Christ must constitute, they taught, a living personal unity. In this respect they were one in aim with Apollinaris; and avoided the mistake of later Christian thinkers, who laid great stress on the distinction between the two natures, but did not bestow equal care on showing how they could be united in one person.

This problem, which was not solved, but only postponed and made more difficult by this decision, was rendered still more insoluble by subsequent speculations. Thought being diverted from the unity of the person to the reality and completeness of the *humanity* of Christ, this came at length to assume a distinct personality side by side with His divinity.

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTA.

The *School of Antioch*, as represented by Theodore of Mopsuesta, maintained, in agreement with Apollinaris, that freedom of will, the power of self-determination, forms an essential part of a true human soul. In opposition to Apollinaris, and in agreement with the Church, he claimed for Christ a genuine human soul. This moral freedom, he taught, was exercised in effecting or realizing the unity between the man Jesus and the Divine Spirit—which is thus a moral union rather than an incarnation. His view of the incarnation was

both defective and false. He says: "Mary gave birth to Jesus, not to the Logos; for the Logos was, and continued to be, omnipresent, although from the commencement He dwelt in a peculiar way in Jesus." "Never, as Apollinaris taught, did a commingling (*κρασις*) of the Divine and human take place in Him; both natures remained ever distinct from each other." On this point Theodore was one with Diodorus of Tarsus. "We affirm most decidedly that the Logos has taken to Himself a man; but we hold it to be an absurdity that He *became man*. John spoke according to the appearance of the thing. Moreover, it was not the Son of God who was born of Mary, but simply a man in whom God was." "Strictly speaking, she bore a man, with whom the Logos had already, it is true, begun to unite Himself; but the union was at first so far from complete that Jesus could not then have been termed the Son of God or Redeemer. Not till after His baptism was He designated Son of God by the voice of the Father."

This shows very clearly to what the tendency which now set in, to distinguish sharply the two natures, and emphasize strongly the complete humanity of Christ, apart from His deity, invariably leads. Theodore, like many modern teachers, never really arrived at the conception of a Divine-human consciousness, or of thoughts and actions which were at once Divine and human; for he could not conceive of the one as forming merely a modification, or part of the being, of the other. Strictly speaking, the two natures were, and continued to be, two persons, and were one person only in appearance.*

* Defective as the Christology of Theodore and the school of Antioch was, they yet contributed many important ideas connected with this doc-

NESTORIUS.

Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and a disciple of Theodore, carried still further, and sought to make dominant, the tendency represented by the school of

trine which are worthy of consideration, especially as regards the nature and constitution of man, and the cosmical place assigned to the humanity of Christ.

In regard to the divine image, Diodorus says: "The divine image can not refer to the invisible essence of the soul, for both angels and devils are invisible: it refers rather to the visible part of man; to those arrangements of his body which enable him to rule over Nature. As the head of the visible creation, he bears the divine image." Where he seems to conceive a God as possessing a distinct form, or at least to conceive visibility to constitute an essential part of the idea of God. "Man, though in one respect a part of the universe, is at the same time the point in which the spiritual and invisible worlds meet and unite. He occupies God's place in the world. He is, in short, the cosmical God. For as all things, visible and invisible, have in their Creator their common centre of unity, so has He willed that all things on earth should combine and unite in, and thus administer to the well-being of man, the witness of the Divine existence."

"It was the will of God that the world, with all its antagonisms of mortal and immortal, rational and irrational, visible and invisible, should constitute one great whole; and He appointed man to be the living bond uniting all things together—the certain pledge of universal friendship and harmony."

"Theodore believed that souls must be created free; and that before being stirred by the irresistible might of love they must be endowed with a knowledge of law, obedience to which was a matter of free choice. It was necessary that man should *learn* the nature of good and of obedience; otherwise the good in us might have been an irrational thing, and we should have had no certain knowledge of our own concerning what is good and what is evil."

It is, therefore, he held, a universal moral law that man can not be perfect at the very beginning; the beginning and the end must be connected by a moral process, and constitute a real history.

"When Adam came forth from God's hand, creation was not yet com-

Antioch in opposition to Apollinaris. He sought to set aside the name of 'Mother of God' given to Mary; and which found a support in the monkish worship of the Virgin then in vogue. His doctrine differs little from that of Theodore, except in its more complete separation of the Divine and human natures, and a less care to preserve the unity of the person of Christ. "The same grounds which forbid us ascribing birth to the Logos forbid us also," he urges, "to say of Him that He suffered, died, and was buried; seeing that to predicate these things of Christ would be to give again to heathenish elements a home in the midst of the Church." "As to nature," he says, "we acknowledge two Christs; as to worship, we have only one."

As Nestorius made no distinction between nature and person, he ought to have concluded from the existence of two natures the existence of two persons. He, or

plete; its completion waited on and presupposed the performance of a moral act by man. Adam's fall, and the subsequent increase of sin, led not only to the world's remaining incomplete, but to its being involved in rebellion and conflict, and ceasing almost to deserve the name (*κοσμος*) which it bore. God, however, continued to be the guard of the primal idea of the world, and of the idea of man's likeness to Himself, and herein lies the ground of the Divine incarnation. Through Christ the world became once more a *κοσμος*; and all those became actually the sons of God who, according to the Scriptures, ought to have been gods and sons of the Highest, but apart from Christ were dying as men.

"Thus the Christology of Theodore assumed a form different from any that had preceded it. (1.) A function of fundamental importance was assigned to the *humanity* of Christ: the mission of Christ was to be the true and real image of God which Adam ought to have been, but failed to become. (2.) He follows that ethical tendency which claims that Christ, also, so far as He is under the necessity of being truly a man, shall undergo a moral development."

his school, however, sought to escape from this difficulty by means similar to those adopted by the later Monothelites, viz., by representing the two natures as converging in a unity of will. But neither he nor his school expressed themselves very distinctly on the matter. He never arrived at an incarnation of God, but only at a relationship between two natures which continue separate—a relationship which he termed a mysterious conjunction.

Nestorius was condemned by the third General Synod held at Ephesus, A.D. 431.

CYRIL.

Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, the chief opponent of Nestorius, led the reactionary movement in opposition to the dualism of the school of Antioch; though his Christology was neither so Scriptural nor consistent as that of Apollinaris. He was especially opposed to the Nestorian 'conjunction.' He considered that it left the Son of God and man separated from and outside of each other, only combining them mechanically. "In the system of Nestorius," he says, "there is no trace of such a union as is required; he resolves the saying, 'The Logos became flesh,' into a mere juxtaposition of two beings, God and man." His own doctrine is an attempt to remedy this defect. Cyril regards the incarnation as the interpenetration, the mutual permeation, of the two things, Deity and humanity—or the appropriation of the human nature and the communication of His own. But it is not enough to postulate such a combination: we must show how the two constitute a real Christology. This Cyril fails to do, falling back on the assertion of absolute mystery and miracle.

Such failure was inevitable from his premises, which precluded at the outset the possibility of an incarnation. In order to escape from the charge made by the school of Antioch, of representing God after the manner of the heathen, as physical and passible, Cyril declared most emphatically that he conceived the Divine and human as separated from each other by an infinite gulf. God, he says, is essentially immutable, incapable of change or of suffering. God, as to His essence, is uncircumscribed, without shape or form, without substance or quantity, and therefore essentially different from us. Omnipresence belongs to His nature; and God can no more be circumscribed by humanity than humanity can possess omnipresence. The two natures being thus defined, man and God would seem to be necessarily exclusive of each other, and a real incarnation to be an impossibility. As Dorner pertinently asks: "If God is by nature, and essentially, incapable of suffering, how can He take upon Himself human sufferings? If He is unchangeable, how can He become flesh? If God is essentially unlimited, how can He so subject Himself to the limitations of the humanity of Christ as in Him to be really one with us? In fine, if He be in essence altogether different from man, how is an appropriation of the human possible to Him, or a participation in the Divine possible to us?"

The Logos, according to Cyril, underwent neither augmentation nor diminution through the incarnation. He remained impassive even in the midst of the sufferings to which through the flesh He was susceptible. He remained omniscient, despite the ignorance to which His humanity was subject. He remained also omnipresent apart from the flesh of Christ, and yet, as to His entirety,

had become man. The Logos made the human attributes His own, *in addition* to those which originally belonged to Him. The Logos and humanity constituted accordingly *one nature*; and, without the loss of His original and peculiar attributes, He has appropriated also human attributes, which, inasmuch as He is their personal subject or centre, can not but be regarded by Him as His own.

But, notwithstanding he lays stress on the unity of the person and even the nature (*μία φύσις*) of Christ, and his assertion of the appropriation of human attributes by the Logos, nothing was done in the way of answer to the question—"How was it possible for the Logos to appropriate to Himself human attributes in addition to His own infinite and divine attributes?" And failing to show how these opposite attributes could be united in one and the same person, the duality and contradiction involved could not be prevented by calling them one, or by conjoining them in paradoxical propositions. As Dorner remarks: "He did not advance far enough to see that the unchangeableness and the inmost essence of the Logos are *love*, which remains unaltered, even though it expresses itself in acts of self-abasement." Still less, we may add, did he see that Divine love, aided by Divine power, is able not only to sympathize with, but really to *become* that which it loves and seeks to save, even to the renunciation of its infinitude and its Divine attributes so far as they differ from the human.

On his view, Christ was simply God with the appearance of a man, but not a real man; and consequently he did not arrive at a real incarnation of God.*

* Dorner, Div. II, vol. i, pp. 63-70.

The Council of Ephesus, which condemned Nestorius, did not thereby indorse Cyril, who was compelled to subscribe the so-called Oriental Confession of Faith—a milder form of doctrine, which had been accepted by many Oriental bishops as a sort of compromise between the schools of Antioch and Alexandria. This ‘formula of concord,’ instead of removing, merely concealed the antagonism, which was destined soon enough to break out again.

EUTYCHES.

The occasion was soon furnished by Eutyches, a chief representative of the Monophysite view, who was accused of heresy and deposed at a Synod of Constantinople, A.D. 448. His views, so far as they appear from his own acknowledgment, were, that he regarded Christ simply as God, and as the Lord of heaven and earth; and that after the incarnation he could find no place for a duality of natures, although he granted their existence previous to the incarnation. How he explained the transition from duality to unity is not very easy to discover. He admitted, it is true, that there was a *σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον* subsequent to the union, but not that there was an *ἄνθρωπον*; consequently viewing the Deity as the exclusive principle of personality in the one nature. The main difference between him and Cyril lay in his further maintaining that “this body of Christ was not of the same substance with ours.” He expressly repudiated the notion of a transmutation of the human element, derived from Mary, into the Divine, ending in the volatilization and disappearance of the human; as also the doctrine of the swallowing up of the humanity, which Theodoret tried to fasten on him. In his view,

consequently, it continued to exist in some way or other.

Eutyches appealed from the Synod to the Bishops of Alexandria and Rome ; and a General Council was finally held at *Chalcedon* (A.D. 451), where the points in dispute between the Monophysite and Nestorian parties, which had been only half decided, came up for a definite conclusion. At this Council Eutyches and his doctrine were formally condemned ; and a Symbol was adopted which was designed to express in clear and definite statements the true doctrine of the Person of Christ. All which this Council did, however, was to decide on two negatives—the negative of the unity of nature, and that of the duality of persons, in opposition to the doctrines of Eutyches and Nestorius. The problem of showing how the two natures of Christ constitute one person was not, and could not then be solved.

THE CHALCEDON CHRISTOLOGY.

THE SYMBOL OF CHALCEDON.

As this Symbol is the basis of most of the Confessions of Faith of the Reformed Churches, and is accepted by the majority of Christians at the present day, we will give a synopsis of its leading features.

The decrees of the Council were preceded by the so-called 'Flavian Epistle'—viz., a letter addressed by Leo the Great to Flavian, Bishop of Constantinople, which was adopted by the Council, and on which its decisions were mainly based.

He commences with the error of Eutyches, which gave rise to the dispute. He charges him with a denial of the humanity of Christ, and confutes him, first from the Apostles' Creed, and then from the Scriptures. He passes then to the question regarding the natures, in reference to which his main position is the following: God so became man that each nature and substance preserved its distinctive characteristics, while both were conjoined in one person. He assumed the form of a servant without sin, thus exalting the humanity without curtailing the Deity; for the self-abnegation by means of which the Invisible made Himself visible, and the Creator and Ruler of the universe sought to become

one among mortals, was not a loss of power, but a compassionate act of condescension.

Both natures retained their individuality; and as the form of God did not do away with the form of the servant, so the form of the servant did not detract from the form of God. God was not changed by His compassion, nor was man consumed by the Divine majesty. The true God was born in the entire and perfect nature of a true man: He was '*totus in suis, totus in nostris.*'

When giving prominence to the unity of the person of Christ, he does not hesitate to teach that the Son of God not only assumed human nature, but actually became man—that the Eternal was born in time, that the Impassible suffered; and yet when his aim is to preserve the distinction of the natures, he defines the mutual relationship as one merely of communion—the two natures are merely conjoined in action. Instead of characterizing all acts and sufferings as at once Divine and human (Divine-human), he distributes one thing to the Divine, and another to the human nature, even after the union; for example, miracles he apportioned to the Divine nature, sufferings to the human. "It did not become one and the same nature to say, 'I and the Father are one,' and 'The Father is greater than I.'" God and man were indeed, in Christ, one person, and therefore reproach and honor were common to both; but the reproach of each, and the honor of each, came from a different quarter. Leo says clearly—and this constitutes his merit—that the fundamental truth of Christianity is sacrificed quite as much by a curtailment of the humanity as by a curtailment of the Divinity of Christ.*

* Dorner, Div. II, vol. i, p. 100.

The *Symbol of Chalcedon* reads as follows :

“Following the example of the holy Fathers, we teach and confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Deity, and the same perfect in humanity, very God and very man, consisting of reasonable soul and flesh, of the same substance with the Father as touching His Godhead, of the same substance with us as touching His humanity; in all things like us, without sin; begotten of the Father, as touching His Godhead, before the æons; begotten in the latter days, for our redemption, of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God, as touching His humanity; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten (do we confess) in two natures, acknowledged *unmixed, unconverted, undivided*, so that the distinction of natures was never abolished by the union, but rather the peculiarity of each preserved and combined into one person and one hypostasis: not one, severed or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, Him who is God, Logos, and the Lord Jesus Christ. And inasmuch as the holy Synod has formulated these things in all aspects, with all accuracy and care, it decrees that it be not allowed to propound any other faith, neither in writings nor in thought, nor teach it to others. Whosoever dareth to act in opposition to this decree shall be deposed if of the clergy, shall be excommunicated if of the laity.”

Concerning this decision of the Council of Chalcedon, which is supposed to have settled the doctrine of Christ's person, several things are to be observed, and need to be thoughtfully considered by the Christian Church.

In the first place, the Council, notwithstanding its six hundred and thirty bishops, was not of a character to warrant its being invested with canonical authority—as every impartial student of ecclesiastical history will admit. Party spirit ran high between the opposite schools of Cyril and Nestorius, inflamed by a recent decision against the latter at a synod convened two years previously, and called from its violent character the ‘Robber Synod.’ The offense caused by this decision, mingled with other secular motives, would naturally bias a council called to reconsider and undo its results. And, in point of fact, the decrees were carried more by intrigue and the authority of the emperor than by conscientious conviction. The remark of Dorner is undoubtedly just and pertinent, that “the Fathers of this Council displayed neither the unanimity of an assembly animated by the Holy Spirit, nor that firmness of judgment which is raised above vacillation and inconsistency, nor that courage in the maintenance of convictions which is possible where a clear and distinct common understanding has been arrived at after long internal conflicts.”

In the next place, the decision arrived at was premature. It prevented the slow result of investigations and controversies in progress, through an impatient desire to end them once for all by a dogmatic formula, when the time was not yet ripe for it. The decision, moreover, was formed on *a priori* rather than Scriptural grounds, in order to meet opposing errors, but ignoring the truth within the error which each school was aiming at, and without attempt at reconciliation.

Then, if we look at the Symbol itself, or the doctrine

defined by it, we shall find it defective to the extent of practical falsity. The mystery of the Incarnation is reduced to the bald statement of two natures in one person. But how these two natures are united, or are able to co-exist in one person, or what is their internal relation to each other, is left in darkness, and darkness the more obscure because what is affirmed concerning them, as retaining their individuality and distinctive attributes unmixed and unchanged by the union, seems to deny and render impossible not only the unity of the person but the incarnation itself. The only historical meaning which can attach to this formula, says Dorner, is this—"That the two natures are infinitely and totally or essentially different from each other; but that the Divine omnipotence made the impossible possible. The positing of *such* a duality of natures can not be denoted a progress in Christology."

The doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon is a denial, moreover, of the older doctrine held by the greatest Church teachers of the fourth century, such as Cyril, Hilary, Gregory of Nyssa—not to speak of others still earlier. It is a denial also of that intuitional image of the Redeemer cherished from the beginning in the heart of the Church, viz., the perfect blending or identification of the Divine and human in the person of Christ. It was the very mystery and glory of the incarnation that in Christ God became man in such a way that the man also at the same time became God. The Son of Man was Himself the Son of God, and not merely united to Him. Every thing human in Christ was conceived as also Divine, and every thing Divine as also human. This mystical conception or intuition of

the absolute unity and identity of the Divine and human in Christ, which reason could not explain, but which faith believed and felt, was certainly a truer conception than that abstract definition attempted by the Council of Chalcedon, which by dissecting and dividing the two factors in order to unite them logically, and construct a Christ level to the understanding, destroys the vitality and power, as well as the mystery, of His person.

"An unprejudiced consideration," says Dorner, "of the course which this dogma pursued must convince us *that prior to the Council of Chalcedon the doctrine of a duality of natures within the Unio was not a doctrine of the Church.*"

Passing over the *pantheistic* element involved in the doctrine of two natures, where Deity and humanity are conceived under the category of physical substances (*φυσείς*), whose relation to each other is wholly physical, and therefore exclusive, and which are united or held together by a third something called a *person*—passing over this radically defective feature of the doctrine, we call attention to the fact *that it totally misconceives the humanity of Christ.*

All which the Council had to say of the humanity of Christ was that it was of the same substance as ours, with the exception of sin. It entirely ignored the fact that Christ represents in Himself, not our imperfect and fractional humanity (which is such even aside from the fall and the corruption of human nature), but the true *idea* of humanity, which no one man has ever, or can ever realize in perfection; that He is therefore the Head in whom, as the Divine Ideal of humanity, all individual men find their completion.

Furthermore, taking its conception of what belongs to a true humanity from *men*, instead of from Christ, it was inevitable that this conception should be a false one. This appears in the separation, or at least distinction, of the Divine and human attributes in the person of Christ, assigning one set of attributes to His humanity and the other to His divinity, as if a perfect humanity excluded, and not included, a Divine element; whereas the very perfection of His humanity appeared in the fact that the human was not separated from the Divine, but both acted together as one power.

Man as fallen, and so separated from God, does not realize the true idea of man, which is only realized in Christ, in whom the Divine and human are perfectly united and indistinguishable from each other. To conceive them as separate in Him, or to conceive the human as ever acting independently of the Divine, is to take our idea of His humanity from the low and imperfect types that are furnished by men, instead of measuring and judging these by the standard of His Divine and perfect humanity. To conceive a limit to His humanity within the circle of His consciousness, or a point where the human ends and the Divine begins, is to limit the incarnation itself, and admit a break in that perfect and indissoluble unity by which He is, and forever remains, the God-man.

Finally, this Symbol *misconceives the idea, and destroys the reality of the Incarnation*. This idea is, according to the Scripture; that the eternal Word *became man*; God was manifest in the flesh. But He did not really *become* man, if the human within Him is to be distinguished from the Divine; and God was not mani-

fest *in* the flesh, but only beside or apart from it, if the two natures co-exist as distinct substances, or if what is Divine is to be referred exclusively to the Logos, and what is human to the man Jesus.

The dogma that each nature retained its distinctive properties after the incarnation, unmixed and unmodified, arose from *a priori* reasoning, and from a desire to preserve the true Deity and the true humanity of Christ, which, while regarding them as exclusive substances, they knew not how otherwise to secure. But such a result is true only of mechanical conjunctions; it is not true even of chemical combinations, much less of vital and organic unions—as of soul and body—where the properties of each factor do not remain unchanged, but are modified or assimilated by the union. Matter, organized and vitalized by the presence of the life-principle, is not the same as dead, inorganic matter, but possesses new properties derived from the higher principle. The human body, quickened and animated by the indwelling spirit, is manifestly not the same in any of its properties as it is after the soul has deserted it. None but a materialist will say that the human eye, lighted up with intelligence and beaming with affection, is the same, and nothing more, than the dull mass of gelatinous matter which is left to the dissector after the seeing power is fled. And none who has studied deeply the relations of soul and body will affirm that the soul is not greatly modified in its faculties and consciousness by the body in which it dwells. And if this be true of the lowest unions between the most opposite substances, as matter and life, body and soul, how much more does this law hold between the highest and nearest related of all

substances—humanity and Deity? The human nature united to and appropriated by Deity can not remain the same, or merely human, but becomes divine; and the Divine nature incarnated becomes human.

The Incarnation, or the doctrine that God became man, is not to be conceived as a *conversion* of the Divine nature into the human, thereby losing its original essence. This would be the case if these natures were as unrelated, or essentially different, as some have conceived, or if they possessed originally nothing in common with each other. Rather is it to be conceived as a determination, or a change of form and condition, while the essence remains the same. This may be illustrated in lower planes by the crystallization of water, which becomes ice, or the manifestation of vapor in the form of cloud; what is universal and invisible and formless in itself, assuming form and visibility and locality, without thereby losing its essential properties. This is to be taken merely as an illustration or aid to thought, not as furnishing an adequate conception, or even a true analogy. Or, passing into a higher sphere, it may be illustrated by the embodiment of a thought in a word, or natural symbol, thus limiting, and expressing in outward form, what is formless and ideal, not by its conversion into the symbol, but by the union of the thought with its image, and thereby elevating the latter from a physical to a spiritual creation. We are the more warranted in using this illustration from the Scriptural name applied to the higher nature of Christ, viz., Word, or *Logos*, which doubtless has its meaning in the fact that He is ‘the image of the invisible God,’ as a word is the image of thought. And we may continue the analogy still fur-

ther; for as a spoken word is made visible by the written letter, passing thereby into a more fixed and determinate form, so the Divine Word became flesh; the Infinite determined itself as the finite; the uncreated and perfect image of God assumed the created image and finite form of humanity, not by a contradiction or conversion of His essence, but by an act of condescension and compassionate love.

Notwithstanding the decrees of Chalcedon were unsatisfactory and practically untrue, considered as positive dogmatic statements, they have yet a scientific and religious value of a negative character. They may be regarded as a declaration on the part of the Church "that no doctrine of the person of Christ can lay claim to the name of Christian which puts a double Christ in place of the incarnate Son of God, or which teaches either a mere conversion of God into a man, or, *vice versa*, of a man into God."

While thus repudiating the opposite errors of Nestorianism and Eutychianism, they failed to recognize or do justice to the truth for which each was contending, and so could possess only a partial and negative value.

The truth of Eutychianism or Monophysitism—i. e., the truth which it aimed to express—was that Christ is one being, with one personality or consciousness, though the constituents of His being were originally two, viz., the Divine and the human natures; as truly one as John or Peter, though constituted of two substances, soul and body. It thus endeavored to preserve the single and total mystical image of Christ possessed by the Church from the beginning, which was manifestly vio-

lated by the positing of two natures, each retaining its own distinctive attributes. The defect or practical falsity of this view was that it found no way of preserving both aspects, the divine and the human, in the one personality, save by the conversion of the Divine into the human, or the conversion or absorption of the human into the Divine. As the former would involve a loss of the Divine, in which the personality was centered, neither Apollinaris nor Eutyches seem to have taught it; and the latter was held under modifications which gave to the incarnate Word a real, but not a complete and perfect humanity.

The truth, or fundamental thought, of Nestorianism was that Christ was truly human as well as Divine, i. e., that He possessed a veritable human nature, with a true human personality. But this it found no way of asserting except by attributing a human personality *in addition* to His Divine, not being able to conceive how the same personality could be both Divine and human.

The Council of Chalcedon were right in denying the double personality of Christ; and also in denying *such* a singleness of nature as excluded either His true Divinity, or His true and complete humanity. But they were wrong in affirming *such* a twofoldness as allowed of a separation, even in thought, between His Divine and human attributes. The asserting of two distinct natures in Christ, each retaining its own peculiarities, gave a decided leaning toward Nestorianism, which the contradictory phrase, 'in one person,' did not and could not counteract.

It is not to be supposed that such a decision could satisfy either party; least of all was Monophysitism either satisfied or silenced. Its premature expulsion by the Council of Chalcedon prolonged indefinitely the settlement of the doctrine of Christ's person. The opposition to that doctrine was now, once more, in the ascendant; and "for more than three centuries the dualism of natures posited by the Council of Chalcedon gained ever wider recognition, in opposition to the traces of Monophysitism which still remained in the Church, until the Christian mind was warned by the rise and spread of Adoptianism to do justice to the unity of Christ's person."

"The unquestioned and sole supremacy of the doctrine of the two natures in the Greek and in the Latin Church dates from Justinian; and all attempts to call again in question the authority of the Chalcedonian decrees, or to obtain for the Monophysites some sort of a place in the orthodox Church, were from that time onward entirely dropped."

The subsequent history of this doctrine, which it is unnecessary to trace very minutely, was not so much a development of the true doctrine of Christ's person as a revelation of the antagonisms and contradictions bound together in the decrees of Chalcedon, and the impossibility of reconciling them without the aid of a higher principle.

The Monophysite party being condemned and proscribed by the Council, separated itself from the great body of the Church, and formed itself into a sect, as the Nestorian party had previously done. But its strength and influence were far greater than that of the latter—as

the element of truth represented by it was higher and more important. "The entire history of the Monophysites," says Dorner, "down to the seventh century, shows how widely and deeply their roots had struck into the soil of the Church, and how not only they were unable to break loose from the Church, but the Church to break loose from them."

The controversy respecting the two natures involved many other questions, concerning some of which the Monophysites themselves were not agreed; as, e. g., whether Christ possessed a corruptible or an incorruptible body, and whether it was created or not. The limitation of Christ's knowledge became also a subject of controversy. The omniscience of Christ was held by the Monophysites generally; but *Themistius*, deacon of Alexandria, advocated the doctrine that the human soul of Christ was like ours in every thing, even in ignorance (appealing to Mark xiii, 32; Luke ii, 52). This doctrine, termed *Agnoetism*, was rejected by the strict Monophysites, who, like Jerome, Ambrose, and others, interpreted these passages by saying that "Christ merely meant that *for His disciples* He did not know that which they could not bear, and concerning which they inquired of Him." The Diophysites, of course, gave a different interpretation — that Christ did not know in His *human* nature, although in His divine He knew. But whether of these twain is the most forced and unworthy both of Christ and Christian hermeneutics it is difficult to say.

A more important controversy growing out of that respecting the natures, was that concerning the two *wills* in Christ, which arose in the seventh century, and

continued for many years. The Monophysites maintained that two natures must also have two wills—that one will demanded one nature. Hence those who were more careful to preserve the vital unity of the person maintained that Christ had but one will—hence called *Monothelites*; while others, bent on preserving the doctrine of two natures, which would be imperiled by such an admission, boldly advocated the doctrine of two wills in Christ—a Divine and a human (*diothelitism*). If it be asked how they were able to do this without denying the unity of the person, the answer is that they held the will to pertain to the *nature*, and not to the person, or *Ego*; which shows that their psychology was not less radically defective than their Christology—that they had not attained to the true idea of will as a spiritual power identical with the personality itself.

After several fruitless attempts to establish the Monothelite doctrine, the Sixth Œcumenical Council of Constantinople (A.D. 681), with the co-operation of the Bishop of Rome (Pope Agathon), adopted the doctrine of *two* wills and two activities as the orthodox doctrine, but decided that the human will should always be regarded as subordinate to the Divine.

This asserting of two wills in Christ is a fact of great significance in the history of the doctrine of Christ's person. In the first place, it is a legitimate and logical consequence of the doctrine of two natures, already asserted. In the next place, it is only a more complete vindication of the reality and integrity of Christ's *humanity*—which is the real aim of the dualistic doctrine; for what is humanity without a will of its own? But the manifest and glaring inconsistency

of this position with the unity of the person reveals the falsity of the whole method hitherto pursued. This may be shown by looking at the argument adduced by Anastasius for the doctrine of two wills. "I came down from heaven, says Christ, not to do mine own will, but the will of Him that sent me. Now, if the rational soul of Christ had no will at all, by what will did He keep His Father's commands? By the will of the Divine Logos? But the will of the Logos is a will that commands and rules; and the will of the Father is one and the same with the will of the Son. By means of what will, then? For the will that commands is one thing, the will that obeys, another. We are thus reduced to the alternative of saying that the will of obedience was the will of the Logos, or of granting that there was a true human will in Christ. The former alternative makes the Divine nature of the Logos a *subject* and *servant*, after the manner of Arius—an error which needs no refutation. [The very thing, however, which the Scripture declares Christ did become when He emptied Himself of the form of the God, and took upon Him the form of a servant—i. e., reduced Himself to the subject and servile condition; which He did not do if the very person or will that obeys is not the same that once ruled and reigned in the form of God.] Besides, freedom is a necessary condition of virtue, and of the fulfillment of the law. No course, consequently, is open but to assume the existence of a will distinct from that of the Logos, and yet pure, good, and free—of a rational, deliberate, reflective will."

This argument—which is the reasoning of nine tenths of the Christian world at the present day—is valid on

the assumption that the Divine and human in Christ are distinct hypostases, but invalid and futile on the supposition that the Divine and human are *identical* in Him; in other words, that His humanity is not something conjoined to, and distinct from, His divinity, but constituted by it, by His entering into a human form and subjecting Himself to human limitations—which is the true idea of incarnation, or the Word made flesh. The will of Christ, like His person, is then *one* will, at once human and Divine. Ignoring, or not yet able to perceive, this simple and Scriptural method of solving the problem, and committed to the dogma of ‘two natures and one person,’ the Church advanced blindly but logically from the doctrine of one will to that of a *composite* will, and then to the doctrine of *two* wills as representing the dualism of the two natures, which at last came to be represented as “held together merely by the formal bond of the unity of the Ego—(a mere abstraction without attributes)—and by which Christ was reduced to a simultaneous double series of activities, of knowledge and volition.” That this is nothing else than a *double personality* is too evident to be disguised. The only escape from this result was in denying, or attempting to deny, personality to the human nature of Christ—i. e., in teaching an *impersonal* humanity; which was done by the Council of 681, in contradiction to its own formula of two wills and two activities.

“It is evident enough,” says Dorner, in reviewing this period, “that the Christological result thus arrived at by the ancient Church, whatever may have been the extent of its traditional influence even down to recent times, was far from bringing the matter to a close.

The human nature of Christ was curtailed, in that, after the manner of Apollinaris, the head of the Divine hypostasis was set upon the trunk of a human nature, and the unity of the person thus preserved at the cost of the humanity. Further—and this is simply the reverse side of the same fault—the entire doctrine of the natures and wills taught by the ancient Church admitted of nothing but an external union of the Divine with the human; and the two natures, continuing unchanged even as to their attributes, were but, as it were, inserted into each other in the person of Christ.”

These futile attempts to reconcile the doctrine of two natures with the one person of Christ, the painful theories of Monothelitism and Diothelitism, of a single, a double, and a composite will, a will pertaining to the nature but not to the person, an Ego without attributes, an impersonal humanity, and, finally, the doctrine of the circling of the two natures within each other (περιχώρησις)—all of which have been actually held in the Church—remind us irresistibly of the ‘cycles and epicycles’ laboriously constructed by the Aristotelian astronomy to account for the motions of the sun and planets, before Copernicus discovered the true system of the universe.

But one more stage was necessary in the logical development of the doctrine of two natures—and that was reached by *Adoptianism*.

Adoptianists took their stand on the previous decisions in favor of two natures and two wills. But at the same time they maintained that, logically, this duality ought to be recognized in the sphere of the personality;

in other words, that each of the two systems in Christ had its own personal centre. Not that they meant to assert the existence of two Egos in Christ, but they tried to conceive the one and the same Ego as pertaining in common to both natures.

Felix of Urgellis, the chief representative of this doctrine, held that the Son of Man was of a different nature from the Son of God—that He was a created being of another substance than the Deity. To carry out the idea of the unity of the person so far as to say that Christ was in the strict sense Son of God, not merely as to His Divine, but also as to His human nature, would be to confound God and man, and to leave no distinction between Creator and creature. Moreover, by designating Christ as to His humanity strictly and truly God, we do away with that resemblance between Him and believers which is a source of so great comfort. Higher, he thinks, human nature can not go, than to be *adopted* into the family of God; and whatsoever goes beyond that is a conversion of substance, and hence involves the annulment of the distinction of the natures. The Adoptionists were accustomed to speak, not of an assumed human nature, but of an assumed *man*. Furthermore, they took adoption in the sense in which it is used regarding Christians who became thereby children of God. Hence their doctrine was that “the Son of God from the moment of conception united this man (Jesus) most intimately with Himself in the unity of His person; so that the Son of Man became the Son of God, not by the conversion of human nature, but by an act of grace; and the Son of God became like the Son of Man, not by a transmutation of substance, but

in that the latter was constituted a true son in the Son of God."

Adoptionism thus put the top-stone on the labors of the old synods. The fundamental ideas of the Council of Chalcedon here came to their head, and could not be further carried out. "It formed," says Dorner, "the close of a long series of efforts for the complete uprooting of every trace of Monophysitism. But it also brought to the view of the Church the danger to which Christology itself was exposed of being set aside, and the idea of the Incarnation of being replaced by a double spiritual life, or even by a double personality."

The opposition raised against this extreme dualism constituted a great crisis in the history of the dogma; and from this point the tide turned, though without reaching any permanent solution of the ever-recurring problem.

The *Council of Frankfort* (A.D. 794), in order to vindicate the unity of the person of Christ, taught that the human personality was destroyed or *consumed* by the Divine; hence this doctrine was termed "Nihilianism." They represented the Divine person of the Son as taking the place of the destroyed personality—and this not merely in His exaltation, but from the very commencement. The difference between Adoptionism and the doctrine of the Council of Frankfort was as follows: "The former maintained that the personality or the Ego of the Son of God pertained to the human nature as its own; the latter maintained that the human nature was made a predicate of the Son of God, which implies that it was essentially deified." Which of these doctrines is most at variance with a real incarnation it

would be difficult to say. Adoptianism substituted a bi-personality for the one person of Christ; while Nihilianism annihilated His humanity. Christ was reduced to a mere theophany. He was no longer a real man, but the Son of God employing the human form assumed by Him as the symbol of His revelation.

Between these two contradictory theories the Church vacillated for many centuries, finding no permanent foothold, or true solution of the Christological problem, but groping its way in a bewildered skepticism, or a blind following of traditional dogmas—till the Reformation brought this and other religious questions to a crisis, and opened a door of hope for those walking in darkness.

CHRISTOLOGY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

THE next period in the history of this doctrine is that of the *Middle Ages*, extending from the ninth century to the Reformation. But this period, as might be supposed, produced nothing new in reference to the Person of Christ. On the contrary, this Person as a living reality receded further and further into the past, and for it was substituted a mere abstraction. "It is characteristic," says Dorner, "that in the writings of Augustine, and through the whole of the Middle Ages, Christianity was not defined as the religion through which we attain to vital fellowship with the living Christ, who is the true creative ground of salvation; but for the *personal* expression 'Christ' was substituted, as the predominant technical term, the *impersonal* expression 'Grace.' This made it possible to regard the highest good as consisting in something else than fellowship with the personal Christ—in something which was viewed as a relatively independent potency placed by Him in the power of the Church at the termination of His work on earth."

The same substitution of a thing for a living person is seen in the still too prevalent doctrine or conception of the Holy Spirit, as that with which the Church has been once for all endowed by Christ; as exclusively bound up with a particular order of men, and through

them transmitted to the Church and its bishops. The Church itself was thus made the incarnation of Christ—the present living incarnation—while the real incarnation was reduced to a lifeless thing of the past.

In regard to the doctrine of Christ's Person, the reaction from the dualism which reached its climax in Adoptionism soon manifested itself in the opposite extreme. Unable to conceive of the Divine and human as one in the person of Christ, there was no alternative between the doctrine of two distinct natures—which were really two personalities—and one nature (the Divine) held to the exclusion or destruction of the other. No sooner, therefore, was it established, in opposition to Adoptionism, that Christ was the Son of God even as to His humanity, than the humanity itself was lost, and the person of Christ sublimated into the pure transcendence of the Deity. The God-man, the sympathizing High-priest, who belongs to our race, practically ceased to exist; and there remained only the unapproachable holy God, as He was conceived and feared by men previous to the appearance of Christ. "All that was now expected with regard to Christ was that He should come again to judgment. No marvel, then, that an ante-Christian horror of death and Hades fell afresh on Christendom—that it sought a compensation for the loss of the sympathy of the God-man in human intercessors, whose post it was, forming as they did the ideal Church, to preserve sinful humanity from the consuming fire of the holy Judge into whom Christ had been transformed." This conception of Christ as God and not also man, as the Judge and not also the Advocate and Intercessor, appears in all the poetry and pictures, the hymns and wor-

ship of the Middle Ages, and of the Romish Church to this day. What, in fact, is the worship of the Virgin Mary but a transfer to the 'Mother of God' of those Divine-human attributes, and especially those gentler graces of love and sympathy, which a false Christology has abstracted from Christ, and which are not more really human than they are divine?

It were useless to attempt to follow the subtle speculations of this period respecting Christ's person—the application of scholastic logic to such a high mystery as the incarnation, with the traditional dogmas already accepted as premises. Nothing could come, as nothing did come, from such speculation but *perverse endeavors to get rid of an incarnation by attempting to explain it*. One or two examples of the kind of reasoning employed may suffice for the rest.

"God," says ABELARD, "is absolutely unchangeable; for this reason it is impossible that He should have become something which He was not eternally; least of all could He become any thing created, or a body, which undoubtedly pertains to humanity." He therefore rejected the formula that in Christ 'God became man,' and 'man became God.' Again, according to Abélard, God and man are so absolutely separated by their very idea that an incarnation is an impossibility.

ANSELM was almost the only one who regarded the God-manhood as necessary to redemption.

The significance of the Incarnation, according to THOMAS AQUINAS, is limited to the fact that the Divine *Person* of the Son, not, however, His Divine *nature*, was inserted in human nature. The human nature was in

his view impersonal ; it was personal, not in itself, but in the Logos, which was a distinction conferred upon it. The Divine essence itself, or the Divine nature, remained unconnected with the incarnation.

DUNS SCOTUS limits the incarnation to a relation between God and man. His conception of God does not admit of an incarnation of God.

RUPRECHT OF DEUTZ (d. 1175) touches frequently on the question of the relation of Christ to humanity, and to the creation in general. Of this he takes a much deeper and more inward view than usual. He represents the incarnation and union with God as belonging to the eternal idea of humanity ; that "even as the woman was created for the man, so also humanity was created for Christ."*

Before leaving this period, it may be well to notice certain related questions raised or revived by the scholastics, which are not without interest in our day, and are even fundamental in one view to a true Christology.

* His view of evil, and how it consists with the omnipotence and goodness of God, is worthy of notice. "He supposes that every thing that has an actual existence is the work of God ; that evil is not the work of God, inasmuch as it is simple inanity, moral nonentity, which seeks to assert for itself an existence independent of God, and to be sufficient for itself. Angels and men fell, not from power into defectiveness, but from defectiveness into defectiveness. Not as saints, as those who are placed in a strong tower of holiness, did they fall ; but they fell to the end that they might become holy, and might gradually advance thereto. The angel who through the fall became the devil did not fall from holiness (for to holiness he had not yet attained), but sought his own pleasure as though he were sufficient for himself ; and this was not a falling out of virtue into sin, but a remaining in the inanity in which he was created ; which inanity is a middle thing between the true and holy essence of God and that nothing out of which God created all things."

Barren and unsatisfactory as were most of their discussions, these deeper problems which could not be solved by logic, and which brought out the mystical element in Scholasticism, have never met with profounder or really better solutions.

To the question why the Son, and not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, became man, Thomas Aquinas replies: "Because the Son is the archetype according to whose pattern man was created at the beginning, and according to which, therefore, he must be restored. The Word of God is the eternal idea of God, the archetype of all creation; and as the several ranks of creatures owe their existence and constitution to participation in this primal type—though after a mutable manner—so it was fitting that by the personal, and not merely partial or participative union of the Word with creation it should be restored in a manner consonant with its original order to an eternal and unchangeable perfection. For even so an artist, when his work has been spoiled, restores it by means of the idea which ruled him in its first production."

Thomas here approaches very nearly to the doctrine of Irenæus, that the first creation was still incomplete; that there was a necessity for the 'immobile exemplar,' instead of the 'mobilis imago,' being manifested through the personal, and not merely through the partial or participative union of the Word with humanity; and that, therefore, the incarnation of God was not entirely and solely occasioned by sin, but was essential to the realization of the eternal type of humanity.

The question herein involved, "*Utrum Christus venisset si Adam non peccasset?*"—i. e., whether the incar-

nation formed part of the original idea of the world and of humanity, and was essential to their perfection, or whether its ground was the contingent one of sin—this question is one that underlies a true idea both of Christ and humanity, and according to the answer given will our whole Christology be shaped. A full discussion of it can not here be attempted. Dorner devotes several pages to it toward the end of his third volume, from which we condense a few historical notes.

During the early period of Christianity the Church paid but little attention to this question, being satisfied with basing the necessity of the incarnation of Christ on the actual and evident need of a work of redemption. This ground, however, was inadequate, in so far as Christ, the highest of all rational beings, in and by whom humanity is exalted to the throne of God, is represented as a mere *means* for others; whereas all other beings had the dignity of being ends to themselves, and ends for Him. To the person of Christ in and by itself, therefore, no importance could be attached. His work, His merit, alone—that impersonal, neutral thing—was of consequence. This view, logically carried out, reduces Christ to the position of a mere act of revelation on the part of God—of a mere theophany, the ground for whose continuance necessarily ceased with the vanquishment of sin; and this drives us irresistibly on to Nihilianism.

In proportion as the Person of Christ came into prominent regard, He ceased to be a mere fortuitous attachment to the work of redemption; and His *work* derived its worth and meaning from the Divine-human *person*.

At an early period the deeper-thinking fathers of the Church were stirred by a disposition to regard Christ not merely as a means, but also as an end to Himself; and especially to acknowledge in the exalted Son the highest good of humanity, the centre of mundane good. Irenæus, above all, was inclined to take this view of Christ. He remarks: "The incarnation effected not merely the deliverance from sin, but also the exaltation of human nature, and the consummation of the whole universe." So taught also Tertullian and Athanasius, and, as we have already seen, Theodore of Mopsuesta.

During the Middle Ages, Peter Abelard, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great left it uncertain whether sin rendered the appearance of Christ necessary, and were satisfied when they had shown His coming to be appropriate in relation to sin; but they at the same time asserted the more distinctly that His appearance was necessary apart from sin. On the other hand, Ruprecht of Deutz connected both reasons, by teaching that when God predestined the manifestation of Christ, sin also was included in His eternal counsel, in so far as it was fitted to become an instrument for the revelation of the Divine love; which view resembles the doctrine of the later Calvinists. He regards the person of Christ as the absolute goal of the world, to which every thing else, even sin itself, was made subservient. Christ is the Head of humanity; and so far from sin being the sole condition of the possibility, or the sole reason of the necessity thereof, a reconciliation of men would have been impossible had not the human nature which He

assumed been from the beginning created with a view to Him.*

* Martensen argues the same truth from the metaphysical and cosmic significance, and the necessary and *eternal* relation He sustains both to the Father and to mankind. He says:

“If the Redeemer of the world stands in an eternal relation to the Father and to humanity—if His person has not merely a religious and ethical, but also a metaphysical significance—sin alone can not have been the ground of His revelation; for there was no metaphysical necessity for sin entering the world. Are we to suppose that that which is most glorious in the world could only be reached through the medium of sin?”

“As the incarnate Logos, He is the centre not merely of the world of men, but also of the universe; for which reason the Apostle views Him not merely as the Head of the human race, of the Church, but as the Head of all creation, ‘the first-born of every creature’ (Col. i. 15), unto whom all things are created. For we may say of man that he is the centre of creation, the point in which the spiritual and the sensuous world meet, nobler than the angels; the same things must be true in the highest sense of the second Adam, in whom the heavenly and the earthly, the invisible and the visible, the forces of the entire universe—angels, principalities, and powers—are summed up and combined.

“In this sense we maintain that even if sin had not entered our world, Christ would still have come. Not until an insight has been gained into this, the metaphysical and cosmical significance of the Mediator, shall we find the proper foundation on which to build our doctrine of the Redeemer.”—*Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 260-263.

CHRISTOLOGY OF THE REFORMATION.

THE Reformation in the sixteenth century put an end to the stagnation of mere scholastic and traditional theology, and gave a new and quickening impulse to Christian doctrine, as well as to the religious life of the Church. As regards the doctrine under consideration, this era is characterized chiefly by endeavors to give reality and equiponderance to the two aspects of Christ's person, and at the same time to preserve its real unity. Whether, and how far, the Reformers succeeded in solving this hitherto insoluble problem, a brief outline of their doctrine will show.

LUTHER.

THE LUTHERAN CHRISTOLOGY is a departure from the Chalcedonian Symbol, so far as this preserves the Divine and human attributes distinct, and the adoption of what is termed the 'Communicatio Idiomatum,' or a mutual communication and reception by each nature of the properties of the other. Every thing human is conceived as appropriated by the Divine; and the humanity receives for its own that which belongs to the Divine nature. Thus the rigid lines of separation which had hitherto kept the Divine and human asunder in the doctrine of the Church were partially at least obliterated.

ated, and a way was opened for the conception of a *Divine-human* Person, instead of a double being who is both Divine *and* human.

Luther demanded in the interest of faith, which apprehends Christ as a single being, that both sides, the Divine and human, should be conceived as perfectly one and undivided—"One thing, One being, so that one can rightly say, This man is God, God is this man;" and "Where God is, there is also the man (Jesus); what God does, that does also the man; and what the man does and suffers, that does and suffers God." This true conception of Christ he attempted to establish, while holding to an essential distinction of natures, by an inward and real communication and appropriation of one nature by the other—not of their attributes merely—so that what is affirmed of the one should be affirmed also of the other, or, rather, of both as conjoined in one person. The chief interest of this view as held by Luther centres in his doctrine of the sacrament, or the real presence of Christ's body in the supper, which implies the omnipresence and divinity of His human nature.

The Lutheran Christology, as afterward developed and formulated in the symbols of the Lutheran Church, rests upon and comprises the following fundamental points: (1) "*Nec Λόγος extra carnem, nec caro extra Λόγον*;" i. e., The Word is not to be conceived of apart from the flesh (or human nature), nor the human nature apart from the Word. (2) "*Humana Natura in Christo est capax divinæ*;" i. e., The human nature in Christ is a capacity for the Divine. This is the central point of distinction between the doctrine of the Lutheran and that of the Reformed Churches; the latter holding to

the formula, "*Finitum non est capax infiniti.*" (3) A third point, held by both, is the traditional dogma, "*In Deum nulla cadit mutatio;*" i.e., The eternal Son of God remains unchanged in His being and attributes. Therefore, in order to a true union, the human nature must be assumed, or taken into the Divine: *Exaltatio humanæ naturæ.*

The Incarnation, according to the Lutheran doctrine, is the assumption by the Son of God of the human nature, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, into the unity of His person; in consequence of which the person of the Divine Logos becomes the hypostasis of the human nature of Christ, which in itself is *impersonal*. For it was not a human person (else there were two persons in Christ), but the human *nature*, destitute of proper personality, which was assumed.* From this coalition (*unitio*) of the Divine and human natures in Christ there results several consequences, or *momenta*—as the 'Unio Personalis,' the 'Communio Naturarum,' 'Propositiones Personales,' and the 'Communicatio Idiomatum.' These are logically drawn out and classified and defined after the manner of the scholastic theology.

The grand defect of this Christology is that it is an attempt to combine into a personal unity two opposite and incongruous natures by means of an abstract and mathematical logic, without an adequate knowledge of the natures themselves, and their relations to each other. The 'Communicatio idiomatum' is only a finer and less palpable division of Christ by a commingling of the two natures, or an extension of the one into and through the

* Hollozius.

other, instead of a mere conjunction, as of two boards glued together, according to the old conception. The illustration employed was the physical one of *heated iron*, where the fire imparts its own properties of heat and glow to the iron, without changing its essential nature. Besides, it is not evident how a nature essentially different from God can partake of Divine attributes; how a human body, limited by form and space, can be ubiquitous, or a human soul, limited in its capacities of knowledge, can be omniscient. It is another thing to conceive the Divine as the *reality*, and the human as the *form* through which it is manifested. This truer conception could not be arrived at so long as the two natures were viewed mechanically as independent substances united from without. Hence the resulting unity was a false or defective one.

Another essential defect of the Lutheran Christology is the absence of any limitation of the Divine nature and attributes in the incarnation, such as the historical life and development of Jesus require. Instead of God becoming man, man is exalted, or taken up into God. The unwarranted dogma "*In Deum nulla cadit mutatio*" excludes any change or limitation in the Divine Logos. Hence the only limitation is that which pertains to the humanity. But as this partakes of the Divine infinitude, and did so from the very first, according to Luther, the question arises how to reconcile this exaltation of the humanity of Christ with His seeming ignorance and dependence during His earthly state. This gave rise to a controversy at the commencement of the seventeenth century between the theologians of Giessen and those of Tübingen. The question at issue was

whether Christ as a man, and during His state of humiliation, exercised the Divine attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence, etc., and governed all things as king, though in a latent manner. The latter affirmed, the former denied. In this denial, however, they distinguished between the *possession* and the *use* of Divine powers, and affirmed that Christ as a man here on earth voluntarily relinquished the exercise of these Divine attributes, while the Logos continued to reign as God. The decision at Frankfort confirmed this view, which, it will be seen, trenches on the absolute unity of the Divine and human in Christ, and violates the Lutheran maxim "*Nec Logos extra carnem.*" They did not go deep enough to consider the real question which lies at the root of the incarnation, the self-limitation of the Logos in becoming man; and therefore the decision of this superficial, not to say artificial one, led to no practical result.

The aim of the Lutheran doctrine is to preserve the unity of the Divine and human in Christ, which was destroyed by the old formulas, and a strong protest is made against any real separation of the natures. So long, however, as a duality of spiritual substances was maintained, especially so long as the two natures were conceived as essentially diverse, and brought together from without, such a union, however close, could not constitute a true unity such as the personal image of Christ presents. Human attributes appropriated by the Divine nature, and even penetrated and pervaded by it, would not make them really divine, or other than human, even as matter, though appropriated and vitalized by the life-principle, is matter still, and not spirit.

The denying of personality to the human nature as such, and making the Divine Logos to constitute the sole personality of the God-man, was a great advance on the dualistic doctrine that had previously prevailed. But the manner in which this was held was a denial of the real humanity of Christ in its integrity and historical development. It also reversed the truth of the incarnation, which is not the deification of a man, but the humanification of God.

If we accept the Lutheran maxim—"Humana natura capax divinæ"—which is, indeed, a great and glorious truth—it can only be on the basis of another truth not fully recognized by the Reformers, viz., the essential *unity*, not diversity, of the Divine and human—which in the case of Christ was not only unity but *identity*, as we shall show hereafter.

The same objection, therefore, which prevailed against the Monophysite doctrine in the fourth century—that it was a mingling and confusion of the Divine and human, would seem to apply logically to the Lutheran Christology; although the practically discerning mind of Luther discovered in the mystical image of Christ a truth not recognized by the old formulas, which he felt, or intuitively apprehended, but failed logically and scientifically to unfold.

Concerning this Christology, Dorner remarks: "All the Monophysite propositions in which, for the sake of asserting the inward unity of Christ's person, human features are, on the one hand, partially attributed to God, and Divine features, on the other, to man, were adopted in the Lutheran doctrine of a '*Communicatio idiomatum*.' The Lutheran Church, however, maintained

an abiding duality of substances as the basis of this 'communicatio.' Regarded from this point of view, the Lutheran doctrine is a combination of the Chalcedonian and Monophysite types. The two types, however, are not so brought together as to be mutually inwardly permanent, but rather follow upon each other like two different doctrinal formations."

In conclusion, it is due to the Lutheran Christology to say that the great aim which characterized it—the real unity of Christ's person—though not attained in the Formula Concordiæ and other symbols of the Lutheran Church, has not slumbered, but has remained ever as the inspiring impulse of new and more successful efforts. The mystical element, which refused to be bound by logical definitions, has proved a help rather than a hindrance, by its deeper affinity with life and religion, and the holy mystery of the incarnation, which must be solved, if at all, not by logic, but by faith and insight.

Some of the early successors of Luther held a doctrine of Christ's person more profound and Scriptural in many respects than that of Luther himself. Eminent among these was

OSIANDER.

His view of Christ's person was closely connected with his doctrine of justification, which he held to be not only remission of punishment, but also the extinction of guilt, the restoration and full realization of the Divine image. This image could not be perfectly realized even in Adam, but only in Christ. The idea of the God-man is the organic centre in which and through which the universe attains its perfection. Hence

he says, God would not have created at all had He not purposed to become man; and He would have become one flesh with the Church, His bride, even apart from sin. The incarnation was necessary, not merely by reason of sin, but for the perfection of man and the realization of the Divine idea. For a further exposition of his doctrine, see Dorner, *Div. II*, vol. ii, pp. 107-115.

SCHWENCKFELD.

The doctrine of Osiander and Schwenckfeld have many points in common, but are distinguished from each other in this, that the Christology of the first places chief stress upon the Divine, that of the last upon the human nature of Christ. He held to a more perfect union than Osiander, who, he says, has no knowledge of the unity of Christ. He divides the natures: to this he is led by the seductive school-doctrine of the '*Communicatio idiomatum*.' He complains that the common view destroys the unity of Christ by making two persons and two sons. "He was not satisfied even with Luther. He did not consider the two natures intimately enough united by the doctrine of the '*Communicatio idiomatum*' adopted by Luther subsequently to 1538; because the essence of the two even then still form an impassable wall of separation between them. This doctrine is only a more refined description of Christ; and it is not clear how a nature essentially different from God can have Divine attributes."

"He regards it as certain that Christ, who must be that by nature which the regenerated are by grace, was begotten of God even as to His humanity, and as to both natures was '*Dei filius naturalis*.' For this reason

he refuses to suffer Christ to be called a creature, even as to His humanity. To represent Christ as a creature in one aspect of His being seemed to him a total destruction of the unity of the image of the Redeemer." *

MENNO SIMONIS.

Menno Simonis († 1561), usually classed with the Anabaptists, advanced a step further in order to secure the Divine-human unity of Christ. "Christ can not have assumed, and made His own, our guilty, curse-laden, sinful nature; else He could not have redeemed us. He must have a pure, spotless humanity, and not the corrupt nature of Adam, in order that He might become the second Adam, able to die for the sins of all, and to beget again into a pure humanity all who believe in Him. But this pure humanity of the second Adam was only possible on the condition that *God became man*. It is not enough to say that the eternal Word assumed a man. That would lead to two sons, two persons; the words 'The Logos became flesh' would then be perverted and emptied of their meaning. Had the eternal Word assumed a humanity which was, as it were, already in existence, it must have been the sinful humanity of Adam. As this can not be affirmed, His pure humanity must have had a higher origin; it must have sprung from the eternal Word himself, and, indeed, so that the Word himself was the humanity which came into existence through the Word. This, however, is inconceivable, save on the supposition that the eternal Word of God himself, the Creator of the world, out of

* Dorner, Div. II, vol. ii, pp. 146-149.

love to humanity, gave up His glory and dignity, and became little for our sake. The Son of God transformed Himself into the elements of a man, into a human germ, which was deposited in the womb of the Virgin, prepared by the Holy Ghost (the conception), and appointed to undergo a truly human development, through which He should regain the dignity He had laid aside. Such a supposition does not contradict the Divine unchangeableness, for both the Father and the will and decree of God remained immovable, even though the eternal Son made Himself passible, and converted Himself into an actual man. Besides, the Logos did not give up His own substance when He assumed the servile form of man: on the contrary, what was effected was that this man acquired a truly holy, yea, Divine nature; for the nature of the Son of God became His, and a complete unity of the person (and of the natures) was established.

“The Scriptures never say, The Word assumed a man, or two persons and sons of different sorts and natures became one person and one Son; but, the Word *became* flesh, and Christ himself was the Son of God. This was not opposed to the original order of God, that a man should be brought into existence immediately by God; the first Adam is the proof thereof. It would, however, be opposed to the order of God if a man of our kind were to be born otherwise than from a father and a mother. The father gives the seed: where that is not the case, the man is not one of our kind. The learned, therefore, with their mode of representing the birth from the Virgin, fail entirely to attain the end at which they aim; they assume a false miracle, which is contrary to

the order of God. What do they accomplish thereby? If Christ were a real child of Adam, a guilty, curse-laden, sin-burdened nature must be attributed to Him, and He could not redeem us. And as respects the Son of God, who is represented to have assumed a child of Adam, on the view referred to, the Son himself would not then have entered into the flesh; He would merely have employed the man derived from Mary as an instrument by which He might suffer for us. But if it were intended that He himself should suffer, and not another in His stead, He must needs enter into flesh Himself; otherwise He could not have suffered. This is too clear for any one to doubt it. (Fol. 589-600, 695.) Those who hold the opposed view have a divided Christ, one half from heaven, the other from the earth. It leads to two persons; for all they are able to say is the absurdity that although every man is a person, and Christ was a man, still Christ alone was not a person. They teach really that there were two sons in Christ: the Son of God, motherless and impassible; and the Son of man, fatherless but passible. According to their representation, it was not the first-born and only-begotten very Son of God who suffered death for us, but the fatherless son of Mary, derived from the sinful and death-deserving flesh of Adam. Moreover, a created being could not be worshiped without falling into idolatry. Had the Word assumed a man created in Mary out of her flesh, contrary to the entire order of nature, He, Christ (as a man), could not have claimed God as His true and veritable Father, nor would Mary have been His (the Son of God's) true mother. He can only have been the Son of both on the supposition that He, the eternal Son, made

Himself little, and that Mary miraculously conceived and bore Him through the Holy Ghost." *

Similar doctrines to those of Menno were taught also by other Anabaptists, especially by Melchior Hoffman.

The later Christological developments, resulting from the new philosophical impulse, and its profounder views of God, of man, and of nature, and their relations to each other, together with the deeper study of God's Word, and especially of the life of Christ—nearly all of which have emanated from the Lutheran branch of the Christian Church—will be noticed incidentally at a later stage of this review.

The Christology of the REFORMED CHURCHES, as represented by ZWINGLI and CALVIN, aimed chiefly at preserving the logical and essential distinction between the two natures of Christ, and therefore failed to preserve the unity of the person. They resisted all attempts so to blend or unite them as to impair any of the essential attributes of either.

According to Zwingli, God has joined the two natures to one another, but so that each nature remains in possession of its own properties, since as man is composed of two substances, soul and body, so also Christ is one person of two natures. According to the Divine nature, He has power over all things; according to the human, He is subject to Cæsar, is limited in His knowledge, has no doctrine of His own, while all His miracles proceed from the Divine power. The finite can not possess the infinite. Hence the Divine attributes can

* Dorner, Div. II, vol. ii, pp. 152-154.

not properly belong to, or be appropriated by, the human. Wherever that is spoken of the whole Christ which is logically true only of one of the natures, or when that is attributed to one nature which is true only of the other, a figure of speech (*alloiosis*) is to be understood. In this manner, not only 1 Cor. xi, 8, and Acts xx, 28, but even John i, 14, is explained, or explained away. As a specimen of the merely logical interpretation of Scripture, and the way in which theology is made, take the following illustration: "In John i, 14 the Divine nature is put for the human. 'The Word became flesh'—since God is perfect, and can not *become*—can only be understood to mean man became God. But, again, since the human nature can not be changed into the Divine, but remains in its own being, this can not be otherwise understood than that humanity is assumed into the unity of the person of the Son of God. Hence the expression, the Word became man, signifies nothing else than *the Son of God assumed human nature*. One can not understand such a figure of speech as John i, 14 to mean the conversion of the Word into a man." *

In short—not to pursue the type into all its specific features—the doctrine of the Reformed Churches is that of the Chalcedonian symbol with a Nestorian meaning; as that of the Lutheran Church is professedly based on the same formula with Eutychian interpolations.

These two types of the doctrine of Christ's Person, the Lutheran and the Reformed, or Calvinistic, have continued with little variation to the present day, and

* Dorner, vol. ii, pp. 597–605—German edition.

are embodied in the various symbols and confessions of faith of the several branches of the Christian Church.

The results of the historical survey, which we now bring to a close, and the new Christology toward which modern Christian thought, enlightened by the past, by a profounder philosophy and a truer interpretation of Scripture, is slowly but surely advancing, will form the subject of the remainder of this volume.

PART II.

RESULTS OF THE HISTORICAL SURVEY.

FROM this extended and thorough historical review, several things are apparent.

The *first* is the manifest failure of the Church, during this long period of fifteen centuries, to arrive at any permanent and satisfactory solution of the Christological problem, or any consistent doctrine of Christ's Person. This is evident, not only from the diverse and often contradictory decisions of the councils, but from the fact that these decisions failed in most instances to represent or to secure the unanimous consent of the Christian Church. The Chalcedonian formula, that has survived the longest, affirming 'two natures and one person,' we have seen to contain contradictory principles, whose logical issue was Adoptianism, or a double personality, on the one hand, and Nihilianism, or the destruction of the humanity, on the other; between which opposing systems, as between Scylla and Charybdis, the doctrine of Christ's Person was in perpetual danger of being crushed. Its only safety lay in the *via media* of an unlogical apprehension of that mystical image of Christ which was cherished in the heart of the Church, and which availed for faith and piety, but which reason could not define.

That the Councils did not settle the question, but in

many instances only hindered and postponed its solution, is evident, moreover, from the continual reappearance of the excluded doctrines. The traces of Monophysitism, which remained in the Church for centuries, in spite of the most persistent efforts to extinguish it, show, or at least suggest, the existence of something besides a 'pestilent error,' viz., a great and important *truth*, which, though imperfectly or erroneously conceived, was yet too precious and vital to be suppressed.

Secondly, it is manifest that this failure to solve the Christological problem is owing either to the fact that it is insoluble—a mystery utterly beyond human reason to grasp—or else to some defect or falsity in the premises assumed, or in the method employed, or, it may be, in both.

That the problem is insoluble, and even uninvestigable by human thought, is indeed held by many Christians at the present day. And doubtless there are truths, clear and palpable to faith, which not only the understanding can not handle, but which reason can not at once overtake; for faith is the pioneer of reason in spiritual things, as sense is in material things. But that any truth, or any fact in the universe, is utterly unknowable, or incapable of being better and more fully known, is certainly not the teaching either of nature or revelation; least of all can we believe this in relation to Christ, the one perfect revelation both of God and of man. If a true theology is fundamental to all sound religion, a true Christology—one that satisfies both the faith and the reason of man, and which harmonizes with the teachings both of Scripture and of science—is fundamental to an enlightened and pure Christianity.

We have seen how a defective Christology, or one that left out the human aspect of Christ, led the way, in the ninth century, to Mariolatry and the worship of saints, and other surrogates to supply the place of the discarded element. We have seen also in more recent times how the contrary error, or a denial of the Divinity of Christ, first robbed Christianity of its supernatural and regenerating power, and is now blossoming out into a 'religion of humanity,' that denies the supernatural altogether, and makes man his own and only Deity.

These lessons from history should teach the necessity of doing justice to both the human and the Divine aspect in the person of Christ; and, as a condition of this, of so conceiving of this person and of the unity of the Divine and human as to render them as inseparable in thought as they are in fact. The renewed study and concentrated regard now bestowed by the Christian world on this Christ-problem, both in its historical and metaphysical significance, is surely not without meaning, and can not be without its results.

1. If we look at the *method* employed by the early theologians, we shall see one grand reason of their failure. This was almost exclusively the *a priori* or deductive method—a logical reasoning from certain assumed and abstract principles as to what *must* be the truth concerning Christ, as if the Incarnation were a mere mathematical problem—instead of first ascertaining the concrete *facts*, from what we see Him to be, or know from Scripture concerning Him, and then framing a theory or doctrine in accordance therewith. This method makes a real incarnation impossible, or else

empties it of its true power and meaning. Under its inexorable process fact is subordinated to theory, truth to definitions, life to logic. The most palpable facts and declarations of Scripture are either ignored, or shaped and squared to fit the assumed theoretical principles. What Burke, with rare philosophic wisdom, affirmed of certain political reasoning, is eminently true of much of the theological reasoning of the schools: "In proportion as it is metaphysically true, it is morally and practically false." And the falsehood is made the greater by the false or unwarranted assumptions that are often mistakenly taken as premises.

Thus, how often do we hear it affirmed that God is *impassible*—a pure theological assumption, without warrant either from reason or revelation. Therefore, it is argued, Christ can not have suffered in His Divine, but only in His human nature; thus creating a dualism in the personal consciousness of Christ, and robbing His sacrifice of its divine and true significance by reducing it to a mere human experience. In like manner it is assumed that God is *immutable*, and incapable of any change. This, which in one sense is true, in another sense is not true, since otherwise there would be no place for prayer or pardon or incarnation—all of which imply a change of action, of feeling, and of *state* on the part of God. What is the modern denial of miracle, including the grand miracle of the Incarnation, and of all supernatural answer to prayer, but the logical and necessary result of this rigid and materialistic conception of the Divine immutability?

Again, it is argued that since God is holy by necessity of nature, and can not be tempted of evil, therefore

Christ's temptation was limited to His humanity, and invaded not the sphere of the Divinity within Him, which stood aloof and supported His human nature in its conflicts. Here, too, the doctrine of Christ's person is stranded in a place where two seas meet. One form of orthodoxy, by making the human nature impersonal, or denying a distinct human will to Christ, takes away His moral freedom and peccability. Nestorianism, on the other hand, allows Him human freedom, but only by means of a double personality. Thus a gulf of separation is created, not only between the two natures, but between Christ and His human brethren; although it is expressly declared that 'He was tempted in all points like as we are.'

The same method of reasoning restricts the obedience of Christ to His humanity apart from His Divinity, since it is the prerogative of Deity to command, and not to obey. And since obedience is impossible without will, the existence of two wills in Christ is logically demonstrated. This, we have seen, was the argument of Anastasius in support of Diethelitism, as also of Pope Agathon in his letter to the Council of Constantinople. The obedience of Christ is thus robbed of its grand significance and value, which is not to show that a man, with all the Divine resources within him, can obey perfectly the law of God, but that God himself obeys the same laws He ordains for man; and by this Divine and sinless obedience, rendered in the place and under the conditions of humanity, to reconsecrate the broken and desecrated law, and to show 'how awful goodness is, in shape how lovely' and glorious!

The radical falsity of this method is seen not only in

its logical results, in destroying the unity of Christ's person, but also in annulling the truth and reality of the Incarnation itself. For it belongs to the very idea of an incarnation that God *becomes* man, and is not simply united to one; and that *as* man, or under the human form and conditions, He is able to do and to suffer what He could not while in the form of God.

To show its falsity in another light, let us apply it to the solution of another common mystery—the incarnation of the human soul in the body. Suppose one should undertake to construct a theory of *Man* on abstract principles, or to show the relation of soul and body and the nature of their union, from the absolute nature and properties of each. Pure spirit, he would argue, is formless and immaterial, and has no relation to space: therefore the soul can not be confined in a body, or circumscribed by form, or conditioned by matter, since this would be a contradiction of its nature. Spirit, too, is physically impassible: therefore the soul can not suffer pain, and, for the same reason, can not know physical sensations; but all sensation of things without is to be referred to the body alone. The soul thinks, and the body feels, or senses, each in its own separate sphere, according to its own nature, 'unmixed and unchanged' by the union. How clear is it that what is theoretically true of each factor abstractly and apart from the other is not true practically and concretely when vitally united in a living person. Besides, if pure spirit is physically impassible, mere body without a soul is absolutely insensible; which shows that the two are, somehow, one in consciousness, however diverse and contradictory in themselves. The theoretical dualism becomes a practi-

cal unity so soon as we pass from abstract principles to concrete facts. And the contradiction, if not the mystery, is solved when we say that the soul, or spiritual part, perceives, thinks, feels, and acts *through* or by means of the body, or material part; and the body gives *form* and *limit*, or conditions, to the soul's activity.

So of the Divine and human in Christ. The Divine is the *soul*, the personality, the inmost truth and reality of the God-man; the human is the *form* under which this personality appears and acts, and by which it is limited and conditioned. And these two are *one* by a unity deeper than consciousness, and more inseparable than that of soul and body; a unity which in the inward or spiritual sphere becomes *identity*, as we shall see hereafter.

2. Not only is the method hitherto employed in Christology a false one, but the solution of the problem has been still further hindered by certain *false premises* and unwarranted *assumptions*, which have held almost undisputed sway in the Church and the schools. Some of these have already been mentioned incidentally; one or two others deserve a special notice.

(1.) It is assumed that Christ's Divinity, if He be indeed divine, must be divine in *form* as well as in essence; that He must consciously possess, at least in His higher nature, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and all the other attributes of Deity. In a word, that what is true of God theoretically, as pure and absolute Deity, must also be true of Deity incarnate. This is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, the very error and stumbling-block which Christianity has had to encounter from the beginning. The Incarnation is an offense and contra-

diction, first, to the senses of men, since it teaches that Jesus Christ is God, when He is *seen* to be a man; even as the revolution of the earth is a contradiction to sense, which sees it to be stationary. Secondly, to the reason—i. e., the natural, not the spiritual reason—which assumes that God is by His nature incapable of change or suffering or humiliation, and therefore it is absurd to attribute to a Divine being what can be true only of a man. Finding that ignorance, weakness, dependence, and suffering, which do not properly belong to God, are experienced by Christ, these conditions are summarily remanded to His human nature as distinguished from His Divine, and so the unity of His person, as well as the reality and sublime import of the Incarnation, is denied. On the other hand, the Unitarians, finding these human and finite conditions unquestionably attributed to Christ and acknowledged by Himself, and unable to stultify reason and Scripture by distinguishing two personalities in Him, hold to the more obvious truth of the *humanity* of Christ, and deny His Deity. Meanwhile the real and fundamental question is, Can there be any real incarnation of God without a *humanization* of the Divine, or a reduction and limitation of the infinite and absolute, so as to bring it into the human form, and under human and finite conditions?

In our ordinary Christology, almost nothing is made of the fact that the Scriptures draw a marked distinction between the form of God and that equality with God which Christ originally possessed, and the human and subject form which He assumed, involving with it human limitations and all the conditions of a true humanity; that He disclaimed for Himself these former

distinctive attributes of Deity, avowing His ignorance of some things, and His constant dependence on the Father who sent Him, and who dwelt within Him, in whose name and by whose power He wrought His Divine works; also the fact that His whole human life and experience is in keeping with this disclaimer—evincing, not what is assumed, a Divine supremacy and immunity, but a real and conscious, though voluntary, subjection to all human conditions. Instead of claiming for Christ what He nowhere claims for Himself, or distinguishing between His Divine and His human nature, it is more consonant with reason and Scripture to say that the nature of Christ is *Divine in essence, but human in form and manifestation*. Human, we say, in *form*; but this form is not to be restricted to the outward and bodily man: it includes or determines the inward. The thoughts, feelings, and entire consciousness of a human being, whatever be their quality, are determined, not by the soul alone, but by the union of the soul with the body. Just as our knowledge or conception of things takes its *form* from the senses through which our impressions of them are received; while reason gives substance and reality to this knowledge, so the whole consciousness of Christ took a finite or human form and limitation from His sojourn in the flesh while it was Divine in essence and quality. The assumption of a human form, therefore, was something more than the mere clothing of a Divine soul with a fleshly garment, and something other than its union with a human soul in a human body: it was the *humanification*, so to speak, of His Divine nature, or its entire subjection to all the normal conditions and limitations of humanity.

In a word, it was just what the Scriptures declare in that wonderful passage of St. Paul: "Being in the form of God," and equal with God in all Divine attributes, "He emptied Himself, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men."

(2.) One other false assumption, the most radical of all, that has hitherto stood as a fatal hinderance to a true Christology, is the supposed essential diversity, or incompatibility, between the Divine and human. The moral antagonism created by sin, the removal of which was one chief object of the incarnation, has been extended to the *natures* of God and of man, not considering that the sin and evil of such antagonism, and the very possibility of a reconciliation and reñnion, is grounded in the fact of an original and essential *unity*.

Probably nine tenths of the intellectual unbelief which Christianity has encountered, and still encounters, in the world, has arisen from the difficulty of conceiving of a real incarnation on the basis of such diversity, or of the union in one person of two such incompatible natures as God and man are supposed to be. The whole controversy between the Monophysite and Diophysite schools, which continued to vex and rend the Church for three centuries, grew out of the assumed incompatibility between the Divine and the human. It was solely because the one nature was supposed to exclude, instead of including the other, that the distinction of natures was so jealously guarded in the symbol of Chalcedon; since no otherwise could the integrity of each be preserved. But to call such a union, or juxtaposition, of essentially different natures an incarnation, or to suppose that the two could subsist in a personal unity, is to

suppose, in the language of Dorner, "that the Divine omnipotence made the impossible possible."

Had the idea been once admitted, or even fully conceived, that the Divine and human are not heterogeneous or exclusive substances, but are at bottom essentially *one*, the greatest objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the chief obstacle to a true Christology, would have been removed. But this truth, in its grand and far-reaching significance, was reserved for a later day; and we shall consider it and its bearings on our subject hereafter.

3. In addition to this false method and these unwarranted assumptions, as another great hinderance to a true Christology may be mentioned the *dogmatic decisions of Councils*.

These, though often partial and premature, and not seldom carried by will or faction, were yet invested with an overweening authority and even infallibility, which assumed to settle for all time questions which time and progressive knowledge alone could solve; and branded as heretical theories and opinions, defective it may be, yet containing important elements of truth. It is needless to show how truth is sacrificed by the foreclosure of all further investigation, and the summary rejection of the *whole* of what has been pronounced heretical by an assembly of fallible bishops. And yet this is the genesis and history of theological opinion, and the way in which certain dogmas have become embedded and fossilized in the creeds of the Church. "In the judgment of history, a man may become heterodox through orthodoxy. Whoso seeks to eternize a particular mode of thought, which has been merely experimentally adopted

by the restlessly self-developing spirit of the Church, may easily miss its true significance, and thus prove faithless to it through very persistency and lack of freedom." (Dorner.) The perpetuation of the many schools and sects which had their origin in a time of theological ferment, and the blind adhesion to many dogmas which have been outgrown by the advancing knowledge and self-developing spirit of the Church, is a sad and striking commentary on the truth of this observation. The difference also between a true and a false orthodoxy is here pointed out. When theologians shall seek in a spirit of love to discover the truth as well as to expose the error in doctrines of an opposite school, the day of real progress will have come. The *comprehensive* method, in distinction from the dogmatic—that which recognizes truth under different forms, and though mixed with error, and carefully seeks to separate and save it—is the only Christian method, because in harmony with the Spirit of Christ. He who came not to condemn but to save; who sought out, or attracted to Himself, those whom the purists of His day despised and rejected; who rebuked the beloved disciple for his intolerant zeal, saying, "He that is not against us is for us," teaches a lesson that is not yet learned—viz., not to reject indiscriminately whatever is outside of our own creed, or is labeled with an heretical name; but to "prove all things, and hold fast that which is good."

The exhortation of Lord Bacon in regard to science and the study of nature, is specially applicable, with a slight variation of words, to theology and the study of Christian doctrine: Mankind are to be earnestly en-

treated by their love of truth, and for the honor of God and the advancement of Christianity, to lay aside their preconceived notions and traditional opinions, and (what he would call) their *idols of the chair*—(the *ex cathedra* decisions of bishops and councils)—and humbly accept instead the teachings of Scripture; remembering that the kingdom of truth, no less than the kingdom of heaven, is to be entered as a little child.

From what has been said, two things, we think, will be sufficiently obvious: First, that *a true solution of the Christological problem has not been reached by the Church*; and, secondly, *the reason of the failure*, viz., the false *method* hitherto employed, and the false or unwarranted *assumptions* on which the prevailing theory is based, together with the foreclosure of all investigation by the dogmatic decisions of councils.

Let us now consider a few truths or principles, not recognized by the fathers, but which seem to us essential to a true Christology.

As the following positions are fundamental to a solution of this greatest of all problems, and to what we regard as a true view of Christ's Person, we have given them a careful elaboration, and ask for them a thoughtful and candid perusal.

I.

*THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE DIVINE
AND HUMAN.*

ALL former theories of Christ's Person—all, at least, that have obtained the sanction of ecclesiastical decisions—are based on the assumption of their essential diversity. They have been conceived as two opposite and mutually exclusive substances. Hence no true personal unity could be attained save at the expense of the reality or integrity of one of the 'natures.' The accepted formula of "two natures and one person," each nature preserving its peculiar properties unmixed and unchanged by the union, indicates the common notion on this subject. The inherent falsity and inconsistency of this notion has been sufficiently shown, and asserts itself to feeling even when no protest arises in the thoughts. On the other hand, this high truth of the essential unity of the Divine and human is demonstrated practically, to faith, in the person of Christ, and is *felt* by the Christian consciousness, which has refused for eighteen centuries to acquiesce in any theory of this person which denies this unity. Some theoretical apperception of this truth glimmered in the minds of the early fathers. Origen had glimpses of it in his view of the Logos as the immanent and rational principle of the world and humanity, through whom alone the rational soul has true

reality. Apollinaris especially apprehended it, and its deep significance as regards the person of Christ, when he represented the Logos as the eternal prototype and original of humanity, and so as not foreign to, but as constituting rather the truth and proper perfection of man; that the humanity of Christ was in some sense eternal, and His Deity was in itself Man from the very beginning. But the science and especially the anthropology of that age were not adequate to the reception of so high a doctrine, and it was either rejected, or its significance ignored, as many other truths and discoveries have been that were born before their time.

As a scientific conception, it has but recently risen on the mind of the Christian world, and, like a new star in the East, is pointing to Him as the one revelation alike of the true God and the true man.

This idea—the essential unity of the Divine and human—is the Christian element in the philosophical systems of Schelling and Hegel, and is not to be summarily rejected because of the pantheistic form in which it here appears. These and other Christian philosophers seem to have done for Christology what Plato did for Christianity in the earlier ages—opened a path for it in deep and thoughtful minds through the lofty regions of philosophy and abstruse speculation. The great service which Schelling has rendered in this direction is justly acknowledged by Dorner. To Schelling, he says, belongs the undying merit not only of having discerned, but also of having taken an important step toward abolishing the dualism which heretofore prevailed in philosophy, and was reflected in Christology, and which was the ultimate cause of the failure of the attempts

hitherto made to construct a doctrine of the Person of Christ. "He saw that it is not right to conceive subject and object as mutually exclusive and merely opposed to each other, but that the essential unity of the two must be taken as the principle of all philosophy: this essential unity he terms *Subject—Object*."

Schelling, it is true, carries out this idea to pantheistic issues by converting the essential unity of the Divine and human into *identity*. In this system, the Divine manifests itself in the human, the Infinite in the finite. But since the Infinite can not be fully manifested in any one finite form, it finds its adequate revelation only in the *totality* of finite forms or spirits, in each of which God is present absolutely. The Divine life in its manifestation thus runs through a process, and this process is History. The finite, therefore, is not merely finite, but that in which God has an historical life and development. The human does not exclude, but contains the Divine within itself. Christ is not the only God-man: Humanity alone is the eternal Son of God; and the incarnation is co-extensive with the race. Thus the idea of the incarnation of God is made the principle of the whole of philosophy; and as this idea is the essence of Christianity, philosophy is reconciled with it. Every thing is to be explained by this idea. Nature itself points to the Son of God, and has in Him its final causes.

The radical defect of this view is in conceiving the relation of the Divine and human as one of *identity*, instead of an essential *unity*, and thus making no distinction between Christ and humanity; in other words, in making the incarnation a *universal*, and not an *individual* fact. But, with all due dissent from this pantheistic

feature, we can not but admire the grandeur and elevation of this idea, so superior to that undivine and really atheistic conception which characterizes our ordinary views of nature, of history, and of man. It is at least more consonant with those inspired and inspiring utterances of Scripture which speak of the future divine dignity of redeemed humanity, when they shall be made one with Christ, the divine and typical man.

For the comfort of those who see in every recognition of truth in a false system a dangerous sympathy with error, and who weigh opinions by names rather than by reason, we subjoin the following judicious words of Dorner: "Many consider this idea altogether apart from Schelling's foundation, according to which the history of humanity is at the same time the history of God, to be in itself thoroughly condemnable, because it unduly exalts man. Unless, however, we are prepared to rob science and Christian life of one of its highest gains, we must not here proceed too hastily, but inquire whether we have not to do with a deep and perhaps long-misunderstood truth." "The chief defect in the early Christology was that of treating Christ as an absolute miracle; as a being absolutely separated by His divine essence from the rest of mankind, even when viewed in the light of its divine idea. . . . Were we *a priori* to set our face against every view which represents the Divine and human as intimately and essentially related, we should be willfully throwing away the gains of centuries, and returning to a soil on which Christology is an absolute impossibility."

Again he says, with admirable force and truthfulness: "No one occupying the platform of Christianity has any

right to raise objections to Christian philosophers who maintain that the birth from God—from divine seed, as taught by John—or the being one in the Son and in the Father, of which the Lord himself speaks, in His high-priestly prayer, and which He compares with the oneness of the Son in the Father, and of the Father in the Son, must be more than a mere moral unity with God—unless he is prepared also to regard the dwelling of the Son with the Father in believers as a biblical, orientally exaggerated mode of speech; or, finally, who take what is said concerning Christians as being partakers of the Divine nature (see 2 Peter i, 4) for full truth and actuality; knowing that, indescribable as is the debasement of man through sin, even so indescribable is his exaltation *through Christ*. This Christian idea also is not merely a grand one, but it is time it should be laid hold of, in order that we may become clearly aware what we have in Christianity, and to what dignity we are called; in order that Christ may no longer seem to occupy the position of a being who is external and foreign to our nature, but that of a true brother and companion of our humanity.” (Div. II, vol. iii, pp. 115, 116.)

“These high truths,” he adds, “require to be handled by consecrated hands, and with due reference to the idea of redemption and regeneration; else, if roughly handled, they become a caricature”—which is also and equally true.

Let us, then, endeavor to get a true idea of what is implied in this unity of the divine and human, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from a pantheistic identity, and, on the other, from a mere moral relation.

Perhaps the truest statement of it would be that the divine and human are in their essence, or essential nature, *homogeneous*; in other words, they are the same in kind, though not in quality or quantity of being. To adopt a theological term, they are *ὁμοιοῦσιοι*, not *ὁμοούσιοι*. An obvious illustration of this unity is seen in the human family, whose members are one in their essential nature, though differing greatly in the form and degree and quality of its manifestation.

Unity implies a community of essence, or nature, as its ground, and also a difference in form or manifestation above this ground, and springing from it, without which it would not be a unity. Thus, the unity of the race consists not only in that which all men have in common (human nature), but also in the individual differences formed by personality, sex, intelligence, race, and other characteristics—all of which, combined in their manifold development, make up the idea of humanity. So the unity of the divine and human implies, first of all, a community of nature, or spirit, which both God and man possess, or rather are, in common, and also a difference distinguishing the two—viz., the immeasurable difference between the infinite and the finite.

To conceive of God and man as the same, or of man as a part of God—which is pantheism—is to convert the essential unity of the divine and human into *identity*. Man is not God, and can not become God, since the finite can not become the infinite. Those, therefore, who conceive of Christ as only a deified man, hold an irrational as well as unscriptural view, since eternity of being—a distinctive attribute of Deity, and one that is expressly ascribed to Christ—can not possibly belong to

a finite or begun existence. So also God is not man, but can become, and has become, man, which He could not do unless there were in both a common nature. We may say further, and without blasphemy, that man is *divine* in his higher or essential nature; and that God is *human*, though not merely human.

The relation of man to God is not that of a part to the whole, differing only in quantity of being; else the union of the two would form a numerical unit, and not a spiritual unity. This, too, would be destructive of *personality*, the one inalienable property of spirit. Rather is it to be conceived as a *complementary* relation, whose union is that of like, but opposite, substances. The most familiar example of this relation is that of man and woman in the mystic unity of marriage. And this analogy is sanctioned by Scripture as a symbol of that higher unity of which we are treating. For as the husband and wife are one flesh, so "he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit." This unity, it is to be observed, always symbolizes in Scripture the union between God and man, or between Christ and the Church, never that between the divine and human in Christ, or between the Logos and the humanity. The significance of this fact we shall see hereafter. Furthermore, as a man is complete, according to the divine idea, not as an individual unit, but only as a social unity, so the true idea of humanity is incomplete without God, or the indwelling Divine Spirit. "Ye are complete in Him." On the other hand, the true idea of God includes humanity—the divine humanity of the Son—the revelation of which is the *incarnation*.

The incarnation was not a change in the nature of God—though a change of state or condition is implied

—but a revelation, rather, of *the essential humanity of God*, and of the (potential) divinity of man. If there were not something human in God, it were inconceivable that He could so identify Himself, in thought and feeling and life, with humanity—as all revelation implies—and that He should make this identification not temporary but eternal. It is certainly a very significant fact that we can not intelligently conceive of God otherwise than as human, and that God every where sanctions this conception. Are we made so as necessarily to believe a lie? or does not the subjective necessarily point to and authenticate an objective truth?

If, on the other hand, there were not something divine in man, it would be impossible for us to commune with, or to find our true end and life in God. Then, too, the reverence and awe we feel in presence of the highest forms of human excellence—which is akin to worship—is an implanted delusion, as well as an enigma.

We make no argument of the application of divine titles to man in the Old Testament Scriptures—which Christ himself recognizes and quotes in vindication of His own higher claim,* or of the different forms of hero-worship and the worship of genius which have prevailed in all ages, and which Christianity has purified, but not extinguished. We simply point to these facts as indices of a truth too little recognized, and which needs to be vindicated, not only as an antidote to the low and degrading view of man entertained in our day, but also for its deep bearing on the incarnation.

* See John x, 34–36. “If the gulf between God and all things finite was infinite and impassable, it must have been blasphemy *in any sense* to attribute the name *Elohim* to mortal men.” (Neander.)

But the fundamental importance of this doctrine requires something more than a metaphysical statement of it. We sketch a few outlines of evidence for this great truth, leaving it to the reader to fill them out.

1. A primary proof of the essential unity of the divine and human is furnished in the fact of *procreation* and *derivation*, or the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. It is a law of nature—of all natures—that like begets like. An artist may create a thing unlike himself; but whatever is begotten or born of another partakes of the nature of the parent. If there is any truth clearly taught in the Scriptures, it is that man is the offspring of God, first by creation, and secondly by redemption. The image of God in which man was created obviously refers to his *nature*, which could not be lost, however marred and corrupted. This image, moreover, has a deeper reference to Christ, as the divine prototype of humanity, the primal and eternal Image of God. Man, being originally created *in* this image, and having fallen away from its divine type, is created or born anew in Christ Jesus; the half-obliterated features stamped anew upon his nature, and the breath of a divine life breathed anew into his soul.*

2. A second argument for this truth is derived from *consciousness* and *Divine communion*. We are able to know, to love, and to commune with God, which we could not do if the divine and human were not essentially one. This communion or intercourse of the human soul with God is the essence of religion, as the first

* For a fuller exposition of what is meant by the 'image of God,' and the radical and essential difference between the natures of man and of animals, the reader is referred to Sermon V. of this volume.

truth—the Fatherhood of God—is its ground and possibility. To deny this immediate knowledge and communion is to vacate religion of its true and spiritual character, and to substitute the heathen idea of magical and superstitious rites.

The divine thoughts as embodied in the physical creation, however great and transcendent, find an answering thought or intelligence within us, else they could not be read or understood—for science is nothing but the reading of the divine thoughts in nature—showing that the divine and human mind is essentially one. Reason, as unfolded in things, in the laws and operations of nature, is the same reason as that which comprehends these laws. The geometry written in the stars and crystals is the same as that in Euclid—save that the real but invisible lines traced in the heavens are made visible in the book, for the help of our childish thought. *Analogy*, or the doctrine of correspondences, by which the facts of nature become the language of human thought and the bases of human words, is another token of the essential unity of the divine and human mind. What is termed *instinct* in animals, and is often mistaken for reasoning, is only a higher form of the same reason that controls the motions of the planets, the shooting of crystals, and the growth of plants. It differs from human reason, not in its nature or results, but in *the absence of personality*. It possesses and controls the subject blindly, and is not consciously possessed by it, as in man; and is all the more divine in its working because not interfered with and thwarted by a human will. For it is one essential mark of distinction between man and inferior creatures, that the will in man is *free*,

and able therefore to resist and transgress the law of his being; while in animals will is necessitated, a mere blind impulse, which obeys blindly and implicitly the law of its nature.*

In the more spiritual attributes of love and goodness and righteousness, the unity of the divine and human is still more complete. Love in God is not a different thing from love in man, but is its ideal perfection; and the latter in its highest and purest forms is felt to be divine. So right and justice in God is the same in idea and in reality as these attributes in man; and all so-called right which contradicts the clear and impartial verdict of the moral reason, whether found in theology or in human interpretations of Scripture, is *ipso facto* convicted of falsehood by the divine right of private judgment: "Yea, do not ye yourselves judge what is right?"

3. Still another evidence of the truth in question is derived from the *human element, or aspect, in the different forms of Divine revelation*. If the divine and human are essentially one, we might expect to recognize something human in every thing divine, as well as something divine in what is human.

(1.) This is recognized by the thoughtful and discerning mind, where many least of all discern it, in *Nature*, which every where points to man as the culminating and interpreting idea of all her forms, the end and aim of all her strivings. It is also contained in the Spirit which breathes through these forms and aspects. We

* It may be true to say that animals possess understanding, but are possessed by reason. Their intelligence enables them to adapt means to ends—which is the function of the understanding; but not to comprehend these ends or the *reason* of their actions—which is the function of reason.

have already spoken of the Divine Reason, or Logos, which is immanent in nature, and is the spirit of its laws, in which also the human reason finds its element and inspiration. Now this Reason, or plastic and regulative power—the essence and reality of all the laws and forces of nature—is not an impersonal *force* merely, as modern science blindly dreams, but a Person—He, viz., by whom all things were created, and in whom all things consist; and not only a person, but *human*—a divine-human personality—if the incarnation be not a delusion. The recognition of this personal and divine-human element, if hidden from the wise and prudent scientist, is accorded to children and poets, who discern with the heart and imagination what can not be seen with the eyes or detected by the microscope. A thoughtful child hears in the holy stillness and solemn beauty of a summer evening, like the first pair in Eden, the ‘voice of the Lord God, walking in the garden in the cool of the day.’ The poet Wordsworth reads in the silent faces of the clouds touched with sunrise ‘unutterable love.’ This is not a mere poetic fancy, or a reflection from his own spirit, but the felt emanation of another Spirit with which his own is in communion. “I have felt,” he says—

“A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.”*

* This recognition by the philosophic poet of a divine-human Spirit at the heart of all created things, which is characteristic of Wordsworth, is the deepest and truest, and most really Christian insight into nature that

This divine-human and indwelling Spirit of nature was perceived by the subtle and poetic mind of the Greeks, and embodied by their plastic imagination in those human divinities, or divine humanities, with which every grove and stream and element was peopled. The Grecian mythology was thus a perverted but beautiful conception—a shattered image—of the truth that the God of nature is not aloof from, but within it, and is both divine and human.

(2.) Again, the *Theophanies* of the Old Testament are a witness to the human aspect or form which belongs to all divine manifestations. These are commonly supposed to be mere apparitions, or temporary forms, assumed by Jehovah on special occasions, and wholly ceasing with their disappearance. Others, like Swedenborg and some of the early fathers, suppose the Lord to have ‘possessed’ the person of some man or angel who thus personated for the time a divine being. Both of these views, however, are attended with insuperable difficulties, not the least of which is the sense of *unreality* which results from such explanations, and which does not comport with the simplicity and truth of the narrative.

We will not here enter into a discussion of the nature of these mysterious visitations. But there is no more reason for doubting the reality or the permanence of these forms which are ascribed to Elohim, or the ‘Angel of Jehovah,’ and who is represented and addressed as a divine being as well as a man, than of the other angels

has been attained, pantheistic as it is sometimes called, and marks a new era in Christian poetry.

that appear throughout the olden time on ministries of good to men. What is the nature of these forms or bodies, and how they differ from those of flesh and blood, we may not know; but that they were not only real, but solid and tangible, is clear from one remarkable instance—that of the angel or man with whom Jacob wrestled—and who is expressly called in Hosea ‘the Lord God of Hosts.’ We hesitate not to avow the conviction that we have here, in these theophanies, a revelation of that ‘form of God’ in which Christ was before His incarnation—tempered, indeed, and subdued to human vision; a revelation also of His true and essential humanity, and so likewise of the essential unity—in this case the identity—of the Divine and human.

It may be objected to this view that Jehovah in His revelations to Moses did not appear in the human form, and forbade the representation of Himself by any image or likeness, enforcing the prohibition by the fact that at Horeb, when God spake to the people, no form or similitude was seen, but only a voice was heard speaking out of the midst of the fire. The divine conduct of Israel, moreover, through the wilderness, was made, not by a personal form, but by a pillar of cloud and of fire. But, doubtless, there were reasons why the true form of God was not revealed to the Israelites, inclined as they were to idolatry, through their long residence in Egypt. The whole Jewish cultus, in its earlier stages, aimed at impressing on the mind of that untutored and half-savage race the great difference between God and man, holiness and sin, typified by symbols and rites that separated between the holy and the profane—all with a view of teaching the great doctrine of sin and atonement. In

the Christian dispensation the opposite doctrine of reconciliation, and the unity of the divine and human, is the great lesson taught by the incarnation. Before the giving of the law, in the primitive Gospel times of Abraham, the reasons for withholding the human aspect of the Divine nature did not exist; hence the many human manifestations of God to the patriarchs. And we find even Moses asking for a truer vision of God than was permitted to the people; which was partially vouchsafed when from a cleft of the rock he caught a glimpse of the retiring form of Jehovah as He passed by.

(3.) One other form of revelation is that presented in the Scriptures, or inspired Word of God. These, we need not say, partake of the same divine-human character; not divine *and* human—as if the one element were added to or existed alongside of the other, each retaining its distinctive characteristics—but *divine-human*, divine in essence and quality, human in form and expression; not less human because the thoughts are inspired, and not less divine because the words in which they are expressed are human words.

It matters little to say that the human language employed by inspiration is an accommodation to human needs and capacities, and that God does not really think in a human way, or with human words and conceptions. The essential thing is that in revelation, or as the revealed God, His nature and thoughts always assume the human form, whatever may be His interior nature or His mode of self-communion; just as a father accommodates his language and thoughts to the capacity of his children, though he may use other and higher discourse with his equals.

In this connection the much-vexed question of *Inspiration*, its nature and laws and limitations, comes into review, upon which, however, we can here bestow only the briefest thoughts.

Inspiration, as the word implies, is the breath or Spirit of God in interior contact and communion with the spirit of man. It is a community of thought and feeling between the Divine and human mind; which implies not more that God's thought is accommodated to the human than that the human thought is elevated to the Divine. The divine and human are here one, and consciously act as one power; just as the air inhaled into the lungs and exhaled from them is one breath. This unity is felt and witnessed in all really inspired utterances. Take some sublime sentiment of the Psalms, and try to separate or distinguish what in it is human from what is divine; and you may as well separate in a human voice what is contributed by the vocal organ and what by the air and breath that proceeds from it. There is the pure and lofty and soul-kindling thought, or idea, which is felt to be divine in its quality, and there is the physical image, or form, in which it is clothed, taken from nature, as all words are; and then there is the warm breath of human feeling, or experience, that gives it life, and sends it home to the bosoms and sympathies of men. But the utterance is none the less a divine, or rather a *divine-human* utterance. Still more inseparable and indistinguishable is the Divine and human in the inspiration of feeling, or affection, since this is more central and spiritual than thought. All true love, St. John declares, is a divine birth. Is it any the less a human affection? And who can distin-

guish what part is human, and what divine, when the love of God is shed abroad in the soul by the Holy Ghost?

And here we need to revise our ideas respecting this whole matter of inspiration, to bring them more into accord with the teachings of Scripture, and the laws and workings of God in humanity. Inspiration is to be regarded as a normal, and not an abnormal or miraculous experience, since God is as necessary to the true idea of man as reason itself. It is so regarded in the Scriptures, and would be so now if our life were not unnaturally divorced from the life of God. In the olden time, not only prophets and apostles were inspired to utter the truth of God, and to write books of Scripture, but Bezaleel was inspired with artistic skill to work in gold and silver and brass for the tabernacle, and Miriam and Deborah to compose triumphal odes, and Joseph and Daniel to interpret dreams and symbols. In Job we read that "the inspiration of the Almighty giveth man understanding"—which may certainly be as true of man, the offspring of God, as that He should give instinct to the bird, and teach it a wisdom beyond itself to acquire.

We shall not attain to a solid and steadfast footing on this question till we cease to regard inspiration as a miraculous gift, which has ceased, or something wholly separated from present and ordinary experience, and recognize it as, in one sense, a natural as well as supernatural gift. Conscience is inspiration—a light shining from God into the soul of every man who does not shut it out or quench it, even that true light which lighteth every man that is born into the world; or, as the old

and true phrase is, the 'voice of God' speaking within us. Thought, in its highest and truest forms is inspiration, as the wisest thinkers have ever acknowledged. Genius is inspiration—'the inspired gift of God,' as Milton calls it, who, if any man, may be supposed to know. And this gift, like that of prophecy, is sometimes bestowed on bad men, who, like Balaam, are compelled by their better genius to speak true and noble words, while their hearts are full of wickedness. All true goodness and love is inspiration—the product and fruit of the Spirit of God, as the Scriptures abundantly declare; and this, certainly, is no miraculous or obsolete experience.

If, now, it be asked, What is the difference between this so-called natural inspiration and that of prophets and writers of Scripture? the answer is, not a difference of kind, but of quality and degree. By their fruits ye shall know them. As the character of Christ, so superior to that of all other men, proves Him to be divine, yet none the less really human, so the character of the utterances of Scripture, so superior, in a religious sense, to those of all other writers, yet akin to them in their human and individual traits, prove their divine origin and authority.

4. A last proof and example of the unity of the divine and human is the *indwelling of God in man*. This includes inspiration, as the greater includes the less, or the permanent includes the occasional and transitory. It implies a unity of nature and of life. This is the normal condition and true idea of man, and the whole end of Christianity to produce—a perfect spiritual union between God and man, so that all his thoughts,

feelings, actions, and life shall be inspired, and in one sense divine; according to the declarations of Scripture, "I will dwell in them, and walk in them." "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Compare, also, Christ's prayer for His disciples, "As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."

If it be asked how the finite and the Infinite can coalesce, and be really one in consciousness, the answer is that the human soul is by its nature *receptive of Deity*. It is therefore, in one sense, infinite in its capacity, not by extension, but intension. The soul is not a mathematical *quantum* whose only enlargement is an outward one. In that case the finite could not contain the Infinite. Rather is its infinitude an inward and spiritual one—the power of an endless life, and a limitless feeling and thought and will. It is infinite in susceptibility rather than in power of expansion. The soul may thus be 'filled with all the fullness of God,' not as the ocean, but as a well, that communicates with infinite waters and unfailing springs, though finite in itself and its measures at any one time. This is indicated by that word of Christ, "The water that I shall give, shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life."

Here, then, would seem to be a basis for the Incarnation, or the unity of the divine and human in Christ, which, avoiding the dualism and mutual exclusiveness of the natures, appears to allow scope for the reality and integrity of each factor, and also for the perfect unity of the two in one person. Hence most modern theologians—those at least who are emancipated from the old

trammels, and no longer bound in the shallows of traditional formulas—adopt this interpretation of Christ's person, and conceive Him to be a man in whom God dwelt absolutely, or to whom He was united in a perfect and inseparable unity. But truth compels us to dissent from this view, as not sufficiently meeting all the conditions of the problem, or the representations of Scripture. These represent Christ, not as the *union*, or even the *unity*, of God and a man, but as the Word made flesh, *God manifest in the flesh*. Furthermore, it does not sufficiently distinguish Christ from other men; for He is the Head of humanity, as well as one with it.

If Christ be only the union of a Divine and human soul in one person, He differs from other men only in the degree in which God dwells in Him, or else in the mode in which God is united to Him. In the former case Christ is only a more perfect man, because more perfectly filled with God; but still a mere man, sprung from the race, and not merely born into it, and by no means justifying that grand and unique claim, "Ye are from beneath; *I am from above*." "*I came down from heaven*," etc.

Or, if He differ from other men only in the mode in which God is united to Him, viz., by a personal and hypostatic union effected at His birth, and destined to be eternal, then the old difficulty comes back as to which side, or factor, the personality, the *Ego*, is to be referred; since this is the one central point which retains its individuality, and can not be blended in a common consciousness; and how is it possible to conceive a *divine* consciousness, such as Christ's language im-

plies, without destroying or absorbing the human personality?

The true solution is found in the fact that the humanity of Christ, at least its essential reality, *is not derived from the race, but brought into it from above*: is an *eternal* and *Divine* humanity. Therefore the divine and human in Christ is not a unity merely, but an absolute *identity*.

To show this, we need to consider another principle or truth, not recognized in the creeds, but implied in the Scripture doctrine of Christ, and essential to a true Christology.

II.

*THE DIVINE OR HEAVENLY HUMANITY
OF CHRIST.*

THE meaning of this doctrine is that the humanity of Christ, in its real and essential nature, is not a derived, but an eternal humanity, and one with His divinity. It is thus a unique and, so to speak, a superhuman humanity—made so not by the union of the Divine nature with the human, or the supervention and indwelling, in a superior degree, of God in the merely human soul of Jesus, but by the divine Original of humanity—that Image of God in which and after which man was created, appearing in the flesh, and living His divine-human life before us.

This may appear a strange doctrine to some minds, who are unable to conceive of the human except as it is presented in the finite and imperfect forms of our earthly humanity. But we hope to allay prejudice and prepare the way for its reception by the following considerations, to which we ask a thoughtful attention:

First, consider the all-significant fact that Jesus was born of only one human parent, whose sacred office it was first to conceive, and afterward to bear and nurture, 'that holy thing' whose true and only Father was God. Why, we may ask, was not Jesus begotten, as well as born, of earthly parentage, if His humanity was

to be wholly identical with ours, differing only by the union with it of a Divine being, thus sanctioning and sanctifying the sacred laws of marriage, as He did all other divinely ordained human laws and relations?

Secondly, consider Christ's own language concerning Himself and His heavenly origin. He every where declares that God is His Father, implying, as His words could not but be understood, not that God was the Father merely of a divine hypostasis united with His person, but of that person or soul which was manifest in the flesh, and which discoursed with them; thus claiming that His *humanity* was *divine*. He declares, with a lofty consciousness of His superior nature and origin, "Ye are from beneath; I am from above." "What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before?"

This title, *Son of Man*—not *Son of men*—which Christ appropriates to Himself, is very significant, and indicates a peculiarity and uniqueness pertaining to His humanity, as we have elsewhere shown. Ponder these grand and lofty utterances near the close of His earthly life: "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father." "Glorify Thou me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."*

* "That holy thing which was born of Mary, while advancing in years and becoming more and more conscious of itself as a human person, became also in the same measure conscious of its deity; it felt itself to be a divine-human personality, because the fullness of the Deity was the ground of its life as a man; it felt itself to be, not merely a participator in the divine Logos, but also the *divine-human* continuation of that eternal life of the Deity which was from the beginning. Although, therefore, Christ says, 'I and the Father are one,' He never says, 'I and the Logos

Consider, too, that riddle put forth by our Lord to the Scribes — “How say they that Christ is David’s Son? And David himself saith in the book of Psalms, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit on my right hand, till I make Thine enemies Thy footstool. David therefore calleth Him Lord, how is He, then, his Son?” This was asked not merely to puzzle them, but to set them thinking, and to show that His human descent from David had a divine primogeniture behind it; in other words, that His humanity was not derived from David, but David’s from Him. As He afterward more explicitly declares, “I am the root and the offspring of David.” And He was the offspring in time, only because He was the root in eternity. Though He was the seed of David according to the flesh, David did not bear the root, but the root him.

The same truth is declared by the apostles in manifold passages: “When the fullness of time was come, God sent forth His Son,” etc. The true and essential being of Christ is indicated by the term *Son*—the Only-begotten of the Father by an eternal generation; one with the Father in the unity of the divine nature, distinct from Him in the trinity of the divine persons.

The difference between our humanity, as derived from Adam, and the divine or heavenly humanity of Christ, is indicated in the contrast between the first and the second Adam. “The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second Man is the Lord from heaven.”

These passages show the identity of the human and

are one.’ For He is the human self-revelation of the divine Logos; for which reason also He styles Himself directly the light and life of the world.”—Martensen.

divine in Christ, or that the *man* Jesus Christ was identically the same person who dwelt in the bosom of the Father before all worlds; which could be said of no created human soul, though ever so closely united to Him or merged in His person. No distinction is made or implied, either by Himself or the sacred writers, between His human and His divine nature, except as to the flesh. He is the Son of David according to the flesh, but the Son of God according to the Spirit, i. e., in His true spiritual nature.

Consider, thirdly, *the peculiar type of His humanity*, and the impression made by His character as a man. This is of a higher order than any of merely human birth.

This is seen not only in His absolute freedom from sin—that sadly characteristic trait of *our* humanity, and that universal mark of our descent from the earthly Adam—while the sinlessness of Jesus, and His freedom from all inherited taint, is inexplicable on the theory of a human soul derived from Adam. It is seen also in His freedom from all local and temporal and national peculiarities. While a Jew outwardly, inheriting Jewish blood, and brought up under a narrow Jewish cultus, He is inwardly as free from all that distinguishes the Jew as if His home had been in Uranus instead of in Nazareth. His thoughts and discourses are marked by the same universality and heavenly breadth and purity, as free from the flavor of human learning, or the mental characteristics of any one age or nation, as the naked heavens are free from earthly exhalations.

Even the peculiarities of age and sex and temperament disappear in the wonderful balance and all-sided-

ness of His nature, which exhibits alike the dignity and strength and masculine wisdom of manhood, and the tenderness and gentleness and intuitive grace of woman; and with all-embracing sympathy and harmonizing love attracts to Himself the impetuous and self-confident Peter, the slow and skeptical Thomas, and the ardent and affectionate John; the Magdalens and the Marys, publicans and sinners, and even little children, whose innocence found both protection and kinship in His sweet and heavenly humanity.

The impression made on those who knew Him best, or came nearest to Him, was the reverse of that made by the greatest of human characters. Familiarity bred not less, but more, of awe and reverence. The nearer men approached Him, and the more they saw of Him, the less they comprehended Him; the more His nature receded and broadened and deepened before them, like the heavens from which He came. There was a mystery and aloofness about it which awed men, as something superhuman, and at the same time irresistibly attracted all but the willfully blind and perverse, as something more truly human than other men possessed.

If it be said that this unique character of the humanity of Christ results from the union of Divinity with it—the higher nature elevating and subliming the lower—we answer that the indwelling of God in other men does not destroy their natural idiosyncrasy or individuality of character. A Peter remains a Peter, and John a John, and Moses a Moses, however holy or divine their character becomes; and by the supposition Jesus is a man like other men apart from His divinity, or the union of the Logos with His humanity. Yet we find

Him unlike other men in these very characteristics which are most inherent and most ineradicable in men who derive their humanity from Adam ; which seems to indicate that His humanity was not thus derived. But, aside from this, there still remains the objection of a *duality* in the person of Christ, which on any theory of union is a composite nature, made up of two opposite, if not contradictory elements, which mars, in thought at least, its perfect and seamless unity. Christian consciousness, as we have seen, steadily refuses to regard Christ as a composite nature, however theological speculation or ecclesiastical councils may so define Him ; and it is time that this intuitive image which faith recognizes found a place in Christology.

Moreover, this theory of Christ's person, as a union of the Divine and human, involves the very serious difficulty of a double union, that, viz., between the Logos and the human soul of Jesus, and another—the only union which Christ Himself acknowledges—that between the Father and the Son. While Christ asserts very distinctly a unity between Himself and the Father, saying, “I and my Father are one ;” and, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father,” He every where and constantly implies a personal distinction, praying to and receiving help, and sometimes audible communications from His Father. And it is certainly a singular thing that the unity between the Father and the Son—who according to the orthodox doctrine are one God—should be less close and personal than that between God and a man. And the anomaly does not cease here : for if a human soul be posited, as the theory implies, there results a *threefold* union—first between the soul and body, next between the hu-

man soul of Christ and the divine Logos, and, thirdly, between the person thus constituted and the Father who dwells in Him. We need not dwell on the complication of this view, which, while it professes to vindicate the humanity of Christ and bring Him nearer to us, removes Him still further from His human brethren, or wonder at the perplexity of Christian minds in trying to conceive intelligibly of Him. In place of the single divine-human image presented in the Gospel, we have a theological and psychological puzzle over which bewildered faith exclaims, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him." All this perplexity and confusion is superseded, and the humanity as well as divinity of Christ more truly vindicated, by a clear perception of the *identity* of the divine and human in His person, or of the divine and heavenly humanity of Christ.

Fourthly, consider what is implied in the fact that Christ is the *divine Ideal* or *Prototype of humanity*.

Here is a view of Christ and His aboriginal relation to man seldom recognized in our modern theologies, and foreign indeed to our modern thought, but which was familiar to the ancient Christian mind, and which ought to be revived as a much-needed element in our Christology. To render this view more intelligible, the reader will pardon the following exposition.

All are familiar with certain ideal forms in the realm of necessary truth. A mathematical line or circle, e. g., is something ideal and invisible, of which all actual and visible lines or circles are but imperfect images. The ideal circle is the true circle, more perfect than any actual circle, since it is eternal and necessary, and com-

prehends all existing and possible circles, while it is comprehended, or perfectly realized, by none; and all actual circles are true only as they approximate or partake of the ideal. We learn the properties of the circle or triangle, not from any particular one, or from any number of them by generalization, but *a priori* by the power of reason to discern necessary and absolute truth.

These are ideas, or ideal truths, existing in and for the reason alone. But beyond this abstract intellectual realm is a spiritual realm, in which abide not ideas only but realities, or in which the ideal is also the real. This is made known to us, not through science, but through divine revelation (1 Cor. ii, 11), and cognized not by reason but by faith. Within and at the head of this kingdom (as man is the head of the lower creation) is Christ, the ideal and prototype of humanity.

Again, all know what is meant by the ideal in the realm of art, viz., that idea or conception in the mind of the artist after which he works, and which he strives to realize or embody in his production. This ideal is more perfect than any actually existing thing, and is not derived from the actual, but the actual from the ideal, which is before it in time and dignity.

Man's creations thus resemble God's, who also creates from an ideal in His own mind or nature. This ideal, in the creation of plants and animals, is a Divine thought or idea, called in Genesis and in modern language the kind, or genus, or type. God created the tree bearing fruit, whose seed is in itself, each after its 'kind.' And as God's thoughts are always distinct and clearly defined, so is their expression in nature. Hence the grand distinguishing genera or types in the creation are never

confused or merged into each other, as the development theory of Darwin supposes.

This divine idea, and its affinity with human thought, is recognized by science in the organic law or plastic power which presides over and shapes, with regulative and intelligent force, all natural growths, and is, as it were, the soul of every created thing. Only modern science fails to recognize the Intelligence behind it, the creative Word and Wisdom of God, of which it is the working, and which alone makes it intelligible to reason.

In the creation of man, the ideal or type is of a different order, as seen in the different language employed in Genesis. This is not an idea or thought of God, but God himself. "Let us make man in Our image, after Our likeness;" and let them have dominion over other creatures, as superior to them in origin and dignity. "So God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him." This language, so emphatic, and twice repeated—as if to penetrate even the dull ear of materialistic science—proclaims the divine origin and dignity of man, with a voice that can not or ought not to be mistaken.

If we ask still further, What is meant by this image of God, in which man is created? the Scripture answers by referring to Him who is "the Image of the invisible God, the first-born of the whole creation;" "the brightness [*ἀπαύγασμα*, outshining] of His glory, and the express image of His person." This is the ideal or prototype after which, and by which, man was created, not an idea merely, as in human creations; not a law, as in nature; but a Divine Person. Christ is the archetypal and ideal Man, from whom humanity itself is

derived, and in whom it finds its perfection. The perfect ever precedes and is the original of the imperfect, the ideal of the actual, both in divine and human creations. Christ is the primal and express image of God, in whom man, the finite image of God, was created. The relation, moreover, between the ideal and the actual, the original and the copy, is just the relation between Christ and humanity. The one is eternal, the other temporal; the one is perfect, the other imperfect (since perfection, or the true idea of man, could not be realized at first without a history and an incarnation); the one universal, the other individual; the one divine, the other human.

If it appear strange or derogatory to conceive of Christ as the ideal Man before His incarnation, since it would seem to imply a human form and human attributes, which are inconsistent, it is said, with the infinitude of absolute Deity, we reply, He is nowhere represented in Scripture as the absolute Deity, but as the 'image of the invisible God,' which implies a visible form. He is himself the informing Word, or formal cause of all things. He is called the eternal *Son* of God; and we learn the meaning of this name only from human relations, just as we learn the spiritual nature of God only from our own spirits. Human sonship is an imperfect image of that divine and eternal Sonship which is realized in Christ, and was realized by Him in His relation to the Father before the world was. The idea that Christ became a Son, or rendered obedience only when He became incarnate, or that His incarnation was a real change, and not rather a revelation of His essential nature and character, is nowhere sanctioned in Scripture,

and is a consequence of the false notion of the essential diversity of the Divine and human.

Consider, moreover, that Christ is the Mediator between the Infinite and the finite, not only as Redeemer, but as Creator, and as such must partake of the nature of both; in other words, there must be a determination and limitation of the absolute and infinite One in order to create, or express Himself in the finite; and this determination is the Word or Son of God.

In regard to the divine or essential form of Christ, it can be no other than the human—that most perfect and expressive of all conceivable forms—the original and prototype of that which we wear, as His divine humanity is the original of ours. This does not imply that Christ always possessed a body like ours—certainly not of flesh and blood—for form is independent of material, and belongs to the eternal ideas or essences of things; as the form which the sculptor hews out of the marble is independent of the stone.*

The essential divinity of the human form is felt in the presence of those creations of ancient art where the ideal majesty and beauty of this form is most clearly revealed, and which are a sufficient refutation of the false and degrading theory that man is only a development of the brute creation. Whoso can believe that man, with the impress of divinity stamped upon his form and countenance, can have “descended from a hairy quadru-

* The body partakes of and expresses, but is not *form*, which is something ideal and spiritual, like beauty, and is before that on which it is impressed. As the poet Spencer has truly said:

“’Tis of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form, and doth the body make.”

ped furnished with a tail and pointed ears," can believe with equal reason that the Belvedere Apollo may have been rolled into its matchless proportions from a shapeless boulder by the casual friction of ages, without the creative hand of the sculptor. Darwin's theory is a blasphemy against man, which, in face of the declaration of Scripture, "God created man in His own image," becomes a blasphemy against God; and which neither the gropings of materialism, nor the speculations of science, falsely so called, can either justify or excuse.

But to return. The fact that Christ now wears this human form in heaven, substantiated in a veritable human body, glorified and made immortal, is presumptive proof that He may have worn it before His incarnation; and if its possession now is consistent with omnipresence and all divine attributes, it was no less so then.

Christ, in His essential humanity, is thus one with, but not identical with, the race—as He must needs be above it in order to redeem and raise it. As Apollinaris long ago protested: "Christ can not have so entirely become that which we are as to have lost the ability to make out of us that which He is." He is not *a* true man, but *the* true Man. His humanity is more true and real than ours, because it is the original from which ours is derived, the prototype of which ours is a copy.

We are aware that this doctrine will sound strange, if not unintelligible to some, whose mode of thought belongs to a different school, and who find it difficult to conceive of a true humanity that is not derived from the race. But this only shows how far our theology and philosophy is from that of the Scriptures and the early Christian writers. The theology which ignores Christ's pre-

existent relation to man, and derives His humanity wholly from the actual human race, is part of that sensuous philosophy which derives all knowledge and ideas from the senses, and believes the things which are seen and temporal to be more real than those which are unseen and eternal. Nevertheless, thought is older than matter, the ideal is more real than the actual, the supersensible and spiritual is more substantial than all which the senses discern. So Christ's humanity, including His essential form, is older and more real, and more substantial than ours, as it is more divine.

The difficulty in question may be removed in part by considering and reflecting upon the essential unity of the divine and human, as already set forth—a unity grounded in an original identity—further by considering the eternal relation of the Son to the Father, in which, as well as in His nature, He is our original, the ideal and prototype of our human relations. As Son of God, He is equal with God, yet deriving His being eternally from the Father, dependent, subordinate, and obedient—showing how subordination and obedience are consistent with equality of nature and the most perfect love and communion. All that is highest and best and most beautiful in human relations is eternally existent in a divine form in Him who dwells in the bosom of the Father. The divine Sonship is thus the ideal and prototype of the human, and divine obedience of human obedience; as divine love is the type and source of all true human love, and the unity and communion of the Father and the Son of all closest human unions.

Fifthly, We call attention to the fact or doctrine, to which very great importance is attached in the Script-

ures, that *Christ is the Head of humanity*, holding a unique and universal relation to the race.

The Headship of Christ is the counterpart of that idea which represents Him as the root of humanity. As the latter indicates His aboriginal relation to man before His incarnation, the former declares His relation as incorporated with the race, and His place in and over it.

This doctrine is specially set forth by St. Paul, who represents Christ as "the head of every man;" "the head of the body, the Church;" as "head over all things to the Church, which is His body, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all." He is also represented as the second Adam—the head and representative of redeemed humanity—and as gathering together in one, recapitulating, or summing up in Himself, the whole of humanity, and even the whole creation.

The idea which seems to be set forth by this conception is that Christ is not only the crown and glory of humanity, but its most essential part, its regnant and organific principle, without which it is an incomplete, headless body, or a disorganized mass—that He is the original and source whence our true humanity is derived, and also the unifying principle in whom the race attains to unity, and all the various and scattered members become one body. Christ is thus the head and representative of mankind in a higher and truer sense than Adam.

This relation implies that His humanity is unique and superior to that of other men, as the head is superior to the rest of the body. Hence it can not have been derived from it. As Adam did not derive his nature from the race that sprang from him, so Christ, the

second Adam, did not derive His humanity from the first; but the race itself, including its natural head, derived its humanity from this divine Head.

It implies, moreover, that Christ is the *generic* or *universal* man, and not a mere individual of the race. If He were this, or if He derived His humanity from Adam, it would be partial and idiosyncratic, like that of other men; but we find it to be as wide and all-comprehensive as the idea of humanity itself, which includes all individuals in its universal and generic scope.*

This universal character of Christ, as the Son of Man, could not be derived from below, by the aggregation in Him of individual traits—since the universal is something more than a mass or aggregate, and is not derived from individuals, but individuals from that—but He is the generic or universal Man before He becomes the individual: in other words, *He is the Son of Man before He is the son of Mary.*

Christ is not the mere flower, or highest development, of humanity, else He could not be its Redeemer; but He is Humanity itself in its head or principal man, the primal archetype of humanity, descending into the race to renew or recreate it after the original divine image.

It implies, finally, that He is the *unifying* principle of humanity, in whom alone the race attains to a complete and perfect unity.

That such a principle can not spring from the race

* “His individuality stands in the relation to all other human individualities in which the centre of a circle stands to all the single points of the circle.”—Martensen.

itself, but must stand above it and comprehend it, is evident both from reason and analogy. The unity of an organism does not consist in its individual parts, or their relation to each other, but in the organic law (or life-principle) which is above it, and yet within it, all in every part, shaping and subordinating the whole to its idea. "Even the natural world is a unity only because there is indissolubly united with it a principle which stands above it, and comprises it within itself, viz., the world-forming and world-sustaining Logos, who is the vehicle and representative of its eternal idea."—(Dorner.) "For He is before all things, and in Him all things consist," or stand together as a universe. "And He is the Head of the body, the Church." Humanity thus finds its unity in Him who is its eternal and realized idea, from whom as Creator and Prototype it proceeded, and who comprises all its manifoldness in His universal and divine humanity.

And not only humanity, but the whole creation, or the entire natural and spiritual universe, finds in Him its head and unity. "As the incarnate Logos, He is not merely the centre of the world of men, but of the universe; not merely the head of the human race, but head of creation (Col. i, 15), 'the first-born of every creature,' for whom all things were created. For as man is the centre of creation, the point in which the spiritual and the sensuous world meet, nobler than the angels; so does this hold true in the highest sense of the second Adam, in whom the heavenly and the earthly, the invisible and the visible, the forces of the entire universe, angels, principalities, and powers, are summed up and combined."—(Martensen.) In a word, as the head of this

lower world is man, the head of the universe is Christ, the divine Man. In both Humanity, or God as Man, is the central idea and last end of creation.

What is implied by the Headship of Christ is still further illustrated by St. Paul in that remarkable trilogy (1 Cor. xi, 3): "But I would have you know that the head of the woman is the man, and the head of every man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God." As the woman is derived originally from the man, and is subordinate to him in position, though not in nature; and as she finds in him her complement and head, forming together with him 'one flesh,' or complete man—as, too, Christ, the Son of God, eternally derives His being from the Father, and is subordinate in place and office, though equal in divinity, and is one with the Father in the unity of the Godhead—so every man derives his true humanity from Christ, is subordinate to Him, and yet one with Him, in the glory to which He is exalted, and exalts humanity, as its Divine Head.

Lastly, we hold up *the eternal duration of the humanity of Christ* as an argument for its essential and eternally existent reality.

One of the most weighty obstacles to belief in the doctrine of the Incarnation is the difficulty of supposing that the infinite and formless One who inhabiteth eternity all at once became what He was not before—a *man*, inhabiting from henceforth and forever a human body, and identifying Himself with human history; or, as Dr. Bushnell has forcibly expressed it, "that at a certain date chronicled in a parish register the eternal God underwent a permanent change of state." The difficulty of believing such a fact, under the ordinary

conception of the doctrine, is so great that relief is generally sought in one of two ways: either by modifying the idea of the Incarnation, and making it merely the union of Deity with a certain man—which is virtually to deny its reality—or by denying its permanence, and supposing that at the end of the Christian dispensation Christ will deliver up, not only the kingdom to the Father, but His humanity also—which was temporarily assumed for a temporary end—and return to that state of invisibility and essential Deity in which He was before. But this latter view is so inconsistent with the whole current of Scripture teaching, and with the common Christian consciousness, that it has never been adopted into the creed of the Church, which teaches that Christ is to reign in His glorified body forever.

But the difficulty is wholly obviated by admitting the grand truth of the divine or heavenly humanity of Christ. Being eternally and essentially human as well as divine, the assumption of a human body, or the being ‘made flesh,’ was only a descent from the heavenly to the earthly condition, from the form of God to the likeness of men; a change of form and condition, not of nature. Possessing already an essential affinity with us, He enters into a flesh and blood affinity. “Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same,” that in all things He might be made like unto His brethren. Then, having purged our sins, and redeemed our fallen humanity, He does not cast aside His human body, as a worn-out garment, no longer befitting His divine and exalted state, but returns with it to heaven, glorified, and forever united with His divine-human person, as a

pledge that our humanity also, soul and body, shall be glorified together with Christ, and made one with Him forever.

This view of the essential and eternal affinity of Christ with humanity meets also another practical difficulty or problem, which presses upon every thinking mind, and has driven some into a rejection of Christianity itself. If, as the Scriptures teach, there is no salvation apart from Christ, or a believing and vital union with Him, if there is no other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved, how were the saints of the Old Testament saved and sanctified, to whom Christ was not revealed, except in obscurest types and shadows? What, too, becomes of the millions of heathen, to whom the name of Christ is utterly unknown; and what shall we say of such men as Socrates and Plato, of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, and other examples, not of morality only, but of heavenly wisdom and piety, which in all ages shine out from the heathen world and enlighten its darkness? Is there no salvation for these, or are they saved by some other name or power than Christ? In short, is Christianity the *absolute* religion for all men and all ages, or only a local and temporal religion, circumscribed in its working by the circle within which the historical Christ and the written Gospel is preached?

Many find a partial solution of this problem in connection with *Eschatology*, by supposing a future or post-temporal revelation of Christ as Redeemer to be made to those who have had no opportunity of knowing and believing on Him in this world; Scripture warrant for which is supposed to be given in those passages which

speaking of Christ's descent into Hades, and His preaching to the spirits in prison. (Eph. iv, 9; 1 Peter iii, 18, 19). Without denying the truth or probability of such a future manifestation of Christ, or foreclosing this door of hope for the heathen world, which the Scriptures seem purposely to have left ajar, yet it does not meet all the conditions and difficulties of the problem, since it makes salvation to depend on objective knowledge, and throws its realization into the future instead of extending it back into the past.

The view of Christ here set forth does meet and answer these difficulties; for it presents a Redeemer in closest relationship with the race from the very beginning—as not far from every one of us, since in Him we live and move and have our being. As the ideal and prototype of humanity, He is the image of God in which we were created, and the root of our humanity itself. As the Divine Logos, He is the light of reason and conscience, that true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world; the light, no less, of outward nature, which shineth in darkness when the inward light becomes darkness, and comprehendeth it not. As such He has come to all men, and is *in* all men, even those who do not receive Him. But as many as received Him, or cherished and followed this Divine light—whether reflected from physical nature, or the symbols and types of Judaism, or the inward oracle of the human soul—to them He became also the life; to them gave He power to become the sons of God; who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

Christ thus had an immanent historical life in the race

before His advent in the flesh. His incarnation was not an abrupt miraculous descent into humanity, without previous connection with it, but only the springing up, in the fullness of time, of that divine seed or root of humanity which was from the beginning, which existed in or underneath the race before Abraham and before Adam; who, as the Wisdom of God, was His companion and counselor in the creation of the world, and *whose delights were with the sons of men*; whose goings forth and whose workings have been of old, even from everlasting. All that is divine and true and good in man in every age and nation is the fruit and product, not of the first Adam, but of the second, who was yet before the first—the first-born of the whole creation, the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end of the creation of God.

These arguments for the divine or heavenly humanity of Christ are sufficient, we think, to establish its truth. But it may comfort and confirm some readers to know that it is no new doctrine, but has been held for substance by many of the ablest and wisest Christian teachers from the very earliest times.

Origen, as we have seen, held the Logos to be not only the truth and soul of the world, and its eternal ideal unity, but also that He is the reason in every soul. "He is wisdom, truth, reason itself, and all the wise are wise through their participation in Him." Athanasius, with most of the Church fathers, conceived Christ in His divine nature as the prototype of humanity, that eternal image of God of which man is a copy, and therefore as necessary to his perfection. "The arche-

type, which could not sin, entered into its production in order to exhibit Himself in actuality, and thus to complete His work. Adam is the not yet completed creation; the archetype was necessary to the completion, to the definite and stable perfection of the creation." But Apollinaris alone, among the early fathers, seems to have grasped the true significance of this doctrine as lying at the basis of the Incarnation. He taught the essential unity and identity of the divine and human in the higher nature of Christ, thus dispensing with the necessity of a distinctively human soul. "They are one nature as to their idea; for no perfect conception can be formed of either of them save in essential connection with the other." But he failed to show how this divine-human soul, or Logos, when it became incarnate, realized a true human development while retaining its essential divinity.

Coming to more recent times, the Mystics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose theosophy was profounder than the narrow scholastic theology which preceded it, held the doctrine of a heavenly humanity in various forms, among whom were Valentine Weigel, Jacob Boehm, Peter Poiret,* and others. It found, also,

* Poiret, 'a French enthusiast' (d. 1719), held the doctrine of a heavenly humanity and a heavenly body in which Christ appeared to the patriarchs. He taught that the Son of God assumed humanity soon after the creation of man, prior to the fall; moreover, that this incarnation took place by the Son of God deriving from Adam a glorious body and a divine soul. He distinguished, however, between the incarnation from Adam and the incarnation in Mary; and thought the name of 'incarnation' should be retained for the latter alone, because Christ assumed *mortal* flesh in Mary. As a shining white garment dipped in and thoroughly imbued with a dark color does not thereby become two garments,

many advocates in England, viz., Robert Barclay,* Henry More,† Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester,‡ Robert Fleming,§ Dr. Thomas Burnet, and several others.

Dr. Isaac Watts held a view of the pre-existent humanity of Christ which is deserving of mention. In his book entitled “The Glory of Christ as God-man, in Three Discourses” (London, 1746), Watts says: “In order to express the intimacy and universality of the revelation of Christ to humanity, we must lay down that the Incarnation existed eternally, either in the decree of God or in reality: in the sense, namely, that God was united with a human soul even before the creation of the world.” He adopts the latter alternative, as follows: “The soul of Christ was ‘actually,’ and not merely ‘virtually,’ the first-born of creation. A glorious creature was assumed by God as an organ prior to the world, and through it all things were created. This glorious soul took up into itself as much of the Divine as any created being could grasp. It is the mirror, the image of God. We, however, who are said to be created in

so also Christ's body does not become two bodies through the assumption ‘de notre corruption mortelle’ in Mary.—*Economie du Rétablissement avant l'Incarnation de J. Christ.*

* The celebrated apologist for the Quakers. In his great work entitled *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity* (London, 1729), Barclay says that the flesh that makes alive, of which John speaks in chapter vi, is a spiritual body come from heaven. He supposes that the Word of God revealed Himself to men in all ages by means of the same body, and that it was not for the first time assumed at the incarnation of Mary.

† *The Mystery of Godliness.*

‡ See the *Discourse of the Descent of the Man Christ Jesus from Heaven*, with the *Defense*.

§ See his *Christology*, in 3 vols.

God's image, were really created in the image of this God-man."

The truth of this view consists in the *pre-existent humanity* of Christ; its error lies in the supposition that this humanity was a *created* human soul, with which God united Himself before the creation, and not an eternal and essential humanity, identical with the Word or Son of God himself. This allies itself also with the truth and error of Arianism, viz., the subordination and dependence of the Son, as (eternally) deriving His being from the Father—which is its true side or aspect—and the doctrine that the Son of God is a created and inferior being—which is its error.

Among the teachers of a divine or heavenly humanity, we may mention also *Swedenborg*, whose wonderful insight, combined with a constructive or systematizing genius equal to that of Calvin, though of a different order, has made him the founder of a sect, which assumes to be the 'New Church.' What of truth there is in the so-called revelations of this modern seer—and there is unquestionably much truth in his writings, though clothed in a somewhat narrow and technical garb—may be received into or grafted upon the system of evangelical Christianity without discarding the old for the new faith.

The doctrine of a heavenly humanity was taught in the last century by *Joh. Wilh. Petersen*. "Jesus Christ," he says, "was God-man from the beginning: in His image Adam was created." According to him, all Divine condescension (*συγκατάβασις*) has taken place in this heavenly humanity, which it was given to believers even in Old Testament times to enjoy.

It was also held, in connection with the profoundest theological and philosophical views, by *Oetinger*, "a man as pious as he was profound." "His great mind," says *Dorner*, "passed from the post-existence of Christianity back to its pre-existence—to the creation of nature and man; he establishes the most intimate connection between the first and second creation by means of the 'sensus communis,' and in direct antagonism to the prevailing philosophy of the age, which was hostile to all realism, and scarcely allowed Christianity a petitionary position alongside of their enlightened philosophy; he strove to produce a 'philosophia sacra,' with Christ for its centre, whose task it is to be the true philosophy." He held to an ideal-real principle in God—a matter which is not matter, and also an ideal which is not a mere product of thought—a *something real which is also ideal*, and *an ideal which is also real*; a nature or corporeality of a higher kind, free from the defects of the earthly nature. This is spirituality as substantial reality. He usually designates it God's 'glory,' through it God communicates Himself to the creature. He held it to be the supreme unity of the spiritual and physical, the Divine life in its revelation. "Because Wisdom, before the Incarnation, was the visible image of the invisible God (Col. i, 15), therefore the Son, in comparison with the Being of all beings, is something relatively corporeal, although He too is pure spirit. The heavenly humanity which He had as the Lord from heaven was invisibly present even with the Israelites. They drank out of the rock."*

* See *Dorner*, Div. II, vol. iii, pp. 76, 82, 276.

Among the later Christian teachers who hold to the primal or essential humanity of Christ may be mentioned Göschel. He maintains the unity of humanity to be constituted by a universal Head, who is also an individual person, or the unity of the universal and individual. This is explained by the idea of the *primal man*, who is the whole of humanity in one. This primal humanity he represents more precisely as follows: "As every individual man stands over the whole of nature, so the God-man over humanity and nature; only that the latter is the absolute spirit, the Logos. He represented humanity completely in Himself prior to its receiving existence outside of, and being filled by, Him. He *is* humanity; we *have* it. He is it entirely; we participate therein. His personality precedes and lies at the basis of the personality of the race and its individuals. As idea, He is implanted in the whole of humanity; He lies at the basis of every human consciousness, without, however, attaining realization in an individual; for this is only possible in the entire race at the end of the times. With the implantation of that eternal idea, therefore, humanity is merely objectively and potentially, not actually redeemed. . . . In the Incarnation, this primal man becomes an historical person. He becomes *a* man; the universal appears as an individual. This is the humiliation, that the Creator should be also created and born, should become Son of God of the Son of Man, and take upon Him the form of a servant. The God-man in and by Himself, as uncreated, is the perfect man; but in the flesh also He is the perfect created man."*

* Vide ut supra, p. 170.

Lange also holds to an essential relation between the humanity of Christ as revealed in the Incarnation and His eternal Divine nature. "The post-temporal, eternal glory of the humanity of Christ points back to its eternal, ideal existence in God. The eternal Son of God can not, in the course of His temporal existence, have saddled Himself forever with something accidental; or have assumed a form which, as purely historical, does not correspond to His eternal essence."* In other words, the post-temporal, eternal, and glorified humanity of Christ points back to an eternal and heavenly (ideal) humanity before the world was.

In addition to these distinguished German theologians, we need only mention the name of the late Frederick Maurice, whose wise and thoughtful teachings respecting Christ and humanity, and their relations to each other, are leavening with new life and a broader spirit the narrow traditional orthodoxy which has hitherto opposed him.

These larger and profounder views of Christ, not only in His eternally divine, but His eternally human and cosmical relations, which are beginning to be entertained, are not without significance in this skeptical era, when science seems to many to be outgrowing and sloughing off Christianity, as an antiquated faith too narrow for the age. The more these views prevail, the more will Christianity be recognized as the *absolute religion*, and not a temporary expedient introduced on account of sin; which not only brings redemption historically, but will remain in the perfection of all things;

* Ut supra, p. 323.

and Christ will be regarded as the centre of history and of the universe. The divine humanity of Christ not only explains, as nothing else can, His incarnation, but is that which alone enables us to understand our own humanity as made in the image of God.

Liebner mentions two respects in which it is necessary for Christology to take steps in advance. "*Firstly*, we ought to cease advancing the idea that the ground of the Incarnation was merely salvation from sin; and should look for a universal theanthropological basis; in other words, we should advance on to the knowledge that the Incarnation of God stands in an original, essential, and necessary relation to humanity, and therefore to creation as its perfection. *Secondly*, we should try to arrive at such a unity of the Divine-human Person as would render the sundering of the two factors an impossibility." How far the views put forth in this volume meet this demand, we leave the reader to determine.

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE KENÔSIS.

A LAST principle or truth, not hitherto recognized as its importance demands, but essential to a true Christology, is what is termed the *Kenôsis*, or *Self-limitation of the Son in the Incarnation*.

The general import and reason of this doctrine may be seen by considering the necessity of some change or limitation in the divine nature of the Logos, in order for Him to realize the conditions of humanity, or a true human development; in other words, to enable Him to become actually, as well as essentially, a *man*. It is necessary, also, in order to understand Christ's actual human experience as a man, His growth in wisdom and character, His avowed ignorance of some things, His human weakness, dependence, sufferings, etc. These are ordinarily explained by the dualistic theory of a human soul in addition to His divine nature, to which is attributed whatever is distinctively human, or inconsistent with absolute Deity; while His divine attributes are ascribed to the indwelling Logos, which was incapable of change or limitation.

The inconsistency of this theory, both with the unity of His person and the declarations of Scripture, has already been shown, and will be more manifest as we pro-

ceed. We shall show that this doctrine of the *Kenôsis*, rightly understood, is the simplest, most rational, most accordant both with fact and Scripture, and therefore the most satisfactory view; one, moreover, which is even necessarily involved in the idea and act of Incarnation itself. Let us first look at the statement and proofs of this doctrine as found in the Scripture, and afterward seek to form a philosophic conception of it that shall be consonant with reason and revelation.

The first and most explicit utterance is that from which the word and conception is derived, found in Phil. ii, 7. The whole passage is as follows: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being [originally existing] in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God [deemed it not something to be eagerly seized and clung to, as a robber to his prey—His equality with God], but *emptied* [ἐκένωσε] Himself, taking the form of a servant, and being made [or becoming] in the likeness of men."

The radical question in the interpretation of this passage is: Of what did Christ empty or divest Himself when He became incarnate? And the only right answer—furnished by the passage itself—is, Of that which He originally possessed, viz., *the form of God*, and *His equality with God*; in other words, all that distinguished Him as God, or Logos, from the humanity which He became.

The 'form of God' implies not merely the visible glory with which He was invested as the image of God, but the divine form of existence, the whole condition and attributes of Deity. The 'form of a servant' is not

only existence in a human form, but a condition of dependence and limitation. In laying aside the former for the latter, He divested Himself of His outward and inward condition as God—His divine supremacy, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.—and entered into the form and conditions and limitations of humanity. How this was accomplished is not here the question—all that is affirmed is the fact itself.

The same thing is affirmed, or implied, in other passages that speak of the Incarnation. “The Word [which was with God, and was God] *became* flesh”—not that He *assumed* humanity as an additional hypostasis. Compare with this passage another (Heb. ii, 14), which is often supposed to mean the same thing, but in reality has a different meaning: “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same.” The Scripture does not say, Forasmuch as the children are partakers of *humanity*—which would be a strange pleonasm—but of *flesh and blood*. Therefore Christ also partook of the same, that, being already essentially one with them—(since “He is not ashamed to call them brethren,” even before the incarnation)—He might be like them also in form and condition. “Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren.” How could He be like them in all things if He still retained His divine prerogatives in addition to His human nature?

Again, it is affirmed of Christ (2 Cor. viii, 9) “that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich.” To what do these contrasted estates of riches and poverty refer?

Not surely to outward possessions, but to something greater and more glorious, viz., His heavenly condition of divine power and glory, contrasted with His earthly condition of weakness and dependence.

“But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor.” (Heb. ii, 9.) How, we may ask, could He be made lower than the angels if He still retained His divine prerogatives in conscious possession?

To these we may add all those passages which imply human weakness, ignorance, temptation, dependence, and suffering—which are supposed to be inconsistent with a nature essentially divine, and are therefore relegated to His other or human nature. Under this head we may cite those which speak of—

(1.) *His human development.* “Though He were a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered.” (Heb. v, 8.)

“And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man.” (Luke ii, 52.) This might be called, as it sometimes is, the language of external description; but subsequent facts, and even His own utterances, prove that the development was real, and not a mere outward show. If the divine nature of Christ is to be exempted from growth and development, it is no less to be exempted from incarnation itself; so that the Logos did not Himself *become* man, as the Scripture declares, but simply *accompanied* the birth and development of the man Jesus. The theory that the Logos graduated His presence in the child Jesus according to His childish capacity—communicating Himself more and more to this person as His powers ripened—which is the

view of Dorner—is one that can only by a stretch of language be called an incarnation.*

* The identity of the Logos with the human personality of Jesus, which is the criterion of the Scriptural doctrine of the Incarnation (John i, 14), is expressly disallowed by Dorner in the following passage in answer to the question, "*How are we to conceive the personal unity of God and man?*" Or (since neither the humanity nor the deity of Christ may be conceived to be impersonal), how do divine and human personality agree in Christ?"

"Seeing that, as all allow, a man who is still undergoing development and growth can not form a personal unity with the Logos as absolutely self-conscious and actual, especially so long as the man has not even arrived at self-consciousness, . . . we have no alternative but to assume that in some way or other the Logos limited Himself for His being and activity *in this man*, so long as the same was still undergoing growth. The divine, therefore, . . . did not become man from the very commencement, and certainly did not form a constitutive factor of the initiatory result. The Logos put a limit on His self-communication till human susceptibility had attained more complete development; in such a manner, indeed, that every stage of Christ's existence was divine-human, and that there was never any thing human in Christ which was not appropriated by the Logos, and which had not appropriated the Logos, so far as the divine-human perfection at each stage required and allowed of it."

Concerning the mode of this divine self-limitation, two views are maintained. "The one maintains that this limitation of the Logos in Jesus is to be conceived as consisting in a reduction of His being to the point of adequacy to the embryonic life of a child of man, to the end that He might gradually arise out of the self-given form of unconsciousness, and in unity with man, or divine-humanly, again become conscious, again acquire His actuality in and outside of Himself. On the only *other* possible view we can merely speak of a limitation of the self-communication of the Logos to humanity, not of a lessening or reduction of the Logos himself. According to this view [which is that of Dorner], the being and actuality of the Logos remained unchanged; and even this man possessed the being and actuality of the Logos as his own property in virtue of the indissoluble union established from the beginning, merely so far as was compatible with the truth of human growth."

Such a view is doubtless the most rational on the theory of a *union*

On this theory it is difficult to see wherein Jesus differed essentially from other men, or why the Logos should play such an essential part in His personality, in addition to the Spirit of His Father with which He was filled.

(2.) *His temptation.* He "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." (Heb. iv, 15.) This He could not have been if He were not morally free, and capable of sinning, or if, in addition to His human nature and incorporated with it, He had divine resources such as we have not. The only alternative, therefore, is that He who was in the form of God really entered into the human condition, which makes temptation a reality, and not a mere show—that in all things He was made like unto His brethren.

(3.) *His dependence on the Father* for all divine or superhuman ability. This is repeatedly and explicitly declared. "I can of my own self do nothing." (John v, 30.) "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father who dwelleth in me, He doeth the works." (Ib. xiv, 10.) "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me." (See also ch. viii, 28; xii, 49.) Here is an explicit disclaimer of the divine wisdom and power which He manifested as proceeding from Himself. Did He impose on His hearers by meaning simply that in His *human* nature—i. e., in one department of His person, and that the inferior part—He

merely between the Logos and a human soul. But union with a man is not the same as *becoming* man. Dorner seeks to preserve the unity of the person by supposing each factor or consciousness to *include* the other in itself, as a determination of itself; resulting in a *divine-human* consciousness and volition. See Div. II, vol. iii, p. 249, 250.

did not say and do these things, while in His *divine* nature—which is the true ‘I,’ unless He is a mere man—He could and did perform them? If, moreover, it were the divine nature, the Logos, whence these works proceeded, why does He say, “the *Father* which dwelleth in me?” The only possible explanation consistent with truth and reason is that the being who thus spake—the incarnate Word—had renounced His distinctively divine attributes, and entered into the limitations and dependent condition of a true man.

(4.) In addition to these explicit utterances, consider those which speak of His ignorance of the day of judgment (Mark xiii, 32); His frequent prayers for help and deliverance, and His acknowledgment of being heard; His struggles and conflicts of soul (John xii, 27); His groans of sympathy at the grave of Lazarus, and of agony in the garden; His yearning for human sympathy in His great trial, and His conscious committal of His expiring spirit to the Father—in short, all that is distinctively and manifestly human in His life and experience. These, which unquestionably demonstrate the real humanity of Jesus, and which are generally considered as proofs of a distinctively human soul, only prove a divine soul incarnated in a human body, and realizing the very conditions of our actual humanity; while the divine love and patience, the sublime and steadfast obedience even unto death, which shine through and glorify these conditions, show that the person who thus acts and suffers, is in His real nature no mere man, or a man and God united, but through and through, from core to circumference of His being, divine.

It would be strange indeed, in view of these passages, if this doctrine of a limitation of the Logos in the Incarnation had not before been entertained, especially by those who conceive Christ as really *one* person, or as undergoing a true human development. It has, indeed, been held in some form from an early period, and special attention has been bestowed upon it by modern theologians as an important element in Christology.* But the difficulty has been to conceive of it in a way to harmonize with the commonly accepted theory of two spiritual natures in Christ; and, apart from this, to conceive the mode, or even the possibility, of a divine being humbling or reducing Himself to human measures and conditions. How, it will be said, was this reduction accomplished; and how far did this self-exinanition of the Logos extend? What, too, became of that which was temporarily renounced? Was it deposited in God? or did it cease to be? or did it continue to have a latent existence in the Logos? And what, meantime, of the essential and economic relations of the Trinity? Were they suspended during the earthly life of Jesus, to be resumed in a new form afterward?

This, it will be seen, is precisely the difficulty which has beset the doctrine of the Incarnation from the first, and has led to a denial of its reality, and the substitution of a mere *union* of God and a man. The objection is a purely speculative one, which has no validity in presence

* Among those who hold this doctrine may be specially mentioned Liebniz, Lange, Martensen, Thomasius, Hoffman, Delitzsch, Steinmeyer, Gess, and many others. An able treatise by the last-named author has been translated into English, with additions, by Reubelt, entitled "The Scriptural Doctrine of the Person of Christ."

of the actually accomplished fact. The same objection, in kind if not in degree, might be urged against many psychological facts which baffle our science to comprehend, but are not the less admitted and palpable facts.

Dismissing all such questions, let us look at what is really implied in the doctrine, and see if we can not form some conception of it that shall be consonant with both reason and Scripture.

A ground of possibility for it, we think, may be found in the divine nature itself. This nature is declared in the Scripture to be *love*. This is the essential being, or inmost attribute of God; and here lies the moving and determining principle of the Incarnation. Now it is the nature or instinct of love to identify itself with its object, and also to make sacrifices for it: the highest form and degree of love is to sacrifice one's self for another. To begin with the former—identification with the object of love. This is seen in human relations in the form of sympathy, where one puts himself in the place and condition of another, entering into and feeling all another's experience as his own. Where this feeling of sympathy takes the practical form of actually sharing the fortunes and sufferings of the beloved object—as a wife sharing the prison with her husband, or one friend taking the place of another condemned to die, as in the familiar story of Damon and Pythias—it is all the more real and expressive.

This identifying power of love is seen in another form in certain exhibitions of genius, or imaginative sympathy, of which love is the soul. Witness this power as exhibited in Shakespeare, to *become* for the time the characters he creates, or to pass over into them, as it

were, and to feel and speak and act through these ideal creations. Have we not here a faint shadow of that power by which God became man? Our thoughts are conceptive merely; God's thoughts are creative. So our sympathy enables us to enter into another's condition in thought and feeling, or at most to share his outward fortunes. God's sympathy, backed by omnipotence, enables Him really to enter into and identify Himself with humanity, or actually to become man in the Incarnation.

This identifying power of love is the solvent principle of the atonement, instead of the cold and balancing demands of justice exacting satisfaction for the broken law by a substitutionary suffering. The love of Christ for guilty and suffering humanity impelled Him to identify Himself as closely as possible with the race; to share not only their prison but their fate; not only their physical nature and condition, but, so far as was possible for such a being, even their guilt and its consequences. In this sense He bore our griefs and sicknesses and *sins* in His own immaculate body, consenting to die the death of a malefactor—the just for the unjust—that He might redeem us to God, not by the payment of a literal penalty, but by the constraining power of love. It was the satisfaction, first of all, of this love-principle which explains the vicarious sacrifice of Christ. But this included, as all true love does, the satisfaction also of justice and righteousness.

This identifying power of love is no less the solvent principle of the Incarnation, which is the identification of a divine being with humanity, not by a transformation of the divine nature *into* the human, thereby losing His

divinity; not by the transfer or addition of human qualities to His own—any more than human guilt was literally transferred to Him, or added to His innocence—but by His coming into the very conditions and limitations of humanity, through His participation of flesh and blood.

Again, it is the instinct of love to make some *sacrifice* for the beloved object. Hence religion, the essence of which is love, has always taken the form of sacrifice. Anciently it was the sacrifice of outward possessions, usually of living things, because of the sacredness attached to all life; while under the Christian economy religion is a personal sacrifice of the heart or self to God; and all with reference to the great divine sacrifice which God has made for us in the person of His Son.

It is common to regard the sacrifice of Christ as consisting chiefly in His death, or the offering up of His human life on the cross. But the doctrine in question points back to a still greater and diviner sacrifice than that: one which only God could make, and in which the whole Deity participates. It is not so wonderful a thing for God to accompany a man through his earthly life, and by a personal union with him to share, in a certain sense, his sufferings, while supporting him in them. But for God himself to *become* this man, by renouncing His deific consciousness and humbling Himself to the human, assuming not only the form but all the conditions and limitations of a servant, experiencing really and personally the weakness, temptations, sufferings, and death of a man, while He is essentially the Son of God and the Creator of the worlds—this is a sacrifice

and condescension which only God was equal to; this is a marvel and a mystery beyond the scope of logic to handle or of reason to understand, which divine and infinite *love* alone can interpret.

This view assists us to conceive of the divine self-abnegation, beside which all human self-denials shrink into insignificance. It is the moral significance and grandeur of this act rather than its doctrinal import which the apostle holds up in Phil. ii, 7, as *preceding* His humiliation and sufferings. "Let *this* mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God . . . emptied Himself, and took on Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." Then follows what is usually deemed His great sacrificial work, but which is only its visible outcome—the manifestation and issue in time of a still greater sacrifice in eternity: "And being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

It magnifies this divine sacrifice, while it deepens its mystery, to consider the Father's share in it: that He suffered not only in the sufferings of His Son, but endured a *privation* corresponding to that endured by the Son—viz., the loss of His equal companionship in glory and blessedness during His sojourn in the flesh; a truth whose awful shadow falls upon us in those pathetic words of Jesus in His last prayer: "And now, O Father, glorify Thou me with Thine own self, with *the glory which I had with Thee before the world was.*" This view also gives an infinite meaning to those other words, so often and so lightly repeated: "For God so loved the world, that He *gave* his only-begotten Son."

The sacrifice involved in this giving is little understood according to the common doctrine that Deity can not suffer, and that the Son retained His deific and heavenly relations while united to the man Jesus.

A still further ground for this doctrine of the *Kenôsis* may be found in the essential nature of the relation subsisting between the Father and the Son. According to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, the Son is eternally begotten, or derives His being eternally from the Father, while equal to Him in all divine attributes. Hence, as the whole life and being of the Son is derivative—having its eternal ground and support in the being of the Father—it is conceivable that the self-diremptive act by which the Son emptied Himself of His equality with God was only a partial withholding of that divine energy or self-communication on the part of the Father which is termed eternal generation. In other words, it is conceivable that there is in the Godhead the same power and capacity for the Logos to empty Himself, or reduce His divinity to the form and limitations of humanity, as there is for its eternal derivation and continuance in the form of God. This is not advanced as an adequate explanation, or as philosophically accounting for the fact in question—since the interior mode and process of the divine existence is beyond our soundings—but only as a possible supposition to meet certain theoretical and speculative difficulties.

Again, the relation of the Logos to humanity, or the essential humanity of the Son previous to the Incarnation, as already shown, furnishes a ground for the doctrine not to be overlooked, which of itself clears away most of the difficulties. The difference between Christ

in His divine and in His human form, or before and during His incarnation, is not a difference of nature or essence, but only of form and condition. First, of the inward—his consciousness—which from being deific and infinite, became human and limited in its form while divine in its quality; secondly, of the outward—"who, being in the form of God, took on Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men."

It may help us toward a solution of this mystery to consider, what is seldom understood, that the essential nature of Deity, or the essential part of this nature, does not lie where we are most apt to conceive it, in those attributes that are furthest from our reach and comprehension, but in those that are nearest to us and within us, viz., the moral or spiritual; not in His eternity and infinitude, His omnipresence, omnipotence, and the like, but in His *love*. Those are the physical conditions under which He exists and holds relations to the universe—the equipment, so to speak, of His nature and sovereignty. This is His inmost and essential being. God *possesses* omniscience and almightiness; He is clothed with majesty, but He *is* love. Hence the former may be laid aside, or temporarily relinquished without contradiction or detriment to His Deity. But God can not renounce, or empty Himself, of love. This, being eminently personal and not physical, is independent of form or condition, and can exist and reveal itself as perfectly in the form of a servant as in that of God; and even more divinely, because of the service and sacrifice which love craves.

The essential nature of Deity, therefore, was unchanged by the Incarnation. The real divinity of Christ, too, is

seen, not in His miracles, considered as exhibitions of physical power, but in the transcendent and marvelous love, the infinite compassion, the all-embracing sympathy that streams from His spiritual nature, and which no veil of flesh, or human limitations, could conceal or dim.

Having thus found a ground for the doctrine, or its possibility, in the divine nature, let us turn to consider the fact itself as actually presented in the Incarnation. The *Kenôsis* can be rightly understood only in connection with this physical fact—the incarnation or incorporation of a divine soul in a human body, and as necessarily involved in it. The main difficulty hitherto has arisen from attempting to conceive of it metaphysically, and to reason about it on *a priori* principles, when the problem is really a physical or psychological one. It is a significant and hopeful indication that the Incarnation is beginning to be studied in the light of physiology and psychology as well as of theology. Many facts and principles from this field reflect light upon, and help to interpret, this central fact of human history.

The Incarnation, it is important to consider, while it is the greatest miracle of time, is not a violation of law—since Christ came not to destroy or abrogate any divine laws, but to fulfill them—but a transcendence and penetration of natural with higher and spiritual laws. Hence, while His conception was supernatural—as it needs must have been for such a divine being—his birth was according to natural laws, as was also His growth and development. The Incarnation, in fact, consisted in a divine being coming under, and being subject to, all human laws and conditions—and becoming thus a

true and real *man*. What was supernatural in Him, as His character and miracles, are not to be summarily pronounced *superhuman*, or relegated to His divinity in distinction from His humanity, but admit at least of the question whether they do not belong to that ideal and perfect *humanity* which Christ came to realize, and which is yet to be realized by His human brethren. (See John xiv, 12.)

Let us look at a few well-known physiological and psychological laws in their bearing on the doctrine under discussion.

That the soul is dependent on the body, not for its existence, but for its manifestation, is a commonly admitted fact. That the form and mode of its consciousness is conditioned in a measure by the physical organism with which it is linked is also a fact about which there is little question, however men may differ concerning the mode and extent of this dependence. The body and brain constitute the organ, and in some sense the mould, through which, as human beings, we think and feel and act. As the power and extent of vision is dependent on the eye and the physical laws of light, and is measured by these conditions, and not by the innate faculty of seeing belonging to the mind — which for aught we know may be unlimited, or extend infinitely further when freed from the outer senses, that limit while they aid the perceptive power of the soul — so the whole knowing power of man, which, as pure reason is independent of sense, is yet conditioned in its forms and conceptions by the mould of the senses and the material world, which first awaken and stimulate its activity. This fact has led some philosophers to derive

all our knowledge from the senses ; which is much the same as if one should derive the world of nature from the window through which it is beheld, or the laws and revelations of astronomy from the telescope. Now as human knowledge and human vision is conditioned in its form by the senses, while it is essentially other and larger than sensation, so the consciousness of Christ was conditioned and limited by the flesh in which He was incarnated, so that it became an actual *human* consciousness, while essentially He was God. That infinite fullness of Deity and deific consciousness which He received from the Father without limit and without a veil, while He was with God and was God, He now received only in a human and finite measure, according to the laws and limitations of the humanity under which He had come.

The difference between Christ before His incarnation and Christ in the flesh is only that limitation of His consciousness and powers which is necessarily implied in His becoming man, or descending to the human and subject state. To retain His full deific consciousness while appearing as a man would not be an incarnation, but only a theophany. To become really incarnate, He must *be* a man, and not simply unite Himself to one, or to a human soul. He must be first a child, with a child's thoughts and a child's ignorance ; must grow in wisdom, as in stature, and in His ripest manhood must have the thoughts and feelings of a man, however divine in their quality, even as those thoughts and feelings must be expressed in human language. To deny the possibility of this because He is a divine being is simply to deny that God can become incarnate, and not less to deny the

plain words of Scripture: "It behooved Him *in all things* to be made like unto His brethren."

If still it be asked, how this is possible—how can the infinite God become an unconscious infant, and grow up to a perfect man?—we might answer that with God all things are possible. But we are not shut up exclusively to faith. The laws which God has ordained are the only rational explanation of His works; and who shall say that it is impossible for Him to obey, or become subject to His physical, as we know He is obedient to His moral laws? What, in fact, is the import of the Incarnation, but to reveal God, not as Sovereign and Lawgiver, but as Son and obeyer of law, in the human or subject state?

The difference between Newton the philosopher and Newton the infant, while each is identically the same being, is a mystery which may help us to conceive, though not to comprehend, the reverse and greater mystery of the Incarnation.

That a soul which has had a history in one world or state should be born into another, and pass through all the stages of a human life, without its previous life and history interfering with the latter, is certainly a conceivable thing, since many have believed, and many do still believe, in the pre-existence of every human soul. Moreover, many well-attested psychological facts demonstrate, what is not less remarkable, that one period of human life and consciousness may be as completely shut off from another as though the former period were passed in another world, and the intervening barrier were a birth into this. To mention only two or three instances from the many that might be cited:

In a recent number of an English periodical is related the case of "the man with two memories," the substance of which is as follows: "George Wilson, a German, of New Orleans, who, after being all but killed by a fall from a platform, and for many weeks entirely deprived of the use of every sense as well as of consciousness, has recovered his health completely, and his powers of mind—his memory excepted, which at present dates entirely from the beginning of his recovery, and is a complete blank as to all and every one—persons, words, things—his knowledge of which had been acquired before the fall."

The following remarkable instance of loss of memory and its sudden resuscitation, is given in a volume by Dr. Winslow on diseases of the brain:

"Reverend J. E., a clergyman of rare talent and energy, of sound education, while riding through his mountainous parish, was thrown violently from his carriage, and received a violent concussion of the brain. For several days he remained utterly unconscious; and at length, when restored, his intellect was observed to be in a state like that of a naturally intelligent child, or like that of Casper Hauser after his long sequestration. He now in middle life recommenced his English and classical studies under tutors, and was progressing very satisfactorily; when, after several months' successful study, the rich store-houses of his memory were gradually unlocked, so that in a few weeks his mind resumed all its wonted vigor and its former wealth and polish of culture. . . . The first evidence of the restoration of this gentleman's memory was experienced while attempting the mastery of an abstruse author, an intellectual effort well adapted

to test the penetrability of that veil that so long had excluded from the mind the light and riches of its former hard-earned possessions."

The remarkable experience of Rev. Mr. Tennant, of New Jersey, which occurred half a century ago, and has been often published, may be familiar to some readers :

After having, to all appearance, died, and while preparations were being made for his burial, he gave signs of life, and was gradually restored to consciousness. So far had the separation of soul and body progressed, that he seemed, like Paul, to have been caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, and seen indescribable visions—which 'trance,' as it was called, became an intermediate and impenetrable barrier between his former and his later consciousness. All memory of his past life and learning was obliterated, and he began to learn anew the simplest rudiments of knowledge—which gradually returned to him as by intuition ; almost verifying Plato's theory that all earthly knowledge is reminiscence—the soul remembering what it has learned in a pre-existent state.

These psychological facts are significant, as showing the close connection and interdependence of the soul and body, and how a slight disturbance of this mysterious union may modify, and even obliterate, whole realms of consciousness, and reduce a mature and well-furnished mind back to the ignorance and simplicity of infancy. Who, then, shall say that it is impossible for an infinite mind, having not only infinite power, but infinite love to prompt and execute such an act of condescension, to come under these laws of His own ordaining, and become a little child, and learn human obedience,

and undergo all human experiences—sin excepted—for the sake of human redemption? And the questions which an idle speculation may ask, as to what becomes of the lost consciousness, or the attributes temporarily renounced, are as pertinent, or impertinent, in the one case as in the other.

It only remains to show the consonance of this view with the teachings of Scripture, and how it meets, as no other does, all the conditions of the problem; and finally to answer some objections to the doctrine.

Notice, first, the prominence given in the Scriptures to the *flesh*, or human body, as being the chief thing in the Incarnation; and the total absence of any mention of, or reference to, a human soul in distinction from the divine personality.

We are not disposed to press the meaning of this word 'flesh' beyond its legitimate meaning, or to deny that it is often used in a generic sense for *man*; but none can deny that it is a bodily term, and always carries with it in Scripture a bodily, and not a spiritual significance. The distinction which St. Paul draws between the flesh and the spirit shows that it can not be applied to the higher nature of man.

Notice carefully, then, the following expressions: "The Word was made *flesh* and dwelt among us" (John i, 14). "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the *flesh* is of God" (1 John iv, 2). "Concerning His Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who was made of the seed of David according to the *flesh*, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. i, 3, 4). The spirit here, according to Olshausen, and the obvi-

ous meaning of the passage, denotes His divine or spiritual nature, and not the third person of the Trinity. He was the seed of David as to His bodily, not as to His higher or spiritual nature. Similar is the import of Rom. ix, 5, and 1 Peter iii, 18. "Forasmuch as the children are partakers of *flesh and blood*, He also Himself likewise took part of the same" (Heb. ii, 14).

The emphatic bearing of this last passage on the doctrine in question has already been considered. Compare also the remarkable passage (Heb. x, 5): "Wherefore, when He cometh into the world, He saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a *body* hast thou prepared me."

The idea and meaning of the word 'incarnation' is the *embodiment* and manifestation of a divine spirit in human flesh, not its union to a human soul.

Notice, secondly, in connection with this absence of any mention of a human soul in Christ distinct from the divine, *the total absence, likewise, of any mention of the Logos as distinct from His humanity*. This is the more remarkable, as so much is made in our ordinary Christology of the union of the Logos with the humanity of Christ, as constituting the divine in distinction from the human. When we look for a confirmation of this in the Scriptures, we can nowhere find it. The Logos, when once made flesh, disappears in the man Christ Jesus, and henceforth appears and acts as a man. The inference is therefore unavoidable that the divinity and humanity are identical, and constitute the *divine-human*, the true and single personality of Christ; in other words, that the Divine Word *is* the man Jesus, and what is called the human soul of Christ *was* the pre-

existing Logos. The passages confirmatory of this view are too numerous to cite, and many of them have been already cited. We add only the following, to which we invite special attention :

“When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth His *Son*, made of a woman, made under the law” (Gal. iv, 4). Here the being who is ‘made of a woman’ is declared to be the pre-existent Son of God—which exactly corresponds to the word of the angel at His conception—“Therefore *that holy thing* which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” “Who, being the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person, . . . when he had *by Himself* purged our sins,” etc. (Heb. i, 3). To which may be added Christ’s own words : “Ye are from beneath ; I am from above.” “What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before.” “Say ye of Him, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest ; because I said, I am the Son of God ?” (John viii, 23 ; vi, 62 ; x, 36). These two titles of Christ, Son of God and Son of Man, are used indiscriminately by Himself, as a careful collation will show. They refer not to His two natures, as divine and human, but to His two relations or aspects. The generic significance of the name Son of Man is treated of elsewhere in this volume.

“I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world ; again I leave the world, and go to the Father” (John xvi, 28). Can we understand this ‘I’ as meaning or including any thing different in the latter clause from what it does in the former ? Or did Christ return to the Father a different personality, or with a different nature, from that which He brought into the world ?

“The first man is of the earth, earthy; *the second man is the Lord from heaven*” (1 Cor. xv, 47).

These passages show, what will be more evident the more it is considered, that the Scriptures give no countenance whatever to any distinction between the divine and human soul of Christ, or that the spiritual nature of Jesus was constituted by the union of the Logos with a human soul. *The only union recognized is that between the Father and the Son.*

Here is where the common view fails utterly to harmonize with the Scriptures. It represents the divine power and wisdom of Christ as the action or inspiration of the Logos who is united to His person; whereas the Scripture, and Christ himself, says nothing of this, but uniformly ascribes it to the *Father* who dwelleth in Him. Christ, according to the common view, is a wholly *abnormal* being, differing from other men not only by His divine essence and pre-existence, but by a special union with His person of a Divine hypostasis—a union which is not a spiritual indwelling, leaving the personal Ego clear and single, but one which confuses the personality, and almost the identity of Christ, now superseding the human by divine omnipotence, and now leaving it to its own weakness, while the humanity looks for divine support, not to the Divinity within, but to the Father above Him. According to the view here presented, Christ's humanity, though divine in its essence, is conditioned like ours, and subject to the same human and divine laws, being made such by the Incarnation itself. God dwells in Him, as in other men, by a spiritual union, differing only in degree and perfectness—a union that preserves His personality distinct, while it enables Him

to say, as no other man was ever able to say with like truth and meaning, "*I and my Father are one.*"

Concerning the relation between the Father and the Son, during the incarnate life of Jesus, which is here brought into view, a few words may be pertinent.

What this relation was previous to the Incarnation is indicated in various passages of Scripture; as, e. g., "The Word was *with* God, and the Word was God: the same was in the beginning with God;" "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father;" "The glory which I had with Thee before the world was." All of these expressions indicate a oneness of essence, with a distinction of personality, existing in the closest and most endearing union. The names Father and Son, which unquestionably appertain to this original relation, indicate the same thing. That this relation continued essentially after and during the Incarnation, but modified by the *Kenôsis*, or human limitation, is also evident. The expressions "I came *forth* from the Father," "The Father *sent* the Son," etc., seem to indicate a separation, not, indeed, in space, but in the degree of nearness and fullness which before characterized this relation. "The glory which I *had* with Thee" implies a diminution of glory, i. e., of divine endowment, in His earthly state of humiliation. His dependence on the Father, maintained by prayer and faith, His ignorance, weakness, temptation, and other human experiences—all indicate not only a limitation of His deific attributes and consciousness, but that the divine indwelling of the Father in the Son, which before was perfect and without limit, was now bestowed in a human measure, or according to His human capacity to receive it.

This may be thought inconsistent with the declaration, in John iii, 34, "He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God, *for God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto Him;*" also with Col. ii, 9, "*For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.*" This last passage undoubtedly refers to Christ's exalted and glorified state; and therefore there is no inconsistency. From the former, too, the inconsistency will disappear if we understand it simply as a denial of all limitation or partiality in the bestowment of the Spirit. In this respect Christ differs from other men, since their inspiration is partial and not perfect: given in specific measures for specific purposes, as we see in the case of the apostles and early Christians. (See 1 Cor. xii, 4-11.) But to Christ the Spirit was not thus dispensed; but every word and act was absolutely inspired and divine. The word of wisdom was not with Him a *charisma*, or special spiritual gift, since He was Himself the Truth. And yet He declares, "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works." The Spirit, then, dwelt in Him as inspiration, but more fully and perfectly than in other men, the difference being one of degree rather than of kind.*

* If any ask why Christ disclaims or never asserts His own deity, since He was divine, and as such might have wrought miracles in His own name or by His own power, the answer reveals the truth and reality of the Incarnation. His deity, as the Word made flesh, was not absolute, but limited; and He was as truly dependent on the Father for all supernatural power as any other man. The essential divinity of His nature was sufficiently declared by His claim to be the Son of God, and was so understood by His foes. Furthermore, it was not becoming in Him who renounced His claim to equality with God in order to become man to reassert it as man. More befitting, as it is more sublime, is that dignified

If we seek to discover the *limit* of Christ's consciousness, or of His participation in the fullness of the God-head, we certainly shall not find it. That boundary-line between His human and divine consciousness, which some have fancied, nowhere exists; but His whole soul, being itself divine, was open to the influx of Deity, as a gulf or estuary is to the ocean of which it is a part. And just what tidal waves flowed in from the infinite deep is as impossible to know as it is needless to ask. The 'abysmal deeps of personality' are beyond our soundings even in a merely human soul; how much more in Him, the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, and who shared the secrets of that bosom as no mortal ever did. Hence those wondrous intuitions of God and divine things which visited the soul of Jesus are deeper and grander than ever before were uttered, insomuch that 'never man spake like this man.' Yet they took the form of human conceptions, and were uttered in human language—showing that the consciousness of Christ, though divine in essence, was human in its form and conditions.

Without supposing a full deific consciousness incompatible with His human limitations, there were not wanting recollections of His pre-existent state, which seem to have grown clearer and fuller toward the end of His life. Of Him the words of the poet are true in a higher sense than of ordinary childhood:

modesty and humility which refused to bear witness of Himself, seeking ever not His own glory, but that of the Father who had sent Him, even at the risk of being taken only for what he seemed; and leaving it to God and time to vindicate His real nature as the God-man.

“Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory did [He] come
From God who was [His] home.”

Not only the relation between Christ and the Father, but that between Christ and believers, is greatly simplified by the view here presented. This relation may be viewed as twofold: First, *objectively*, as example; Christ in His human life being the *ideal man*, who is what we were made to be, and has done what we have failed to do; whom we are to set before us as the one perfect object of faith and following. Second, *subjectively*, as an indwelling Saviour. This relation is declared to be a perfect spiritual union or indwelling, like that between the Father and the Son. Both unions are rendered more simple and intelligible without the intervention and complication of a human soul. The perfection of humanity is realized not by union to another human soul, but by union of the human soul to God; and this union is accomplished by God becoming man, or descending to the human state, and so supplying a type and medium for the divine indwelling. Thus the threefold or triple-linked chain of union between God and man is accomplished through Christ the Mediator: *God in Christ*, and *Christ in humanity*, according to the prayer of the Saviour, “that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us.”

Our conception of the humanification, or human limitations, of the Son will not be complete without taking into view also His *glorification*, or reinvestiture with His original divine power and glory. This is held up in the

Scriptures as the reward and end of His humiliation, and the crown and completion of the redemptive work. It is also represented as the act of the Father (John xvii, 5; Eph. i, 20-22). When this glorification commenced, and whether it were a gradual process, or accomplished in a single act, it is not very important to inquire. It is clear, however, from the Scriptures that it dates essentially from the resurrection. What took place in the interval between His death and resurrection, when He descended into Hades, or the lower parts of the earth, according to St. Paul, and "preached to the spirits in prison," according to St. Peter,* belongs to that department of His redemptive work which is most veiled from human knowledge, but which is obscurely revealed in these passages, and which we have no right to ignore or misinterpret because of any fancied doctrinal objections to their natural and obvious meaning. The extension *downward* of that grace of God which bringeth salvation, below the world of living men, to those who died without any knowledge of a Saviour, and the manifestation of this grace in the person of the descending Son of Man—who tasted death for *every* man, for those who lived before as well as after His advent—this overflow of the grace of God is surely in keeping with the character and mission of Him who came to "preach deliverance to the captives, and the opening of the prison doors to them that are bound," and who went nowhere with-

* Eph. iv, 9: "Now that He ascended, what is it but that He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" 1 Peter iii, 18, 19: "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by [in] the spirit; by [in] which also He went and preached unto the spirits in prison." See also 1 Peter iv, 6; Phil. ii, 10.

out dispensing life and health and forgiveness in His path. It is the perfection of the humiliation of Christ that He touched the lowest point of our mortal history ; living not only a human life, and dying a human death, but descending also to the place of departed spirits, to share its bodiless and shadowy experiences. And if He went thither at all, how could He go otherwise than as a Redeemer?*

Having thus descended into the lower parts of the earth, and there "spoiled principalities and powers, triumphing over them" as the Lord of life, He ascended through the opened tomb to the living air and light, and thence to the celestial light and glory, "far above all heavens, that He might fill all things."

It has been a question long in dispute whether the body with which Christ rose were His natural or His spiritual body. On the one hand, its apparent identity with the body that was crucified, as shown by the visible print of the nails, and its substantial and tangible properties, as evinced by the Saviour's words to His disciples—"Handle me and see ; a spirit hath not flesh and bones

* "By His descent into Hades, Christ revealed Himself as the Redeemer of all souls. The descent into the realms of the dead gave expression to the truth that the distinctions of Here and There—the limits of place—are of no significance regarding Christ, and do not concern His kingdom ; and on this ground it is that we include this article in the doctrine of Christ's exaltation. No powers of nature, no limits of space or of time, can hinder Christ from finding His way to souls. His kingdom has extended even into the region of the dead, and still includes that region ; and the distinctions of living and dead, of earlier and later generations of men, of times of ignorance and times of knowledge, possess but a transient significance. All fatalism regarding different individuals and races of men is thus obviated and destroyed."—Martensen.

as ye see me have"—together with the fact of His eating before them and with them, seem to indicate that it was a material body of flesh and blood. On the other hand, there is a certain strangeness and mystery about His bodily manifestations which prevent His disciples from at once recognizing Him. He appears 'in another form' to different beholders. His body, moreover, is endowed with new and wonderful properties, which enable Him to pass through closed doors without obstruction, to appear and disappear with no apparent trace of whence or whither—showing that it was not subject to ordinary physical laws. During the forty days between His resurrection and ascension He does not tarry with His disciples as formerly, and has no certain dwelling-place, but 'shows Himself' on different occasions, and then mysteriously disappears—a fact which is unaccountable on the theory that His physical conditions are unchanged.

Some have resorted to the supposition that His body during this time was gradually undergoing a spiritualizing process, which was completed, and the Son of Man fully glorified, at His ascension. But there is no evidence of this, or that His body had any different properties at the close from what it possessed at the beginning of this period. It is more rational to suppose that He rose in His spiritual or celestial body—though its glory was veiled from mortal eyes—and, at the same time, to revise our notions of spiritual substance or corporeity, as not something ethereal and phantasmal, but more solid and substantial than what we call material substance. That celestial bodies are tangible, as well as visible, and have a mighty force of resistance which

nothing material can withstand, is evident from the wrestling of the angel with Jacob, and the deliverance of Peter from prison by the hand of an angel, not to mention other examples. In regard to the resemblance or identity between the natural and the spiritual body, we may say, in the words of Raphael to Adam :

“What if earth

Be but the shadow of heaven, and things therein

Each to other like, more than on earth is thought?”

That some wonderful change has passed upon the person of Christ since His former life and intercourse with men is *felt* by every reader of the Gospels as well as by His nearest disciples. A more exalted tone and bearing breathes from His presence, as of one more largely and fully conscious of His Divinity, and of the higher relations He was henceforth to sustain to mankind and the world, inspiring more of awe and reverence toward Him on the part of His disciples, while there is not less of love and condescending grace toward them. This consciousness betrays itself in the utterance: “All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth”—which implies that previously He did not consciously possess omnipotence; and in the command which follows: “Go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”—revealing the fact that the Son of Man is already glorified, and has resumed what He relinquished, His equality with God.

If now the question be asked, Wherein does Christ's glorification consist? or, How does Christ in His present exalted state differ from Christ when He dwelt in the flesh? the answer is twofold: *first*, in the removal of

those human limitations which were incident to the incarnation, and the resumption of His deific attributes and original glory; *secondly*, in the accession of what His human life and experience may have added to His divine consciousness, together with the human body which He assumed, now glorified and made immortal.

That Christ's present exalted state is not the mere resumption or repetition of His former glory, but has in it new elements or increments of blessedness resulting from His incarnation, is evident both from the nature of the case and the testimony of Scripture. We read in many passages of Christ's exaltation as being the *reward* of His humiliation and suffering, as something which He has earned or won for Himself by His obedience—"Who for the joy that was set before Him—[not the recovery of a past, but the attainment of a new and higher joy]—endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God" (Heb. xii, 2). "Wherefore—[because of His obedience and death]—God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name" (Phil. ii, 9). This 'name' is not the mere title of Divinity, but all which the name of Jesus has come to signify—that ever-accumulating moral glory which has gathered about this name, like a galaxy, from His human life and character, and which only a history such as His could give. That this is not a natural or an inherited, but an *acquired* glory, appears from another remarkable word of Christ himself: "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, *even as I also overcame*, and am set down with my Father in His throne" (Rev. iii, 21). It is as if in emptying Himself of His divine dignity

the Son had renounced His rightful inheritance, in order to earn it for Himself by entering the lists with men, and struggling up through temptation, suffering, and a sinless obedience, to win again, as a man and conqueror, that crown which He had laid aside as God; thereby teaching the great truth that the throne of God is no arbitrary despotism, but is established in righteousness; and that the righteousness of God is no necessitated virtue, exempt from trial and suffering, but one which can endure, and has endured, temptation and self-denial and sacrifice, and been proved by *obedience* even unto death, and so is one in essence and quality with that virtue which God requires of man.

It is obvious how this translation of the divine holiness into human virtue, through the incarnation, and its development under the same conditions of trial and temptation to which we are subject, identifies Christ morally with His human brethren, and adds a new element to the joy of His present state—the joy, namely, of *overcoming* both for Himself and His followers. It gives a new and deeper meaning to that word of the Saviour—"That they may have *my joy* fulfilled in themselves."

This human experience of Christ, taken up into His glorified state, gives a new meaning also to the divine *sympathy*, which is now not an ideal and distant, but an *experimental* knowledge of all human trials and infirmities. As the remembrance of his own childhood—especially if it be not a memory merely, but a sacred treasure hid in the heart—enables a father to enter with a deeper sympathy into the pleasures and griefs of his children, so the treasured experiences of His earthly

life enable the exalted Son of Man to sympathize with all human joys and sorrows to an extent which as God, even, He could not do.

The exaltation of Christ in His human and glorified *body* is a fact of great significance here. It signifies not only the eternal perpetuation of that human form which He wore on earth, and through which He will continue to manifest Himself forever, implying thus the capacity of this form for the indwelling and expression of 'all the fullness of the Godhead bodily;' not only the resemblance outwardly between Christ and His saints, whose bodies are to be made like unto His glorious body at the resurrection; but it also signifies that the *humanity* of Christ is to continue in all its essential attributes. This humanity, we have seen, existed essentially before the incarnation in the Eternal Son who was the image of the invisible God and the divine prototype of man. But it existed *ideally*, though not less really. In the Incarnation the ideal becomes the actual; the original Divine Image is merged in the human and finite image; or, as it is expressed in Scripture, He who was in the form of God takes upon Him the form of a servant, and is made in the likeness of men. Now it is this actual and historical humanity which Christ became, and not that ideal humanity which He was eternally, that is perpetuated in a glorified form in heaven. The veritable body which He wore on earth, transfigured and glorified, is that which He now wears, and will wear forever.* And this is a symbol and to-

* The question is here pertinent, whether the glorified body of Christ is *ubiquitous*, as Luther contended; and, if not, how it can be true that

ken of those human yet divine attributes which were manifested through it, and which still exist in all their essential reality.

As the print of the nails is still visible in that marred but glorious body—a token to all beholders of ‘the Lamb that was slain’—so the print of those human experiences of which the cross was the culmination may be seen in the countenance, and felt in the loving sympathy of Him who, though dwelling in the midst of the throne, shall yet feed His disciples as of old, and shall “wipe away all tears from their eyes.”

Concerning the employment of Christ in heaven, and His future relations to the redeemed, undue importance has, perhaps, been attached to a single aspect of His work, the *priestly*, based on one or two passages of Scripture; and not sufficient import given to His kingly and cosmical relations, as “Head over all things to

He *fills all things*, according to Eph. iv, 10; and is omnipresent, according to Matt. xxviii, 20.

We can at least form no conception of body that does not occupy space, i. e., which is not *local*. The presence of Christ, therefore, in heaven is a local and visible presence; but it is not necessarily limited to the circumference of His human form. The human spirit is not always limited locally to the body in which it dwells. Many facts seem to show that there is a capacity in man, even in this life, of being unlinked, in a measure, from his fleshly fetters, and of extending his presence and consciousness beyond his body, of which Paul’s experience, when ‘caught up into Paradise,’ is a striking example.

The human limitations to which Christ was subject by His becoming flesh do not apply to Him in His glorified body, since it is not corporeity, but *flesh*, that limits spiritual capacity. Christ may be spiritually omnipresent, as well as omniscient, in His heavenly body, while His presence is *manifested* only through His outward form.

the Church, which is His body, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all."

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews carries out the analogy between the earthly and the heavenly priesthood, by comparing the entrance of the high-priest into the holy of holies to the withdrawal of Christ 'within the veil,' or His ascension to heaven, "where He ever liveth to make intercession for us." Whence it is inferred that this is the Saviour's actual and constant employment—this single image filling the mind, to the exclusion of other conceptions. But it is not necessary to suppose that the glorified Redeemer is thus occupied in heaven, or that He needs actually to intercede for His human brethren. For He says to His disciples, "I say not that I will pray the Father for you, for the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me." But His very presence there in the body that was crucified, with all that it signifies of love and suffering, is itself a perpetual intercession, as the presence of a soldier hero, returning scarred and glorious from the battle-field, is an irresistible plea for the country he has saved.

The truest as well as sublimest conception we can form of the exalted Saviour is that furnished by St. John in the Apocalypse—"the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne," i. e., Love and Gentleness—love that has suffered, and gentleness that is patience—elevated to supreme dominion, and governing all things in the interest of redemption and of righteousness.

This dominion over all things includes a *physical* as well as spiritual regency. The government of all worlds, as well as all souls, is upon His shoulder. His creative

and all-sustaining activity as Logos does not cease with His coronation as Redeemer, but is exercised in the grand and progressive work of the *new creation*, or the physical redemption of the universe, which is spoken of as the 'restitution of all things,' and which the Saviour may have had in view when He said to His disciples, "I go to prepare a place for you."^{*} Again, as regards the reign of Christ with His saints, this royalty to which He is exalted does not mean exclusiveness, as with earthly monarchs, or preclude the most free and loving intercourse, as is clear, not only from His character and teachings when on earth, but from another sure word of prophecy; for it is written, "He that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them. And they shall see His face, and His name shall be in their foreheads." Nor is the thought forbidden that He who is the Truth, the revealing Word of God, will hereafter resume those unfinished conversations with His disciples, that divine table-talk which was interrupted by His death, and speak of those 'many things' which then they could not bear, but which may be safely spoken and better understood in the light of eternity, and at the marriage-supper of the Lamb.[†]

* Compare also what is said of the deliverance of the creation from 'the bondage of corruption,' which it now shares with man, into 'the glorious liberty of the children of God' (Rom. viii, 19-21); implying a future transfiguration or glorification of the physical universe corresponding to the glorified bodies of the saints.

† The *subjection* of the Son to the Father, at the close of the mediatorial reign (1 Cor. xv, 28), is referred by Canon Liddon to our Lord's humanity in distinction from His divinity, 'since,' he says, 'it *can* only apply to a created nature.' But not to speak of the impossibility of such a distinction and separation of the 'natures,' the passage obviously teaches

Thus much concerning the *Kenosis* and the *Plerosis*, or what is commonly termed the humiliation and the exaltation of the Son of God. Let us now consider some of the more obvious objections which may be made to the whole view here presented.

The first and most radical objection which will present itself to many minds is that it allows no distinctively human soul to Christ, and therefore is a denial of His real humanity.

This question of a human soul has been recurring repeatedly in the course of our investigation, and may as well here be disposed of once for all.

The demand for a human soul, with those who blindly follow the creeds, obviously rests on the formula that Christ became man by 'taking a true body and a reasonable soul.' With those who look below human creeds to the reason and truth of them, it rests on the supposition that a human soul is necessary to constitute Christ a true and real man. But, granting this, it is not necessary, what is also assumed, that this human soul shall be derived from the race. If this were necessary to constitute humanity, then Adam was not a true man, for he did not derive his humanity from the race, but immediately from God, insomuch that he is called in the Scripture genealogy 'the son of God.' In this respect he is more truly a type of the second Adam, the Eternal Son

that the original subordination of the Son—which is implied in the very name 'Son,' and which has been temporarily superseded by His exaltation to the mediatorial throne, and investiture with universal dominion—that this relation will be finally resumed, when all things shall have been subdued unto Him, and Christ and His saints will reign indeed, but subordnately, 'that God may be all in all.'

of God, than any of his descendants could be. It is this radically false assumption that the humanity of Christ must have a human origin, that it must be derivative, and not original, earthly and not heavenly, temporal and not eternal—it is this assumption which has confused and falsified the whole conception of Christ's Person, and brought it down from the grandly simple doctrine of Scripture to the artificial and traditional dogma taught by theology.

It might be supposed that a dogma so long and so persistently held must have some warrant for it in Scripture; but no passage can any where be cited that either teaches or implies it, while many, as we have seen, distinctly imply the contrary.

Again, there is no evidence whatever in Christ's life and experience of a human soul distinct from the divine. All seeming evidence of this, such as His human development, His ignorance, weakness, dependence, and other distinctively human traits, are better explained on the theory of a Divine soul subjected to human limitations; while all the testimony of Christ concerning Himself and His divine origin contradicts this assumption.

Furthermore, there is no practical need or real use in holding to such a dogma. If it be said that a human soul is necessary to make Him more truly human, we reply, *This would make Him human in a sense in which He is not, and which He uniformly disclaims*; the Son of *men*, and not the Son of *Man*; would make Him to be from below, when He is really and only from above; the Son of David according to the spirit, when He is only such according to the flesh; would, in

fact, remove Him further from us, instead of bringing Him nearer; since, by the supposition, there is conjoined with His human soul a divine hypostasis, which we have not, and can not have.

The positive reasons which lie against this dogma are many and weighty; but the all-conclusive reason is that *it conflicts with the unity and singleness of Christ's person*, and so with the integrity of that image impressed by the Gospels on the Christian consciousness. The historical review given in the preceding pages shows conclusively that there is no conception of a *union* of two spiritual factors possible which shall avoid this duality, and preserve this image in its purity, whether the human soul be allowed a distinct activity or not. The moment a human soul is posited, as the principle of His humanity, however close the union of the divine and human becomes, a dualism is inevitable. A *man*, Jesus, is conceived, to whom God, or the Logos, united Himself; whether at the beginning or afterward, and whether all at once or gradually, as the human soul grew in capacity, makes little difference, so far as the unity of person is concerned.

The human Ego, though lost, theoretically, in the divine personality, reappears in conception, so that Christ is after all a *man*, endowed with divine powers, and not the *God-man*. It is a union of God with a man, and not a real Incarnation. Indeed this, and nothing else, is the avowed teaching of the Reformed churches, as set forth in the Westminster Confession: "So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in

one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion."

The view presented in this volume of the *identity of the divine and human*, we submit, is the only one which preserves the integrity of Christ's person inviolate, and renders the sundering of the two aspects an impossibility. As the coat of Jesus was without seam, woven from the top throughout, so His person is without seam or composition, being from His generation in eternity to His birth in Bethlehem, and from His descent into the lower parts of the earth to His exaltation at the right hand of God, of one divine and heavenly substance. The outer raiment of flesh, which veiled His substance, was indeed human flesh, derived from His human mother, and making Him bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh; but in His true and inner personality He was the Lord from heaven, at once divine and human, Son of God and Son of Man.

The one essential requisite in regard to this doctrine is that Christ's humanity be a true and real humanity, irrespective of its origin; that His soul be human in its development, experiences, and manifestations, its thoughts, feelings, and sympathies; not that it be humanly derived. The essential humanity of Christ before His Incarnation furnishes, as we have seen, a ground for that actual and complete humanity which was realized by His participation of flesh and blood.

It may be a help in the reception of this view to distinguish, as the Scriptures do, and as a true psychology requires, between the *πνεῦμα*, or spiritual principle in man, and the *ψυχή*, or fleshly soul, the animating principle of the body, including the natural desires and

appetites, as distinguished from the will or personality. The oversight of this distinction has been the source of great confusion, not only as regards the conception of Christ's person, but of humanity itself. So long as no radical and essential distinction is recognized between nature and spirit, as included in man; between the principle that allies us to the animal creation, which is of the earth, earthy, and the principle which allies us to God, and is immediately derived from Him, we can not expect a true and Scriptural doctrine either of Christ or humanity.

That Christ was possessed of a psychical principle in connection with the body or flesh He assumed, and that this was derived from the race into which He was born, is too evident to be denied. That it was the seat, in Him, of natural desire, and so of temptation, though not of sin, is also evident. And this principle may not improperly be called a human soul, provided we do not confound it with that higher and rational principle, the *πνεῦμα*, or 'spirit, which alone constituted His personality, as it does the personality of other men.

In the person of Christ, this rational soul, or *πνεῦμα*, was the Divine Logos, from which all human souls are derived, and in whose image they are created. That Christ possessed two rational souls, the divine original and the human copy—i. e., a divine and a human personality—is what the orthodox creeds really teach, but which is both needless for faith and incredible to reason.

The doctrine of *diothelitism*, or the existence of two wills in Christ, which prevailed in the seventh century, and which was based upon the conflict seen in Him between the human desire and the divine will, and ex-

pressed in the words "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt"—this doctrine, and the controversy which grew out of it, could never have arisen but for the confounding of these two principles, the natural *desire*, which is irrational, and belongs to the lower nature, and the *will*, which is spiritual, and in Christ was divine, and of course one with the will of God. This conflict of the flesh with the spirit was a genuinely human experience, like that which takes place in all good men; only in Christ the will or spirit was uniformly and victoriously steadfast in its adhesion to duty, or the will of God.

It has long been an unsolved question whether the soul, including the rational and spiritual principle, is propagated with the body, or is a new created substance in every man. Tertullian was, in the ancient Church, the most decided and bold advocate of traducianism. "We admit," he says, "that there are two kinds of seed—a seed of the body and a seed of the soul; yet we contend that they are simultaneous." With him the greater part of the Western Church agreed, while the majority of the Eastern Church favored creationism. Augustine, who might be supposed to be the most decided traducianist, struggled all his life with this question, though he inclined more and more toward creationism, notwithstanding Pelagius made use of this doctrine to combat the dogma of original sin. In the Lutheran Church opposition to semi-Pelagianism made creationism almost a heresy. (Delitzsch.)

Into the merits of this controversy we do not propose to enter further than to say that its solution is only possible on the ground of the distinction we have indicated between the rational and the psychical soul. The more

the essential difference between nature and spirit is understood, the less possible will it be to conceive of spirit or spiritual qualities as propagated by natural laws, and a deeper and wider meaning will be given to those words of Christ, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

The assertion of Delitzsch—that "the view of some modern theologians that the spirit is created, while the *psyche* is propagated or begotten, can not be entertained; since the soul is more intimately connected with the spirit than with the body"—is entirely without foundation. The *psyche*, or animal soul, is obviously more allied with the body and the earthly life than with the spirit. Hence the apostle Paul, whose language is the most precise and discriminating on this point, often contrasts the body and the spirit, or the flesh and spirit, but never the body and the *psyche*. Moreover, in his doctrine of the resurrection he speaks of a psychical body—this earthly body, of which the *psyche* is the animating principle, and a spiritual body, whose animating principle is the *pneuma*.*

The bearing of this view on the question of a human soul in Christ is obvious. If all rational souls are derived immediately from the Father of spirits, instead of mediately from Adam, there is still less reason than is commonly supposed for Christ to have received such a soul in addition to that which constituted His divine personality, and a still closer affinity is seen between Him as the Elder Brother, the First-born of the whole

* For a fuller exposition of this subject, see Sermon VI., on the Human Trinity.

creation, and His human brethren, the younger children of the same Father.

In this view there is a truth in the common representation that Christ *assumed human nature*, understanding by this phrase what is natural, in distinction from what is spiritual—the *flesh*, with its *psyche*, its desires and natural affections, in distinction from the spirit, or rational soul. The former He derived from His human mother; the latter, the true Ego, was the Divine Logos which came down from heaven. (Romans i, 3, 4.)

It was urged by Gregory of Nazianzen, against the monophysite doctrine, that “what was not assumed by the Redeemer is not redeemed.” And this is made an argument for a distinctively human soul in Christ. But this is itself an assumption without warrant from Scripture, and would require, if true, that Christ should have assumed human depravity as well as human nature, since it is only our depraved and sinful humanity that needs redemption. More true is the argument urged by Apollinaris that Christ must needs be other and better than we are, in order to make us that which He is.

In the Athanasian Creed occurs the following language: “Perfect God and perfect man, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh. . . . For, as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.”

This analogy is accepted as true, and the best statement of the union of the divine and human in Christ, beyond which it is impossible to go in explanation of the mystery. But a little examination will show its insufficiency, not to say its falsity.

In the union of soul and body there is but one personality, viz., the rational soul, of which the body is the mere instrument and expression. In the union of Deity and humanity there are two personalities; since humanity is by its very idea personal—a person, and not a thing. Or if, to avoid this, it be said that the humanity assumed by the Logos is impersonal, then the humanity loses its distinctive essence and becomes a thing—a mere instrument of Deity. This is in fact the position of modern orthodoxy, as declared by Canon Liddon: “Christ’s manhood is not of itself an individual being; it is not a seat and centre of personality. . . . It is a vesture which He has folded around His person; it is an instrument through which He places Himself in contact with men, and whereby He acts upon humanity. . . . In saying that Christ ‘took our nature upon Him,’ we imply that His person existed before, and that the manhood which He assumed was itself impersonal.”* But the *humanity* of Christ, in its full and un mutilated reality, is the demand of faith, and the demand also of the Gospel history, which every where represents Christ as a *man*, whatever else and more He may be.

If it be said that Christ’s humanity has its personality in that of the Logos—the human personality existing, but merged and lost in the higher Divine personality—we reply, Just so far as the human personality is lost or denied, in that degree the real humanity of Christ fades from view; and in so far as it is retained (as a distinct hypostasis), a double personality appears.

* *Lectures on the Divinity of Christ*, pp. 259, 260.

The view here advocated avoids this dilemma by making it unnecessary. The humanity of Christ is true and perfect, but it is a *divine* humanity—divine not by union with a divine nature, but because its essence is the Divine Word, the eternal Son of God, who is also and eternally the Son of Man.*

The only other objection which we deem worthy of notice is that the view here presented is a revival of the old monophysite heresies of Apollinaris and Eutyches, which were condemned in the councils of the fourth and fifth centuries.

We have already adverted, in the foregoing review, to the elements of truth, as well as of error, contained in these doctrines; and have shown how the rejection

* "It belongs primarily to the idea of a person that it is a unity in the core of its being; only as thus posited can it be historically conceived. By the prevalent doctrine this unity in the person of the Redeemer is destroyed. Jesus Christ is represented in the doctrine of the Church as a double being, as the personal union of two hypostases which have nothing in common with each other, rather which are purely contradictory, and which have been brought into the closest and most indissoluble union with each other by a miracle at once incredible and inconceivable. He is consequently *God and man in one and the same person*. The Church theologians have strenuously sought to represent this union of God and man in one person as conceivable and possible; but they are always at length driven back to the position that the thing is inconceivable, and that an insoluble mystery hangs over the person and life of Jesus Christ. But such a resort to mystery and miracle in explanation of an historical fact is scientifically nothing worth; it shows the incompetency of theological thought to set forth a conception of what is contradictory in itself, and to render intelligible (*denkbar*) what is actually inconceivable."—Schenkel, *Charakterbild Jesu*, p. 2.

This criticism, whose justness as regards the commonly accepted doctrine can not be evaded, falls disarmed and powerless before the view of Christ's person presented in this volume.

of both by an indiscriminate condemnation prolonged for centuries the controversy to which they gave rise, and postponed indefinitely the settlement of the true doctrine. But a careful inspection of the condemned doctrines will show wherein they differ essentially from the present view.

The error charged against them, on the ground of which they were condemned, was a denial of the true humanity of Christ, and making Him to be merely God, or the Logos, in a human body. Eutyches extended the doctrine of one nature even to the body of Christ, maintaining that it was not of the same substance with ours. He admitted that there were two natures before the union, and only one after it. He was less profound and discriminating than Apollinaris, who held to the reality of Christ's human nature, as derived from His human mother, but refused to allow Him a human or humanly derived *νοῦς*. The chief reason of this was that he was unable to conceive of *freedom of choice*, the peculiar property of the Adamic *νοῦς*, without sin (*ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖ ἁμαρτία*). Therefore, in order to have a sinless Christ, he must exclude the human *νοῦς*, or rational soul, and substitute the Logos in its place. This Divine soul, or Λόγος, who is the true personality of Christ, is purely *ατρεπός*, immutable, incapable of sin and temptation, and also of growth or moral development, therefore wanting in the essential conditions of a true humanity. His growth was only apparent, not real; and the same was true of His temptation, being without freedom of choice. Hence the divine in Christ *does not truly represent the human*, though identical with it in personality. He does not become in all things

like to His brethren, but stands aloof in His unchangeableness and already perfect holiness.

Apollinaris was right in refusing to allow a human soul to Christ in addition to the divine, but wrong in denying to this divine soul the very conditions and limitations which a true humanity requires. He was right also in maintaining the essential and eternal humanity of the Logos, as the prototype and original of our humanity, but wrong in not allowing to it an actual *becoming*, according to the declaration, "The Word became flesh," and a subjection to all the laws and conditions of our finite humanity.

The difference between this view and that maintained in this volume must be obvious. While claiming for Christ a single divine personality, the eternal Logos, we maintain that this Divine Word really became man, by divesting Himself of His divine form and His equality with God, and taking upon Him human nature, i. e., a true body and a psychical soul, and so subjecting His divine nature to human limitations, and to all the conditions and experiences of humanity, sin only excepted. The truth of the humanity is thus preserved in its completeness, a free, moral, and historical development is allowed to it, while the unity of the person is secured, without division or confusion, by the identity of the divine and human in His personality.

While Apollinaris failed to do justice to the humanity of Christ in its historical truth and development, the great merit which belongs to him in clearing the image of Christ from the confusion and dualism inseparable from the Church doctrine must not be overlooked. This merit is beginning to be conceded to him by some

of the best modern theologians. Liebner, in his *Christology*, gives the following tribute: "We acknowledge that a very high place must be assigned to Apollinaris in the development of Christology. The great *questions* which he directed toward the Church doctrine it neither then nor has it to this day truly answered. If the Church were right in its opposition to him, he was also right in his questions against it. And it is noteworthy that the doctrine of the Church, although it rejected Apollinarianism, at a later age arrived itself at a similar result in the doctrine that Christ had a human soul, but *an impersonal human nature*; a proof that Apollinaris had at least hit the essential point, and one which is not to be got around or put by."*

Whether the view of Christ advocated in this volume be accepted or not, it at least steers clear of the two fundamental forms of all heresy, viz., *Ebionism* and *Docetism*, the former of which denies the essential Deity of Christ, and resolves Him into a divinely endowed man; while the latter denies His real humanity, making Him man only in form and appearance. The essential Deity of Christ is preserved in the fact, distinctly and unequivocally maintained, that the person who appears in the flesh—the true Ego, which is single and indivisible, and below all change or union of 'natures'—is the Divine Logos, which was with God and was God; and this notwithstanding His human form and human consciousness, as the Word made flesh. His essential divinity is not abrogated by the Incarnation.

* *Christologie, oder die Christologische Einheit des dogmatischen Systems*; p. 372.

Deity is not converted into humanity, thereby losing His divine identity, but Christ is *God as man*, self-emptying of His deific form and consciousness, and coming under the laws and limitations—physical, moral, and spiritual—of humanity.

His true humanity is also secured, without curtailment or abridgment, in the fact of His possession of a true human nature derived from Adam, to which His divine personality, the Logos, sustained the same relation which a purely human personality, or the rational soul, sustains to the flesh or nature to which it is united; in the fact, also, that He passed through a true human development, growing in wisdom and character, as other men, and “tempted in all points like as we are;” and this notwithstanding He was without sin, and that the humanity He exhibited was an ideal and divine humanity, not derived from the race, but the original and prototype of ours. The present view is based on the historical truth of the Gospel, and is the only one that consistently carries out this truth, both as regards the divinity and the real human development of Christ.

As regards the unity or singleness of the person of Christ, we claim that the view here presented is the only one which preserves that image of the Redeemer given in the Gospels, and reflected in the Christian consciousness in its clearness and integrity, without seam or flaw or confusion.

The fundamental difference between this conception of His person and that of the commonly accepted doctrine may be indicated as follows: The latter starts from the *diversity* of the divine and human, as they

are commonly conceived, and attempts to bring them together *from without*, so as to form a unity in the person of Christ; with what success the foregoing pages have abundantly shown. The former starts from their essential unity, or *identity*, as they exist in God, or the Divine Word, and seeks to develop this unity first of all from *within*. It regards the human in Christ (i. e., His spiritual, not His fleshly nature) as a development or determination of the divine, differing from it, not in nature or essence, but only in form and degree. The unity thus resulting is not that of heterogeneous and exclusive natures—which can never be other than a conjunction—but analogous, in some respects, to that presented in the Trinity, in which the Incarnation has its ground and possibility. As the Son is identical in essence with the Father, but distinct in form and manifestation, so Christ, as man, is identical in essence and personality with the Divine Logos, but differing in the form and mode of His existence. As the Son is God, or the Absolute One, reduced to a personal form, the eternal image of the invisible God, so Christ, or the Word made flesh, is God reduced to a finite form or image, viz., the human.

To state our position in a little different form, for the sake of a fuller exposition: The true unity of the divine and human in Christ is not a *synthesis*, or the union of two opposite and incongruous ‘natures,’ which is the common view, but a development or determination of the divine in the form of the human. In other words, the divine and human in Christ are identical in their root and essence, both being eternally contained in Him who is at once the Son of God and the proto-

type of humanity ; but the divine first determines itself *as* the human in the Incarnation, when the Word, which was God, *became* man by being born of a woman, and coming under human and finite limitations. The true humanity of Christ is thus not derived from the race into which He is born, therefore not partial or sinful like ours, but determined from within, while conditioned from without, viz., by the flesh in which it was incarnated. It is therefore a truly divine humanity. His nature is the Divine-human, and His person the *God-man*.

It will of course be objected by the mere logical reasoner that, by identifying, we confound the divine and human in Christ, and so make Him to be neither one nor the other, because the two 'natures' and their attributes are not kept distinct. But this objection is a difficulty only to the understanding, and, even if valid, is less false to the concrete and living image of Christ presented in the Gospels than the traditional formula of 'two natures and one person.' It may not be easy at once to conceive this identity of the divine and human in His person, so accustomed have most minds become to the logical conception of them as distinct. But a little effort of thought, and a careful study of the grounds on which this identity is based, will bring it out at length into a clearness which will make the ordinary and dualistic view of Christ as impossible to the reason as it is distracting to faith. What Christian faith demands, and what the Incarnation really imports, is that which Luther clearly perceived, and strove ineffectually to frame into a doctrine—that *the very God we worship is Himself man*, with human feelings, sympathies, affections, and is not

simply united to a man. And the other side of this grand truth is that the man Jesus, in His inmost being and personality, is *God*—God manifest in the flesh. This is the very distinction we claim for the humanity of Christ, that it is a *divine* humanity, as it needs must be in order to redeem and make our humanity divine.

Next to the singleness of Christ's person, which is thus reclaimed from the duality and distraction in which the creeds have left it, the superiority of the present view appears in the truer conception it gives of the *humanity* of Christ, or of *Christ as realizing the true ideal of humanity*. We invite special attention to this point as one of supreme importance, and where the ordinary view falls utterly aside.

Just so far as the divine in Christ has been distinguished and separated from the human has His humanity fallen below that ideal image of God in which man was created, and which He came to manifest; until the residuum that is left is no other or better than our common humanity, sin only excepted. What in Him is divine is beyond our attainment, and what is human has no inspiring and quickening power beyond that of other men; and so He fails altogether to be the model Man, the realized ideal of humanity, and becomes an enigma or an abnormal being, except as faith ignores the verdict of the understanding, and discerns the transcendent truth brought to light in the Incarnation, that *what is most divine is most truly and really human*. When once it is clearly seen and admitted that the very core and essence of Christ's humanity is *divine*—the Eternal Word, and not a merely human

soul—it will be easy to see that every act and demonstration is at once divine and human, and not the less human because it is divine.

Our idea of humanity, and of what belongs to it, has been derived empirically from the undivine and imperfect specimens of it as seen in men, and the inductions of a crude and unregenerate science; and this has been the measure for judging the humanity of Christ, instead of judging these by that true and perfect ideal. Hence the divine element has been regarded as no essential part of humanity, but as foreign to its idea, whose presence in Christ separates Him from other men, as itself is carefully separated and distinguished from the human. This defective and empirical idea of humanity has vitiated our whole conception of Christ's person, so that what belongs to humanity itself, and so, normally, to all men, is made the peculiar distinction of Christ, and the proof of His divinity; while that which is really His distinction—His essential Deity—is either ignored or denied, or so held as to destroy the unity of His person.

The true idea of humanity, as the Scriptures abundantly teach, includes God, as an indwelling presence and power, one with the soul and the soul's life; and this idea is perfectly realized only in Christ, in whom God dwells absolutely, as the inspiring source of all His words and actions. These He constantly ascribes, not to Himself, but to the Father who dwells in Him. This perfect union of God with the man Jesus, which is commonly thought to constitute His divinity, does not make Him a divine being, but only *a divinely inspired man*. Compare Paul's saying, "I live, yet not

I, but Christ liveth in me," and Christ's own word of promise (John xiv, 23 ; xvii, 23). Christ's divinity does not consist in the *union* of His humanity with His deity, however close this union may be conceived to be. The union of the man Jesus with the Logos is an idea utterly foreign to the New Testament. The only union which He recognizes is that between Himself and the Father. His divinity lies, rather, in the *nature* of the being or man who is thus united to God, or in whom God dwells thus absolutely. This being is not a compound or composite person, part divine and part human, but a single personality—the very same who, as the Son of God, was one with the Father in glory and blessedness before the world was—receiving His divine being and life eternally from Him, and as the Son of Man lived a human life in less exalted but not less real union and communion with God: *Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.*

The unity here realized, or the indwelling of God in Christ, is not peculiar to Him, except in degree and fullness, but is promised by Christ to all His disciples. But the *identity* of the divine and human, or of the man Jesus and the eternal Logos, is the distinction of Christ alone, and marks Him as the *God-man*.

The importance of the distinction here indicated—which is ignored by most theologians through the supposed necessity of finding a human soul in Christ—can not be overestimated. While it places the deity of Christ on a ground absolutely beyond the reach of all created or finite beings, it at the same time brings within our reach, and makes a part of our very humanity, as redeemed, that which many suppose to belong only to

His divinity—oneness with God—so that we may verily be ‘partakers of the divine nature.’

And here we see the practical value of the doctrine, already demonstrated, of *the essential unity of the divine and human*, as furnishing the ground and possibility of the indwelling of God in man, and so of forming a true humanity according to the ideal presented in the man Jesus. This view is necessary not only to elevate humanity, in its idea, from the low place to which materialistic science is attempting to reduce it, but also to redeem morality and religion itself from rationalistic barrenness and deadness. It is necessary for *morality*, to give to the law of the conscience a divine sanction, so that it shall be recognized as the very voice of God within us, and the ideals of the reason be regarded as what they are, inspirations of the Divine Reason or Logos, the inward shining of that true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. It is especially necessary for *religion*, to bring it back to its true and spiritual idea, as the life of God in the soul of man, the union and communion of spirit with Spirit, and to give reality to the truth that there is no righteousness or life apart from God living in us and working in us to will and to do. This doctrine is needed to counteract the false independence and shallow Pelagianism and atheistic materialism of the age, and to substitute for the loud clatter of mechanical forces the silent and gentle ministry of *life*. “Without me,” says Christ, “ye can do nothing;” i. e., Christ in us as a living person, and not as a dead dogma; Christ not as an abnormal and inexplicable being, but as the divine Man, the true ideal of humanity, and necessary to its perfection.

We here close this extended review of the doctrine of Christ's Person. We think we have shown conclusively that the past and current theories on this subject, whether fossilized in creeds, or lying loose and unstratified in the conglomerate called orthodoxy, do not meet the demands of a true Christology, as verified by a true interpretation of Scripture, by the Christian consciousness and a sound psychology. Whether the view here presented does meet and answer these demands, we leave to the impartial judgment of the reader, asking him not to condemn or reject it till he has thoughtfully considered and candidly weighed the reasons upon which it is based, especially the three ground principles so elaborately presented. Upon these principles—viz., *the Essential Unity of the Divine and Human; the Divine or Heavenly Humanity of Christ; and the Kenôsis, or Self-limitation of the Logos*—the true doctrine of the Incarnation seems to us to rest as on an immutable foundation.

In this presentation, we are not conscious of having strained a single text to meet theoretical views. On the contrary, it is the felt discordance of the prevailing theories with the plain and obvious teachings of Scripture that has led to this thorough and fundamental revision of the doctrine.

If the reader will study anew and impartially all these teachings, in the light of the view here presented, we think he will be astonished at the wonderful simplicity and grandeur of the doctrine as thus interpreted. Its harmony, not only with the whole teachings of Scripture, but with the laws and revelations of God in other departments of the universe, of which the Word

is at once the author and the interpreter, the Alpha and Omega; with the truest and most ennobling view of man, as made in the image of God; and with the grandest and most affecting view of God as Love and Wisdom—this many-chorded harmony will come to him as a celestial tone proceeding from and bearing witness to the TRUTH AS IT IS IN JESUS.

THE END.

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
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